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PREFACE
"The Development of the concepts 'myth9 and 
’history9 from Hegel to Bultmann" is an explanatory 
study designed to trace and assimilate some of the 
thought patterns in the 19th century which have a 
bearing upon the "entmytholosierung" issue raised 
in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann* These 19th 
oentury ideas are associated with two schools of 
theology in that century, Hegelianism and 
Ritschlianiam* The former theological position 
encouraged "the movement away from history ”, and the 
latter, along with the search for the historical 
Jesus in the "Lives of Jesus", initiated a "Return 
to History"* The movement away from history is 
described in the first section of the thesis.
Hegel’s distinction between Vorstellung and Begriff, 
and Strauss9 efforts to erect a theology on the basis 
of his understanding of Hegel’s image-idea approach 
to history, culminate in the negative theories 
advocated by Bruno Bauer in the 19th century and the 
Christ-Hyth theorists in the early decades of the 
Twentieth century*
"The Return to History", or the "Quest of the 
Historical Jesus", arose in the numerous "Lives of
Jesus" toward the middle of the 19th century.
This quest of the historical, factual Jesus, end 
the supremacy accorded the Revelation in Jesus, 
received theological formulation in the Ritschlian 
theology. The guiding principles of this search for 
the "real" Jesus behind the metaphysical speculations 
and sythical forms, created an impasse in 19th century 
theology. On the one hand, the Hegelians mythicised 
Jesus and historicised the Christ, and, on the other, 
the Rltschllans historicised Jesus and mythicised 
Christ* That is to say, the Hegelians, while 
concentrating on the universal significance of the 
"Absolute Religion", lost touch with the particulars 
in the Hew Testament picture* The Rltschllans, 
while concentrating on the particularities, neglected 
to relate the "remembered Jesus" with the "present 
Christ"*
Some Twentieth century theologians, William Temple, 
Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, have endeavoured 
to relate the two concepts 'myth* and ’history'• 
William Temple’s Chrlstology remains true to the two 
emphases, Jesus and the Christ, but this theology 
merely states the problem* Rudolf Bultmann’s theology 
gives a fresh interpretation of myth and history in 
the Hew Testament, but his Chrlstology is basically
Ritschliam. His ethico-religious emphasis, or 
his mythological approach to reality, offers 
a questionable resolvement of the impasse. The 
Theology of Paul Tillich, while supplementing 
Bultmann9s understanding of the place of myth 
and symbol in theology, errs on the side of 
Hegelianism. His form-content approach to Christian 
ity, while delineating the issues which gave rise 
to the impasse in 19th century theology, sacrifices, 
to use his terminology, " the Jesus character of 
the Christ".
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INTRODUCTION.
This essay proposes to grasp the historical 
origin of certain biblical, philosophical and 
theological trends of thought which are causing 
dismay sad protest in aid-twentieth century.
There have been many challenging books addressed 
to the problems which one encounters in 
contemporary theological writings, but these 
attempts at criticising and erecting new syntheses 
have failed to present the sweep of theological 
activity in the 19th century. After probing in 
this difficult setting, we discovered that, if the 
current descriptions of the Chrlstological issues 
are to be meaningfully assessed, some attention should 
be given to certain germinal ideas in the 19th century. 
The 19th century witnesses two trends in 
Chrlstological thought: one in the beginning of the
century which took as its basic framework the 
idealistic philosophy enunciated by Hegel, and the 
other pattern toward the end of the century found 
its theological expression in the theology of 
Albrecht Ritschl• The first trend was concerned 
with the ideal conception of the Divine Humanity, 
or the Christ of Divine Humanity who is independent 
of history or historical validation. This pattern 
was set forth in the early writings of Freidrick
Strauss. If Strauss9 speculations are pushed 
to their logical conclusions, as they were done 
in the writings of Bruno Bauer and the Christ- 
Myth-theorists in the 19th and early 20th century, 
they 1 ad to a negation of the historical Jesus 
and some rather absurd attempts to explain the 
origin and developaent of the Christian movement. 
Ironically, the first pattern in the I9th century 
contributed to a historical and critical approach 
to the lev Testament. Freed by the Idea, i.e., 
the belief that the let ion, Begrlff or Divine 
Mammal ty, was 1— une from criticism, these 
theologians were equiped to deal radically with 
biblical problems and to set the stage for many 
expert findings in Mew Testament theology. The 
first trend, despite its contributions to a study 
of history, can be called "the movement away from 
history".
The second discernible trend in the century, 
initiated by Strauss9 second life of Jesus (His 
life for the German People) in 1864, received 
theological expression in the systematic theology 
of Mbrecht Ritschl and the Post-Ritschlians 
toward the close of the cantury. The advocates of 
the so-called Liberal picture of Jesus, sought to
discover In the human picture of Jesus obtainable 
in the 3/noptic narratives, the basis for a 
historical Chrlstology. "The „.uest of the 
Historical Jesus", to use the title of Albert 
Schweitzer's classic work, and the "Back to the 
Historical Jesus", constituted the driving force in
this school of theology. The "Remembered Jesus" and
*■
the Christ of the peet, understood apart from the 
gystlcal and ecclesiastical and idealistic 
speculations, encounters nan, according to this 
school of thought, in human moral excellence and in 
the God—revealing quality of Jesus. The particular 
historic facts concerning Jesus and the "plain man's 
attitude to plain facts" sere supreme in the 
Rltschll^n school and in the novelistic lives of 
Jesus which appeared through the century.
Is believe this Chrlstological dialectic in the 
19th century is basic to an understanding of the 
"entmythologsierung" controversy initiated by 
Rudolf Bultmann in his 1941 essay, "Rev Testament 
and Mythology"* Moreover, this apparent 
irreconcilable antithesis in 19th century Christolog­
ical thought must be grasped before the reconstruct­
ions in the 20th century are intelligible. It is 
our tentative hypothesis that two theologians in
1* Quick, O.C., "Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition" -
p.6.
the 20th century, Bultmann and Tillich, separate 
on their interpretation of the Christ precisely 
along the lines set by the Hegelian scheme the 
Ritschlian ethlco-religious emphasis. Paul 
Tillich9* theology moves a step beyond the Ritschlian 
theology, while retaining the essential gains of 
that theological pattern.
There are surveys which attempt to trace trends 
which are written from some preconceived pattern 
or which, through their forcing of ideas into some 
Procrustean bed of rationalism, seek to spell out the 
pattern which is considered to be primary and unique 
in the given period surveyed. Schveitser and Hegel, 
among others, make this error. In his "Quest of the 
Historical Jesus", Schveitser illustrates his 
approach to his data. Speaking of the three great 
alternatives which the study of the life of Jesus 
had to meet in the 19th century, Schweitzer writes: 
"The first was laid down by Strauss: either purely
historical or purely supernatural. The second had 
been worked out by the Tubingen school and Holtzmann: 
either synoptic or Johannine. How came the third 
(Johannes Veiss and himself): either eschatological
or non-eschatology. Progress always consists in 
taking one or other of the two alternatives, in
xii.
abandoning the attempt to combine them. The
pioneers of progress have, therefore, always to
reckon with the law of mental inertia which
manifests itself in the majority - who always go on
believing that it is possible to combine that which
cam no longer be combined, and, in fact, claim it
as a special merit that they, in contrast with the
*One-sidedf writers, can do Justice to the other
side of the question. One must Just let them be,
till their time is over, and resign oneself not to
see the end of it, since it is found by experience
that the complete victory of one of two historical
alternatives is a matter of two full theological 
2.generations."
Though one would not question the progress made on 
the lines which Schweitzer erects, it has been the 
combining efforts in the field of biblical criticism 
and in the portraits of Jesus which have 
revolutionised 20th century biblical exegesis* 
Perhaps if Schweitzerfs thorough-going eschatology 
had been tempered by a due regard for those passages 
in the Hew Testament which could not be compressed 
into his interpretation, he would have made a more 
profound contribution to biblical theology* But, we 
&re not concerned with this aspect of Schweitzer’s
2* Schweitzer, Albert, "The %uest of the Historical
Jesus" - p.237 ~ 238.
rill*
thinking* We are interested in impugning this 
either-or approach to theological problems* Before 
we can criticise the dichotomous approach to 
theological problems, these Issues must be stated 
and the absolutism of these separate treatments 
shown to be relative. It is, to return to the 
purpose of our essay, in the development of the 
concepts 'gyth' and ’history• from Hegel to Bultmann, 
the tracing of the either-or approach in the 
19th century and early 20th century and to follow 
this with some description of the dialectical 
treatment of these issues, particularly in the 
theology of Paul Tillich. We shall be concerned with 
one principal area of biblical interpretation: the 
bearing of myth on biblical exegesis and the 
consequent interpretation of history* For our 
starting point, the Philosophy of Hegel, primarily 
because his interpretation of historical facts gave 
birth to the ideas of Strauss and Bauer and , 
indirectly, to the Christ-myth theories in the late 
19th and early 20th century, will receive some 
interpretation* It is imperative that Hegel's 
philosophy be sketched, particularly that part which 
bears upon the central theme of our essay* We shall 
be concerned with Hegel's thought to the extent of
defining and describing his approach to history.
The distinction which Hegel makes between 
"Yorstellung” and "Begriff will prepare us to 
understand Strauss' Chrlstological reconstruction. 
Bruno Bauer, following Strauss' Hegelian 
speculations, carried this distinction on to its 
logical conclusion, thus being the first 19th 
century theologian to deny the historicity of Jesus. 
The writings of Strauss and Bauer, or the seeds which 
they sowed, combined with other factions in the 19th 
century, e.g., comparative religions and the 
evolutionary hypothesis applied to religious ideas, 
gave birth to the Christ-myth theories. These 
theorists, J.tf. Robertson, W.B. Smith, Arthur Drews, 
Jensen, S&utsky and Kalthoff, to mention the well- 
known ones, were determined to explain the birth of 
Christianity apart from Jesus of Hazareth or the 
"Gospel Jesus" (Robertson).
When we have surveyed what we have termed "the 
movement away from History" in Hegel, Strauss, Bauer 
and the Christ-myth theorists, we return to the mid- 
nineteenth century to pick up the threads of the other 
trend which culminated in the theology of Albrecht 
Ritschl. The Ideal Christ of the Hegelians gives 
way to the historical Jesus and the search for the
hum*n portrait in the synoptic writings.
Despairing of the traditional interpretation of 
the supernatural and the metaphysical embellish­
ments of the idealists, this school of ethico- 
religious thinkers were concerned to bring home 
the force of the divine in the sphere of the human. 
The sphere of the divine on earth was located for 
the bulk of these theologians in the moral. The 
value of religion was chiefly its bearing upon the 
moral life. The qualities in Jesus which inspire 
goodness, morality and brotherhood are woven into 
a Chrlstology.
Considerable attention has been given to the 
"Lives of Jesus" written during this period.
Albert Schweitzer and Heinrich Weinel ftJesus in the 
nineteenth Century and After") devote much space to 
such attempts to reconstruct the life of Jesus. We 
propose bo introduce our inquiry by merely glancing 
at these efforts and to proceed to reveal the 
logical development of this trend in the Ritschlian 
school. The theology of Ritschl, Herrmann, 
Troeltsch and Pfliederer, will receive some 
clarification. We are particularly interested in 
the interpretation of history.
Our survey must move into the twentieth century 
to trace some of the both-and approaches to the 
theological and Chrlstological problems. William 
Temple's theology, especially his Chrlstology, 
has bean chosen to mirror the efforts in this 
century to do Justice to both 19th century 
Chrlstological trends. The theology of Rudolf 
Bultmann and Paul Tillich will further describe 
the relationship between myth and history. We 
will develop Bultmann's demythologizing of the 
New Testament from three angles. First, Bultmann 
understanding of myth is compared and contrasted 
with David P. Strauss9. Second, Bultmann's dual 
description of myth is described and the criteria 
for establishing myth in the New Testament. Third 
the theology of Paul Tillich, especially his 
understanding of myth and history, criticises 
and supplements Bultmann's ideas.
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PART ONE
THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM HISTORY.
xviii.
CHAPTER I.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.W. HEGEL.
PREFACE.
fe ere concerned with Hegel's interpretation of 
history and the way in which his two concepts 
'Vorstellung' and 'Begriff' gave rise to Strauss1 
mythical interpretation of Christianity and, indirectly, 
to the Christ-Hyth theories in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. While primarily interested in 
Hegel's distinction between image and idea and the 
theological understanding of this point of view in Strauss, 
we are forced to give some summary statement of Hegel's 
Interpretation of Christianity and the relationship 
which exists between Christianity and philosophy in his 
philosophical system, fe proceed in the following 
manner: First, we describe Hegel's philosophy of history 
and his understanding of the dialectical transitions in 
history, viz. the immersion of Spirit in Nature, Spirit 
advancing to the consciousness of its freedom, and the 
elevation of Spirit to its pure Universal form.
Secondly, Hegel's identification of the course of human 
history with the course of the Divine Self-Revelation of 
God involves him in a discussion of the Trinity.
Similarly, there are three transitions in religion, vim-
Nature Religion, the emergence of Religious Freedom 
and the final Revelation of the Absolute Religion. 
The central point of our discussion is reached when 
Hegel considers the ways in which religious 
consciousness appropriates the Idea.
CHAPTER I
THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.W. HEGEL.
I. Hegel's Philosophy of History: A General Description.
Hegel's Philosophy of History is concerned to show 
that the history of the world is none other than the 
dialectical progress of the consciousness of freedom on 
the part of the subjective spirit, and the consequent 
realisation of that freedom on the level of objectivity 
personified in the State. World history begins when 
the subjective consciousness, impelled by the necessity 
of its nature, separates itself from the state of 
dreaming innocency or potential self-consciousness, and 
seeks to actualize its freedom in the negativities of 
History. The aim of history and the essential subject 
matter of History, is the achievement of objective 
freedom by peoples, totalities that are states.
Unlike the typical philosophies of History which 
emphasise the objective side of history, i.e., what 
has happened, chronicling and collecting and 
recording factual details concerning events which 
took place one after another in time and space 
without any vital or essential connection, Hegel is 
cognisant of this side of historical research; his 
concern is to emphasise the subjective side of history, 
the underlying reality of the events. In his history, 
facts and events conform to a pattern which only pure 
reason can work out independent of the manifold and
relative data of history. He is concerned to 
portray the coherence and intelligibility behind 
the historical process as a whole - to show that 
historw, nuinixest^ a hidden meaning which cannot 
be observed or detected by the ordinary tools of 
historical research. His aim is to penetrate 
behind the surface of historical phenomena, with its 
incompleteness and arbitrariness and accidental 
movements 9 to the reality which he has no doubt 
underlies them. The pragmatic, critical and 
reflective histories of his day were concerned with 
some aspect of history, deducing details from one 
period, recording and interpreting these elements 
without realising the reality which was moving 
through them. Hegel, on the other hand, was not 
content with the mere collection and elaboration 
of the external and visible elements, he was seeking 
to reveal the underlying plot, the inherent nicessity 
and rationality o~ history - to open ior inspection 
the essential clue of history, which was understood 
to be the development of freedom.
His methodological approach can be illustrated by 
reference to his views on historical Christianity in 
his Philosophy of Religion lectures. It will be 
noted particularly in this reference, his appreciation 
of the dual nature of history, i.e., what has 
happened and the interpretation of the event. Or,
*6 Paul Tillich says, "History is both fact and 
interpretation of fact, or receipt ion of the 
event*** While he admits Christianity's concern
with the Divine History of Jesus Christ, the events 
which present themselves in a sensuous manner are 
of no concern to the notion* Unlike Tillich, who 
considers the fact to be an integral part of the 
reception, Hegel would contend that the fact 
concerns the ordinary pictorial mind but not the 
mind which thinks rationally and coherently* But 
in any case, what he says will serve to bring out 
his specific approach to History* Acknowledging 
the events, he says they have another side which 
is often neglected. "It has the Divine lor its 
content, divine action, divine timeless events, a 
~ode oi working that is absolutely divine. And 
this is the inward, the true, the substantial 
element of this history, and it is just this that 
is the object of reason* In every narrative, in 
fret, t ere is uhis double element.. .evexy narrative 
contains this external series of occurences and 
actions, but these are occurences, it must be
2
remembered, in the life oi a man, a spirit."
It is not the n rrative in its empirical, concrete 
manifold sense which concerns Hegel, but the inner
1. Paul Tillich, Lectures in Advanced Problems in 
Systematic Theology, delivered at Union
Theological Seminary, Sprinr Semester, 1952,
Peter John's transcription, p.50.
. Philosophy of Eeligion, Ql.l. p.146.
element In the outward sensuous historical event.
It is the universal laws, forces and patterns of 
history which constitute the content of his 
philosophical nalysis of History. Because of his 
consciousness of the devel nt of the intern 1 
principle oi *he free s.irit, his Philosophy of 
History purposes to give a thoughtful, comprehensive 
construction of historical events. He undertakes 
to pass in review the drama as a while, to discover 
its final cause, to demonstrate its motive, and to 
indicate its total significance. Philosophical 
history, concerned as it is with man9s internal 
potentiality and the realisation of this essential 
nature in the negativities of History, is, so 
Hegel would claim, the only adequate interpretation 
which can do justice to Spirit; which is in itself 
the constitution of the heart of History's 
investigation.
Utilising Reason, which is the inherent principle 
of the Spirit and the Universe, the tool which can 
make explicit what is implicit &nd actual what is 
potential in Spirit, Hegel seeks to give the basis 
for his interpretatio: o. History. Only through 
Reason which governs the processes of Spirit and 
IT&ture, which in reality is the source of the 
Universal and the region in which God-is,^* can 
the sensuous impulses, vain imagination, restless 
passions and agonising events of History take on
3* Philosophy of Religion, Vol.l, p.202
5.
new meaning nd mirror the relevance and potent­
iality of Spirit* Reason, "the substance of the
lL
Universe" and "the infinite complexity of things}* 
can comprehend the Spirit in its essence, 
undeveloped stage, and at the same time understand 
the stuff of History which presents the Spirit 
wit a t he necessary Held ox actualisation. It is, 
further-more, and only with the beginning of 
Rationality, that History can be said to be History* 
Illustrating his point, Hegel caustically criticises 
the fanciful theories which posit the beginning of 
History in man’s paradisical stage of existence*
He says, "The only consistent and worthy method 
which philosophic! 1 investigation can adopt is to 
take up History where rationality begins to 
manifest itself in the actual conduct of world 
affairs, (not where it is merely an undeveloped 
potentiality), where 8 condition of things is 
present in which it realises itself in conscious 
will and iction*"^* "Consciousness alone is clear­
ness) and is that alone for which God or any 
other existence can be revealed*" * History is 
inaugurated by inference of reason, that is to 
say, History begins wh*n the conscious Spirit 
extricates and elevates itself above the natural 
selx-contradictions to its true essence* And
Philosophy of History, p*16< 
Ibid, p*62*
Ibid, p*64.
any other beginning of History, is to Hegel,
“ ^ nt e-Hi s toxical”, and beyond the pale o~ History.
After formulating his method of historical 
examination, Hegel attempts to examine Spirit, or 
“the phenomenon of Historical investigation” in 
more detail. Spirit is the inner region of 
man's subjective consciousness, the house of 
volition, resolut ons, actions:, interests and, where 
reason is present, as the absolute substantial 
nature of man's being. The nature of.• ."Spirit is 
Self-contained Existence." “Bow this is Freedom. 
This self-contained existence o rit is none 
other than self-consciousness - consciousness of
one's o m  Being* The Freedom o~ Spirit, which....
"resulted from the revelation of the Divine Being
O
as its original besislf or. ...“whst was intruded
by Divine Wisdom, “^ must advance to the comprehension
of this freedom. Hegel says.. .“It is the very
nature of Spirit, just because it is living to be
at first only potential, to be in its notion or
conception, then to come forward in existence, to
10unfold, produce itself, become mature.“ The 
maturity of this unconscious freedom of Spirit 
“can be actually accomplished in the domain of
existent, active Spirit, as well as in that of
mere Mature.” The question of the means by 
which this undeveloped hidden and unrealised
?• Ibid., p.IS.
8* Ibid., p.16.
9. Ibid.,-p*17*
10. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.l. p.75*
11. Philosophy of Histoxy, .16.
freedom develops itself to a world, conducts 
us to the phenomena of History.
Although, as we have seen, the freedom ox the
Spirit is an implicit Idea, the means it uses to
actualise its potentiality, are external and
phenomenal? presenting; themselves in History
to our sensuous vision. The means for realising
man's essential freedom, his complete self-
consciousness in union with the objective
consciousness of the State, appears in the xorm
of natural existence, natural will, physical
cravin , instincts, passions and subjective
concepts. “This vast congides of volition,
interests, n i activities, constitute the
instrument and means of the world Spirit for
attaining its object; bringing it to conscious-
12nesr, and realising it.” * It is through the
activity of History, described by Hegel as....
“the si ughter-bench at which the happiness of 
peoples, the wisdom M  States, end the virtue 
of individuals have been victimise •tl that the 
Universal latent principle of Freedom and absolute 
seli-consciousnese can be translated into uhe 
stage of objectivity. Reason utilises the 
misery and suffering, the particular will o^  
the nations, as means for accomplishing her role 
in the world. The negative field of History,
12. Ibid., p.26. 
13• Ibid., p.22.
constituting an essential, necessary and 
incidental stage in the Spirit's development, 
is directed to rendering the unconscious impulse 
of freedom a conscious one. The interest and 
passion of men, and nations, the drivin ; xorce 
of eros, inevitably present in Spirit, but 
obscured and hidden in nature, serve as 
instruments and necessary means lor the actual- 
isation of the idea of Freedom.
In this stage of the Spirit's development, it 
is knowledge, or the actuality ox thought, which 
brings out man's essential contradiction between 
what he is and what he should become. “By the 
very act ox thoughtful cognition and volition,
I will the Universal object - the substantiality 
of absolute Season.“ That is to say, Hegel 
contends that only on the basis of a Philosophical 
comprehension o. History, can the Idea of Freedom 
be seen advancing to an Infinite antithesis; 
between the Idea in its free, Universal lorm - 
in which iv exists for itself - and the contrasted 
lorm o~ abstract introversion, reflection on 
itseli, ieh is xoraal existence-ior-sell, 
personality, formal freedom, such as belongs to 
Spirit only. The Universal Idea exists as the 
substantive totality of things, on the one side, 
and as the abstract essence of free volition on
14. Ibid., p.42.
the other side. This reflection ox' the mind on 
itself is Individual self-consciousness - the 
polar o : osite of the Idea in its general lorn, 
and therefore existing in bsolute limitation.
This 3 ol r op ooite is consequently limitive, 
particularisation, for the Universal absolute 
Being? it is the side oi its definite existence; 
the s] here oi its formal reality, the sphere of 
the reverence paid to iod* (Note:- this 
paragraph will be clearer when Hegel's ideas 
on the Trinity are oiscussed).
It is clear so far in our discussion, that the 
realising activity, vis-a-vis the sphere of 
History, with its limitations and restrictions, 
is the middle term of the syllogism, one of whose 
extremes is the Universal essence, the Idea, 
which reposes in the penetralia of Spirit; and 
the othe-, the conr lex oi external things - object­
ive matter. Our next inquiry should be - “What 
then constitutes the development from the middle 
position; the actualisation of Individual seli- 
comsciouaness to Universal, or to the iorld- 
Historical Individual Consciousness?” We are 
informe 1 that the process of subjective sel - 
consciousness is not complete within itself....
“The spirit of man has its source oi life neither 
in its abstract sel*-hood (in consciousness snd
15* Ibid., p.42.
conscience) nor in its mere natural environment
end organic endowment (in sense-sflections, and
social law and usage), but in the unity of both -
a unity which transcends either. Both individual
end society live and grow, becau e they ere
continuous and one; because they presu ose an
ideal unity of a living Idea at the root of
their being, as their inner end essential guiding-
principle, at once constitutive and regulative of 
”16their action. “Both individual and society
live togethc ....because they presuppose an 
ideal unity or living Idea at the root of their 
being.” These words point to the synthesising 
process; the process whereby the subjective 
freedom is achieved on a lasting b:sis. It is 
the Universal objective consciousness me iated 
through the St te, in its laws, and its universal 
and rational a rangements which supplies the 
machinery for the full cctuelisation of the 
Ideal. ”The State is the Divine Idea as it 
exists on Earth”. ..le have in it, therefore, the 
object of Histoxy in a more definite shape than 
before; that in which Freedom obtains 
objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of 
this objectivity. For law is the objectivity 
of Spirit; volition in its true form and only 
that will which obeys law, is free; for it
obeys itself - it is independent, and so free."1'7* 
Commenting further on the function of the State, 
Hegel says: "The State Is the Idea of Spirit in 
the external manifestation of human will and its 
Freedom. It is to the State, therefore, that 
change in the aspect ox History indhsolubly 
attaches itself; and the successive phases of 
the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct
1 0
olitical principles." * The State, the 
objective reality which unifies the subjective 
and objective self-consciousness, the realm 
when Spirit comes home to itself, form the 
basis and centre of the other concrete 
elements of the life of a people - of art, of 
lav, ox morals, or religion, of Science. "Among 
the forms of this consciousness, Religion occupies 
the highest position. In it, Spirit rising above 
the limitation of temporal and secular existence - 
becomes conscious of the Absolute Spirit, and in 
this consciousness of self-existent Being, 
renounces its Individual intent; it lays this 
aside in devotion, a state of man in which it 
refuses to occupy itself any longer with the 
limited and particular.”  ^‘ The function of 
Religion will be considered in another context, 
but meanwhile - before conside ing the epochs 
which History naturally divides itself into - 
the Hegelian dialectical transitions must be
17* Philosophy of History, p.41.
18. Ibid., p.42.
19. Ibid., p.51.
discussed in more detail*
The subject of history is man, (essential or 
universal, generic man), as he realises and 
develops his inherent freedom in an objective 
framework. History has a beginning (when man, 
by the exercise of reason in the frictions of 
histoiy comprehends his true necessity and 
separates himself from his universal essence), 
a middle period (when man is actually in the 
process of extricating himself from his 
natural sell - when the spiritual essence of 
man begins to conquer the natural that attaches 
to him), and an end (when the human and divine 
nature become one, v/hen man realises he 
possesses the essentiality and substantiality 
that belongs to the idea of the deity, and, 
further, when this subjective self-consciousness 
is s nctioned and united with the objective 
consciousness presented by, and embodied in, the 
State. Hegel sums xcp this developmental 
process in his o m  words in his “Philosophy of 
History". He says.. ."The first step in the 
process presents that immersion of Spirit in 
Mature which has already been referred to; the 
second shows it as advancing to the conscious­
ness of its freedom. But this initial
aratian from Mature is impenect end partial,
since it is devised immediately from the mere 
State of nature, is consequently related to it, 
and is still encumbered with it as an essentially 
connected element* The third step is the 
elevation of the soul from the still limited and 
special fora of freedom to its pure Universal 
form; that state in which the spiritual essence 
attains the consciousness and feeling of itself." 
But it must be borne in mind that the unity or 
conjunction ox the particular with the universal 
is realised only in the State. The individual's 
every thou ;kt and act, and will, receive their 
being and significance from a reality which is 
established in him as a permanent spirit. The 
ideal totality of t .e p rts is realised under the 
particular form of a Nc:tion (Volk) which in the 
visible sphere represents (or, rather, is, as a 
particular) the absolute and infinite. Such a 
unity is neither the mere sum of isolated 
individuals, nor a mere majority ruling by 
numbers, but the fraternal and organic common­
wealth which brings all classes and all rights 
from their particularistic independence into an 
ideal identity and indifference. In the state, 
or ideal nation, the moral life embraces and is 
co-extensive with religion, art and science; 
practice and theory are one; life in the idea 
knows none of those differences which, in the
20. Ibich, p.59.
un-ideal world, make art and morality often 
antithetical, and set religion at variance with 
science. It may be remarked that, while Hegel's 
"Philosophy of History" envisaged the ideal 
Nation as the synthesis, he is at pains to record 
the process by ^hich History carries out a 
judgement on nation after nation, until the 
lower, inadequate formulations of the ideal 
are reached in the Ideal Nation, the Germanic.
:o this developmental scheme we must now turn 
our attention;
Hegel establishes the line 01 his argument when 
he says; "In the History of the World, only those 
peoples can come under our notice which form a 
State, for it must be understood that the 1 cuer 
is the realisation of freedom, i.e. of the 
absolute final aim and that exists for its own 
sake. It must further be understood that all the 
worth which the human being possesses - all 
spiritual reality, he possesses throught the State."' 
It is then clearly the State, with its 'idiosyncrecy 
of 3 irit* and peculiar national genius which will 
determine the grades in which absolute Freedom 
becomes a possession. Before discussing the State 
(the German nation) which finally realises perfect 
Freedom, it will suffice only if the so-called 
imperfect phases are mentioned.
21. Ibid., p*41.
History begins when the daylight of spiritual 
consciousness dawns upon nan. This dawn of 
rationality occurred in Asia. The first main 
division of history will accordingly be the 
Oriental world, the scent of history fs childhood. 
Hegel describes this stage by reference to the 
idea of freedom. That is..."unreflected 
consciousness - substantial, objective, spiritual 
existence, *oms the basis; to which the subjective 
will first sustains a relation in the form of 
faith, confidence, and obedience." At this 
point, freedom is recognised as a spiritual 
attribute, but only in an inadequate form, the 
fom  of an abstract universal, which, as such, 
can be lodged only in one subject or substance.
The Oriental worl i ,  therefore, admits that one 
is free. This one, politically, is the Monarch, 
who is the substance of the State, of which his 
subjects are the accidents.
The Grecian world constitutes the second 
division, representing the second age in the life 
of history, the age ox you h or the "period of 
adolescence". Here, spiritual freedom is not 
recognised as a concrete universal, and hence 
as the prope ity of all men, yet it is no longer 
ascribed to one. The Greek and Roman world 
declared that .."some are free". In Greece, 
"individualities are developed".
22. Ibid., p.111.
In the third hase of History, History attains 
the age ox manhood in che Homan world. It is the 
age ox painful labour. Individuality is brought 
under the yoke, ox abstract and "dead" law, 
receiving, however, as a partial compensation, 
the £02*1 recognition and definition of its 
le^al status in the possession o~ sp cific 
"person 1 rights".
Finally, with the Gemanic world, end under the 
inspire Lion ad reconciliation oi the Absolute 
Religion, History reaches the age of full maturity. 
The antithesis between Church and State, between 
particular and universal, between subjective 
and objective self-consciousness vanishes. "The 
* Spiritual becomes re-connected with the Secular, 
and develops uhis latter as an independently 
organic existence*. ...This is the ultimate 
result which the process of History is intended
to accomplish.
11. The Ideal State, with particular reference 
to Reformation Christianity.
Con3iden tion ox the completion, the ideal 
fulfilment and cctualisation of freedom in the 
Germanic world, leads directly to amination
of the art exercised by the Revelation ox the 
Absolute Religion. The preparation for the 
reception of the Revealed Religion will be
23- Ibid., p.116
considered in another context; but* ior the present,
the unification oi Religion and the State is of
primary concern. While the reconciliation of God
end man came during the reign of the Caesars,
according to Hege^ full appropriation of this
revelation, "must be looked for elsewhee than
in the properly Roman world.”1* In the Roman
world, the Church and the State were divided;
each serving a different cause and advocating a
different means for healing the division of
mankind* The State, by its very nature,
entailed the subjugation of private rights
and the thwarting of personality development.
The Church, by its very constitution,
obligatory allegiance and persecuted existence,
could noL offer an adequate basis for the
actualisa o- the Spirit of Freedom on a
secular level. The reconcili tion.. ."posited
■ V v 2in the Christian religion". I was appropriated
in the individual's heart, but, because of the
split between the secular and the sacred and the
inevitable subjectivism of the Revealed Religion,
the Church was helpless to break the discord
between the inner life ox the heart and the
actual world. It was the Germanic world which
first freed the idea of Freedom from the
1. Ibid., p.333*
2. Ibid., p.336.
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substratum oi the religious unconsciousness 
and peved the way lor the objective realisation 
of the self-consciousness* Though it must be 
remembered, the t according to the Hegelian 
dialectic, this consciojsnese did not realise 
itself in one period oi time* v;ithin the 
German world, Hegel sees three periods of the 
development of Freedom* He has designated 
these three phases; the Kingdo of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit*
The first period begins with the appearance of 
the Genae nation in the Homan Empire* This 
corresponds to the Kingdo the Father in that 
the Spirit is present implicitly, but reacins 
self-involved. The second period, covering the 
Middle Ages with the beginnin of the reign of 
Charlemagne to the time of Charles the Fifth, 
represents the Kingdom of the Son. This is the 
manifestation of God merely in a relation to 
secular existence, shinin0 upon it as an alien 
object* The second phase develops the two sides, 
of the antithesis (Church and. State, subjective
uaness) to a logically 
and opposition. The 
ocr&cy, and the State 
for itself as a Feudal Monarchy* States were 
formed without a sense of universality and the
Church made herself the mistress of all the 
relations of life - of ^cience, art - she v/as 
the permanent repository of spiritual treasures. 
The third period of German history - or the 
development ox freedom in the Geman civilisation, 
called by Hegel, the Kingdom of the Spirit, begins 
in the first half of the sixteenth century and 
e tends to mode231 times. This phase of history 
represents the harmonisation of the antithesis. 
With the union between the Church and State, 
between Season and Faith, and between subjective 
and objective self-consciousness of freedom, 
political life was now to be consciously 
regulated by reasoned thought*
It is to be noted that Hegel applies the same 
threefold development to the history oi the world 
which preceded the emergence of the German 
civilisation* The first periol, or the reign 
of Oharlenagne may be coshered with the Persian 
Empire* It is the substantial unity of the race. 
The unity had its foundation in the inner man, 
the heart, and both secular and spiritual abide 
in their simplic% • This is the period of 
self-involved freedom, or the kingdom of the 
Father. The Greek world, with its merely ideal 
unity, corresponds to the period oi German history 
preceding Charles V. This is a period of
separation - a breaking away from the substantial 
unity and establishing the antithesis between 
God and the Son, or between God and the World.
The third epoch of German history may be likened 
with the Homan world* Religion and thought 
adva..ce to the comprehe sion ox che Idea. "The 
authority ox Rational Aim is acknowledged, and 
privile es and particularities melt away before 
the common object of the State* People will the 
right in and for itself; regard is not had 
exclusively to particular conventions between 
nations, but principles enter into the
X
considerations with which diplomacy is occupied. 
Both Church and State advance to the comprehension 
of the Idea* This epoch has abolished the 
separations occuring in the realm o„ reality; now 
the distinct elements of the German world manifest 
their es. ential nature.
Returning to the third phase in German.hist017, 
the Kingdom ox the Spirit, the period which annuls 
the antithesis between Reason and Faith, between 
the St te er. b e Church, and between God and His 
Son, ve nay inquire concerning the peculiar 
elements which effected whis synthesis.
Hegel occupies himself with the antitheses 
between Church and State in his ,fPhilosophy of 
History". In another conterrt we will have cause 
to examine the resolvement of the antithesis
3* Ibid., p.359
between Religion and Philosophy. Two factors in
the third phase ox German history contributed to 
the cbrog tion oi the antithesis; the Reformation
and the German 3t te.
*
A* The Re >o mat ion.
Pdor to the Gexman Reformation, the period of 
the Son, or the hase of history from Charlemagne’s 
reign to Charles the Fifth’s reign, the organised 
Church was no longer spiritual, but only an 
ecclesiastical power calculated to paralyse in 
its subjects spirit, will and intelligence. The 
result was shameless vice and unscrupulousness.
The Church of the Middle Ages confused the 
manifestation of the Deity with definite, 
objective and specific embodiments. In its 
pilgrimages to the places frequented by Christ, 
zest for uncovering the actual grave of their 
Christ, and the unspiritual emphasis on the 
"Host", the Catholic Church endeavoured to 
"objectify" their God. urthexmore, sins were 
-orgiven in a grossly superficial and trivial 
fashion - to be purchased for money# In this 
reign oi ecclesiastical terror and religious 
bigotry and blind, unconditional obedience to the 
Church Dogma, the Monk of Wittenberg* Martin Luther, 
declared that the specific, definite end sensuous
manifestation of the Deity was not to he found
in the elevate! Host, or the search for a deity
in an earthly sepulchre ox stone, or in any other
external mode of worship* The Absolute Ideality,
God, in his particular existence as Spirit, was
to be discovered in whe inner recesses of the
heart. This simple monk, so Hegel says, recognised
that Christ is truly and fully present only to the
believing spirit - through this channel God in
Christ becomes the bread of the world. This is
the simple ioctrine o i Luther, which may be summed
up in the words "faith" ami "the witness of the
spirit". The Christier* consciousness is not
the consciousness of a sensuous object as God,
nor a mere historical memory, and by the removal
of the attribute of sensuous externality, all
doctrine re reconstructed and all superstitions
Aare reformed away* Hegel gives his definition, 
or unde ^standing of Luther ’s doctrine of Faith in 
the following words t "Faith is by no means a 
bare assurance respecting finite things - an 
assurance which belongs only to limited mind as, 
for example, the belief that such and such a 
person existed and said this or that; or that 
the Children of Israel passed dry-shod through 
the Red Sea - or that the trumpets before the 
walls of Jericho produced as powerful en
4. Philosophy of Religion, vol.1. p.45.
impression as our cannons; for although nothing 
of all this had been related to us, knowledge of 
God would noc be less com lete. In fact, it is 
not belief in something that is absent, past or 
gone, but the subjective assurance of the eternal,
*or Absolute Truth, the Truth of God."^* The 
reform measures instituted by the Lutheran 
Reformation, Hegel is assured, prepared the way 
for reconciliation between the secular and 
sacred which be, ore was impossible* Luther’s 
doctrine of faith and responsibility did not 
demand that the subjective spirit renounce the 
world; on the contrary, the spirit was urged to 
emancipate itself from its own particularity and 
come to itself in realising the truth o~ its 
being* Responsibility instead of ascetism was 
encouraged by him whose ideas now made possible 
the union of the State and the Church* Because 
the message of the Church was now extricated from 
the sensuous and particular externalities 
sanctioned by the Catholic Church, the free spirit 
could proceed to realise its necessary destiny*
B* The German State-*
While the Reformed Church exercised its reconciling 
function, the German State, because of its inherent
5* Philosophy of History, p*4J2.
genius, its system cn government end free heritage
was prepared do give the subjective spirit its
legitimate objectivity. Hegel poses a question
and his answer affords us an insight into the
peculiar function performed by the German nation.
He asks* "Why was the Reformation limited to
certain nations and why did it not permeate the
whole Catholic worl ?*' He answers by pointing to
tbs purs inwardness of the German nation; its
refined spirit, and its homogenous culture.
These factors prepared the German people to be
beaxe s of the Christian principle and their
country to be the proper soil for the emancipation
ox 3 irit* * "The Bomenic Nations, on the contrary,
have maintained in the very depth of their soul -
in their spiritual consciousness, the principle
o disharmony; they are a product of the fusion
of Homan and German blood, and still retain the
n
heterogenity thus resulting. # hese latter 
nations are not free because they leave their 
affairs, v ieir subjective freedom and inmost 
being in the hands of an outward authority - uhe 
Church and the State, and the separation of their 
interests, religious from secula , witnesses to 
an unrealised separation and dichotomy in their 
inmost soul. But it is the German nation which,
6. Ibid., p.^38.
7. Ibid., p.436.
following ohe process of mediation between man 
and God which recognised objective existence as 
the crux of the reconciliation between the 
subjective and objective sell-consciousness, that 
proceeds to take this harmonisatio into its own 
life and st rts out to build u*; its secular 
relations. Because truth had been embodied in 
the secular and finite was shown to be but a 
oment God*a existence, and not separate from 
Him, it follows.... "that morality and justice in 
the State are also Divine and commanded by 
God."®* Following the Reformer's sanction of 
society, illustrated by Luther's lifting of 
marriage from the less than holy place it had 
been placed in by an exphasis on chastity, 
and the Christian's responsibility for the 
conduct of industry, crafts and trades, it is 
now perceived that the ethical and the just, 
in the sphere of man's social end political 
relations is worthy to be termed divine. With 
the acknowledgement that the rational element 
in volition and action constitutes the obedience 
to the laws of the State instead of the blind 
obedience demanded by the Catholic Church, man 
need no longer fear contradiction or persecution
8. Ibid., p.440.
on the part of the religious conscience. With 
the recognition that the secular is capable of 
being the dwelling piece of the true, the State 
and the Church could now attain immediate 
unification. Secular life, became the positive 
and definite embodiment of the spiritual 
kingdom - the kingdom of will freely manifesting 
itself in outward existence. Objective freedom, 
fully t torea u* on in *he State constitutes the 
laws of real freedom and the instruments whereby 
the contingent will, and unruly passions, may be 
subjugated. This subjugation does not annul 
subjective freedom; on the contrary, objectivity 
maintains this freedom. "If the objective is 
in itself rational, human insight, end conviction 
must correspond with the reason which it embodies, 
and we have the other essential element - subjective 
freedom also realised.
Hegel's last words in his "Philosophy of Hist or * 
prepare the way for a fuller analysis of his 
views on the Trinity. He sayst "The history of 
the world, with all the changing scenes which 
its annalm present, isthis process of development 
and the realisation of Spirit - this is the true 
fheodicea, che jusxixication of God in History." - 
In anothercontext he amplifies this remark by 
sayingi "The State is the expression of the
9* Ibid., p.476.
10. Ibid., p.477.
progression oi God in the world. Each State, 
each civilisation with its particular arts, 
religion, and science, each government, embodies 
a phase of the Universal Idea or World Spirit.
Thus the history of the world becomes the actual 
realisation of an infinite, eternal and objective 
mind."11,
3* Bezel's Doctrine of the Trinity.
Because Hegel identifies the course of human 
history with the course of the Divine Self- 
Revelation of God, iw is necessary to enquire 
further into his views on the Trinity, said by 
hi. to b. "th. <ocl. on which oh, Mttoiy or th. 
world turns•" God's dialectical transitions, 
so we are informed, are as necessary to His 
actualisation of self-consciousness as the 
dialectical phases which the human spirit and 
the universe passthrough to realise complete 
self-consciousnesj . In order to be God, He must 
separate Himself from His implicit consciousness, 
from the stage designated by Hegel as ’^ Father", and 
become an object to Himself, or realise Himself 
as Spirit. Only as He returns to Himself is He
11. Ibid., p.470.
1. Philosophy of Histocy, p.331*
God and without the world (God's object) God is 
not God. o understand this scheiae, vie must 
bea in mind two errors which Hegel was 
attempting to refute. (1) Popular religious 
thinking had made God unknowable, incomr rehensible 
and other than finite. Man was on one side and 
the finite was opposed by an infinite, and it 
was impossible for the finite to know "what God 
is", His essence of basic movements. "That God 
is" was only assertion the popular religious 
aind would make. Hegel was satisfied that 
contradictory, abstract lo^ic created an 
impossible antithesis between Being and Thought.
On the basis ox his understanding of the Notion 
(God in His moments), He el believed that he could 
destroy this dualism.
(2) Theolo leal thought in his day confined 
its studies to the historical, the manifestation 
of God's "Other" without attempting to comprehend 
the "absolute ideality" of God, or God in his 
finished process. Consequently, Trinitarian 
thinking was abstract, confusing and contradictory 
To refute bo tlx errors, Hegel endeavours to show 
that the Trinity was not unthinkable, butj in 
reality, formed the basis for understanding God 
in relationship to Himself and to the world.
Hegel's triune God h s three moments,
characteristics or so-called determinations.
In the first phase, God exists as Universal,
unrealised essence in and for itself. At this
moment God is in his eternity before the
creation ox the world, and outside of the world.
Bssentit ly God abides v&thin Himsel-. "The
Universal contains its entire idea, but it only
2
contains it in the idea of potentiality•"
But the Universal, by its very inner nature, 
and its logic 1 necessity must differentiate 
itself within itself, and thus preserve within 
itself the elememt of difference, but yet to 
do this in such a way as not to disturb the 
Universality which is also there. God's essence, 
or the absolute Idea,implies the existence of 
an Other, and Object which it consciously 
knows.
The second moment, or the stage in the 
development or "theogony" ox God, entails the 
abolishing of his abstract Universality and the 
positing of Himself as an Other. God begets 
His Son, the Other. He posits the Other ox 
Himself in the Creation oi the world. What is 
thus created, this "otherness", or "other-bdng", 
divides itself into two sides: physical nature
and finite spirit. What is thus created is,
2. Fhilosorhy o~ Religion, Vol.II. p.Ill
therefore, an "other”, end is pieced at first 
outside God. This moment in God1s particular­
ism fcio or direr, tior, represents the necessary 
elf-extern Using, the logical act of going out 
of Himself into finitude. As Hegel says, "the 
finite is therefore an essential moment of the 
infinite in the nature of God, end thus it may 
be said it is God Himself who renders Himself 
finite, who produces determinations within 
Himself.• He wills the finite; He Himself posits 
it as an "Other11 and thus Himself becomes an 
"Other" than Himself - a finite - for He has as 
"Other" appeared to Himself. This "otherness", 
however, is the contradiction of Himself within 
Himsel . He is thus the finite in relation to 
that which is finite. But the truth is that 
this finiteness is only an appearance, e 
phenomenal shape in which He possesses Himself."^* 
There are three discernible ends to be served 
by God’s "beholding Himself in Himself" *or 
particulwrising Himself as Creation, nature and 
nite. spirit* (1) God becomes cc us, more 
than subjective, but objective in his particulsr- 
isation. * But this antithetical "otherness", 
or self-differential moment serves as the
3. Ibid., Vol.II. p.198.
4. Ibid., Vol.II. -d.198.
5. Ibid., Vol.II. p.335.
necessary process by whi :h Absolute Spirit 
lifts the finite up to Himsel nd consequently 
annuls Himsel. as finite. This self-determined 
process provides the means whereby God returns 
to Himsel ... "And only on this return is He
■ * ‘ c.
God, without the world God is not God." *
) Besides providing the necessary means by 
which God comprehends Himself as God, the 
second determination (the particularise cion of 
Go: as an foche~*’f creatio; , finiteness and nature), 
illustrates the unity of the Divine and Natural . 
Nature is His creation, and He lets His power 
be known in it, though not His power only, 
but His wisdom as well. This wisdom reveals 
itself in what it produces* by the presence of 
arrangement in accordance with an end.'7* The 
idea that God is estranged from Nature and that 
the order of Nature or the laws of Nature are 
introduced with the thought that God must 
miraculously intervene in nature in some 
individual thing contradicts His creation. 
•Whenever", so Hegel says, "God’s relation to 
the world in general is defined in a 
miraculous manner as requiring His immediate 
anilestation in it in a particular way, for a
6. Ibia«, Vol.I. p.200.
7. Ibid., Vol.H p. 189.
dLexinice end in a limited sphere, it is then
8that His true miracle in nature is misunderstood." 
Clarifying what Hegel has in mind leads us to 
the supreme end desired by God in the moment of 
the "Other". (3) "The true miracle in nature 
is the manifestation of spirit, and the true 
manifestation of spirit is fundamentally the 
spirit of man and his consciousness of 
rationality of nature, his consciousness that 
in these scattered elements, and in these 
Mniiold contingent thing, conlox.it, to l.«. 
and reason are essentially p r e s e n t " T h e  
true end", illuminating his point further,
"and the true realisation of the end are not 
present within nature as such, but rather 
they are essent&Uy to be found in consciousness.
He manifests Himself in nature, but His 
essential appearing is that He appears in 
consciousness, in His reflection or 
reappearance, in such a way that in self- 
consciousness it reappears that His end is just 
to be known by consciousness, and that He is 
an end for consciousness."^*.. .That is to say, 
it seems that finite consciousness is a moment 
of Spirit itself. In God’s self-differentiation 
and self-diremption, God knows Himself as He
8. Ibid., Vol.II. P.186.
9. Ibid., Vol.II. P.186.
10. Ibid., Vol.II. P.189*
posits Himseli in finite spirit, or finite 
consciousness. Hegel’s own words bring further 
light on this stage, especially note how 
,fhumanity" is in God, when he says: "God is 
Spirit but He is spirit in any essential 
sense only so xar as He is known to be the 
self-consciousness of Himselx, the eternal act 
ox creation, end in such way that this creation 
of an "Other" is a return to Himselx, a return 
to the knowledge ox Himselx." Since it belongs 
to the esential character of God Himselx that 
He should be in His very nature the other of 
Himseli, and thetthis other is a determination 
or qu lity within His own nature, so that He 
thereby returns to Himself as the human element 
is reconciled to God, it follows that we thus 
get the determination which is expressed by 
saying that humanity is in God. Thus man 
knows that what is human is a moment of the 
Divinx itself, and consequently he stands in 
a ^ree relation to God. For that to which 
he stands related to as to his own essential 
being has the essential characteristics of 
humanity in itself, thus, on the one hand, 
man is related,as it were, to the negation of 
his merely natural life, and, on the other hand,
to a God in whom the human element is itself
affirmative and an essential characteristic,•
what exists in men as concrete individuals is
represents as be ins something divine and
substantial, and man in all that constitutes
his essential nature, in all that has any
value ior him, is present in what is Divine."1 *^
The thi d moment of God (analogous v/e may say,
though Hege would not use such presentational
language, to toe individual’s realisation of
his divided existence and the return of the
particular estrangement into the Universal -
the moment when the division between man’s
spirit, and his "other" nature, is abolished) is
the moment when God returns from that "otherness"
to the realm oi perfect individuality or self-
12consciousness itseli. * In this sphere, 
knowledge maintains itself - its otherness - 
in its op osites. The particularity or 
otherness succumbs and expires in its 
universality, i.e., in its knowledge, which is 
true Being reconciling itself with itself. God 
becomes concrete spirit by the fact o His 
passing through and realising the three moments 
of His nature. The movement through the content 
of His ifcole self in this way constitutes His
■.■.M. - ■  ...   . , „ , ■ ■ ■ ■ ..mmmm
11. Ibid., Vol. II. p. 222-C.2J.
12. Phenomenology of Mind. Vol. II. p.776.
actual reality. 7/hen determined, God is not 
as yet the true God# In so far as He is no 
longer determined and limited in His actually 
existing manifest , He S iriu which 
exists in and for itself#^'
Before the return to individuality, the two 
sides of Bod seemed contradictory and absolutely 
independent, but when He advances to the third 
moment, the two previous moments are unified 
and Be contains within Himselx the totality 
of the transition# within the third moment, the 
synthesis Is a higher unity# A unity which 
preserves the essence of both opposites, while 
annihilating them as opposite, irreconcilable 
antitheses. Unlike the ortbocLix trinitarians 
who have an either/or God, contradictory 
opposites without a higher synthesis, Hegel 
claims that his views, recognising both/and, 
God’s universality, and difference, and the 
recognition of the necessary return into 
S irit, makes God's essence knowable and 
comprehensible.
13. Philosophy of Religion. Vol.I. p.211
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4. The Appropriation of the Absolute Idea: 
"Aneigunc".
We have seen what God is in His essential 
natures He is the life process of the trinity, 
in which the Universal puts itself into 
antithesis with itself, and in this antithesis 
is identical with itself. God in His element 
of Eternity represents what encloses itself 
in union with itself9 the enclosing of Himself 
with Himsel • But there are two sides to the 
Ilotion of Religion. The side which concerns 
the estrangement of God in His "Other** and the 
reconciliation and return of God to 
Individuality, or complete self-consciousness, 
and the other side, which entails the "el evation 
of man to God,” or the subjective consciousness 
which is conscious to Itself of God. When 
the subjective human element and the objective 
Divine element meet and realise their 
essential unity, Religion realises itself as 
an active Divine-Human consciQusnes. We are 
informed that this perfect at-oneness occurred 
in the Absolute Religion, the revelation of 
Christianity. But before we can discuss 
the nature of this stage of consciousness, we 
must inquire further into the process by which
man comprehends himself as a moment of Ck>dfs 
own existence* Relevant to this investigation, 
is the question* ”lhat situation in manvs 
consciousness necessitated the transition from 
the pre-Christi or pre-reveale - religious to 
the Absolute 'Religion?” Because we plan to 
give special consideration to the three 
particular levels by which the human appropriates 
the Divine within the Revealed Religion, our 
discussion at this point will be concerned with 
the three general religions which to some degree 
coincide with man’s appropriation of God*
In another context we noted that Hegel views 
each State, each Civilisation, with its 
particular arts, religion and science, as 
embodying a phase of the universal Idea or 
World Spirit* In like manner, he contends that 
each Religion prior to the actual realisation 
represented a period of the development of the 
Absolute Religion* In some unique sense, the 
History of Religions coincides with the History 
of the World* The gradations of the World Spirit 
from the not free to "all being free,” corresponds 
to the movements which Religion goes through 
before reaching its completed, and necessary 
goal* *
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Tile first st jge, or more immediate form of.
Reli j on, is Nature Religion, which answers to 
the childhood 01 human!ty* Spirit and Nature 
exist in an immediate unity and the spirit by 
its absorption in this potential unity does not 
advance to the condition of separation. Note 
the parallel in Hegel*s view of freedom in the 
Oriental world.
The second st , is the age of youth (the 
age of Spiritual Individuality) or the emergence 
of reli ious freedom. Three forms or types of 
reli ion are treated in this stage of development: 
The Religion of sublimity, or Judaism; of 
Beauty, or the Greek; of outward vitality and 
utility, or the Roman Religion. But because 
of the inherent contradictions in these 
religions, including Godfs antithetical ••Other” 
being pc and e*cplained in an abstract,
unresolved manner, the revelation of the 
Absolute Religion was necessary and inevitable.
The third stage; the revelation of the Notion 
in its diremption and. reunion, is fully 
revealed in Christianity; the religion of 
ripe manhood.
But whi t caused the human spirit to break
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with the preceding religious interpretations 
and posit a new version of reality? What 
provoked the ordinary religious piety to 
picture their deity in an immediate, sensuous 
appearance? The substance of the transition 
to the Absolute Eel igion is the same as tie 
movement to the Absolute State in Hegelfs 
"Philosophy of History*1* It is the unhappiness 
of the age, the negation of the Boman conscious­
ness as it appears in Stoicism, scepticism and 
Judaism* Though the universal ism of the 
Homan Empire, including its definite conscious­
ness of world history and its contribution of 
formal personality to the spiritual conscious­
ness of man, was a positive development; its 
negativity was that it allowed the objective 
consciousness, embodied in its Emperor to 
vitiate subjective consciousness* While the 
Homan world invested each independent being 
with a recognised abstract right, this legal 
personality was in the long run negated. The 
Individual was subject to the inflexible 
authority oA one, the Easeror* All independent 
persons were ruled by the Imperial head of the 
State* Instead of the co-relation between the
objective and subjective consciousness, the 
objective reality overcame the subjective human 
ego* This was the infinite misery of the Homan 
world* The Greek had decidedly the conscious­
ness of himself as a spiritual being, and of 
t e spi itual character of the ruling power of 
the universe. But this consciousness v/as not 
ure; the spiritual was known only as in 
i mediate unity with the natural end sensible. 
The highest spiritual conceptions of the Greeks 
were only such as art could represent, in which 
the sensuous is e ployed as mediums of pure 
thought* Furthermore, Stoicism and scepticism, 
with their abstract formulations, forced the 
subjective self-cansciousnes r to retreat and 
withdraw from the relative world into the 
inwardness of its own self-consciousness ego. 
Another school oi Greek thinkir :, Platonism 
and neo-Pl a ton! sm, by their devaluation of 
material existence, caused the human ego to 
renunciate the world and escape the discord and 
solipsism oi the age* The Jevvish emphasis on 
the utter transcendence of God contributed to 
the doubt and frustration of the day. As God 
became more and more Universal and less and less
concretely hypost&sised in the symbols of the 
cult, the piety of the Jewish law became more 
end more to exercise the dominant role. Under 
the extreme requirements of the law, the Jewish 
consciousness, represented in the Davidic 
confes ions, felt itself condemned, humbled, 
broken and aanihil
Th< unhappy, despairing consciousness, the 
infinite sorrow and to mien ting uncertainty 
concerning God’s relationship to man was, so 
Hegel says, the birthplace of the impulse felt 
by s irit to , ictur God’s spiritual nature in 
a- specific, real and actual manner...’’This need 
(sorrow and helplessness) was created by the 
progress 01 history, by the gradual advance 
o- the world Spirit* This immediate impulse, 
this longing which wishes and craves for 
something definite, the instinct, as it were, of 
Spirit, which is impelled to seek for this, 
demanded such an ppearance in time, the 
manifestation of God as the infinite Spirit 
in the form o* a real men*"^* And.."it was 
to Christ that the Idea (God’s eternal 
movements and ideality) when it was ripe and 
the time fulfilled could attach itseli, and
p
in Him only could it see itself realised." *
1* Philosophy of Heligion, Vol.III. p.112.
2. Ibid., Vol.III. p.115*
But during this period of doubt, anxiety and 
despair, Hegel makes it quite clear that the 
thinking, speculative consciousness was certain 
that finiteness was a ptrt of Godfs Being. The 
conceptual mind (Begriefen) gr&sps (Ergrleft) 
the conceition (Begrlff) of Godfs essential 
triune a ture. The conceptual mind apprehends 
the circular, becoming process of God, whereby 
the Idea posits itself into antithesis with 
itself and returns to itself in completed 
self-consciousness. The antithesis or "Other** for 
the speculative mini is*."the Son of God 
comprehended in pure ideality but reduced to 
limited and particular conceptions, it is 
the world, nature an! finite spirit."^* The
specula 
or His 3
ti VO mind r co ni ses thet God's "Other**
 ^A f$t-ion contains within itself af firmat-
ion of (lod f ♦ i. w • c+ D' M H* M G H* H* H 11C I vy WX
r* {T* T t Ctl f ’ss as Spirit. The st^ge of negation,
xnc 06X^ «M» — A . * * .» *4* 4.V«, ox vxxe "Other”, the keno3is
of the 1f S vUer, th 
titute
*^i?l I '*■*externalising of the
Logos, <:ons 1 s the implicit unity between
God and Man« The rational mind, motive ted
bv nece.’w »+*-Jt JL Vy rath.er thin contingency, envisages
Goc * z s<?1 f—differ■entietion and restoration to
3* Philosophy of History, p.336.
Himself t nd because of this cyclical process, it 
can see the infinite in the finite and finite in 
the infinite*
But it was not in this abstract form that 
spiritual truths could te first mediated to the 
consciousness and knowledge of man* On the 
contrary, for the ordinary man, so Hegel says, 
with ml&ed intellectual constitution, spiritual 
intelligence is a gradual growth out of the 
natural and visible beginnings to the truly 
spiritual* IX the harmony between man and God 
is to exist as certain, actual and real, it must 
exist for the sensuous, presentational conscious­
ness in the form of n object separated from other 
objects, and in the individual man that represents 
the at-one ness between God and men* The figurative, 
pictorial, representative mind must form a mental 
image of the Divine nature to explain the 
reconciling process as an event... "the event of 
God's emptying Himself of Himseli, relinquishing 
His Divine Being through His factual incarnation 
end death*" * Hegel says: "The act of God's
differentiation implies for this mode of thinking 
that the Son gets the determination of the Other 
as such, that He exists as a free personality, 
independently for Himseli.” *^ For this mode of
4* Phenomenology of the Mind, Vol.II. p.792. 
5* Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p.230.
consciouanes , God "In the fullness of time,"
mode explicit to the ordinary pictorial mind
the implicit unity between Himself and His
"Other”. But, while He conceded to make
known His identity v*ith the finite spirit
(or revealed the finite subjectivity in His
own Being), the sensuous existence in which
♦
Spirit is embodied is only a transitional 
stage. "Christ dies: only as dead is he
exalted to heaven and sits at the right hand 
of Godp only there is he Spirit."6*
was only alter his death that the Son 
of man became fully declated as the Son of 
God: it was only then that he could be fully
recognised in this char , that is his 
spiritual character, or that he could 
completely maiiiest himself in it. Men were 
reconciled to the spiritual wretchedness 
which he had passed through not while Christ 
as a historic Individual was with them, but 
only afterwards, on the Day of Pentecost, 
that the Apostles were filled with the Hoi 
Ghost: then first the scales fell from their
eyes, and they all knew their Master.
This is to say, the historical figure of 
Christ represents the immediate moment of the
6. Philosophy ofHistory, p.357
4*5.
Spirit fs unveiling itself as the Notion, but 
onlg after the death of the "mental image” 
could the 3 irit come upon His friends...
"Only then were they able to conceive the true 
Idea of God, viz., that in Chrisi; man is 
redeemed and reconciled; acknov/ledged to be 
Spirit, and the fact proclaimed that only by 
stri ping himself of his finiteness and 
surrlndering himself to pure self-conscious­
ness, does he attain the truth. Chris t-man 
as man - in whom the unity of God and man has 
appeared, has in his death, and his history 
o Spirit, a history which eveiy man has to 
accomplish in himself in order to exist as 
Spirit, or to become a child of God, a 
citizen of His Kingdom."7*
It is then,so Hegel contends, not the 
historical, by-gone personality (a subject of 
theological thought in Hegelfs generation) 
regarded from the unspiritual birth narratives; 
his miracles; or his early domestic relations, 
whic concerns the Christian religion. On 
the contrary, this type of unspiritual 
thinking, this method of objectifying 
reality, cannot approach the essence of truth 
which is "posited in the Christian religion.”
7* Ibid., p*34*0.
The death of the Son annuls the human side of 
Christ9s nature end inaugurates the transition 
into the religious sphere, i.e., into the 
S iritual Community. In his death, God returns 
from the stege of estrangement to Himself and 
"it is bee use of it that He is Spirit.”®* The 
negation o. the negation, the abolishing of 
Godfs "Other” is symbolised (though Hegel would 
not use pictorial language to describe the inner 
relations oi the Trinity) in the resurrection of 
Christ. He who first was regarded as a teacher, 
a friend, a martyr, as an individual under the 
.limitatic sense, now comes to have a totally 
different positio.. The atoning death considered 
in a "si ritual wayf,^ becomes the means of 
salvation and the central point of reconciliat­
ion. The gh the faith when it is coming into 
existence, begins with faith in the individual,
his individual man is changed by the Spiritual 
Co vr.Uy, He is recognised to be God and is 
characterised as the Son of God and as comprising
, . ' . . if -a-- f, V,, • : ■ ' - . ‘ ' '
• • • • :
all of the finite which attaches to subjectivity 
as such in its development, but as being 
subjectivity He is separated from substantiality.’
Because the "supreme Idea” is deposited in the
10.
8. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p.96.
9. Ibid., Vol.III. p.97.
10. Ibid., Vol.III. p.115.
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Spiritual Community, and because the community 
comprehends the Son of Man as Godfs "Other" — 
the "Othe rM, which is only a passin moment in 
Godfs reconciling process - the community no 
longer stands in need of any relative proof of 
j o . ..an- . u vi v.*, 1• •, specxax mi^ocies, 
historical verification of events, dates, which 
are, after all, probabilities z ©red from
• v a #  v w - X o • • •
»hfia the Snirit in itself* which l^eds into allIMmv V-V c4V A it § nUXvu Xv OUo XiiwU OX X
truth, end which, by means of its truth or Spirit , 
exercises upon 3pirit the true kind of force, a 
power in which Spirit has left to its absolute
freedom. With the oplrlt as its teacher•
the person of Christ has been decreed by the
Ghurc‘* to bo fcho Son o Go,,V ^ I U J dV ; .  V W  V v  v»iv U v U  U  - J U u *
IPt|XC*
tionship between
(the Church, 'j 01If A
Lples) and
us, Hegel says of the 
ode > ordinarily utilised for 
substantiating the Jesus of History: Conte orary... 
"investigations into the historicity of Christ, 
begin from the point ox view which implies 
that the real question is as to the sensuous 
element in the appearance of Christ, as to what
LI. Ibid., Vol.III. p.116.
Ibid., Vol.III. p.121.12.
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is historical in it, as if the verification
of Spirit and of its truth was contained in
sue*, nt-rratives r ./ rc'no one who was repV( sent-
ed as a historical person and in a historical
fashion. This truth, however, is sure and
certain in itself, el thou wh it has an historical
15st rting point. n y Unlike the empirical
method used by the ecclesiastical councils
ior determining truth,....Hthe true Christian
content of faith is to be justified by
philosophy, not by history. What Spirit does
is not history; it takes to do only with
what exists on its own account, is in-and-cor-
itself , not with something past, but, on the
14contrary, simply witfe what is rresert.” *
5* !hle -ionshT between Yorstellun^ and
uIf.
A. The wavs in which the Religious Consciousness
appropriates the Idea.
But the question remains: "How does the 
subjective consciousness apprehend the 
objective, the Absolute Spirit?" or "How does 
the subjective mind appropriate, interpret and 
explain the appearance of the Divine, the 
reconciliation of the subjective and objective
13. Ibid., Vol.III. p.111.
14. Ibid., Vol.III. p.121-122.
consciousness?” In Hegel*3 developmental 
scheme, the subjective consciousness of the 
Absolute Spirit is essentially and intrinsically 
a process. A development from the lower to the 
higher, from the determinate mode of conscious­
ness to the indeterminate mediated in the 
Absolute Idea or Notion, constitutes the 
necessary progress of the Idea*s reception.
The three steps, by which the finite subject 
realises that the infinite subject has been 
revealed to him as certain, sure and actual, are, 
on the one hand, processes which precede the 
revelation of the Absolute Idea, that is to 
say, the religions prior to the final 
revelation begin with the barest of categories, 
feeling; the antithesis of which is thought, 
idea, or ordinary sensuous versions of 
reality, and the ultimate synthesis reached 
in the Absolute Religion, utilises the thesis 
of feeling, idea, and culminates(in the Notion 
(Begriii). On the other hand, the three ways 
or modes of comprehending the Divine-human 
relationship are triadic within the Christian 
religion. Feeling or immediate knowledge, and 
idfeaa, the thesis and antithesis, are the lower, 
dispensable developments in the dialectic,
which are com leted when the ITotion is known 
in-and-for itself# Hegelfs problem in his 
"Philosophy of History" and "Philosohy of 
Religion" lectures, is Sim ly to illuminate 
the inevitable and necessary transitions of 
the Idea. Be:ore embarking on a discussion 
oi the two lower developments, it is well 
to point out Hegel9s confusing presentation 
of Vorstellung. He seems unable to make up 
his mind clearly as to whether the character^ 
istic quality of the Vorstellung lies in its 
relation to feeling, or its relation to 
picture-thinking. Sometimes Hegel conjoins 
in a single sentence these two ways of
erentisting the Vorstellung of religion 
from the Be griff or Philosophy. A good 
example is a passage in the "Philosophy of 
it" where he sums up the whole matter as 
follows: "The Uaiv* rsal S irit exists
concretely in art in the form of perception 
and image, in religion in the form of feeling 
and pictorial imaginative thinking, and in 
philosophy in the form of pure free thought."^* 
But because Hegel does separate these two 
forms of knowledge in some places, particularly 
in his "Philosophy o~ Religion" lectures, we
1. Philosophy o^ Right, Dydels translation, 
page. 431. |
will treat each knowledge separately#
The first position of the finite , iritf or 
the primary way the naive religious piety 
apprehends the unity of the Divine and human 
n ture is through Feeling# Feeling is, 
according to Hegel, the i mediate form in 
which any matter is posited in consciousness 
as ours, its quality as our own. But he says#, 
"the most contradictory elements are to be 
found in feeling! the most debased, as well
p
as the highest, and noblest, have a place there." 
God, if he is confined to feeling, has no 
advantages over wisat is worst, even "the 
kingliest flower springs from the same soil 
and side by side with the rankest weed. *
"All religions, even the most false and 
unworthy, exist in our feelings, and hearts, 
just as much as these that are true. There 
are feelings which are immoral, unjust, 
godlea , just as :mch es ther are feelings 
which are moral, just and pious." * furthermore, 
when man bases hie knowledge of God simply on 
feeling, he withdraws into the sphere of sheer 
arbitrariness, mere centingeucy or fortuitous­
ness. Even, continues Hegel, the animals have 
feelings, immediate and instinctive knowledge.
2. Fhilosophy of Religion, Vol.I. .130.
3. Ibid., Vol. I. p.130.
4. Ibid., Vol. III. p.181.
Though feeling is the sphen in which the 
Being.of God is immediately exhibited, the Being 
of God, or Being in-snd-for-icsel., cannot be 
localised or discovered in the region of 
immediate knowledge. God,s being is independent 
and self-existent, but this independence and 
self-existent content is not to be found in the 
area of feeling. If anything, this content is 
negated. Immediate knowledge knows what God is, 
but not what He is. The subjective consciousness 
is so immersed in its relationship to God, that it 
fails to clothe this relationship with any 
objective content. Realising the inadequacy of 
immediate knowledge,.4."we must," so Hegel says, 
"therefore look around us for another basis for
God. In feeling, we have noz found God either in
accordance with His independent Being, or in 
accordance with His content. In immediate
knowledge, the object was not possessed of
Being; on the contrary, its Being was found 
in the knowing subject, which discovered the 
basis of this Being in F e e l i n g . " i  man who
has to do with Feeling only is not as yet 
complete! he is a beginner in knowledge, in 
action."6*
5. Ibid., Vol.I. p.37.
6. Ibid., Vol.I. p.37.
But ell is not lost; for in itself, religious 
feeling contains the necessity, the inherent 
* contradiction for the advancement to the stage 
of perception and reflection; That is to say, 
when the empirical subject seeks to com: rehend 
the "Other", or his relationship to God, he is 
driven to reflect on and seek to posit the 
distinction between himself and the "Other" 
to who i he is immediately related. In order 
to maintain fellowship or community with others, 
the pe son motivated by feeling withdraws 
from his own particularity, his own ideas and 
opinions, and participates in a common "object" 
which forms the basis for objective discussions 
oi this immediate knowledge#
The next stage of the religious consciousness, 
necessitate d by the inherent divisions between 
the Universal and the subjective consciousness 
on the level oi immediate knowledge, is when 
the spiritual idea exists as an object for 
consciousness. The infinite sorrow, the 
despairing and unhappy introverted conscious­
ness perceiving Itself caught in ltd own 
subjectivity, rises above its own arbitrariness 
and posits an object or mental image to 
represent the unity between the divine and
human nature. Within this stage of conscious­
ness, man attempts to reach absolute knowledge 
by figuratively and pictorially representing 
the union and by abstract reflection on the 
relationship.
The content which perceived in its immediacy 
in feeling, now receives some objective 
reference which mediates this knowledge. The 
non-spaculetive consciousness, called by 
Hegel - the ordinary mind, or the stage of 
thinking when "religion can be said to be 
reasoning naively" - clothes thought or the 
Notion (Begriff) in sensuous imagery. This 
presentational thinking presents the 
speculative under the guise of the natural, 
the outward and sensuous. The reconciliation 
between God and man, oi; in general, God*s 
relationship to the world, the finite spirit 
and the realm 01 nature, is expressed in 
anolories taken from natural life and events. 
The popular idea of the creation of the world 
is a Vorstellung (figurative bodying forth) of 
some ration 1 truth. The philosophical truth 
for which it stands is that the Idea posits 
itself forth into extern lity and "Otherness" 
and becomes the world. Truly understood,
this is not an act or event in time, but an 
eternal or timeless process of the Idea. But 
popular, representational thinking conceives 
the eternal truth of the creation as an event 
which happened. But, if an event, (God’s 
logical and necessary differentiation is 
ta) : an act in a sensuous manner), the 
creation is made to appear as if it were an 
accidental and arbitrary act of God. God 
either might or mig$it not have created the 
world. To "create” is an image borrowed from 
the technical operations of man, and, if God’s 
eternal act is represented as happening in 
time, the Universal Idea is obscured through 
an interest in.what remains contingent and 
arbitrary. :dn, in this type of figurative 
thought, the persons of the Godhead are 
represented as Father and Son, and by the v 
fact that the ordinary mind clings to the 
conce; "Son", it is lowering and trans- 
.he moments of the Motion to the level 
of imaginative thought. When the representat­
ional mind expresses the relationship between 
the Son and the Father in organic terms, it 
is., ."dragging pictures and presentations into 
the realm of uhought."^* The truth this
7. Phenomenology of the Mind, Vol.II. p.733*
designation "Son" 3tands for, according to 
Hegel, is the differentiation of the Notion 
within itself. The Universal, i.e., The 
Father, puts forth the particular, i.e., The 
Son, from itself. The incarnation, i#e., the 
Idea of the God-man, is a Vorstellung which 
stands for the central truth of all religions, 
nr rely the unity of God and Llan. Similarly, 
when the concept o, ity is elaborated
by the ordinary mini, the persons or moments 
Hegel would say, are numerically considered 
as three externally complete moments in 
relation to the other. But utilising. •
"childlike relations or childlike natural
8for:is." * Vorstellung conceives the inner 
qualities and relations in a sensuous, 
netu al tvA e ternal shape. For that matter, 
so Hegel writes in another context, the 
popular idea of God as a person is itself 
a Vorstellung, which stands for the truth 
that the absolute is spirit, not a cause or 
mechanism, but Personality, self-conscious-Q
ness, or Absolute Idea. *
Representational thinking by its vexy nature 
and dependence on sense-apprehension and 
sensozy categories is chained to the transient,
8. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p.25. 
9* Ibid., Vol.II. p.2A0.
the perishable and the continent. Its pictures 
of God derive their content from the sphere of 
immediate, determinate forms. It envisages 
what is timeless and infinite under the 
conditions of time and space. Vorstellung 
seeks si ns < n wonders - sensible manifest­
ations of the Divine powerfs presence. It 
perpetuates the sensible presence of Christ in 
the form of the consecrate! Host; the host by 
transubstantiation becomes the very body of 
Christ, and is adored as God sensibly present 
before the eyes of the faithful. The 
presentational mentality sanctions crusades 
to the places requented by Je3us in his earthly 
life. Journeys are made to the "holy land" 
to deter: ine the place of Jesus* grave, and 
so forth. Jesus* words, ,rWhy seek ye the living 
among the dea', He is not here, but is arisen," 
do not, according to Hegel, appear to discourage 
these fruitless quests. The Notional Kind, 
the mind that knows the relative moments of 
the Absolute, realises that Christ is neither 
here nor there, but within you, in the living 
heart. When conscience, will and reason see 
him there, and welcome him there, they shall 
find him there Furthermore, it is natural
1C. Ibid., Vol.III. p. 235.
for the Vorstellung (the figurative mind) to 
occupy itself with the eye-witness accounts of 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. 
Commenting on v.hat he calls "synthetic" 
thinking, Hegel writes* "It is not the Notion, 
but bare extern?lity and particul rity, 
merely the historical manner in which spirit 
once upon a time appeared, the soulless 
recollection of an iieally presented historical 
figure and its past." When representational, 
metaphorical, pictoral thinking relies on the 
u»*m ii itu 1 to r rove its spirituality; it 
naturally (on the basis of Hegel*s concern 
for the completed Idea or the totality of 
the moments) falls into contradictions and 
one-’sidsdness. The proper perspective is, 
according to Hegel*, to regard the determinate 
mode as a passing moment of Godfs revelation* 
General Idea (Vorstellung advancing to the 
realm of reflection) supervenes upon the 
immediacy of sens-c : prehens * on, and brings 
distinctions into the apparently simple; it 
isolates the different qualifies and aspects 
of things, and, by the terms in which it 
crystallises them, finds them in opposition
11. Phenomenology of the Mind, Vol. II. p.?76.
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to one another. I/hen this separation end 
cl ssification is done, according to Heg&X, 
the one fund&aental characteristic which 
constitutes the essence of the object is 
held fast and is present before the mind as 
a totality within itself* While the 
reflective consciousness takes up a polemical 
attitude to the sensuous and pictorial, Hegel 
believes that its explications remain entangled 
with the one-si deduces which characterised the 
sensuous, contingent images of the represent­
ation cl mind* fhe reflective consciousness 
att s to hold firmly to the factual, known 
object. In the process of securing its 
reference point in the temporal, in the finite 
(the historical development of the known in 
the phenomenal sphere) it lowers the infinite 
in a series of multiple contradictions. While 
the Torstellung (as idea) is concerned to 
perceive intellectually the differences 
between the finite and infinite, it remains, 
el is careful to point out, on .the level 
of difference as difference, and fails to go 
beyond the unity in the difference. For 
example, if the abstract consciousness posits
the finite as being limited by the infinite,
Knd that the infinite stands on one side or
ap- rt from the finite, it follows that the
infinite itsel2 is limited. Iu has its
boundary in the finite and it is th£ <„ which
the finite is not* The infinite has something
which is on the yonder side of the finite,
and is thus inite and limited* Instead of
com rehending the unity between the finite and
infinite, the ordinary mind drives an even
deeper wedge between the two. The two remain
isolated, exclusive and fixed determinations*
Thus it is that the ordinary consciousness
leaves the Notion in a contradictory state-
widening the gulf between the Absolute and
the human* By its extreme emphasis on the
historical..."it degrades the content into an
historical imaginative idea end heirloom
12handed down by tradition.” It preserves 
and retains an external lifeless entity.*
"devoid of knowledge," and while doing so..*
"it mis es the inner necessity of the Notion."^* 
But the speculative consciousness, motivated 
by the logical necessity inherent in the 
Notion, abolishes the contradictions between 
the universal and particular, and in doing so*.
12. Philosophy o jion. Vol.II. p.240.
13. Ibid., p.57- Vol. I.
trb rings fluidity into these hard end fast 
thoughts and exhibits, along with their 
differences, the connection by which they 
organise themselves into one whole."
Religion, the stage in which the absolute is 
cognised neither in e purely sensuous ?/ay 
nor in a purely rational way gives way to 
the Notion. Religion does not get beyond 
the accidental, c pricious positing of 
reconciliation in an historical event in time 
and space. It represents the essential, 
necessary estrangement from God in a factual 
mrnne: in its doctrines of the Incamauion, 
the death o: Christ, his resurrection and 
rscension. The ete~nal truth of spirit, 
wherein the human mind in its separation 
from God is at the same time identical with 
being and bound to recognise this identity, 
is represented, symbolised and taught in a 
contradictory, sensuous and precarious way. 
But Hegel says that the figurative thought 
represents the highest kind ox thinking of 
which the masses of men are capable. Pure 
abstract thought, the thought which takes the 
differentiation of God in his "Other", and 
conceives of these determinations as moments
14. Ibid., Vol. X. p. 59.
instead of fixed, isolated reference points, 
is beyond the ordinary, nrive piety of the 
religious mind.
Spirit, to become completely reconciled to 
itself, must drive beyond the differentiation 
of the "other” to the stage of completion, or 
the moment of individuality. Divorced from 
the religious naivette which thinks of God 
in "homely" pictures and in immediate sensuous 
and independent categories, the Notion, or 
Absolute Idea now under the competent guide 
of Philosoihical Reason and logical necessity, 
comprehends its determinations as Ideal 
moments. Furthermore,..."The Idea (Begriff) 
when stripped from the contingency ox the 
Vorstellung, is seen in its perfect clearness, 
pure transparency, being home with seli."1 *^
That is to say, when religion moves beyond 
the one-sided pictorial thinking to the 
Notion, the determinations and differences are 
absorbed and consumed.• ."And this means no 
element or moment of the Absolute stands 
apart or is independent of the rest, but 
each appears as something that is a show or 
semblance in relation to the other...Then 
every distinction, every distinction, every 
definite element is something transparent,
15* Ibid., Vol. III. P.364.
not existing its own account in a dark 
and impenetrable fashion. This implies 
that the objects distinguished are not 
independent and do not offer resistance to 
each other, but are posited in their ideal- 
ity."16*
The Notion can break away from the things 
that are - as Aristotle says, "First for us",- 
the immediate appearances and apprehensions of 
sense which are continually changing, and reach 
those things that are "first by nature"- the 
law or principles which manifest themselves no 
more or no less in one set of appearances than 
in another* Because the self has the capacity 
for transcending itself, contemplating itself 
and emancipating itself from the limitations, 
not only of individual circumstances but even 
of generic nature, the fulfilled self- 
consciousness generated by Reason and logical 
necessity can envisage himself and the objects 
related to self in a unified relationship.
This capacity for self-transcendence, which 
comprehends in one completed whole, the self 
m &  the not-self, the self and the world in 
correlation or in organic unity, gives man a 
universe! vantage point. The element of
16. Ibid., Vol. 1. p.155*
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abstraction or the ordinary consciousness 
which cannot get beyond the contradictory 
relationships and unresolved dualism of cause 
and effeet, substance and accident, force and 
expression, inner and outer being, finds its 
completion in the Notion, described by Hegel 
as the ncorrelativity of given opposites”.
The Notion comprehends the reciprocity of 
correlative differences, or latent unities 
which manifest themselves as differences, yet, 
in their differences, are still one with 
themselves. Only the ideal Notion can over­
come the dualism which Aristotle had left 
between the pure intelligence and the 
intelligible world which is its object. The 
The Notion holds the Universal, particular 
and individual moments of God together and 
realises that each moment contains in itself 
the other two movements. For the Notion, 
the Universal which had become particular in 
its "other” (nature and f inite spirit and, 
for the ordinary mentality, individual man) 
now returns into itself. The particular 
negates itself, dies, rises again from the 
dead and ascends to the Father. In this act, 
the particular, which was sundered from the
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universal, becomes identical with it. 
Reconciliation is complete and the estrange- 1 
tent between God nd His "Owher" is over-come.
The absolute Notion,or Be;.riff, lifts the 
"reve; led ReH^Lor.” out of the region of 
caprice and accidental opinions, invests the 
naive analogies and pictorel representations 
with objectivity, and, if further, transforms 
immediate knowledge of Godfs "Other” into the 
sphere where knowledge maintains itself in 
itself in its otherness end in its opposites. 
In the Notion, utilising Hegel*s phrasing,... 
"particularity succumbs and expires in its 
univers lity, i.e. in its knowledge, v/hich is 
true being reconciling itself with itself."1 7^* 
fhe Absolute Idea is the systematic 
recognition of the fact that there is no 
position without a negative ana the negative 
is yet only the path along which thought 
passes to a fuller positive. This higher 
reality, this gran 1 synthesis, comprehended 
only by the Notion, realises that the infinite 
has appeared in the finite and the finite in 
the infinite, and that, as a consequence, 
each no longer forms a separate realm of
17* Phenomenology of the Mind. Vol.II. p.794-.
producing abstractions or contractions.
With particular reference to the sensuous
history in which Christianity first appeared,
the Motion realises uhat this history is the
mere point of departure (ausgangspunkt) for
the spirit of faith. The historical Jesus is
only. .."the garment of flesh from which spirit 
±3has passed.11 * As determined, (God in His
or), God is not yet the true God. In so 
far as He is no longer determined and limited 
in his actually existing manifestation is he 
Spirit, manifesting which exists in and for 
sell. Only the Hotion can mediate 
religious knowledge free from the contingencies 
of historical research, the splits of immediacy, 
perception, being and not being, finite and 
infinite, human and divine. These contradict­
ions contain within themselves the basic 
unity v.hich drives beyond the polarities to a 
realised unity within the differences. Under 
the competent guide of Absolute reason, the 
Spirit is extricated from transitoriness, 
change, the vicissitudes of the world, from 
evil and from division, and is represented
as absolute consciousness - bein_ in and for 
——  ■ ■     — -   — , — -— .
18. Philosophy 0i Religion. Vol.I. p.211.
19. Ibid., p.211. Vol. I.
self.
Another aspect of the ITotion, of particular
concern to Heligion, is the full realisation
and actual is ati on of the Spirit when it has
taken up its abode in the religious
community* "At first," according to Hegel,
"however, the Idea ap, ears in a single
individual in a material, pictorial form;
this must be discarded and the real
signification, the eternally true essence,
must be brought into view* This is the faith
of the Spiritual Community when it is coming
into existence. It starts from faith in the
individual; this individual man is changed
by t s Spiritual Community. He is recognised
to be God and is characterised as the Son of
God and as comprising all the finite which
attaches to subjectivity as such in its
development, but as being subjectivity He
20is separated from substantiality."
But the death of Christ, spiritually 
interpreted by the friends of Jesus at 
Pentecost, signifies the cancellation and 
transcendence of the immediate, material, and 
sensuous manifestation. At Pentecost, the
20. Ibid., Vol. Ill, page 115
real inauguration point of the Church aid
Revealed Religion, die xriends of Jesus..
"were able to conceive of the true idea of
God, viz. that in Christ man is redeemed and
reconciled; for in Him the idea of eternal
uruth is recognised, the essence of man
acknowledged to be Spirit, and the fact
procla imed by stripping himself of his
finiteness and surrendering himself to pure
self-consciousness, does he attain the 
21truth. In his death, Christ-man as man,
h&s presented the eternal history of Spirit - 
a history which every man h s to accomplish
in himself in order to exist as spirit, or
22uo become a child of the kingdom.
Within the Spiritual Community, the 
realised Kingdom ox God on earth, the 
community in which the individual is born 
into, and the community where he is destined 
to share in its truth, ^  the Idea reaches 
perfection and urue ideality. The religious 
communion comprehends the inner movements of 
Spirit through the "Other" and the necessary 
and inevitable return to the Universal. The 
Spiritual Community apprehends the "nowness",
21. Philosophy of History, p. 34-0.
22. Ibid., p. 34*0.
23. Thiloso:hy of Religion, Vol. III. p. 127.
the essential contemporaneity of the 
reconciliation* for it, the present contains 
the past and the future in it, as moments. 
Because of its realised content, the community 
has no concern for the origins and primitive 
embodiments ox the determinate idea, or for 
that matter for whet the actual human being Oft
(incarnating the divine spirit) has spoken.
It is free xrom the verification and authen­
tic tion of its doctrines on sensuous, 
empirical grounds. Within the Community, 
doctrines and dogmas are v/orked out end 
received their fin 1 amplification and 
development. And., "whether the community 
gives its expression to its consciousness on 
the basis a written documents, or attaches
its own selx-determini tion to tradition, is nodb
25at all €81 essential one.” Death abrogates
the human side Ox Christ's n ture and inaugur­
ates the transition to the religious, 
b iritual sphere. The teachings of Him who 
was imaginatively and pictorially presented 
by the primitive religious mind serve as 
guides, directions and examples to the 
comx.unity which completely knows the Absolute
24. Phenomenology of the Mind, Vol. II. p. 775* 
25* Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II. p. 125.
in end for itself.
6. Evaluation of Hegel's Philosophy.
Criticisms of Hegel's dialectic have been 
legion, end under the impact of various 
schools of existentialism they have become 
fai ilier - possibly more familiar than Hegel 
himself. Kierkegaard, Kiefczche, Marx, 
Schelling in the 19th and 20th cencury have 
exposed Hegel's transcendentised, essential- 
istic version of reality. Instead of pursuing 
these criticisms directly, we v/iil concentrate 
on Hegel’s distinction between Vorstellung 
end Begriff - pointing out his unsatisfactory 
el tionship to historical Christianity.
Before ve can embark on this task, some 
mention must be made of the philosophical 
problem Hegel inherited irom his predecessors 
and contemporaries. His dialectical solution 
to this dilemma establishes his treatment of 
historical Christianity. Kant, Pichte, 
Schleiermacher, and Schelling had left the 
relationship oetveen the subject and object, 
between thinking and Bein^, the infinite and 
iinitef the self-conscious Ego and the
Absolute Ego in an antithetical rele^ionshi . 
Kant, wrestling with the distinctions which 
philosophy had assumed to exist between 
subject end object, between tho ight and 
things, sought to abolish this clevage - 
not by suppressing one of the factors, but 
by showing that thought and things are really 
related in all our thinking. But though 
Kant, as against Hume, vindicates a certain 
reality for knowledge, it is still not a 
knowledge of realities. In place of the old 
duel ism, he creates a new dualism - now between 
phenomenon and nuomenon. There is a world of 
things in themselves to which the mind cannot 
perceive. As one interpreter of Kant has 
remarked* "The dualism between God and Man 
is so far mutually exclusive for Kant, that 
what is done by man in Histoiy appears to be 
necessarily done without God. Whet is done 
by God, on the concrary - as, for example, 
a revelation - appears like a hand from 
behind the clouds thrust suddenly into the 
web of human affairs•" * The c nception of 
the "thing-in-itself", the relation of the 
unknown object to the phenomenon o- 
expearience, became the starting point of a
1. Alexander, Archibald, "A Short Histoiy
of Philosophy", page 150.
new se ies of speculative thought which led 
ultimately to the ef:orts of Fichte, Schelling 
and Hegel to explain the world as a system of
Reason*
Fichte, concerned to portray the unity of 
subject and object in the self-conscious 
ego, established a system of pure subjective 
idealism. All that is the ego, all that we 
know belongs to and takes place within our 
consciousness* Reality is experience, and 
it is nothing more* Hence the Philosophy 
of Fichte starts with the demand that the 
facts of experience shall be examined as 
facts of self-consciousness. While he 
denied Kant*s "thing-in-itself”, he did so 
at the expense of all reality. His 
philosophy involved a dualism between ideal­
ism and realism - an alternating, a 
reciprocity of the two sides (the ego and 
non-ego) which could only be overcome by 
affirming the reality of the ego* In his 
avtespt to reduce nature to a mere 
negative condition, a self-created object 
of thought, and to make spirit all in all, 
Fichte turned the life of the spirit itself 
into something shadowy and spectral - a
conflict with a ghost that could not be laid* 
Shelling's philosophy arose to supplement 
the one-sided idealism of Fichte. Convinced 
that Natux-e, the e*rternal world, comprised 
the object of knowledge» or a necessary 
pan llel, (existence manifests a like 
intelligence to the spiritual world),
Sohelling sal? forth an objective Idealism 
which so completely merged and identified 
the difference between nature and spirit, 
that the reality of both was lost and the 
absolute became a pure point of indifference 
to be apprehended only by mystic contemplation 
or in intuitive feeling* Alexander remarks 
in his "S-.ort Histor, of Philosophy” 
concerning the approach of Fichte and 
Schelling: "While subjective idealism
only attained a unity at the expense of one 
o* the factors, Schelling only escapes the 
one-sidedness of Fichte by establishing a 
formal abstract identity in which the 
differences are cffirmed, but not finally 
harmonised* w
Schleiermacherfs theology, so severely 
castigated in Hegel's "Philosophy of 
Religion”, recognised the identity of
R* Ibid*, p.165*
thought snd being - in which all contradictions 
are solved- but, unlike Schelling, he holds 
this identity to be an ideal which is never 
reached cognitively by man. IX the union 
between thought and things, between intellect 
and thi will was to take pi; ce, Schleie rancher 
was convinced the* it would be reached through 
feeling. In feeling, the soul end the universe, 
man and God, co-ningle and become one.
Hegel, laced with these diverse elements of 
thought - subject and object, individualism 
and pantheism, reason and revelation, history 
and the idea, God the Father, the Son and 
Holy Spirit, which previous philosox^hers only 
succeeded in partially reconciling, and that 
su; pressing one oi the sides - abolishes 
these antitheses by conceiving the whole 
Oi hisuory 6 3 the work of God, and a growing 
revelation of his nature and purpose. What 
had been regarded as opposites - mind and 
matter, spirit and nature, the intelligible 
and phenomenal world - must be grasped in 
a unit,/ o thought, and that not in an 
external way, but by bringing into distinct 
consciousness the meaning ox their differences 
as necessary elements of reason. By applying
■ '■
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his dialectic, -firming the necessary opposites, 
Hegel set up r higher synthesis in which truth 
resides exclusively neiuher in the subject nor 
in the: obje t, but in relation and movement 
subsisting between the two, both sides being 
affirmed as equally valid moments and, at the same 
time, reduced to me • ly relative moments of the 
one absolute existenc of mind. From his 
vantage point Of Absolute Idealism, abstraction, 
called by Hegel the besetting sin of philosoph­
ical, theological and historical thought, could 
be done away with. The one-sidedness which 
prevailed in the phi osophy of his day could now 
be seen in a new light - necessary movements of 
the Spirit that empties itself and returns to 
itself*
Whatever we may say about the dialectical 
principle in the hands of Hegel, the method is ■ 
still one o the most relevant ways to describe 
the movements of life and history in their 
tensions, convrasts, and contradictions and in 
their trend toward more embracing unities. But 
the question arises: "Is the Hegelian dialectic
genuinely dialectical?" We must answer, as 
Kie icegaard, Tillich and others have done, that 
it is not: for instead of maintaining the real
differences between the thesis and antithesis,
and, for thrt Butter, the co-existence in the 
one mind o: feeling, understanding and Idea 
(the dynamic synthesis), Hegel abolishes the 
relative movements and dis ;olv 3 the contradict­
ions in existence by making them come to a halt 
in synthesis. "In the last moment, essence 
triumphs over existence, completion over 
infinity, and the static over the dynamic...
The circle is c l o s e d * Instead of realising 
that : rogress, even in the concept of freedom, 
brings new problems and tensions, Hegel resolves 
uhe antinomies in history. When Hegel made his 
dialectic of identity and contrast and resolvement 
in synthesis one of logical necessity, he 
presupposed that essence and existence and the 
polarities left by Kant could be resolved on 
the pi one of history. In this sinrularistic, 
mite . end organic syste ., t ie dialectical 
no - a Eierkegaardian expression - between the 
infinite and the finite, between the creative 
first mind and the creature ly human mind, is
pressed. By breaching the cleavage in thought, 
Hegel erred in imagining that the dialectic of 
Histoiy would come to a stop v/ith his synthesis.
real, historical estrangement of man from 
his original unity was concealed in this
3. Tillich, Paul, "Interpretation of History",
page 166.
esxenti list syste . fhe dialectic failed to 
recognise the paradoxical relationshi betv/een 
essence and existence. In this failure Hegel 
eli inaces the existential integrity and freedom 
of the individual and the group in their anxious 
personal decisions. His mystical spriori, or 
his awa/eness o~ something that transcends the 
cleavage be tween subject and object, introduces 
and substitutes an outside scheme of certain 
abstract categories for the multiplicity and 
the rich variety of the actual phenomenon. In 
principle, ontolo ists may agree with Hegel’s 
categories, or possibly use his profound 
re-apjlication of these classifications to 
interpret reality, but they would insist that 
his system be supplemented by a sober realism 
which builds on the foundation of historical 
facts and which, moreover, takes into 
consideration man’s anxiety in time. The 
Christian theologian, according to Tillich,
"adds uo : ystical apriori, the criterion of the
4
Christian message." * Its verixicsti; ,
Tillich says, is the "efficacy in the life- 
oces. and the proces. of verification is 
itself a process within "the theological circle."
Another problem Hegel encountered at the time 
of his writing - one which will interest us in
4. Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol.I. p 
5* Ibid., p* 102-10..
our appraisal of his relationship to historical 
Christianity - concerned the controversy 
between Orthc interp retatiori of Christian­
ity and the rationalistic int err; ret at ion.
The Auklarunw or the spirit of scientific 
enlightenment and historical criticism 
delighted in demolishing miracles and laying 
bare discrepancies in the biblical narrative. 
The Rationalists criticise! the Orthodox 
.manner of basing their beliefs on particular 
historical phenomena. The progress in Science 
had consisted in the ever clearer apprehensicn 
of the reign of lavv, as exhibited in instance 
after instance, and the consequent denial of 
all breaks in the continuity of natural 
process by the intrusion into the realm of 
nature by a supernatural agency. The 
inviolability of nature, excluded and displaced 
the emphasis placed on the miraculous and this 
interpretation further served to convince the 
Rationalists that no positive value was to be 
attached to the truths of the historical 
faith. Hegel believed that the radical and 
somewhat negative criticism of the Rationalists 
was justified, in that it provided for
acceptance and promulgation of the Christian 
doctrines apart from the validation of the 
historical records, but he was convinced that 
the Rationalist's rejection of the external 
and circumstantial was no cause for despair 
or disbelief in the true or Divine content < £  
the message*
On the other hand, the Orthodox, confronted 
by the Eation&list challenge and destitute of 
a higher principle to free itself from the 
literal, historical record, began to lay a 
dis] ortionate weight on the external and 
historical* Hegel says wittingly of the 
orthodox theologians who allow theology to 
become soley a study of history and philology, 
that they are like clerks in a great trading 
house who keep books and accounts only with 
regard to the property of others, who only trade 
for others without having any capital of their 
own. They receive a salary, it is true, but 
their ox^ice is merely to serve and to register 
what belongs to othe • people. "History," Hegel 
says of the orthodox interpretation, "has to 
do with truths which were truths, namely for 
others* not with such as are the property of 
those who deal with them. But,in philosophy 
and religion, the great matter is that the
spirit itself receive contents, something of
its own, and judge itself worthy of the
6knowledge.” * Hegel denies the presupposition 
on which both Orthodoxy and ordinary rational­
ism proceed, viz. that the peculiarly Christian 
doctrine stands or falls with the proveable extra- 
naturalness o^  certain facts. In other words, 
from the ventage point reached by Hegel’s 
Absolute Id a or Notion (Begriff), the Hegelian 
dialectic cz n withdraw from the noisey arena 
occup ed by the split between Orthodoxy and 
Nationalism. Hegel’s method of dealing with 
the Absolute religion does not go to work 
historically according to the method o_ the
mind which begins at the other side. Rather,
n
he sets out from the Notion. His meta­
physical interpretation of history proposed 
to bring out and draw into the light of 
consciousness the ideas, the reason, the order, 
the design, which are present in the real, and 
are the inner power that moves it. More will 
be said in this context v/hen we critically 
examine Hegel’s starting point. Meanwhile, an 
examination of the method used by Kant and 
Lessing to rehabilitate by philosophical means 
the Christian doctrines will throw some light 
on Hegel*s approach.
6. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.I. p.42-43* 
7« Philosophy of History, p.25*
Kant, faced with the same cleavage between 
the Church and the world, between revelation 
and reason, ethicised the Christian dogmas. 
While he believed the historical forms of 
Christianity expressed the pure religion 
imperfectly v/ith a great admixture of error, 
he retained the fonns, or attempted to retain 
them, ad ladders which had served the childhood 
of thought. It w* s his aim to separate the 
true and eternal content of Christianity from 
the husk of circumstances in which these 
truths were first presented to the world.
His onl^ canon of interpretation was exclusive­
ly ethical, and 111 questions of the original 
sense or historical accuracy of the sacred 
writings are simply left on one side. These 
forms, because t.ey were contingent, non- 
rationel matter, temporal and local in nature, 
we e destined to pass away. Their value lies 
in their bein vehicles for the ideas of true 
religion, and, for this reason, they are not 
to be thoughtlessly autackei. Historical 
belief while "dead in itself", lends itself 
to an ethical exegesis, and on this point 
alone justification may be given to its divine 
origin. Historical Christianity, or the
particular embodiedment of the ethical, is a 
leading-string to bring us to pure religion and 
it should be employed with the consciousness
Q
that it is nothing more.^* Kant's ethical 
understanding of scripture placed the truths 
of religion above historical proff. The 
credentials o~ Christianity rest on a document 
preserved ineffaceably in every soul, and 
therefore no miracles or historical data are 
required to produce what has become a proto­
type in human reason. Clearly, Kantfs 
tenuous relationship to historical Christianity 
and,even more questionable, his corporate 
Christ, or ideal humanity, severed from, and 
independent of, its ercemplification in one 
man, cannot be accepted. Despite his efforts 
to safeguard the hypostation of the ideal 
hu anity in a particular man, his ethical 
philosophy, though an attempt to reanimate 
the faith, is separated from the person and 
particular environment and the preparation 
for the revelation in Jesus the Christ in the 
Jewish Community. The truths of Christianity 
become timeless eteroalities which are for 
all practical purposes divorced from particular­
ity.
8. Kant, Religion within the Limits of
Pure Reason.
Hegel's whilosoThy ox religion - in particular, 
his views on historical Christianity - was in a 
large measure de endent on Kant's method of 
dealing with the Christian message. Instead of 
ethicising the doctrines, Hegel substitutes the 
Religion oi the Spirit, the Begrixi, freed and 
emancipaced from the particular. The Christ - 
conceived in picturesque imagery by mankind on 
the plane o- "religion still thinking naively" - 
is, for the liotion, a witness of, or a sign of, 
the "unity of the Divine and Human already in 
the thought of man." The relative moment of 
the self-externalising of the logos is completed 
and fullilled in the return of the Spirit to 
itsel . Through the Atonement, fallaciously 
conceived ox in an objective, crude pictorial 
imagery by che religion of Vorstellung is a 
necessary moment oi the movement of the Absolute 
through the Other and back ot Itself. The 
historical form is necessary, but the Historical 
is carcingent. It cannot, therefore, form 
a part of the essential religious content.
When the content is elimated from these out­
worn forms, it is found to be identical with 
truth, or with the Begriff.
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Though Hegel, like Kent, is concerned to 
point out the necessity for the concrete 
exemplification o. the Idea; like Kant, point­
ing to the sensuous conctetion of the Idea in 
one man - on the principle of Hegel*s false 
dialectical method, the sensuous forms are 
superceded by the last moment in the triadic 
aovement, i.e. thesis moving into antithesis 
and forming a new synthesis. The final stage 
abolishes those ohat dialecticslly precede 
it. Instead of the continual co-existence ox 
the two sides, the empirical Jesus who was 
confess* d to be the Christ by the original 
community and the contemporaneous Christ 
through the Holy Spirit, both unified in 
ex erience of the believer, the contemporaneous 
or living Christ is independent of, and 
severed from, the particular sensuous 
manifestation in history. Though Hegel believes 
it to be a universal rule that thought must set 
out from sensuous certainty - from something 
given and something positive - the given, in 
this instance, what is pictorially presented 
and representationally understood by the 
Vorstellung, is dissolved into a metaphysical 
principle which, in reference to his previous 
understanding of the Trinity, has no essential
place for the particular is at ion of Him who 
was known to be the Christ.
Though there is some question about Hegel’s 
reference to the particular in his all-embracing 
universal, organic philosophy, let us approach 
the question from a different perspective.
Whet within his philosophy obscures the 
particular history' of Christianity, prior even 
to the emergence of the Absolute Religion?
S. eaking of the preparation of Christianity in 
the world, Hegel says not a word on the fact 
that Christianity issued out of Judaism and 
cannot, therefore, be understood apart from 
the historical hope of Judaism. The actual 
historical genesis of the religion of Universal 
freedom, according to He el, issues directly 
out of the negation of the free self-conscious­
ness of the peoples. It is certainly true 
thac the age prepared the way for Christianity 
and was to a large measure the condition of 
its promulgation and acceptance; but the 
negative condition is far from afiording a 
positive explanation of Christianity. The 
fact of Christianity, so one interpretor of 
Hegel*s position is led to say, "loses any 
ultimate reality." "It contains nothing which
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the mind cannot already grasp and is merely 
an illustration oi what the thinker knows 
already in principle. As Lessing wrote - 
It is the picture book to the text book of 
the absuract idea, and the philosopher can
Q
know the text without the pictures.1ty The 
existence of the God-utan, or the uniqueness 
oi Christ is ex lained from an inner necessity 
of the religious consciousness at the stoge 
of the relioion of redemption, ihe ivision 
between subject and objecu, between the divine 
and human consciousness,is reached or 
cognitively known when the subject reaches 
within his own being the knowledge of this 
spirit* The antithesis between subjectivity 
and objectivity and its necessary removal 
comes when the subject recognises that the 
antithesis is in essence removed already in 
the being of the Absolute Spirit. Granted 
that the removal of the hostility is a 
possibility, but does the abolishment of the 
cl vage depend on Him who was the Christ or 
upon the ccoition of the "three-fold" 
nature of reality conceived by Hegel to be 
valid and reconciling prior to Christ’s 
coming?
9 » Rust, "Ihe Meaning of History" page 42.
Looking at the particular event - the 
atonement o~ God with Man, the abolishment 
of the one-sided relationship between God 
and Man, between God and the relative 
moment, or between G o and the instrument of 
atoning reconciliation - on the basis of 
Hegel’s ideas on the function of the Spirit­
ual Community, it appeal's that, while the 
particular introduced the reconciliation 
into the stream of consciousness, it is no 
longer bindin^ on the Ecclesia to refer to 
the paiiicular embodiedment of the Idea. The 
accomplished reconciliation is the basis of 
the Church: it is taught in the Church’s
doctrine and the Church is itself the outward 
expression 01 the truth. The relation of the 
subject to the problem of salvation is, 
therefore, essentially different, according as 
he is or is not born within the pale of the 
Christian Community• The Church is, after the 
conflict and dictomy experienced and conquered 
in the early comnamity, the society where the 
virtual conquest over evil is already acheived, 
and where, therefore, the individual is spared 
such bitter conflict and outcast wretchedness 
as preceded the formation of the community.
While this view of the matter represents 
the essential Christian affirmation of the 
victorious conquest of "New Being" over 
"non-Be in 1 (borrowing, for the moment, Tillich’s 
terminology), the Christian Church emphasises 
the "toweuherness", or indissoluable union 
of the victory and the victor, the community 
and the Christ, and the Christ and His community. 
Hegel’s view of history and of the reconciling 
process in the Absolute Religion attempts to 
do justice to the dual nature and dialectical 
content of history* Historical research, 
according to him, must com rehend no less what 
has happened than the narration of what has 
happened. He sought to sketch the underlying, 
the hidden and metaphysical meaning of history 
which was being neglected by the pragmatic 
historians, and completely disregarded by the 
Auklarung. But his philosophy of history, and, 
more particularly, his attempt to do justice 
to the "event of Jesus Christ" or "events" 
associated with Jesus, is anti-dialectical. 
Instead of holding the fact of history, the 
rememberedfhcts in Christianity, in a 
dialectical relationship with interpretation, 
or the received facts in relationship with the 
witness in the Church, Hegel comes to the facts
with a ready-made dialectical apparatus and 
sets his ui pets in lively action, picking and 
choosing, discarding and holding the evidence 
ahich would contribute to his supposed end, viz. 
philosophising and allegorising Christian 
History •
The ambiguity in Hegel’s thought and his
non-dielectical inter natation of history may
be illustrated by some additional references
to his interpretation of the spiritual
com.unity. lie says o~ the place of sensuous
knowledge in the Christian message, the
followings "In com orison with this absolute
knowled, '(deposits: in the s iritual community),
the sensuous knowledge referred to accordingly
takes a secondary place, it is indeed a
starting point, a point o£ dc which
has to Seiullyrecognised. ” "Since
Spirit starts from what is sensuous, and
attains »o this lofty estimate o- itself, its
reli don o^ the sensuous is a directly negative
11relation. This is a fundamental principle." 
Otherness, externality, finitude, or imperfect­
ion, is degraded to the condition of something 
unessential? the otherness, or Other Being of 
the Son is a passing, disappearing moment, end 
not at all a true, essential, permanent and
10. Philosophy of Religion. Vol.III. p.120.
11. Ibid., p.118.
1 2absolute moment. * Within the Spiritual 
Co imnnity.. "evil has implicitly and actually 
been overcome..The Child, inasmuch as it has 
been bora in the Church, has been bom in 
freedom and to freedom; there no longer exists 
for it any absolute other-Bein^, this other 
3ein is considered as something overcome and 
conquered."1 *^
There are two very clear thoughts emerging
from the above statements: (1) Hegel confuses
the dynamic relatio.nship between the historical 
manifestation and the eternal and Divine Christ, 
or ever-present Spirit. The three Persons, 
supposing that he would allow us this terminology, 
are really three stages of evolution rather 
thsn co-ordinate personalities, of which the 
third is higher and more real than the other two. 
ue are in sympathy with Hegel's effort to avoid 
one-sidedness - abstracting one level or one 
person from the other two - but, when this 
objectifying process - even in face of his 
polemic against abstractions - is dissolved, 
into uhe third movement of the developmental 
process, he ignores the paradoxical tension 
maintained in the Christian Community between 
itself and the "event1*. Instead of abolishing 
the one-sided point of view, Hegel creates 
another half truth. The Church or Spiritual
12. Ibid., p.123. 
13• Ibid. , p.H9«
Co mmunity is the recipient of the absolute 
idea, end within its life the absolute idea 
is to be discovered and encountered. But the 
Community for Hegel is in point ox fact the 
Divine idea eibodied in the World. Where the 
Christian faith acknowledges that the historical 
Jesus has been interpreted to be the expected 
Christ in the community, it is not to be over­
looked that the fact of his appearance is 
considered secondary in the philosophy of 
Hegel and Kant. Instead of the swallowing 
effect pro iuced by their minimising the event 
of Jesus, the Christian Church attempts to 
relate the Jesus ox History and the Christ of 
faith. These inter-related and co-existent 
thoughts are necessary and valid if the Church 
is to know itself as judged and forgiven.
More consideration of Hegel's views on 
Vorstellunj and Begri^f will bring out these 
two criticisms, but, for the present, a brief 
summary of the state of our argument. Hegel 
sep. rates his interpretation ox the Absolute 
Religion from the person ox Jesus, if you please 
the Logos externalised in the God-man. Jesus 
is only an exam le of the concretion of the 
Idea that the Human and Divine are one, an Idea 
which may be realised prior to the advent of 
the Absolute Religion* Reason, or the Notion, 
is now freed from the particular. Reason has no
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longer to emphasise the occurence in History 
of the God-man. ?£uch like Kant, the third 
movement, or the return of the estranged 
"Other” to God, has been stamped on the soul 
of man.
Hegel’s absolute third moment, entailing the 
unity of God and man, confuses the perfect and 
the imperfect, the creative mind and the 
creaturely mind. In the process, the infinite 
and the finite are joined; their contradiction 
annuled. He has no difficully showing this union, 
but, when he explains how the finite became 
imperfect in ohe first instance, his logic jumps 
and fells back on the inevitability of fallen­
ness in order to initiate the return to God 
and, even, man beck to himself.
The religio is Vorstellung, feeling, intuition, 
and pictorial representation of the object of 
religion, is the primary example of what Hegel 
condemns as abstraction, objectification of the 
process. Vorstellung, ambigiously represented 
in Hegel’s thought, performs, on the one hand, 
the task of introducing the idea into the 
historical consciousness, representing the idea 
as concretely exemplified.- While, on the other 
hand, philosophy justifies the thinking of the
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religious consciousness. In faith, the true
content has become a "ce:tainty", but there
is still wanting to it the lorm of thought.
Ail the forms, such as feeling, popular ideas,
ani ref lectio: , may certainly have the form
of truth, ouo they themselves are not the true
form which makes the true content necessary.
"Thought", according to Hegel, "is the
absolute judge before which the content must
14verify and attest its claims." * In the
following paragra h he represents the 
secondary-task of philosophy: "It is not the
concern of Philosophy to produce Religion in 
any individual. Its existence is, on the 
contrary, presupposed as forming what is 
fundamental in everyone. So far as man’s 
essential nature is concerned, nothing new is 
to be introduced into him. To try to do this 
would be as absurd as to give a dog painted 
writings to chew, under the idea that in this 
way you could put mind into it. He who has 
not extended his spiritual interests beyond 
the hurry and bustle of this finite world, 
nor succeeded in lifting himself above this 
life through aspiration, through the 
anticipation, through the feeling of the Eternal, 
and who has not yet gazed upon the pure ether
14. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p.148.
of the soul, does not possess in himself that 
element which it i. our object here to comprehend."'®' 
In this res] ect it is the Vorsteilung which must 
act asthe guide and as the ground-breaker to the 
thoughtful, creative discipline of philosophy.
The Vorstellung is importa/fc, in so far as it 
opens u, new grounds and conceives the Eternal 
idea made concrete. The justification of 
philosophy supervening upon these naive 
categories lies in che necessity for a coherent 
system of Church doctrines. It is only 
principles or beliefs that can be held in 
common. Feeling , as such, is purely subject­
ive and can afford no bond of union. It is of 
the utmost importance, according to Hegel, that 
religion like philosophy be founded upon a 
substantial objective content of truth*
There is, however, another and very different 
side to Hegel’s thought about the relationship 
of hilosophy to religion, and it is a side 
which exercises an influence on his general 
outlook which is incommensurate with the extent 
to which he allows himself to give expression 
to it. John Baiilie comments on this in the 
following manner in his "Interpretation of 
Religion". "Eor it is difficult to escape the 
impression that it is from philosophy rather 
than from religion that Hegel himself prefers to
15* Ibid., Vol. I. p. 4.
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draw his own spiritual nourishment."1S# Is 
this* criticism valid? Yes, if one is carefxil 
to recognise the ambiguity in Hegel's views. 
Substantiating this point one may refer to the 
considerable transformation that the doctrines 
of Christianity undergo in Hegel's "philosophic 
rehabilitation" of the faith. Religion is the 
truth fox* all; it is the truth for the heart, 
calculated to affect the feelings and the moral 
will. It is, as Hegel says, "reason thinking 
naively." It has got hold of vital and eternal 
principles; but the form v/hich it presents 
then in, while best suited to its own purpose, 
is not adequate to the principles themselves.
It creates feeling and contingent facts as 
necessary and constitutive and integral elements 
in its int: r- ret a cion. While philosophy, freed 
by the Notion, comprehends the absolute Idea, in 
and of itself. The frame, in this instance the 
historical manne • of understanding the faith, 
does not stand on the same level as the work of 
art that it encloses. While the Vorsteilung 
may have been a vehicle, a mere stimulus of 
such an I such truths, when this mode of represent­
ing things is stri ped of these truths- and 
Philosophy is able to perform this process on 
the basis of its understanding of the movements
16. John B illie, "Interpretation of Religion"
page 195*
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of the Eternal Idea - Vorsteilung loses its 
religious bearing. It is eternal principles 
or truths which are necessary for the ming of 
pure reason. Speaking of philosophy and its 
relauionshi? to feeling and pictorial thought, 
Hegel says.."feeling is then not rejected by 
hilosophy; on the contrary, it simply gets 
through philosophy its true content.” That 
is to say, it may not be rejected, but this is 
nor to deny that it has been superceded by 
philosophical* analysis. Philoso hical thinking 
places itself in opposition to the concrete 
and carries through the opposition until it 
reaches a reconciliation between the two.
"This reconciliation", according to Hegel,
"is philosophy; so far as philosophy is 
theology, it sets forth the reconciliati n 
of God with Himself and with Nature, and shows 
that nature, othei^being, is Divine, that it 
partly belongs to the veiy nature of finite 
spirit to rise into the state of reconciliation 
and that it partly reaches the state of 
reconciliation in the history of the world.. 
This religious knowledge thus reached through 
the nature, and in ossession of the spiritual 
community passes through three stages or
17. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p. 14-9.
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positions.. the first position is that of 
immediate naive religion and faith; the 
second, che position of the understanding, 
of the so-called cultured reflection and 
enlightenment5 and finally, the third position, 
the stage of philosophy.f * Again Hegel’s 
false dialectical method comes in view* Inscead 
holding che preceding stages in tension with 
the com leced idea, the stages are virtually 
abolished and the synthesis, because it has 
no need ox the external and outward to verify 
or establish it, can dispense with the inaccurate 
and uns iritual emphasis of the Vorsteilung; 
fo the latter stood in need of supplementation 
and revision and verification on the part of 
Philosophy*
Philosophy not only supplants the religious 
naivette and gives to religion a certain 
rationality, end thac particularly to the 
Rationalists who delighted in de recating the 
element of reason in the Absolute Religion, 
but Dialectical philosophy begins with the 
proposition that God is essentially triadic in 
nature. The idea comes outside of Himself, 
posits Himself as the Other and returns to 
Himsel:.-. This ositing of Himself in an Other
18. Philosophy ox Religion, Vol.III. p.149-
Being is a necessary movement wherein He Knows 
Himself. ”Without the jorid, God wo Id not be 
God.” With the com. lex trinitarian movements, 
apriori conceived, the absolute religion, 
because'it emphasises the point oi return in 
the deeuh oi Christ, could be used as a 
necessary vehicle for the elaboration of the 
synthesis reached at the level of Spirit. The 
Absolute Religion, bee use Philosophy knows the 
content oi theldea, can be authenticated through 
philosophy. ”This standpoint (the Notion, or 
Begriff) consequently supplies us with the 
justification of religion, and, in particular, 
of the Christian or true religion. It knows 
the content in accordance with its necessity, in 
accordance with its reasons, and so, too, it 
knows ohe- forms also in the development of this 
content."^* Hegel writes in another context: 
••Subjectivity develops the content out of itself, 
but does this in accordance with necessity - 
knows end recognises the content to be necessary 
end that it is objective, thar it has an 
% esse rial existence of its own, is in end for 
itself. This is the standpoint oi Philosophy, 
according to which the content takes refuge 
in the Notion and, by means of thought, gets
19. Ibid., Vol.III. p.146
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2 0its restoration and justification*" # On the
basis ox Hegel’s trinitarian ideas, it is 
necessary that the Season or ITotion posit 
itself as an Other to itself and, in recognising 
the Qthe , return to itself, or "die to itself". 
This complex scheme by which God receives 
justification in history, ties itself uniquely 
to the Christian revelation and, in the 
cyclical process, devised already, the empirical 
or articular Other is nullified in the process 
of the Other returning to Itself. With these 
thoughts in mind, the Bergriff - the completed 
ilotlon - can pick and choose from the Vorsteilung 
to establish its acceptance and, in the process, 
identify itself with the sacred dogmas* "It 
was to Christ only that the Idea, when it was 
ripe, and the time fulfilled, could attach
itself, an in him only could it see itself
21realised." "But the history of Christ is a 
history for the Spiritual Co xounity, since it 
is absolutely adequate to the Idea..This is 
what muse be regarded as the essential thing, 
this is the verification, the absolute proof; 
this is what is to be understood by the witness 
ox the Spirit; it is the Spirit, the indwelling 
Idea which attests Christfs mission, and, for
20. Philosophy of Religion, Vol.III. p.145*
21. Ibid., Vol.III. p.113.
those who believed, and for us who are in 
possession ox the Notion, in its developed 
form, this is the verification."
Speaking of the practice of verifying the 
truth of the Absolute Religion that refers to 
the sensuous element in the appearance of 
Christ, Hegel makes it plain that the "outward" 
has been t *anscended.. ."The verification of 
Spirit cannot be simply asserted as if its 
truth was contained in such narratives 
regarding one who Was represented as a Historical 
person end in a Historical fashion. .This truth, 
however, is ure and certain by itself, although 
it has an historical starting point 
Elaborating furthe r on the manifestation of the 
Other in History, Hegel asks the question and 
offe *s his enswers.... "Is such a manifestauicn 
true in and for itself? It is, because God as 
Spirit is the triune God. He is this act of 
manifestation, this self-objectifying, and it 
is His nature to be identical with Himself 
while thus making Himself objective; He is 
eternal love. This objectifying, as seen in 
its completely developed form in which it 
resolves the two extremes o^  the universality 
of God and iinitude or death, and this return
22. Ibid., p.lip.
23. Ibid., p.110.
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into sell, is the act ox abolishing the 
rigidity oi the antithesis; is love in the 
infinite sorrow which is at the same time 
assuaged in ic. This absolute truth, this 
truth in and for itself that God is not an 
abstraction, but something concrete, is 
unfolded by philosophy *n
Clarifying his view on what is accomplished 
in the reconciliation, Hegel augments his 
presuppositions on the matter when he writes* •• 
"That God has shown Himself to be by His very 
nature reconciled with the world, that what is 
human is not something alien to His nature, but 
that this otherness, this self-differentiation, 
finitude, as it is sometimes expressed, is a 
moment in God Himself, though ro be sure, it 
is a vanishing moment; still, he has in this 
moment revealed and shown Himself to the Church."^* 
The mind posits or presupposes the unity of 
the divine and human. Thought presupposes that 
God in his true Hotion is the life process; 
the trinity in which the universal puts itself 
into antithesis with itself and is in this 
antithesis identical with itself. "Faith 
simply lays hold of the thought and has the 
consciousness that in Christ this absolute 
essential truth is perceived in the process
24. Ibid., p. 99*
25. Ibid., p.99.
of its development, and that is through Him 
that this truth has first been revealed.”
Fro.r bhese quotations the second point made 
conce rning the subservience of religion to 
Philosophy has been amply illustrated. 
rliilosophy knots the content of the Notion, 
its necessary movements, and the Absolute 
Religion merely illustrates the moments of 
the Notion fulfilling itself, and returning to 
itself. It is to be remembered thau Hegel’s 
ideas on *his subject are ambigiously stated 
an., that this ambiguity gave rise to similar 
confusion and division in the Post-Hegelian 
reactions.
Following this train of thought a bit 
further, Hegel’s views on the traditional 
doctrines in the Christian faith may be 
briefly summarised. The atonement is an 
exhibition only of one great rhythm of thought - 
the oneness of God and man. The death of 
Christ, reconciled the Absolute Being with 
Himself , and this act of death is Christ’s 
resurrection as Spirit. It does not 
represent the whole of the matter to speak of 
the atonement as o ecu ring at a particular time 
and happening to a particular individual. The 
truth is that this one person means all men,
26. Poid., p.87*
and tills once means always, but it does at 
firsc sight a pear as an empirical fact that 
happened to one man aid no more and belongs to 
a past which is no longer here. The right 
relation 01 the subject to the truth of the 
atonement, if Hegel’s thought is being inter­
preted correctly, is that it (man) should itself 
’’come to the same conscious unity, should deem 
ic good for itself, produce it in itself, and 
be filled with the divine spirit. This is
pure self-consciousness that knows and wills
27the truth, is the divine spirit in it• ” '
If this thought is Hegel’s, and, from our 
exploration Oi his philosophy, it is surely 
an implication, then it may follow that the 
kernel of Christianity is not the Historic 
incarnation, but the general truth of the 
Incarnation; the Union of God and man, the 
truth that In God we live and move and have our 
being, thao truth which human consciousness 
may re resent or does represent, in the move­
ments of the Absolute Spirit.
Doraer makes a point in his work on the 
"Person of Christ" in connection with the 
Hegelian sche.ie which bears repeating. Dorner 
points out chat the rhytbmatic process of the 
Divine life (constantly enters into limitation
2?. Ibid., p.150.
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or linitude, an' constantly returns out of it 
again into itself, or restores itself to 
identity of form) precludes the adequate real­
isation of God’s essence in any finite being. 
Since the finite has momentary being, it is 
clear that no place remains for a God-man in 
whom fullness of the Idea should take up its 
abode. Moreover, God would cease to be a 
living God if the Idea should in any way attain 
absolute realisation, whether in an individual 
or in the whole. The inadequacy of the form to 
its content solicits the process ever afresh.
If Christ should be conceived as the perfect 
God-man, history woul come to a termination 
with him. At the v ry most, Christ could only 
have formed the beginning of a higher stage in 
the process 01 the Divine self-consciousness,
beyond which, however, the following stages
28would be destined to advance.
On the basis of Dorner’s critique, it would 
appear tha* the triadic movement actually 
debunks and depreciates the finite and, 
furthermore, the supposed synthesis reached in 
the absolute Religion actually runs counter to 
the entire system; for we are led to believe 
that God becomes a subject in the endless 
series or totality of finite spirits. The
28. Domer, f ./ ., History of the Development of
the Doctrine of The Person of Christ, Vol.III. 
page 148.
world exiots merely to mediate God’s own self-
consciousnes . According to the Hegelian system,
all men participate in God-manhood in such a
manne r that a C histology is incompatible
therewith. The universal God-manhood, or
inca nation taught by Hegel, is neither derived
nor derivable from Christ; it necessarily robs
Him o^' his specific .osition, and puts all men
29on essentially the same level with Him.
An evalu cion by Hicolas Berdyaev may serve 
to esqpound the criticism made that the Hegelian 
system swallows the finite. He says in ’’The 
Divine and ?he Human” - "In German metaphysics 
of the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
eve ything is on a razor edge and may be toppled 
over on to one or other ox opposite sides. The 
philosophy of Hegel, which was its crowning 
manifestation, may be interpreted either as the 
final engulfing of the divine by the human and 
as an expression of the pride of man, or as the 
final engulfing of the human by the divine 
and as the denial of human personality. Both 
interpretations o~ Hegel are possible....Hegel, 
and, in part, Schelling, teach the becoming of 
God. The world process is the becoming of God; 
in man God finally becomes conscious. Both a 
deification of man and a repudiation of man
29. Ibid., p.148.
take place. There is nothing which is purely 
human, distinguished from the divine and standing 
before God in a drama which is being played out.”30. 
The Divine sel. -consciousness is, on the basis of 
our understanding of Hegel, in bondage to 
humanity. God is subjected to the conditions of 
time and to the process of gradualness, finding 
his adequate revelation in the totality of finite 
forms. Domer’s further word on the subject 
should be noted: He says - 11 If* God does not
gradually arrive at self-knowledge through the 
process of humanity (as it itself slowly arrives 
at knowledge) then, does Hegel teach or 
recognise a God above and outside of this 
process of humanity? On the contrary, it 
considers it to be its greatest honour to have 
overcome this view of the world. If God were 
sell-consciousness in eternal absoluteness, and 
if, consequently, He Himself were eternally 
His own other (sien andem), what ground would 
this system have for representing God as 
opening Himself to a world in which distinctions 
are taken seriously, and to a process of the 
world which is to overcome this veritable 
distinction. ‘
We may remark at this point that, while the
30. Berdyaev, Nicholas, "The Divine and the 
Human11 page 30-31 •
31 • Domer, page 151*
view of God as standing out of the world
entirely up to the point of his supernatural
entrance in his Son makes the revelation of
God something xoreign to the consciousness and *
life of man; then the opposite view, which
descends into the depths of human nature to
discover in i*c a God-related element, errs
in making the Incarnation of the Son, even
God Himself, too immanent. Either way of
comprehending the act of God in Christ avoids the
paradoxical union of God and the world. When
the problem of the relation between God and
the world is solved by converting the whole
of philosophy and theology into christology -
by treating the entire world as the Son of
God - the dialectical relationship between God
and His world (creation) is obscured. A
Christology ox the "Divine Humanity” is the
natural outcome of such a step. David
Frederick Strauss, whose views will be
discussed in a moment, understood the particular
incamacion in this vein. He says: "This
individual (Jesus Christ), by His personality
and His fates, became the occasion of raising
the truth that humanity is the God-man to
32.universal consciousness."^
32. Ibid., p.293.
Returning for a moment to consider Hegel’s 
views on the Evangelical history, we may say 
that his views fluctuated - and this is 
nowhere more evident than in his disciples.
Some of them held that this history entire, 
and others that this history in part, is 
tenable in conjunction with the philosophy of 
History. David Frederick Strauss, whom we 
shall discuss in more detail in our next 
cha ter, said in this connection: "The
question which can be decided from the stand­
point ox the rhilosophy 01 Religion is not 
whether what is narrated in the Gospel actually 
ha pened or not, but whether in view of the 
truth of certain conceptions it must necessaiy- 
ily have hap ened. And in regard to this, what 
I assert is,tha^ from the general system of 
the lei elian Philosophy it by no means 
necessarily follows that such an event must 
have happened, but that from the standpoint 
of the system, the truth of that from which 
actually the conception arose is reduced to a 
matter of indifference; it may have happened, 
but; it may equally as well not have happened.
And the task of deciding on this point may be
33calmly h- nded over to historical criticism.
33. Schweitzer, Albert, "The Quest of the 
Histo deal Jesus." Page 115*
Hegel1s authority may be appealed to by 
those who believe not only in an Incarnation 
of God in a general sense, but also the 
manifest a cion o_. God in flesh as taking place 
in one man (Jesus) at a definite time and place. 
From the apriori necessity of the Idea (going 
outside of itself and returning to itself) the 
incarnation , .whether individually or generally, 
must have taken place. Strauss’ ambigious 
interpretation ox Hegel in ehis instance is 
significant .or its portrayal of the real, 
though unsolved, problem in Hegel’s thought.
It is not clear, according to Strauss,
"Whether the evangelical fact as such, not 
indeed in its isolation, but* together with the 
whole series of manifestations of the idea (of 
God-m&nhood) in the history of the world, is 
the truth; or whether the embodiment of the 
idea in that single fact is only a formula of 
which consciousness makes use in forming its 
concept.
To the question whether, and, if so, how far, 
the evangelical histoiy can be held in 
conjunction with the Idea (the fundamental 
Notion of the Hegelian School) of the identity 
of the Divine and the human nature, three
34. Ibid., p.114.
answer's are possible: either the existence of
the history is compatible with Philosophy, or 
merely part of it, or that neither in part nor 
at all can the history be retained as history. 
The Hegelian school, as we shall presently 
witness, was divided into three divisions, 
according to these three answers. (1) The 
right side, represented by Marheineke' and 
Goschel, Gabler, Ganz, Herring and Schaller, 
emphasises the positive side of che master’s 
religious philosophy, implying that in Jesus 
the idea oj. God-raenhood was perfectly fulfilled 
and, in a certain sense, intelligibly realised. 
These men believed that Hegel’s emphasis on 
uhe creativi insight of religion end the 
philosophical dependence on rhis insight, 
supported and preserved the tenets of revealed 
religion. (2) The moderates, or centrum, 
or middle party reaction, while not professing 
to be thorough-going disciples of Hegel, 
applied the main principles of the system to 
the various sciences, particularly to Christian 
dogmas and to history. The representatives of 
this school, according to Alexander, "contended 
manfully against the materialism of the age for 
a spiritualistic interpretation of the world, 
and they found Hegel’s ideas helpful. (3) The
35* Alexander, History of Philosophy, p.351*
left on* extreme reaction, represented in the 
thought of Feubach, Strauss, Bauer and, later, 
Croce, isolated arguments in support of a 
negative interpretation of Christianity. This 
school, on the basis of Hegel’s dialectic and 
his distinction between Vorstellung and Begriff, 
believe the latter to triumph over the fonner 
and to lead the way fo • the rejection of the 
concrete, pictorial Vorstellung. At a later 
period in Surauss’ interpretation of Jesus, he 
writes in his "Popular Life for the German 
^eople" and his "Streitschriften" - "Christ is 
described as *a religious genius, who, owing to 
the eculierity of his constitution, or to His 
moral vigour, may possibly have worked some of 
the miracles of healing; and, although he is 
not in all respect the accomplished reality of 
the Idea, but merely as regards religion, in 
religious nu tters it is impossible to transcend 
the highest goal thereof, to wit, that a man 
should know himself in his immediate conscious­
ness to be one with'God.Commenting on the 
two major reactions, the left and right, Croce 
says..."It would be impossible to decide which 
of the two interpretations wrs the more faithful 
to the thought of Hegel; for both of them were 
founded upon Hegelian doctrines, end were
36. quoted by Domer, "Person of Christ" Vol.III.
page 292.
opposed and hostile to one another, precisely
37because those doctrines were contradictory. "f/ * 
John Bailie writes: "The left wing’s insist­
ence upon the popular and pictorial character 
o*^' religious thinking soon lei to the facile 
identification of dogma with mythology, and 
so to the virtual dismissal of religion from 
the philosopher’s spiritual stock and trade..
Bug the right wing, so Bailie believes, was 
also one-sided. "The right wing’s indiscrim­
inate acceptance of the whole religious 
tradition blurred the distinction between 
what is vi„al and what is me rely secondary 
and incidental; between the living and the 
outwom.. .Often there has been as iruch 
fundamental religious scepticism behind the 
indiscriminate conversation of the right as 
behind the more subve sive illusionism of the 
leit."39.
We shall be concerned in the next chapter 
wiGh the leftist reaction as represented in 
the writings of David Frederick Strauss. 
Meanwhile, some brief summary of the main points 
arising out o. Heuel’s own interpretation may 
suxiice to make us aware of the central issue
37* Croce, "What is Living and what is Dead of 
the Philosophy of Hegel" page 202, quoted 
by Bailie, John, "Interpretation of 
Religion" page 197*
38. Bailie, "Interpretation of Religion", p.200.
39. Ibid., p.200.
at stake. (1) The Vorstellung, or pictorial 
representation is a. transitional stage to the 
absolute idea. Though this stare seems 
necessary if the truth was to be brought home
to everyday humanity. The leftist group 
isolate the relative value of the Vorstellung 
and, as a consequence, they are led to 
emphasise the fictional, mythological and 
relatively unimportant part exercised by the 
pictorial in the necessary realisation of the 
Absolute Idea. In this emphasis, Christ 
represents "Humanity" united to God through 
dyin , rising and ascending to Heaven. This 
emphasis, particularly in Feurbach and the 
later Straussian writings (1866 "Leben Jesus", 
and other writings) gave rise to the thought 
of making God’s spirit only in finite spirit, 
while in Himself He is not spirit but a 
merely physical principle. God, the Absolute 
Spirit, appears to be no more than the result 
attained by the finite spirit. (2) On the 
other hand, Hegel’s emphasis on the pictorial 
and concrete particularised incarnation of the 
God-man in the Christ, gave rise to the view 
that the unity of the Divine and human natures 
has been brought into human consciousness
through the Christ, and, moreover, this union 
is a certainty through the death of the God- 
mon.
If the Hegelian dialectic can be understood 
as progressing to the Absolute Spirit, and, at 
. the same time, correlating the thesis, antithesis 
in a dynamic synthesis which does not abolish, 
nor extinguish the thesis and antithesis, then 
the Orthodox Hegelians have understood Hegel’s 
religious philosophy. But, as we have been 
careful to point out, on the basis of Hegel’s 
anti-dialectical scheme, (the latter stages 
transcending and superseding the former), the 
concrete, in this instance the object of the 
Absolute Religion, the person that unified 
v/ithing Himself and the Cosmos the divine and 
human, is swallowed in the synthesis, (the 
Absolute returning to Himself out of a state 
o~ estrangement). The co-tempo rani ty of the 
Absolute Idea, (a favourite way Hegel uses of 
relerin to the realised Idea), seems to be 
independent of the "fact” that Jesus was 
• confessed to be the Christ by the original 
community. Though the "facts” of sacred 
history are "remembered facts", (John Knox’s 
phrase), Hegel annihilctes the dialectical 
relationship which must exist betv/een the
Church and the "origin 1 witnessing community." 
This fact is clearly presentable in his view 
of the spiritual co annuity. In the last 
analysis, this interpretor of Hegel would accuse 
him o a form ox docetism and monophysitis.
That is, the God-man, the particular self- 
manifestation Oj. Go'; is only an appearance, a 
ph ntom which the Church can dispense v/ith as 
long as it reco nises that the idea has three 
essential, necessary movements. It is our 
final judgment that the Hegelian system cannot 
have a place for a legitimate Christology. The 
Unive sal God-manhood, or incarnation taught 
by him, is neither derived nor derivable from 
Christ; it necessarily robs Him of his 
specific position, and puts all men on 
essentially the same level with Him. God 
really denotes the essence of humanity, and 
everyone, apart from the mediatorial function 
of the Christ, is redeemed by bringing his 
essence to development, or, more precisely 
expressed, by bringin^ it to consciousness.
— .—  ---,---- life.— ™  ~ ---------—
CHAPTER 11.
1. Introduction: Strauss’ Interpretative Key.
The contemporary 1 fentmytho 1 o g i sierungM controversy 
assumes that there is myth to be interpreted in the 
Hew Test ment and that, unless this myth is explained, 
the Gospel ce not be effectively communicated in 
our modem age. The letter ox these assumptions,
St reus > nuintained, must govern any interpretation 
of ohe Gospel, but the iormer, the existence of 
myth in the Bible, particularly in the New Testament, 
hrd to be proven. However the current school of 
denyGlnlogtong defines myth, and whatever may be 
our reservations s to the application of their 
Jmethods to the history ox zhe New Testament, the 
recognition of the existence of this literary 
form in the New Testament finds its origin in 
general in -he early decades of the 19th Century 
and, in particular, in the expanded application 
given zhls interpretative hey in Strauss’
"Leben Jesus'*.
Ouher theologians had applied the mythical key 
before Strauss, nd he ire el/ admits that his 
critique is not novel; but his predecessors and 
contemporaries hi j consistently carried forth 
his thesis. They had been content to stop with 
ohe Old Testament and, if they advanced to the 
Hew Testa ent, only the infancy and ascension- 
resurrection narratives caine under their purview. 
Strauss’ contribution to the discussion, which
will be examined in detail, was to bring together 
into one result the material which his countrymen 
had for a half century before been accumulating in 
order to invalidate or seriously question the 
pretension of the Gospel ns-natives to be taken as 
genuine history. The way had been prepared for 
this heimeutic 1 method advanced in his critique 
by Lowth, Heyne, Eichoxn and Gabler, but none of 
these men had the courage, or the transcendence, 
so Strauss informs us in the preface to his 1st. 
edit n o: his life of Jesus, to utilise to the 
fullest extent end apply in any thorough-going 
manner, the tool which he maintained would 
annihilate the irreconcilable impasse created in 
biblical interpretation by the supe mature lists 
and rationalists. Only a treatise written by 
one ear ncipnted fro . certain religious and 
dogmatical presuppositions which had hindered 
research in the past, and only one who realised 
before enib rking on such an investigation, that 
the essential gospel affirmr cions remained 
inviolate, cles;ite his criticisms, could apologise 
for the faith in the courts of science and 
philosophy. The author believed himself eminently 
qualified for such a task. Though others could 
execute such a work with incomparably superior 
erudition, they did not, or could not, separate 
themselves from their outmoded presuppositions.
118.
3ut St reus sf . ith coolness end detachment, bom 
out of his hilo.jO: hical studies, more particularly 
in the fires o~ Hegelian philosophy - though this 
predisposition is nowhere ; cknovdedged, however 
evidential it a; j be in his writing, and especially 
in his ChristoloJLc: 1 reconstruction - Strauss 
coul 1 arbitrate between the opposing schools and 
present n int rpreration or the Gospel purporting 
to be fr ed fro the uorl viev/ im lied in the two 
champs*
Strauss’ question in 18351 when his ~irst life of 
Jesus was ublished, and in 1864, when he wrote the 
Life o- Jesus for the German People, was: "Is the
Gospel hisfo^ true or reliable as a whole, and its 
details, or is it rot?" On the basis of what
we know ox history, scienc , and philosophy, end, 
in particularf the character of God, wtut is true 
and valid for all time, and what depending on 
casual and ten orery circumstances, had now become 
useless or pernicious*
Strauss * question and his answer caused considerable 
consternation among t e two schcols of biblical 
criticisms which had assumed that all, or at least 
in part, when the history was str.i of its 
miraculous embellishments, the content of the Gospels 
possessed historical validity* His task, as he saw 
it, was to inv di late the two out-standing
1. "Life oi Jesus lor The German People" p.XI, 1864.
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interpretations before he could advance his own.
The supematuralists, represented primarily by 
Olhausen, but in some degree drawing sympathisers 
from the rationalists and the middle of the road 
of ecclectic mythicists, as Straus3 called them, 
assumed the histo y to be factually and objectively 
true. The miracles and the events which carried 
them were both true history. The rationalists, 
on the other hand, dissatisfied with the philosophy 
of histo.y imrlied in the former’s presentation, 
and offended by the acceptance of miracles as 
historical fact, advanced an interpretation purport­
ing to free the events from their supernatural 
trappings. These embellishments and miraculous 
int. inventions in s world free from interpositions 
were only dra eries which need only to be drawn 
aside in order to disclose the pure historic form. 
..hile the supem turalists offended the discoveries 
o~ sci rice, the rationalists mutil-ted and defaced 
the affirmations of faith. On this basis - that 
is, on the terms which faith and science require - 
each view w s untenable. Scientific theology, 
instead Ox turning back from rationalism to 
supernatural is.;, or from supe mature lisn to 
rationalism, muso move straight onward between the 
two and search out a new path for itself. In 
accordance with the philosophical method which 
Strauss utilises, but in no place admits to be
the rationale 0 - his mythicising process, he sets 
up a di lectical attem - che thesis represented 
by supernaturalis.tic expl nation with an antithesis 
represented by the rational! rfcic explc nation, 
resolved into a synthesis by che mediating 
solution, vfedfvis the mythological interpretation. 
The deuelir‘ dialectic, as we shall note when we 
discuss the specific incidents in the life of 
Jesus, dett rii: os the method of the work. Each 
event in the life of Jesus is considered se fcely* 
first as supematurolly explained, then as 
rationalistically e 1 ined, ;nd the one explanation 
i so r -uted by he other. "By this means,” remarks 
3t aus in is re ce, ”whe incidental advantage 
is secured that the work is i -ed to serve as a 
repertory of the leading views and discussions of 
all parts o: Gospel history.”
Before- illustr ting this process, his introductory 
section discussing the development of the mythical 
point o; view in relation to the Gospel histories 
should receive some attention# His survey of the 
attem]ted reconciliations between Gospel history, 
between the assumed immediate manifestations of 
the divine in history, and the mediateknowledge of 
the divine in modem culture through the finite 
casual nexus, points up the solution, or at least 
paves the way for a solution which Strauss offers
as a eoncili toiy measure in the body of the work. 
The problem which Straus ; posed in his book, and, 
for that m: , the central aim of his work,
besides invalidating the supernatural 1st and 
urely rationalist ;ositions, may be noted in the 
following quotation from his introductory section. 
He says in che section, "The application of uhe 
mythus too circumscribed," referring to the half­
way position occupied by the current mythicists.... 
(For them) "the entrance to the Gospel history 
was through the decorated portal of mythus and 
the exit was similar to it, whilst the inter­
mediate space was still traversed by the crooked
pand toilsome paths of natural interpretation."
The two extremities had been cut off by the 
rul ing kni e of criticism, while the essential 
halo of the history, the period from the 
baptism to the resurrection, remained as yet 
unasjailed. He was convinced that the middle 
way, between the historical and mythical* chosen 
by the mythicists v/ho used the historical mythus 
as a m ans of relapsing into the inconsistencies 
comm n to the naturalists and rationalist 
interpretation, was a misrepresentation of the 
mythical position. They retained some of the 
events as historic 1 anddesignated others as
2. "Life of Jesus" p. 45.
mythical, and this rather arbitrarily. Strauss 
believed this inconsistency was due to a misunderstand­
ing and failure on their pert to clearly apprehend 
the claims set out in the mythical interpretation.
:is aii , or what he proposed for himself in his work 
is stated in the section, "The mythical view not 
clearly apprehended.” 3; eaking of himself: "This 
writer applies the nature of themythus to the entire 
history. He recognises mythi or mythical embellishments 
in every section, and ranges under the category of 
ythi no. merely the iraculous occurences during 
the infancy of Jesus, but chose also of his public 
life; not merely mirscles operated on Jesus, but 
chose wrought by him."^* "We have to realise," he 
sa^s in his preface, "that the narratores testify 
sometimes, not to outward facts, but to ideas, often 
ost poetical, and beautiful ideas, constructions 
which even eyewitnesses had unconsciously put upon 
facts, im inetion concemin. them, reflection upon 
then, reflections and imaginings such as were natural 
to the time an at the author’s level 01 culture.
What v/e have here is not falsehood, not misrepresent­
ation of the truth. Ic is a plastic, naive, and, at 
the same time, oiten most profound apprehension of 
truth, wichin the area Ox religious feeling and poetic 
insight. Iv results in narrative, legendary, mythical 
in n t o ,  illustrative often of spiritual truth in a 
manner more e ? ecc than any herd prosaic statement
4
could achieve."
3« "Leben Jesus" Section II
4. Religious Development from Kant. p.114.
Before addressing ourselves to the inconsistency in 
the mythical school which Strauss sought to clear up, 
the last statement points us to a definition of myth. 
Considering the great importance v/hich the idea of myth 
possesses in Strauss1 work, it is indeed striking that 
the author has nowhe ?e entered into a connected invest­
igation of this idea, and especially into a more definite 
settlement of the conditions under which alone a myth can 
originate* He infers that myth is a process, a develop­
mental schema to account for the rise and progress, the 
character and influences on Christianity. In the life 
of Jesus for the German People he says: "L*y fundamental
notion in regard to the unhistorical element in the 
Gospels has been that of the myth, by v/hich I understand, 
inve.citudes, resembling history of original Christian 
ideas, fashioned in the legend which unconsciously 
invented thenf . These legends, or the legendery trans­
formation of the real life of Jesus arose chiefly from 
the practical feelings and wants of the people and on 
this recount formed according to the free play of the 
imagination# But myth, contrary to the rationalist 
position, is not so much the product of conscious 
invent .‘on, as the result of a pronounced inclination to 
the pictorial. This type of representational thinking is 
the form to which the human mind naturally resorts at the 
stag-, where it inevitably finds the difficulty of resting 
in the conceptual world. In other words, mythicising is 
the child-like faculty of putting things, v/hich the 
juvenile mind is incapable of stating in a scientific 
fashion, in a concrete and pictorial form. "We rate as
5* "Life of Jesus for the German People" Vol.I. p.142.
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Gospel myths any narrative, related directly or 
indirectly to Jesus, v/hich is not, and in so far as 
it is noc, to be accounted an expression of fact, 
but a precipitate of an idea of his earliest 
disciples."
Strauss* classification of mychi and his criteria 
for distinguishing between the various mythi will be
discussed in a later section; but now a glance at
■
his definition of religion may prepare the way for 
the implicit presuppositions of our author. "If 
religion be defined as the perception of truth, not 
in th form of an idea, which is the philosophic 
perception, but invested with imagery; it is easy 
to see that the mythical element can be wanting 
only when religion either falls short of, or goes 
beyond, its particular province, and that in the
7proper religious sphere it must necessarily exist.”'* 
Religion, it appears on the basis of this 
definition, is a body in forth in the semblance 
of historic* 1 form, the essential truths v/hich in 
hilosophy coincide with the actual. This is 
possible for philosophy..."because for this 
disci line,” Strauss remarks further, "the thought 
of God is coni rehended to be his essence, and 
in the regular cours* itself of nature end of history, 
the r vol tion of the divine idea is acknowledged."8'
6.. Thombum, T.J. "Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical"p.7. 
7* "Life of Jesus" p.80.
8. Ibid., p.80.
From this understanding of religion, it may he 
inferred that the author vas more concerned with the 
working out the Hejeli? n principles - the differences 
between Vorstellung andBegriff, - pictorial, 
representational thining and conceptual cognition - 
on historical grounds, nrrrowing the ideas that the 
master had made large end indefinite, defining v/hat 
he had left undefined, than he was in attaching any 
independent meaning to myth, or giving any positive 
significance to this literary form. His religious 
ideas presuppose a meta hysic, one that vitally 
affects his view of the nature of God, his activity 
in the v/orl and the possible reconciliation v/hich may 
be effected between the discoveries of Science and the 
affirmations of faith. These metaphysical presupposit­
ions will be elaborated in connection with the section 
tenne I. by Strauss, "Dogmatic import of the life of 
Jesu meanwhile, in fairness to the author, the 
develorm nt of the mythical key will be discussed. It 
is in this section what Strauss outlines the problems 
concerning the mythical interpretation and the reticence 
of the w -T5 in the field to apply the interpretative 
ion:; to the Nev, Testament. Within this section, Strauss’ 
manne • o. rectifying the limited and inherent betrayal 
of the mythus is set forth in some detail.
11. The develop ment of the mythical interpretation:
A. Philo soph:/ of History.
The rationalists, the mythicists, and to some extent 
the allegorlsts - but not as decidedly as the other 
interprotators, - shared the same interpretation of 
history. An account in the Gospel history is declared
unhistoric r1, vhcn to ure the words of Strauss, "the 
nerr tive in irreconcilable with the known nd universal 
lrws . ich govern t *e co\u?se of events# Nov/ according 
to the 1 rws agreeing with all just philosophical 
conceptions an. all credible experience, the absolute 
cause never disturbs the chein oi sec ndary causes 
by single arbitrary rets oi inter o3ition, but rather 
m nilests itself in the production of the aggregate 
of finite caus litiec, ind oi their reciproc 1 action.
• hen, t crefore, we meet with an account of certain 
phenomena or events of which it is eitfc rpressly 
strted or iu; lied that they were produced immediately 
by God himself (divine ep-sritions - voices from heaven 
and the Hue), or by human beings possessed of 
supernatural powers (miracles, prophecies), such an 
account is in so far to be considered as not historical* 
And, inasmuch as, in general, the intermingling of the 
spiritual world with the human is found only in 
unauthentic records, and is irreconcilable with all 
.just conceptions! so narratives of angels and of 
devils, oi their appearing in human shape and interfering 
with hum n concerns, ennnot possibly be reconciled as 
historic!1*
Another law oi liistoiy, overlooked by the ecclestic
mythicists in their preference for establishing the 
histo ice 1 1 ct, concerns the law of succession. All 
occurences, not excepting the nost violent convulsions 
and the uost rapid changes, follow in certain order of 
sequence o: incr ase and decrease* Ii, therefore, we 
ere told o a celebrated individurl t vctcd
already at his birth and during his childhood that
attention which he elicited (elicited) in his manhood; 
that his followers at a single glance recognized him 
as be in all tnab he actually was; ii’ the transition 
from the dec_ est des ondency to the most ardent 
enthusiasm after his death is represented as the work 
of a single hour: we must feel more than doubtful
whether it Is a real history which lies before us. If 
psychological laws otherwise quite usual to us are 
absolutely broken, the historicity of the record is 
open to grave sus icion. To be re garde as historically 
valid, a narrative must neither be incinsistent with 
itself nor in contradiction with other accounts.
Another point implicit in tne anti-supematuelism 
shared by the naturalists, rationalists and mythicists, 
is iven succint formulat on by Strauss. Ex laining 
the rise oi tne unhistoricel point of view v/hich one 
meets in the sacred writings, he says: "In the ancient 
world - that is, in the east - the religious tendency 
was so preponderating, and the knowledge of nature 
so a imited, that the law o~ connection betv/een earthly 
and finite beings was very loosely regarded. At every 
link there vva a ris: osition to spring into the infinite, 
nd to see God as the immediate cause of every change 
in nature or the human mind. In this mental condition 
the biblical history was written. Hot that God is here 
re resented as doing all and everything himself - a 
not. cn which, from the manifold direct evidence of the 
fundamental connecti n b tween finite things, would be 
impossible to any reasonable mind: but there prevails
in che biblical writers a ready disposition to derive 
all things down to the minutest details, as soon as 
they appear particularly important immediately from 
God. He it is who gives the rain and sunshine; he 
sends the east wind and the storm; he dispenses war,
famine, pestilence; he hardens hearts and softens them, 
suggests thoughts end resolutions. And this is 
particularly the case with regard to his chosen 
intrustm nts an b- loved people. In the history of 
the Israelites we n I traces of his immediate agency 
at every step: Through Moses, Elies, Jesus, he performs
things v/hich never would have happened in the ordinary 
course of nature. " *
3o f' r the rationalists andthe raythicists can agree 
on the basis of their common conviction, that all 
things ere linked together by a chsin of causes and 
effects, which sutlers no interruption. Even the 
naturalists and the deists can agree to this view of 
history, with the exception that for them the stories 
we- btributed to ignorance, and imposture. With 
this vie., of History, tie supematuralist position 
s bee ruled out o~ c urt before her case has been 
presented. Though the Allegorists, that is the 
earliest interpreters, lid not completely share this 
view o: history, they did, so Strauss contends, by 
their relinquishment of historical reality , the 
cor. preal and literal for the spiritual in order to 
preserve to them an absolute inherent truth, approximate 
the mythical point of view. While the Allegorists 
maintained the author of sacred scripture to relate 
in historical semblance a higher inspiration 
received from a divine agency, the mythical view 
similarly convinced that the inner signification of 
the events was clothed in historical semblance, 
derived the ins -i rat ion from the natural process 
where the legend originated and developed in the 
spirit of a community.
9* "Leben Jesus" p.78.
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'The Christian and Hebrew allegorists, offended by the 
sensible, hum nising anthromor hie traits ascribed to 
the deity end endeavouring to penetrate to the aim of
the author of the nacvs tive in question prepared the
way for the rejection of the literal accuracy of the 
records. But uhe allegorists due to their super- 
naturalist bias, their fear of offending the faithful 
in" their lack of critical tools, could not embark on 
the radio; 1 criticisms 0 the narratives prof erred by 
the naturalists, rationalists end the Mythicises. The 
question is now, in view of the philosophy of History, 
the rise of the mythical point of view through the 
naturalist an- rationalists and Strauss* quarrel with 
the nythicist school ox thought.
B. 3 I3B  Ob- TkB CTnilOAL VIBE.
The evolement 0 the -.ythicsl position through the 
naturalistic and rationalistic criticism of scripture 
and the freedom given to biblical interpretation by 
these schools c n best be illustr;ted by the reaction 
to and elaboration of these ideas in the mythical 
interpretation. Because the findings of the 
rationalists and naturalists were felt to jeopardise 
the essential affirmations of the faith, the mythical 
point of view stepped in to arbitrate between the 
rationalists and supematuralist s.
The rationalists, particularly Eichom and Paulus, 
opposed their position to the naturalists and the Deists. 
The latter had declared the papular deities the inventions 
of imposters designed uo deceive and subjugate the 
common people* The rationalists, contrary to this
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view, believed the rods were benevolent men, wise 
lev.give *s • nd just ulers ol e rly times, whom the 
gratitude of their contemporaries and posterity had 
encircle with divine glory. These proceedings were 
not fraudulent schemes, with an intention to deceive, 
but they were altogether natural, considering the 
mentality of the age, yet morally irreprehensible•
The rati nalist, influenced by the mythological 
research of Heyne, perceived that the divine inter­
positions must be alike admitted, or alike denied, 
in the primitive historic^ of all ; eo le. To avoid 
the ni turaliuuic accusation that the accounts of the 
divine inte rventions were based upon deceit and 
falsehood, the n t•onelists contended that the 
ancient records ere to be interpreted in the spirit 
ox their a&e. They are the productions ox an infant 
* nd unscientific age; end treated, without reserve 
of divine interventions, in ccordance with the 
conception and phraseology of that early period. So 
that, in point 01 fact, we have neither miracles to 
wonder at, on the one hand, nor deceptions to unmask 
on the other; but simply the language of a fonner 
.age to uran.:! te into that ox our day. The super­
natural lustre was not a fictitious colouring 
imparted with a design to deceive, but the natural 
and spontaneous illumination from antiquity itself. 
Instead of discarding the kernel along with the husk 
of history, it was the task of the biblical interpretor, 
who desires to deal with matte, s of fact, to separate 
the constituent elements of fact and opinion so closely
-
amalgamated end yet in themselves so distinct; end to 
extricete the jure kernel oi fact from the shell of 
ox inion. In order to do this in the absence of any 
lore genuine account which would serve as a correcting 
parallel, the inter retor must transplant himself in 
imagination upon the theatre of action, and strive to 
the utmost to conte plate the events by the light of 
the age in which they occurred. And from tins point of 
view he must seek to supply the deficiencies of the 
narrative, by filling in these explanatory collateral 
circumstances, which the relator himself is so often 
led by his x redilection for the supernatural to leave 
unnoticed.
But, this vie*, proposed by Eichom and more completely 
developed by Paulus, resu rosed the Old and New Testament 
writings to contain a minute and faithful narration, 
composed shortly after the occurence of the events, 
recorded a d derived, whenever this was possible, from 
the testimony of eyewitnesses. For it is only from 
accurate a id original reports, so they assumed that 
the ungarbled feet can be disentangled from interwoven 
opinio; . Although these interrretors admitted that some 
of the books we e not written contemporaneously with the 
events, they still believed that the legendary addition 
could be cleared away and the natural course of history 
traced. Assuming h e historical basis of the Old and 
New Testaments, they begin to weave them into one 
consecutive chronologically-arranged detail of facts.
The attempts to reduce the miraculous narrative to the 
natural order of cause and effect ere by no means
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designed lor the purpose of expelling them away, but 
rather to give credibility to what took place, end to 
revent any after-thought about minor circumstances 
from interfering with our confidence in essentials. When 
for instance, to illustrate Faulus1 procedure, we rea 
that an angel by tl c name ox Gabriel visited Mery to 
ann unce to her the maternity ox the Messiah, the 
eu e m  tural circumstances might easily induce us to 
reject the whole story as fabulous. This indiscriminate 
rejection of good and b ;d is prevented, if we learn from 
some sag cious interpreter to distinguish fact and opinion 
as mingled in the gospel narratives. We shall then 
dismiss th story about the angel as a supposition of 
M ry; but that someone visited her and made the 
announcement - this, as the true essence of the story, 
we shall firmly retain. So that, according to the theory 
of Dr. Faulus, the main point in the above instance is, 
that some person visited Mary, that such person being the 
angel Gabriel unnecessary.
Advancing biblical criticism co id not accept the 
assumptions of this school of interpretation. Two reasons 
ere evident and three ere given by an annonymous writer - 
which Strauss quotes: 1. The records were net written by 
eyewitnesses or by persons nearly contemporaneous with the 
events. Strauss attempts to substantiate this point in his 
external evidence tor the existence of mythi in the ITew 
Testament. 2. That which Faulus reserves in the instance 
quoted as essential, the Evangelists themselves would have 
considered so far secondary, or rather worthless, that they 
would not have t lit of telling the story at all under 
such limitations; that which Faulus calls their opinion
about the fact, constituted in their estimation, the 
fact itself; the circumstances are the very es :ence of 
the story, end if the fact was not as they tell it, it did 
not happen at all. The annonymous writer whom Strauss 
agrees with, says that "the essential defect of the 
natural inter; rotation as exhibited in its fullest 
development by Paulus* co uientaiy, is its unhistorical 
mode of procedure. He objects, so Strauss says: "that 
it allows conjecture to supply the deiiciences of the 
record; adopts individual speculations as a substitute 
for real history; seeks by vain endeavours to rer^ resent 
that as natural which the nar re describes as 
supernatural; and lastly, evaporates all sacredness 
and divinity from the Scriptures, reducing them to 
collections of amusing tales no longer meriting the 
name of histoiy. According to our author and the 
annoymous writer Strauss is quoting, this insufficiency 
of the natural .ode of interpretation whilst the 
supernatural also is felt to be unsatisfactory, lead 
the mind to the mythical view, which leaves the 
substance of the narrative unassailed; and instead of 
venturing to explain the details, accepts the whole^ 
not indeed as true history, but as a sacred legend.
Strauss believed that if’ the mythical view is admitted, 
the innumerable, and never otherwise to be harmonised 
discrepancies and chronological contradictions in the 
gospel histories,disappear, as it were, at one stroke.
10. "Leben Jesus" r .32.
C. CLASSIFICATION OF THE KY I.
Now th£ t it had become impossible to rest satisfied 
with modes of inte j retation so unhistorical, an 
interpretative key must be developed v/hich did justice 
to both faith end history. While the rationa ist had 
insisted that all primitive histories, whether Hebrew 
or Pagan, should be treated alike, this equality 
gradually disa* peared. The mythical view became more 
developed in relation to profane history, but the natural 
mode of explanation was.still used to interpret the 
Hebrew records. Un^il it had been proven that the events 
recorded in the scripture e not written by eye­
witnesses or those nearly contemporaneous with the events, 
and until it w s established that what Paulus reserves 
as being essential, v/a in fact, secondary in the minds 
of the authors of sacred scripture, the myt.iical view 
could not be developed in relationship to the Old 
Testament, much less admitted in the New Testament.
The next decisive seep in the realisation of the
mythical point of view was taken by Bauer when he 
explained, after Gabler and Schelling, the nature of 
the mythus, or upon what grounds a narrative must be 
recognised as mythus. "A narrative," he explains, "to 
be recognisable as mythus, first, when it proceeds from an 
age in which no written records existed, but in which 
facts were transmitted through the medium of oral 
tradition alone; secondly, when it presents an 
historical account of events v/hich are either absolutely 
or relatively beyond the reach of experience, such as
occurences connected with the spiritual world, and
incidents to which, from the nature of the circum-
stances, no one could, have been witness; or, thirdly,
when ie desls in the marvelous and is pouched in
11symbolic 11 1anguage."
These biblical critics offered the following
general definition of the mythus. "It is the
represe.it at ion o_ an event or of an idea in a form
which is historical but et the same time characterised
by the rich pictorial and imaginative mode of thought
12and express! n of the primitive ages." They also 
distinguished several kinds of mythi:
Historical mythi: Narratives of real events
coloured by the light of antiquity, which confounded 
the divine and the human, the natural and the super­
natural.
.ilosophical mythis Such as clothe in the garb 
of historical narrative a simple thought, a precept, 
or an idea of the time.
-oetictl mythi: Historical and philosophical mythi
partly blended together, and partly embellished by the 
creations of the imagination in which the original 
fact or idea is almost obscured by the veil which the 
fancy of the poet has woven around it.
To classify the biblical mythi according to these 
several distinctions is a difficult task, primarily 
because the ythus which is purely symbolical wears 
the semblance of history equally with the mythus which
11. "Leben Jesus'* p.25*
12. Ibid., p.26.
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represents an actual occurence. These critics, however, 
laid down rules by which the different mythi might he 
distinguished. The first is, they say, to determine 
whether the narratives have a distinct object, and 
what that object is. Where no object, for the sake of 
v/hich the legend might have been invented, is 
discoverable, everyone wo Id pronounce the mythus 
to be historical. But if sll the principle 
circumstances of the narrative concur to symbolise 
a particular truth, this undoubtedly was the object 
of tl.e narrative, and the myth is philosophical.
The blending of the historical and philosophical 
myths is particularly to be recognised when we can 
detect in the narretive an attempt to derive events 
from their causes. In many instances the existence 
of an historical foundation is proved also by 
independent testimony; sometimes certain particulars 
in the mythus are intimately connected with known 
genuine history, or bear in themselves undeniable 
and inherent characteristics of probability; so 
that the critic, while he rejects the external form, 
may yet retain the groundwork as historical. The 
poetical mythus may be distinguished by the negative 
criterion offered by Bauer. When the narrative is so 
wonderful on the one hand as to exclude the possibility 
of its being a detail of facts, and when on the other 
it discovers no attempt to symbolise a particular 
thought , it may be suspected that the entire narrative 
owes its birth to the imagination of the poet.
These mythi, instead of being intentional devices 
to deceive, v.ere not the artistical product of 
design and invention. They were unartificial and 
spontaneous, gliding in of themselves, in the lapse 
of time and in the course of transmission. The 
sages of antiquity, so Schelling says, "clothed 
their ideas in an historical garb, not only in order 
to accomodate those ideas to the apprehension of a 
people who rust be awakened by sensible impressions, 
but also on their own account. Deficient themselves 
in clea • abstract ideas, and an inability to give 
expression uo their dim conceptions, they sought 
10 illumine what we3 obscure in their representations 
by means of sensible imagery."^*
The rationality ox the mythical view served to 
refute the indemonstrable hypotheses which the 
naturalist mode of interpretation had been weaving 
around the unproven eye-witness accounts, the 
groundwork of historical fact. This mode could be 
retained as long as the events coincided with the 
records,or the records were nearly contemporaneous. 
Since the only means of acquaintance with a history 
is a narrative v/hich we possess concerning it, the 
naturalists are not justified in inventing a 
natural course of events. Because we do not possess 
a paralleled account of the life of Jesus, the critics 
seeking from the supernatural basis, the natural 
course of events, will only v/eave a tissue of 
absurd hypotheses even more wonderful than the fact 
itself. The natural interpreters, furthermore, are
Ibid., p.27.
not justiiied to refer the dress in which the even ts 
are clothed to oetry, end preserve the events them­
selves as history. The whole - dress and event - 
belong to the province of poetry and myths.
The mythicises further pointed out that since the 
Nee Testament presents false facts and impossible 
consequences which no eye-witness could have related, 
and which could only be the product of tradition, it, 
too, contains mythi. The thesis that it was customary 
to look for mythi in fabulous primitive ages where no 
written records existed, end the possibility that in 
the time of Jesus writing prohibited mythi in the 
N w Testament, does not to this school present a 
serious problem. The existence of written documents 
does not prove the life of Jesus was immediately 
recorded. The state o^  excitement among these 
unpoetical eople obscured and concealed facts.
Le^ewis ..ere gradually formed, by steps no longer 
traceable, and not by one individual but under the 
stimulus of the group. Speak:'ng to this point,
Strauss says, "The ; icsl i & were formed- 
by the influence of sentiments common to mankind; 
and that the different elements grew together 
without t e author*s being himself conscious of 
their incongruity. It is the notion of a certain 
necessity and- unconsciousness in the formation of 
the ancient m^ .-thi, on wnich we insist." for that
14. Ibid., p.76.
matter, although written documents may have 
existed in the Gospel era, these documents and the 
recipients of the message of Jesus were still imbued 
with the philosophy of history v/hich failed to 
distinguish between history and super-history. Strauss 
believes that when the dawn of an historical age is 
considered, it must be remembered that the birth of 
history is r lative. The people of highly civilised 
Greece, and of Home the capital of the world, stood 
on an eminence w ich had noc been reached in Galilee 
and Judea.
then it is accented that we do not possess the 
immediate record of an eye-witness in any one of 
the four Gospels, and that each originated from 
oral tradition, it is much easier to find a 
continually increasing number of mythi and mythical 
embellishments.
The impugning 01 tlierecords to be eye-witness 
* cco nts of the events destroys in one stroke the 
hypothesis that had governed the existing rational­
istic interpretation ox the Gospel history. If we 
do not possess the immediate record of an eye-witness 
in any one of the four Gospels, and Strauss was 
intent on establishing the unhistoricity of the 
fourth Gospel - for when the historical groundwork 
of the synoptic Gospel3 had been invalidated, these 
interpreters retreated to the fourth Gospel and 
continued to perpetrate their rationalist view of 
history — then v/e have no right to suppose that the
ungarbled fact can be disengaged from the miraculous 
embellishments. Orally transmitted facts intermingled 
from the lack of historical data, with conjecture, 
and historical guises and inferences derived from 
Jewish prophecies, formed in harmony with Jewish- 
Christian tastes, forbid the chronologically- 
arranged schemes of the rationalists, and 
seriously questions the easy manner in v/hich 
many raythicists detected historical mythus in the 
New Testament.
In order to answer the question which Strauss had 
osed, i.e. the invalidity of the half-way position 
of the mythi cists, no w that the strictly rationalist 
osition had been refuted, some attention must be 
given to tv/o inter-related ideas: Strauss* 
classification of the mythi and the development 
of myth in the New Testament, with particular 
emph .sis on the origin of myth in the New Testament 
writings. After the mythicist interpretation of 
scripture had been established on the basis of 
external grounds and the authorship of the New 
Testament writings on internal grounds, the inter­
mixture of fact and idea, some of the supporters 
of the new theory did not clearly apprehend the 
nature and the extent which mythi formed the basis 
of the Hew Testament. Not only were they content 
to find myth only in the two extremities, the 
infancy and resurrection narratives, but their 
insistence on the absence of myth in the public life 
of Jesus forced them back upon the rationalist
position which they had sought to refute. The 
cherscteristic which had been recognised as 
constituting the distinction between the historical 
ond philosophical mythus was of a kind which easily 
betr.-yed the critic back again into the scarcely 
abandoned rati nalistic explanation# His task, with 
regard uo the historical nyuhi, was still to separate 
the natural fact, the nucleus of historical reality,
1 rom its unhistorical and miraculous overlays. An 
essential dixie ence indeed existed, as has been 
pointed out. The natural explanation attributed the 
embellishments to the opinion of the actors concerned, 
or o~ the reci ients; the mythical interpretation 
derived them fro . traditi a; but the mode of 
roc ceding was left too little determined. If the 
rsuion list could point out historical mytni in the 
Bible, without mate ially changing his mode of 
e*' 1 m  hon; so the supernaturalist, on his parh felt 
himself less offended by the admission of historical 
mythi - v/hich 3till preserved to the sacred narratives 
a basis o_ fact - than by the supposition of 
hiloso hical mythi, v/hich seemed to annihilate every 
trace of historical foundaiiion. The inconsistent 
mythicises, Bauer, in particular, so Strauss contends, 
fall under this criticism and contribute to this 
confusion. When, for instance, Bauer thought he was 
e*plaini$6 Jehovah*s promise to Abraham as an 
historical mythus - admitting as the fundamental fact 
of the narrative Abrahamfs hopes of a numerous 
posterity, awakened by the contemplation 01 the
star-sown heavens - "Bauer imagined he had seized 
the mythical point of view. Yet another theologian 
imagining he was also faithful to the mythical view, 
divested the arm uncement of the "birth of the Baptist 
o- the supernatural but retained the dumbness of 
Z charieh as the historical groundwork. In like 
manner, Krug immediately after assuring us that his 
intention is not to e rr lain the substance of the 
history (according to the natural mode), but to 
explain the origin of the narrative (according to 
the mythiccl view), constitutes an accidental 
journey ox oriental merchants the basis of the 
na retive of the visit of the wise men from the 
Ba.ru. But the contradiction is most glaring when 
v»e meet v.ith palpable misconceptions ox the true 
nvcure of a mythus in a work on the mythology of 
the Hew Testament, such as Bauer’s; in which, for 
instance, he admits, in the case of the parents of 
John the Be cist, a marria e which had actually been 
childles- during many years - in which he explains 
the angelic appearance at the birth of Jesus as a 
meteoric phenomenon; supposes the occurrence of 
lightning and the accidental descent of a dove at 
his baptism; constitutes a stoim the groundwork 
of the transfiguration; and converts the angels 
at the tomb of the risen Jesus into white grave- 
clothes. Even Gabler, who had otherwise made the 
most pertinent contributions to the study of myth 
in the Bible, confounds the natural explanation
with the historical mythical view and the historical 
with hilosophiCc 1 mythi. In spite of his pre­
dilection in itvoi r ox the philosophical mythus 
in relation to biblical history, and his careful 
guarding against the arbitrary proceeding of 
handling as philosophical a mythus through which 
a fact unquestionably glimmers, and avoiding the 
op. osite tendency to explain naturally or 
historically that which belongs properly to 
mythical cloth n , one is surprised, Strauss 
maintains, to find Gabler himself was ignorant of 
the true nature both of the historical and of the 
philosophical mythus.
The confused eclectic point ox view, as Strauss 
calls it, owes its origin to those who neither 
give up the history', nor are able to satisfy 
themselves with its clear results, but who think 
to unite both parties by this middle course - 
a vain endeavour, thinks- Strauss, which the rigid 
supernatural 1st pronounces heretical, and the 
rationalist derides.
Ic is at this point in the discussion which one 
can easily accuse Strauss ox descending into what 
he himselx condemns as the onesidedness ox the 
position which despairs of disengaging the historical 
contents from the mythical narratives of the 
scriptures; consequently being led to handle the 
whole mass of Gospel mythi as philosophical, at 
least in so far as to relinquish the endeavour to
extract from them a residuum of historical fact. 
Tho gh he says thatv/hen he undertakes to extract 
the historical contents which may possibly exist 
in narratives recognised as mythical, he would be 
equ-lly careful neither on the one part, by a 
rude and mechanical separation, to place himself 
on the sam groun with the natural interpreter, 
nor, on the other, by a hypercritical refusel to 
recognise such contents where they actually exist 
to lose si ;ht of the history. But the question 
lingers, es ecislly in the light of the scarcity 
of historical facts which Strauss admits in the 
history or the ones uncontaminated in the Gospels 
"Does he in fact get beyond the arbitrary 
selection of fact which characterises the view 
which he was anxious to oppose?" Before Strauss* 
own classification of the mythus in the New 
Testament, the distinctions and gradations of 
mythi and the criteria v/hich distinguishes the 
unhistorical in the Gospel narrative, can be 
elucidated, some considerati on must be given to 
the primary reason why he supposed myth to be 
found in the New Testament.
D. HIE NAJU5Z 0: THE MYTHI HI THE NEV> TESTAMENT
In one 1- ce in his discussion, Strauss makes a 
very pointed statement which may illustrate his 
position on the problem of myth in the New 
Testament possibly better than any other one 
phrase in the introductory section: "Naw, if the
history oi tne life oi Jesus be of mythical creation 
oi a fact out of an idea, inasmuch as it embodies 
the vivid impression of the original idea which the 
first Christian community had of their founder, 
this history, though unhistorical in its form, is, 
nevertheless, a faithful representation of the idea 
o the Christ. If, instead of this, the history be 
legendary - (seeing of an idea in a fact) if the 
actual external facts are given in a distorted 
and oxten magnified form - ere represented in a 
false light and embody a false idea - then, on the 
contrary, the real tenor of the life of Jesus is 
losw to us. But the idea of the Messiah,
tran ferred from the Old Testament to the New, is 
true end retained intact. In the case of the 
synoptic presentation, the idea of the Messiah 
arose gradually through the spontaneous, 
unconscious excitement in the primitive community; 
but, in the case of the fourth Gospel, invented 
end created from the tradition by one individual.
The ideas w,.ich were narrated into facts arose 
unconsciously, unintentionally - in the community 
v/ith this as the guiding rule: "Such and. such
things must have happened to the Messiah; Jesus 
was the Messiah; therefore such and such things
i t
happened to him." Strauss prefers an
illustrative sylogism: "The Messiah was to come
from Betflehen. Jesus was the Messiah, consequently
17he must have been bom in Bethlehem." ‘ * The
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expectation oi s Messiah had grown up amongst the 
Israelite people Ion before the time oi Jesus, and 
just then hr d ripened to full maturity. From its 
beg inn' ng this expectation was not indefinite, but 
determined and characterise! by many particulars. 
Moses was said to hcve promised his people a 
j rophet like unto himself, and this passage was 
in che time of Jesus applied to the Messiah.
Hence the rabbinical principle: As the first
redeemer, so shall be the second; which principle 
was c I out into many particulars to be
acted in the Messiah after his prototype Moses.
* in the Mes iah was to come of the race of David, 
and as a second David take possession of his thro ne 
therefore, in the time of Jesus it was expected that 
he, like David, should be born in the little village 
of Bethlehem* Moses describes the supposed Messiah 
as v prophet; so, in his own idea, Jesus was the 
greatest end last of the prophetic race. It was 
natural, Strauss claims, for the Jews - with 
their allegorising tendency - to consider their 
ions and destiny as types of the Messiah. On 
the basis of the predictions it was necessary 
beforehand that the Messiah's life should be 
< domed with that which was most glorious and 
important in the lives of the prophets. These
merely figurative expressions, that is, in the 
Messianic expectations, soon cue to be 
understood literally (M. ct.Xl:5j Duke Vll,21 i.),
and tl us the idea oi the Messiah was continually 
filled U] v.itf nev; details, even before the 
appearance of Jesus. Thus many of the legends 
respecting him had not to be nev/1 y invented; 
they elr ady existed in the popular hope of the 
Messiah, having been ostly derived with various 
modifications from the Old Testament, and had 
merely to be transferred to Jesus and accomodated
-I Q
to his character and doctrines.’1 The
evangelists had only to unite in one representation
the different existing traits; in fact, the
picture arises of its own accord before the
reader. With reference to the birth of John
the Baptist, Zacharies end Elizabeth (Luke 1),
like . brah m  and Sarah when Isaac was promised
to the: , were "well stricken in years" (Gen. TVlllsll).
That the father did not believe, and desired a
sign in confirmation of the announcement, is
related here (Luke 1*11) v&h almost the seme
words ' r Gen. XV:8. The song of praise in Luke 1
is taken almost word for word from the stoiy of
the birth of Samuel (1 Sera. 11), who was in like
manner e late-born chili . The appearance of the
angels and the statement that the boy should be
a Nazarene who should drink no vine or intoxicant,
are features also of the birth of Samson (Lakel:15ff;
cf*. Ju Ig.Xlll 5); both are holy from their birth.
T..e same thing is true also with regard to the 
story of the birth of Jesus himself. Here one has
18. Ibid., p.95*
a de finite. foo'thol in the passage in the Old 
Testament, especially to he noted in Matthew’s 
Gospel. It was inferred from Isa. Vlll:14 that 
the Messiah must be born of a. virgin (Matt.1:23).
But Isaiah heee spoke 01 a young woman: it v/as
the Gre k translator who first made this into 
virgin. In this passage Isaiah v/as not thinking 
at ill o~ the IA s iah, while the translator, 
quite probably, and the Christian certainly, 
supposed that was whac was meant. The super- 
n tural birth o- th Messiah, end thus of Jesus, 
has been inferred from the passage. The tendency 
of the Ancients to represent great men and 
benefactors of their race as sons of God must also 
be remembered; Hercules and Discuri, Romulus and 
Alexander, Pythagoras and Plato, are some of those 
concerning whom stories of a supernatural 
generation have been accepted - and so on, infinitum, 
through the entire history of the New Testament.
To the objection that the interval between the 
eeth o- Jesus and the formation ox the 
narratives w > too short for the rich collection 
mythi, and especially for the application of 
the messianic myths to Jesus, Strauss says: If
we assume that the greater part of these mythi 
did not arise during the interval, but originated 
in the legends of the Old Testament, before and 
after the Babylonish exile an . were transferred 
with suitable modifications to the expec ced 
if 3 iah, then regardless o.f the length of the
interval, myth already existed. In the period 
between the format ion of the first Christian 
com: unity and the writing of the Gospels, there 
remains to be effected only the transference of 
mes ionic legends, alnoso all ready formed, to 
Jesus, with sane « Iterations to adapt them to 
Christian opinions, and to the individual 
character and circumstances of Jesus: only a
very small proportion of mythi having to be 
formed ent y new.
The history of the New Testament is really 
the poetry of a people whose imagination had 
been fired with the fairy tales of the ancient 
vnrld and with the narratives of the Old 
Testament. What kernel of historical truth 
remains under this poetry? Without coming to 
grips with this Auestion in a manner which it 
deserves, at the moment we shall offer some 
observations on Strauss’ treatment, more by way 
of indicating the movements in his thought to 
this point: 1. Strauss’ critique of the
evangelical records consists,it would seem, in 
converting into causes what the Church of Christ 
recognises as effects. The Church created its 
Christ virtually out of pure imagination. Christ 
receives his majesty from the community; he did 
not, as Christendom has believed, in accordance 
with John XV11:2^, Cor.ll:18, impart his majesty 
to his disciples. But if the Church created
Christ from the Old Testament prototypes - 
scrutinising and comparing Jesus with previous 
standards — we are left with this query: What
created, or who created the Church? Whom does 
the author represent as the originator of this 
revelation in the world? No one. The origin 
of Christianity vanishes into the thickest mist. 
The authors of the prefactory history in the 
Gospels, it would seem, compounded their 
narratives like a mosaic out of different 
antitypes in the Old Testament. Schweitzer’s 
comment clarifies our critique: "He does not
see that while in many cases he has shown clearly 
enough the source of the form of the narrative 
in question, this does not suffice to explain 
its origin. Doubtless, there is mythical 
material in the story of the feeding of the 
multitude, but the existence of the story is not 
explained by referring to the manna in the desert, 
or the miraxmlous feeding of a multitude by 
Elisah. The story in the Gospel has far too 
much individuality for that, and stands, more­
over, in much too closely articulated an 
historical connection. It must have as its 
basis some historical fact. It is not myth, 
though there is myth in it. Similarly with the 
account of the transfiguration. The substratum 
of historical fact in the life of Jesus is much
: ore extensive t —an Strauso is preps red to admit. 
Sometimes he fells to se the foundations, because 
he proceeds like an explorer who, in working on 
tn© ruins o. an Assyrian city, should cover up 
the most valuable evidence with the rubbish 
thrown out from another portion o_ die excavations. 
2. It is not t :e cor re s ondence in the acts 
and events of Jesus' life with ancient predict­
ions that caused his reception by the Israelites 
the promised Chri but it 1 i pro sumption, 
somehow existing independent, that he must be the 
Christ, that united with the recollection of 
those predictions in the people's minds to make 
up the story oi this accomplishment. In other 
words, while discussing the Messianic prophecies, 
Strauss never really makes much of the reasons 
why certain ex; ectations were attached to Jesus. 
Reco jni ;ing the several messianic expectations 
elaborated in Jewish history, how were these 
e*: -rotations sorted out in the minds of the 
evangelists ii we assume as Strauss leads us to 
believe he does, the personality of Jesus to 
have had such a minimal effect on the narrators 
of that history? 3« Even on the Hegelian 
principle, that at the head of all finite 
transactions, and historical ones among the rest, 
individuals stand as "the subjectivities that 
realise the substantiality of the idea," Jesus
19. Schweitzer., Albert, "The paest Of The Historical
Jesus" p.84.
the Christ may have his pl.-ce, not as the one 
s oken of in the New Testament, but as primus 
inter pares, in the chapel of the enlightened 
Emperor Alexander Severus (Straussi an 
comparison) where he stood with Orpheus or 
Homer as companions; where, too, we may assign 
to him in his own religious department, Moses, 
and also Mohammed, for his associates.
4. .« ile Jcrauss never did deny the historicity
oi Jesus, his critique seriously raises the 
question ox the historical existence of the 
person ox Jesus. Gospel history is regarded 
merely as the embellishment of the picture 
of the Messiah, which had taken shape in the 
religious consciousness of the Church.
111. Gradations of the Rfcrthi.
A* Evangelical Bfrthus.
A narrative relating directly or indirectly 
to Jesus, which may be considered not as the 
expression of a fact, but as the product of an 
idea of his earliest followers. This mythus 
may constitute the substame of the narrative,
or it may sometimes be an accidental adjunct to
the actual history.
B. Pure lift/thus.
This type racy have two sources. The one source 
is the Messianic ideas and expectations existing 
. according to tiieir several forms in the Jewish 
mind before Jesus, and independently of him; the 
other is that particular impression y/hich was 
left by uhe personal character, actions, and fate 
of Jesus, end v/blch served to modify the Messianic 
idea in the minds of the people. The account of 
the transfiguration, for example, is derived 
ilnost exclusively f om the former source; the 
only amplification taken from the latter source 
being that they who appeared with Jesus on the 
Mount spake of hix3 decease. On the other hand, 
the narracive oi the rending of the veil of the 
ten le at the death of Jesus seems to have had 
its ori in in the hostile position which Jesus, 
and his Church after him, s.ustained in relation 
to the Jewish ten? le worship. Here already 
we have something historical, though consisting 
merely of certain general features of character, 
osition, etc., we are thus at once brought upon 
the ground of the historical mythus.
9% Historical Mrthus.
This type has for its groundwork a definite
individual fact which has been seized upon by 
religious enthusiasm, and twined around with 
mythical conce. tions culled from the idea of 
Christ. T:iis fact is perhaps a saying of Jesus 
sue, a that concerning "xishers of men" or the 
barr n i^g-tre< , which now appear in the Gospels 
transmuted into marvelous histories; or it is 
perha s • real transaction or event taken from 
M s  life; for insta ce, the mythical traits 
in t e account of the baptism were built upon 
such a reality#
By way oi explanation, Strauss says that the 
unhistorical which these myths embody - whether 
formed gra ual ~y by tradition, or created by an 
individual author - is in each case the product 
of en idea. But for the parts of history which 
are distorted, misconstrued through transformation 
• n I transmission nd which point to a traditionary 
origi the term, legendary is certainly more 
appro; riate.
D# •.d...iti n of the Author.
That whic does not point to the impetus to 
clothe an idea or can be referred to tradition, 
must be regarded as the addition 01 the author, 
as purely individual, and designed merely to give 
clearness, connection, and climax, to the 
representation. Strauss illustrates from the 
passage which speaks of the "renting of the
curtain in the temple." "The author must have 
known it wo 1 £ pear that he had neither seen
this hat pen nor heard it from anyone hut that he 
had invented it himself. But in this very instance 
an allegorical form of speech such as we find in 
Heb.T:19fi; to the effect that the death of Jesus 
opened the -ay for us through the curtain ihto the 
:ioly 01 holies, might have easily been understood 
by hearer in t literal sense and thus that story may 
h* ve arisen entirely without consciousness of 
invention#
IV. Criterion by which to distinguish the
unhiseorical in the Gospel narrative;
Having shown, Strauss believed, the possible
Lit ce of the mythical and the legendary in 
the Gospels, both on extrinsic and intrinsic 
^rounds, nd deiined their distinctive 
ch raceeristics, it remains in conclusion to 
inquire how their acvual presence be 
recognised in individual cases.
The mythus prese two heses. In the first 
piece it is not history, in the second it is 
fiction - the product of the particular mental 
tendency of a certain community. These two 
phases afford the one £ negative the other a 
positive criterion, by which the myt us is to be 
recognised* ____________________
20. "Leben Jesus*1 p.207 Vol.l.
156.
1. Negative: History does not suffer violations. 
The cause air effect relationship invalidates
jl..aci.cs, ("Indeed no just notion of the true 
nature of history is possible, without a 
pe ception oi the inviolability of the chain 
of finite cases, and of the impossibility of 
miracles")/'" demands that events conform to 
the law of succession, preserves the unbroken 
1 v/3 o:. psychology whereby no individual or 
frou can act in a manner directly opposed to 
his own h bicual mode. To be regarded as 
historically valid a narrative must neither be 
incon latent with itself nor in contradiction 
with other accounts.
2. Positives /mi account may be positively 
r Sorted to be legendary or poetical, partly 
by its , ;iy by its substance. If the 
for be poetical, if the actors converse in 
hymns, in r more diffuse and elevated strain 
than might be expected from their training or 
their situations, then the’se discourses, at 
least, can not be accepted as historical. If 
the contents of a narrative are in striking 
agreement with certajn ideas current v/ithin 
the r gi.cn in which the narrative originated, 
which .the? selves seem to be formed from pre- 
c nceived opinions rather than from actual
21. To id., p.74-75.
expeid nee, then, according to the circumstances, 
it is more or les probable that such a narrative 
had a nyuhic 1 origi: . Strauss knew quite well 
that: at th't time those criteria mijht not be 
applied in r raech* nicr 1 manner to the lives of 
great men, and that ell of them have simply 
relative value from the point of view of proof. 
Only in C'ses where several such signs are 
found together can a conclusion drawn from 
them be accepted as probable or certain. Strauss 
instances the concurrence of signs from the 
visit of the Magi and t£e murder of the 
innocents at Bethlehem to illustrate the 
proboMity of myth: "This event harmonises
remark with the Jewish Mesoianic notion, 
built u or. theprcphecy of Balaam, respecting 
the star which should come out of Jacob; and 
with the history of the sanguinary command of 
Pharaoh. Still this alone would not suffice 
to stamp the narrative as mythical. But we 
have also the corroborative facts that the 
described appearance of the star is contrary 
to the physical, the alleged conduct of Herod 
to the psychological lav/s; that Josephus, who 
gives in other respects so circumstantial an 
account 01 Hero , agrees with all other historical 
authorities in being silent concerning the
Bethlehem m. s ere; and chat the visit of the 
"agi, togehter witfi the flight into Egypt, related 
in the one Gospel, end the presentation in the 
Temple related in nother Gospel, mutually 
exclude one another. Wherever, as in this 
instance, the several criteria of the mythical 
concur, the result is certain, and certain in 
proportion to the accumul tion of such grounds 
of evidence.11
In the Gospel records the 'difficult question has 
to be settled whether a record in which there are 
legendary traits may' be said to be entirely 
unhistorical, or aerely in those traits. To 
separate the historical elements from the fine web 
of legend, which weaves itself around all human 
history, needs delicate and practised hands.
V. Summary and Criticism of Straussf Interpretative
Does Strauss m nage to separate the element of 
fact in the New Testament from the mythical 
adjuncts which have been blended with it - and 
determine how much may belong to the one, and 
how much to the other, without relapsing into 
the forced ration lised attempts to sketch a 
natural course of history, once the myths have 
been dissolved? Does he retain a residum of
22. Ibid., p.91.
fact in the Gospel history - or, because the 
history is so inseparably v/edded to the idea, does 
he orego any 'ttempt to disclose how much fact 
he really discovers in the Hew Testament? He 
admits in his Popul r life for the German people 
that the previous "Life of Jesus”, four in number, 
each wavering, vacillating, between saying one 
thing end taking it back in another edition, that 
he proceed then to discuss the Life of Jesus 
analytically - from the exterior to the interior, 
from the bus to the kernel, seeking to penetrate 
iro the u per strata to the primeval rock; and, 
in the process, separating off what v/as inadmiss- 
able to arrive at whet was true. There was no 
lace for summing up his corclisions end developing 
into one result v/hat might have been the truth 
as regards the erson and history of Christ , 
looked at from a strictly historical point of 
view. Strauss, even in hi3 earlier lives of Jesus, 
does not rejeer the existence of Jesus, though at 
thau time, he seriously questioned the historical, 
adeque ued and unprejudiced knowledge of the actual 
facts involved; He was so intent on pointing 
out to the rationalists and the ecclectic 
iyt icists that, on internal grounds, the Hew 
Testament narratives were so promiscuously blended - 
constituting unhistoric^l ingredients and historical 
fact - that it was extremely difficult to determine 
the element of fact when the unhistorical
embellishments v/e *e discarded. But, in 1864, 
he \va.; more on. ident that he could get behind 
the unhistoricc1 laye s to the historical 
ke nel. Since the position taken step by step 
by hi-toric:1 criticism had been made secure and 
”v know now for ce :t in what Jesus was not, and 
did not do, that it is nothing superhuman or 
supernatural, end thus it will be all the more 
pos ible for us to follow the intimations of 
the Gospels as to the natural and human in him, 
so far es to be able to show, at least in 
rough outlin , what he was and what his object 
was.”^ *  From the analytical discussions 
it had been made clear to Strauss that the 
conceptions 0- Jesu$ transformed into a 
temperature in which it could not fail to put
for the numerous unhistorical shoots, one ever 
more miraculous than another, in the most 
luxurious growth - the gradual development of 
the conceptions fromed ox Jesus, the enrichment 
of the history of his life with traits ever 
more erd more ideal. First deposits of the 
unhistorical, then how over every layer a new 
one foir.e , how every one of these layers was 
only the precipitate from the former conceptions 
of the period and the circle within which it 
grew till, at last, with the Gospel of John, a
23. Ibid., Vol.I. p.216
resting place was gained - beyond which a further
vance end, at the same time, a higher spiritual-
iS'C'or., was -_o longer possible and also no
24longer required.
Although he manages to write a life of Jesus
in 1864 and present a definite portrait of Him,
this picture mr de him * n outstanding ethical
reformer, a transformer of the statutory moral
lews to -n ethic of good disposition. Whether
Strauss succeeded in distinguishing his position
from the ecclectic mythicists, v/ho had sought
to retain the historical and philosophical
nythue an: discover some unadulterated facts,
is only imp11 d in his critical section. The
answer must be looked lor in is concluding
section, T,TLe Bogrnetic import of the Life of
Jesus”. By way of preps rati , a passage from
thi; secti n illumines our way. Speaking about
the tasks oi the philosopher and historian,
Straus says: MThe real state of the case is
this: The Church refers her Christology to an
individual who existed historically at a certain
period; the ulative theologian to an idea
which only attained existence in the totality of
individuals; by the Church the evangelical
narratives are received as history; by the
critical theologian they are regarded for the
25.most part as mere mythic.”
24. Ibid., p.217, Vol.l.
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VI. "Dogmatic Import of the Life of Jesus”:
Conclusive light can be thrown on Strauss' 
distinction between the historical and 
philosophical mythus, and the supremacy of the 
latter, by giving some attention to the implic­
ations which he draws from his historical survey 
01 the life of Jesus. Though he draws out in 
detail the philosophical points of his Christology 
only in the concluding section - as though they 
were the result of his preceeding critical 
examinations - we have only to refer to the 
preface of his work, and to the reasons why the 
theologian could attempt such a critical study, 
to arrive at the conclusion illustrated by the 
maxim, "What is last in execution is first in 
intention." The brief outline of his dogmatic 
presuppositions will enable us to form some ideas 
of the rationale which governs his mythicising 
process.
In the opening paragraph to this section,
Strauss begins by admitting that in the process of 
the argument, considerable doubt had been 
thrown on the acknowledgment of the historical 
mythus - that is to say, that an historical fact 
exists at all on which myth has been woven. 
.Apparently the inquiry, so he believed, had 
permanently crippled the factual basis of the 
faith and irretrievably dissipated the boundless
store of truth end life which for eighteen 
centuries has been the alien of hum nity. He 
says essentially the same thing in a much more 
descriptive nr nner it the conclusion of his 
1864 work: "After removing the mass of mythical 
pan sites of dix'xerent kinds that have clustered 
around the tree, we see that what we before 
considered branches, foiliage, colour, and form 
of the tree itself, belonged for the most part 
co those parasitic 1 creepers; and instead of 
the removal o them Ir ving restored the tree to 
us in its true condition and appearance, (the 
supposition of the rationalist), we find, on 
the contrary, that they have swept away its 
proper foliage, sucked out the sap, crippled 
the shoots and branches, and consequently that 
its original figure has essentially disappeared. 
Eve y mythical feature added to the form of
sus ha > not only obscuredsn historical one,
30 that with the removal of the first the latter 
v/ill come to light, but very many have been 
destroyed by the mythical forms that have over- 
laid them, and been thus completely lost."
Although there is little of which in the Hew 
Testament v/e can say for certain took place, 
and of all to which the faith of the Ohurch 
especially attaches itself - the miraculous 
and supernatural matter in the facts and 
doctrines o Jesus - it is far more certain
26. "Li., e for German People” Vol.II p.430-431.
that it did not take place; in reality, the 
happiness o~ mankind cannot depend upon belief 
in things cf which it is in part certain they 
did not take place, in part uncertain whether 
uhe,/ i cake pi ce, and only to the smallest 
extent beyond doubt that they took place. Whet 
then can, be done x or a faith which rests on 
such precarious grounds? With this in mind,
Strauss proposes co restore to the pious 
believer all that he might think lost by the 
destructive mychical process applied to the 
life or Jesus. In the interests of faith and 
science, Christianity» recognised as the most 
e cellent reli ion, must be identified with 
the highest philosophic truth. How was this 
identification accomplished? By cutting the 
roots of Christianity from history.
The He elian dialectical triad serves him in 
this process. The thesis is the orthodox 
Christology, the antithesis, the rationalists, 
the eoclectic christology of Schliermacher, 
the christology interpreted symbologically by 
Kant and Be Weute, and the synthesis, which is 
the negation o^' the negation, is the speculative 
christology 01 Hegel.
The problem must be met in this theological
reconciliation between religion and the deepest
philosophical truth concerns the assumption 
which traditional Christology makes about the 
individual God-Man. The Church refers her 
Christology to an individual who existed 
historically at a cert? in period; the 
speculative theologian to an idea which attains 
existence in the totality of individuals: By
oiie Church the evangelical narr; tives are 
received s history; by the critical theologian 
i hey re re garde for th. most part as mere 
mythi.^
The Church on the basis of its imaginative, 
ictorial presentation assumes that one man - 
one individual - was the God-Man, but the 
specul tive Chrlstologist demands to be led
to the idea in the feet, to the race in the
individual. oology, to this speculative
mind, which in its doctrines on the Christ
stops short at him as an individual
is not theology, buo a homily orpd
a rer on* Simply, the problem is this:
How the Divine and human nature can have 
constituted the distinct and yet united 
position of an historical person?
Orthodox Christology, working on the basis 
of a supernatural world view, or at least the 
possibility of a miracle in the conception 
Jesus Christ, and the veracity of the
27- "Leber Jesus’1 1 Volume, p.782.
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evangelical history, preserved in the creedel 
ail irma tip s re Nice a and Cclcedia the doctrine 
of the one Christ subsisting in the two natures, 
each with its properties entire and unconfused. 
But how can these things be? Strauss inquires. 
The roots ox the complicated exchange of 
properties, the union oj- the two natures in one 
person, cannot be reconciled, so he contends, 
with the view that ordinarily one nature is 
common to many individuals or persons, but in 
the creedtl formulations, one person is 
supposed to partake of two different natures. 
/.Iso concerning the v;ork of Christ, never as 
succinctly defined by the Church as Strauss 
supposes, the ideas of revelation and miracles 
were chiefly called into question. The 
perfect God^ on the basis of an enlightened 
view of him and of History, could not have 
created a world which from time to time 
needed the extraordinary interposition of the 
Creator, nor more particularly, a human 
nature which was incapable of attaining its 
destination by the development of its innate 
faculties; that the immutable Being could not 
operate on the world first in this manner, then 
in that, at one time mediately, at another 
immediately, but that he must always have 
operated on it in the same manner, namely in
167.
himseli and on the whole immediately, but for 
us and on individuals mediately.2^ ’
The r tion? list, oppressed by the severity 
ox tne Orthoxox Christology and seeking to 
understand the doctrines of the faith in the 
litht of the discoveries in Science and the 
enlightened philosophy of History, propounded 
in its stead - system which, in Strauss1 
opinion, considers Christ as a highly 
distinguished man, who by his faultless life 
end exa::;le, realised his unique destiny.
But in the defence of the Church’s confession, 
Straus says this is not the Christ that the 
Church ©ffirms. Every system of religious 
doctrine must erfor. two functions in Strauss’ 
opinio: : They must, first, give an adequate 
expression of the faith which is the object of 
the doctrine and they must place this expression 
in c relation, whether positive or negative, to 
scienc- . The rationalist in an effort to meet 
the latter requirement, minimised and distorted 
the faith.
The Ecclectic Christology, of Schiermacher, 
as Strauss Calls it, who, while pursuing to an 
uncommon decree the negative process of 
Rationalism against the Church doctrine, 
undertook i;o reconstruct the positive Christian 
In a way of his own. How then does the
29. ’’Leben Jesus” 1 Volume, p.765-766.,
attemp t oi Schiernr cher to rescue men at the 
sa . time ^ro ; the difficulties of super- 
n „ r 1 ism and the m tiness of the rational­
istic school, succeed in the judgement of this 
critic? He ~irst stages in full the doctrine 
of the Gaubenslehrej- that the certain 
pos es. io, in uhe Christian community of a 
means o urific tion and perfection can be 
tr c d to no other source than to its adored 
Head; that the existence in Christ of this 
fullness of co .nunicable virtue is the meaning 
of God being incarnate in his person; and, 
since this archetypal character, which his 
Church ever approaches but never fully reaches, 
pervades every historical event of his life, 
this is the meaning of the divine and human 
natures being united in his one person: while 
the miraculous conception, the supernatural 
.vorks, the resurrection end ascension of Christ 
are believed, i all, historic ally only, 
as read in Scripture, but not as associated 
with our interior experience. Of this 
system Strauss pronounces, that though it is 
the nearest approach possible to the 
establishment of uniteddivinity and humanity 
in one personal Christ, it is, nevertheless, a 
failure boch in respect of science and of faith
.169.
In respect of faith: because amidst the i^ any
■ ticulars in which it is a veiy inadequate 
substitute for the Church system * this appears, 
l he obse ve , among the ost striking, that 
iu excludes from spiritual consideration the 
resurrection of Christ, the foundation stone 
Oi tv Christian syste: , the centre of its 
cycle Ox festivals, an! sinks consequently 
with it the tru* conception of the Lordfs 
death, as well as of his ascension into heaven. 
Then, toe, when the \eLidity of the person of 
Christ, or the God-consciousness which he 
mediated, rests merely on a backward 
inference fro: the inward experience of the 
Christian as the effect to the person or Christ 
-■ the cause, the Christology of Schiermacher 
has but e -rail support, since it cannot 
prove that that inward experience is not to 
be experience without the actual existence of 
Christ.* In res ect of science - the 
grand objection against the system is simply 
that such union of the archetypal and the 
historical cannot be: not only, we are told,
because all art, science and ability ought to 
be united with piety in an archetype ( a 
condition which the life of Christ cannot 
sup-ly), but because even in the department 
of piety, the ideal in an individual historical
30. Ibid. P.772.
person o- not be realised without miracle. 
Though Schiermacher recognised only an act of 
Divine creative power only in the constitution 
of she person of Christ, this concession will 
not, in Strauss’ judgement, repair the breach 
which the supposition only of one miracle makes 
in the scientific view of the world.
Ilor will Schiermecher’s philosophy remove the 
metaphysical difficulties connected with 
ascribing to one man in the developmental 
chain, a freely developed, perfected, sinless 
ers nality. This assumption would be 
contradictory, or contrary, to the laws of all 
development to regard the initial member of 
e series a. the greatest - to suppose that in 
Christ, the iou; der of that community, the 
object of which is the strengthening of the 
consciousness of God, the strength of this 
consciousness was absolute, a perfection which 
is rather the infinitely distant goal of the 
progressive development of the community 
founded by Him. As neither an individual in 
general, nor in particular, in an historical 
series can j resent the perfect ideal, so, if 
Christ be regarded decidedly as man, the 
archetypal nature and development which 
Schiermacher ascribes to him, cannot be brought 
to accord with the laws of Human existence.
The failure to retain in combination two 
discordant ideas - the ideal in Christ and the 
Historical Jesus - resulted in the latter 
falling as a natural residum to the ground and 
the xormer rising as a pure sublimente into the 
ethereal world of Ideas. Historically, Jesus 
can have been nothing more than a person, 
highly distinguished indeed, but subject to 
the limitations inevitable to all that is moral. 
By means o his exalted character, however, he 
e ertei so powerful an influence over the 
religious sentiment, that it constituted him 
the ideal of piety - in accordance with the 
general rule, that an historical fact or 
person cannot become the basis o.! positive 
religion until it Is elevated into the sphere 
o^  the ideal. Gradually Str us., is implicitly 
elaborating his Christology. Although he may 
censor Schiermacher's conception of the 
relationship between the historical Jesus and 
the Ideal Christ, the same irreconcilable 
relationship exists in Strauss1 Christology.
But, meanwhile, to roceed with his preparatory 
analysis... undertaken with the expressed 
desija to invalidate and substantiate his own.
The first noticed Christology which attempts 
to fill ur the impersonal and purely ideal 
conce tion, inherited, in part, from Schiermacher 
but finding its origin in Spinoza, is that of
Immanueal Kanb. Spinoza’s statement, which 
influenced 19th Century Christological 
thinking, (Hegel, Shelling, Kent, Fichte, 
Streus , Sc he lie marcher, ’’that to know Christ 
after the flesh is not the matter necessary 
lor s - lv ti n, but to know the Eternal son of 
lodf), is elaborated by the symbolical (as 
Strauss calls it) Chris oology of Kant.
Kant’s philosophy, os we noted in another 
section of the thesis, ventured to exclude 
from his religion "of pure reason" the 
necessity of supposing an individual man, 
whose holiness and merit were available for 
others as well as himself, and to place in his 
ste d < ideal of moral perfection, to which,
£ s seated in the reason, and thence extending 
its power over the whole man, the mental 
view should be directed by a moral and not 
an .istoric 1 faith. This ideal is the logos* 
the Son by a God made all, in whom he loves 
the world: and though, in a world like the
present, it appears that we cannot otherwise 
represent to ourselves this ideal than as 
embodied in e man - a man exhibiting its 
moral force in the strongest contrast with 
opposed evil, against the most powerful 
temptations, to tin ext re ilty oi suffering
an l the most ignominious death - v/e are still 
desired uo remember that the binding and 
assimilating virtue belongs to the archetype 
in our pure reason, not in the human example - 
v/hich is never perfectly adequate - which may 
appear variously among men according to 
circumstances, but to which in no living 
instance are we warranted in ascribing a 
supernatural origin.
Straus., on uhe absis of the faith, objects 
to this Kantian view. He says that, while 
Kant eiz hasises in his own characteristic way 
the suffering and death of Christ (the 
crucifixion of the flesh or the old man in 
t/ose who realise the divine archetype) he 
makes no use of Christ’s resurrection and 
ascension. Instead of the Divine reality 
which faith discovers in the history of Christ, 
Kantian idealism offers an overwhelming 
obligation - a duty which each men must assume 
to free himself. Even Science, according to 
Strauss, objects to a philosophy v/hich calls 
for obedience to a reality which has not been 
ected.
Strauss extends his objection on the same 
score to the symbolical Christology as carried 
out into the story of the Gospels by De V/e the
and Horst. While considering the life and 
aistory ox Jesus Christ to he fabulous in eveiy 
supernatural part, these men regard the history 
os the eternal power oi symbolic truth, so that, 
whf t to the old believers were holy Facts and 
Histories ere to them no less holy Fictions - 
human nature and the religious impulse remaining 
exactly as they were before. Horst and De Y/ette, 
iccording to Strauss’ interpretation, admit that 
the first Christians needed the factual histoly 
to animate their religious andmoral disposition, 
but it must be r member d that ideas constituted 
the inmost kernel of this history. These facts 
have become superannuated and doubtful, and only 
ior the sake of the fundamental, inherent idea, 
are the narrr uives of the facts an object of 
reverence.
itrauss, ostensibly defending the claims of 
the Christian Faith, opposes what he calls 
these empty an f  unrealised ideas. If Kant,
De ..evte and Horst are to be believed, the 
Christian must turn his view from a reconciled 
v/orld to an unreconciled one, from a world of 
happines into a world of rniseiy. As we sh&ll 
soon see, Strauss’ criticism of the system on 
the basis of the infinite approximation toward, 
the idea which is to be reached after endless
pro res ion is, in feet, somewhat characteristic 
of his own Christology.
The t o set : o objections co each of the above 
sev roe systems in succession, as causing the 
mutilation of faith and the offence of science, 
serve merely to set the stage for the Christology 
which will, according to Strauss, satisfy the 
requirements of both science and faith. Before 
advancing to outline this perfect Christology, 
it is well to rex - hat has been said else­
where: many of uss * views are implicit in
the Christo-lo ies v/hich he castigates. These 
ideas may be summarised. (1) The impossibility 
of i!iracle - even the concession of one unusual 
h nomenon vis a*vis the case of Jesus Christ 
will offend Science. If the unity of the Divine 
and Human must actually have been manifested, as 
it never he been, and never more will be, in one 
individual, this reconciliation will contradict 
the rode which the Idea realises itself.
According to Strauss, .. It (the Idea) is not 
vont to lavish all its fullness on one exemplar 
and be niggardly towards all others - to express 
itself perfectly in that one individual end 
imperfectly in all the rest: It, rather, loves
to distribute its riches among a multiplicity 
of exemplars which reciprocally complete each
other - in the alternate appearance and 
suipr.. 3si on of a se ries of individuals.”^ 1#
Ihe mode of the develo ment of the Idea from 
the lower to the higher, which science has 
established, rules out the a?chetypal realisat­
ion of the Idea in one perfect exemplar.
(2) The real point at stake here, one which 
Itreuse finally lev- lops in connection with 
his speculative Christology, (so termed by 
him geld ), concerns his doctrine of God and His 
relatioxish ith the world. The Idea posits 
I v, serf' (Himself) in the Other, which is 
understood to be Nature, or humanity. The 
Idea develops through this Other and returns 
to Itself as the Other continually realises in 
the idea, or as the Other comes to the Notion 
that it is indeed the God-man, not individually, 
but corporately.
VII. Strauss’ Speculative Reconstruction of 
Christolory.
Strauss begins his reconstruction of Christ­
ology by referring to the Idea of God in the 
most recent philosophy, viz. Hegel’s 
"Phenomenology of Spirit". From the vantage
31. Ibid., p.779-780.
point of this higher mode of argumentation,
Strauss proceeds to sketch the Idea of God and 
Man in the:' r reciprocal relation. 7/hen God is 
spoken of as Spirit, it is a necessary consequence 
of that statement that, so far as man is spirit, 
there is no distinction or difference between 
them. The newest philosophy bids us view the 
infinite God not as without or above the finite, 
but as comprehended in it - setting forth all 
finite existence, nature and the human soul 
merely as his own exterior manifestation; from 
which He ever again in like manner draws them 
back into unity with Himself. Or, as he said of 
the enlightened view of science in connection 
with his discussion of Kant’s Christology:
The idea conceives that.."the infinite has its 
existence in the alternate production and 
extinctio: of the finite." Strauss continues:
"As Han, considered as a finite spirit, 
limited to finite nature has not truth; so God 
considered exclusively as an infinite Spirit , 
shut up in his infinitude has not reality....
The infinite Spirit is real only when it 
discloses itself in finite spirits; as the 
finite spirit is true only when it merges 
itself in the infinite. The true and real
existence of spirit, therefore, is neither in 
God by Himself, nor in man by himself, but in 
the God-: .m; neither in the infinite alone, 
nor in the finite lone, but in the interchange 
o impartation and withdrawal between the two, 
v/hich, on the pert of God, is revelation; on 
the part of man, is Religion.T,^ ^#
roceeding along Hegelian lines, and now we 
t r. to see more clearly that his Christology 
cannot be understood apart from his adopted 
philosophy, 3tr uss discusses the History of 
Religion - the rise of the Absolute Religion.
He says that, so long as man knows not that 
he is spirit, he cannot know that God is man. 
ihile under the guidance of nature, prior to 
the emergence of self-consciousness and the 
necessary differentiation involved, man will 
worship IT* tune# Then he has learned to . 
submit himself to lav; and regulate his 
natural tendencies by external means, he will 
conceive of God as a Law Giver. But, continues 
the story of man’s pilgrimage, when in the 
vicissitudes of the World’s History the 
natural state discloses its corruptions, the 
legal its misery; the former will experience 
the need of a God who elevates it above itself,
32. "Life of Jesus" Vol.I. p.777-
the latter, of a God who descends to its 
level. "Men being once nature enough to 
r ceive as his religion the truth that God 
is man, and man of a Divine race, it 
necessrrily follows, since religion is the 
form in which the truth presents itself to 
the popular mind, that this truth must appear 
in a genuine, intelligible way to ell, as a 
feet obvious to the senses. In Other words, 
there must appear a human individual who is 
recognised as the visible God. This God-man 
unity is in a single being;,, the divine essence 
and the human personality; it may be said, of 
him that he had the Divine Spirit for a father
X X
and a woman or his mother."^* Inasmuch as 
he is viewed not in himself but as reflected 
in the Divine substance, he is thus divinely 
sinless and perfect; as man of a divine 
essence he has power over nature and works 
miracles; but, as God in a human manifestation, 
he is depen ent on Nature - subject to its 
necessities and sufferings, even to the last 
debt of death..."The God-man Himself dies 
and shows thereby that it is God with his 
assumed humanity in real earnest; that he 
has not disdained to descend to the lowest
33. Ibid., p.778.
depth of f nite being - while he, even from 
that depth, knows how to find a way of return 
to himself; even when the exinanition is most 
CO-. lete, he can remain identical with himself. 
Yet more, inasmuch as the God-man as a spirit 
reflected inuo its infinity stands contrasted 
with men as holding their finite state , an 
opposition and s fight is thence set forth, and 
thedeath of the God-man is defined as a violent 
one by the hands of sinners; whereby to 
hyslccl istrc sa is added also the moral one 
of the is race an condemnation of trans­
gression. If God thus found his way from 
ie ven to the grave, so must also a way be 
found for man from the grave to heaven: the
death of the Prince of Life is the life of the 
mortal.
Already, by his coming into the world as 
God-man, has God shown Himself reconciled with 
the world; but yet more, in that, by dying, 
he stripped himself of his natural state, has 
he shown the way by which he ever carries the 
reconciliation into effect; viz. by ever 
remaining identical with himself throughout 
the condenscension to a natural condition and 
the throwing off of this again. Inasmuch as the 
death of the God-man is only the throwing off
of his exinanition (or humiliation), it is, 
in fact, an exaltation and return to God: and
thus the death is actually followed by the 
resurrection and ascension to heaven...And 
tixus also must the Church renew herself, in 
a spiritual manner, the main circumstances 
of the life which he lived outwardly. Finding 
himself in a natural state, the faithful man 
must die, like Christ, to the natural - but 
inwardly only, as he outwardly: he must
suffer himself to be crucified and buried 
spiritually, as Christ was bodily, in order 
that by the removal of the natural state he 
ay be identical with him as Spirit, and be 
a sharer in Christ's blessedness and
ZZl
dominion. *
from these words we may suppose that Strauss 
had actually reconstructed a Christology which 
rese bled the belief of the Church in the God- 
men. But the illusion arising from these fine- 
sounding words is soon dissipated by the 
statements which follow. Clarifying his 
position and, in particular, his point on the 
unity ox the Divine and Human in one historical 
person, Struss writes: "Though I can conceive
that the Divine Spirit in its exterior and
34."Life of Jesus", German edition, Vol.II. p*757- 
761, quoted by Mill, p.26.
condescending manifestation is the Human, 
and the human spirit in its reflection into 
itself, and its elevation above itself, is 
the Divine, yet can I not on that account 
represent to myself how divine and human 
nature can have made up the distinct yet 
connected ingredi* nts of one historical person. 
Though I see the spirit of humanity in its 
union with the divine, in the course of the 
world's history ever more perfect, exert 
itself as might over nature - yet this is some­
thing altogether different from imagining an 
individual man armed with such might for 
certain arbitrary transactions. Assuredly, 
froi the truth that the removal of the 
natural being is the resurrection of the spirit,
the bodily resurrection of an individual will
35never follow.
In view of these expressions, we may think 
that we have come to the point so strongly 
condemned in the Kantian and De Ytettian schools 
of seeing only idealities in theGospel, and 
leaving nothing for faith to rest on. But 
our author gravely assures us otherwise: he
bids us reflect on the prodigious difference 
between the future idealities of those 
dreaming transcendentalists, and the real
35. "Life of Jesus", Vol.I. p.779.
present operative ideas with which his rich
diagnosis has furnished us. "What," he says,
"shall nob the idea of the union of divine and
hum* n natu o be real in an infinitely higher
sense, when I apprehend the whole of humanity
as its subject of operation, than v/hen I set
apart a particular man - man as such? Is not
the incarnation of God from eternity a truer
chi nr , than one in an exclusive point of 
36#fciae?" Unfolding in a more direct way his
understanding, he comments: "Luther
subordinated the physical miracles to the
spiritual, as the truly great miracles. And
shall we interest ourselves more in the cure
of some people in Galilee than in the
miracles of intellectual and moral life
belonging to the history of the world - in
the increasing, the almost incredible dominion
of man over nature - in the irresistible
force of ideas, to which no unintelligent
matter, whatever its magnitude, can oppose
any enduring resistance? This would be a
direct contravention of the more enlightened
37.sentiments of our own day..."
The idea, the very essence of Deity, is 
related to the regions of art and science,
36. Ibid., p.781# 
37# Ibid., p.781.
civil end ordinary life, instead of being 
confined to the mere circle of religion. The 
croY.ning statement or his point of view is of 
such an extraordinary character that it must 
be quoted in full:
"This is the key to the v.hole of Christology, 
that, as subject of the predicate which the 
Church assigns to Christ, we piece, instead of 
an individual, an idea; but an idea v/hich has 
an existence in reality, not in the mind only, 
like that o* Kant. In an individual, a God- 
mar., the properties and functions which the 
Church escribes to Christ contradict themselves 
in the idea o the r ce they perfectly agree. 
Humanity is the union of the two nacrures - 
God become man, the infinite manifesting 
itself in the finite, and the finite spirit 
remembering its infinitude; it is the child 
of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, 
Nature and S, irit; it is the worker of miracle 
in so far as in the course of human history the 
spirit more and more completely subjugates 
nature, both within and around man, until it 
lies before him as the inert matter on which 
he exercises his active power; it is the 
sinless existence, for the course of its
development is e blameless one, pollution 
•cleaves to the individual only, and does not 
touch the race or its history. It is Humanity 
that dies, rises and ascends to heaven, for, 
from the negatio of its phenomenal life, 
there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; 
from the suppression of its mortality as a 
personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, 
arises its union with the infinite spirit of 
the heavens. By faith in this Christ, 
especially in his death and resurrection, man 
is justified before God; that is, by the 
kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, 
the individual man participates in the 
divinely human life of the species. How, the 
main element of that idea is, that the 
negation of the merely natural and sensual 
life, which is itself the negation of the 
spirit, (the negation of negation, therefore,) 
is the sole way to true spiritual life. This 
alone is the absolute sense of Christology: 
That it is annexe! to the person and history 
of one individual, is a necessary result of 
the historical form which Christology has 
taken."^* Yet more compendiously is this 
stated at the end of the section. Strauss
38. Ibid., p . 780.
writes: "If we recognise the incarnation, the
death, and the resurrection, in which the 
double negcuion makes an affirmative, as the 
eternal cycle, the endless pulse of divine 
life ever returning into itself, what can be 
attributed of separate or special import to 
an individual fact which exhibits this 
roc ss nly in a sensible manner? In the 
outward fact our age will be conducted merely 
to the idee, in the individual to the race at 
1 rge, for its Chriseology: a dogmatic
t eol gy, which, in handling the topic 'of 
Christ, rests in him as an individual, is no 
dogmatic theology hue a sermon."^*
VIII. A Critique of Strauss' Christology.
After s Strauss* Christological
reconstruction - a reconstruction which 
pur; orbed to answer the requirements of faith 
and science - i ftor noting especially the
Idea of the Gobtmenschiches to be the key to 
his C , the relationship between the
archetypical historical person of Christ, and 
the God- rv-hood, or Divine Humanity is forced 
u..on us £3 a subject of enqe;iry. If humanity 
is general, the totality of finite objects is 
the Son of God, what place and what function
39* Ibid., p.781.
is assigned to the one confessed to be the 
edia ,or of the God-manly (Gottmenschich.es), 
or, rather, Divine-human (Gott-lichmenschliches) 
life? .fiat is the relationship between the 
eternal Incarnation of God and the incarnation 
in the x rticul' r God-aan? These questions 
an 1 the related subject matter suggested 
demand a fuller explication before Strauss' 
mythologising scheme c~n be criticised.
Before in rating the inquiry which may, 
or may not, demonstrate an intelligible 
relationship between the particular historical 
God-man and the Ideal Christ (Divine Humanity), 
it may be emphasised that our author does not 
doubt the actual historical existence of Jesus. 
He does not r u tempt in his first four editions 
of hi "Leben Jesus" to give a positive life of 
Jesus, but it is assumed that there are certain 
histo reel daca substantiating this life.
Though Strauss did not cast doubt on the 
historicity of Jesus, his mythical theories 
and speculative reconstructions did prepare 
the way for the eventual rejection of the 
historical Jesus in the writings of Bruno Bauer. 
Strauss, like Hegel, whom he follows at many 
points, v/as not concerned with the phenomenal 
history o: the individual. It was assumed that
the external, sensuous data had been mythically 
embellished through transmission. Like HegeO, 
the external fact was a point of departure for 
the Spirit which knows itself united with God. 
After the annihilation of the sensuous external 
and the crude representations (Vorstellung), the 
entire object of faith is completely shifted; 
from sensuous and empirical it has become 
spiritual and divine, and it has its credentials 
no longer in history, but in Philosophy.
Through this passing over the sensible history 
(the image) to the absolute, the former is 
abolished as an essential; it is degraded into 
a subordinate. , over which stands spiritual truth 
on its own proper (independent) ground. Moreover, 
sensible history is reduced by Strauss to a 
distant dreamy vision which has its place now 
only in the past, and not, like the ides, in the 
spirit ever absolutely present and conversant 
with it. Bu g , it the history of the mediator 
performs only a suggestive function to faith 
and after which this history is to be discarded 
from view as a bygone dream, what, if any, 
mediatorial function v/as exercised by the 
God-man?
Strauss points to this question when he 
amplifies a statement in connection with what 
he-has said co; ceming the key to his Christ­
ology. This further clarification, conspicious- 
ly suppressed in his later editions, gives some 
indication ox his answer. "This alone is the 
absolute subject-matter of Christology: the
circumstance that this appears bound up in the 
person and history of an individual has no other 
subjective ground than this - that the individual 
in question, by means of his personality and his 
destiny, became the occasion of bringing that 
s bject-mett- r into universal consciousness; 
while the degree of s iritual attainment in the 
ancient world, and the vulgar, perhaps, of 
everytime, can contemplate the idea- of humanity 
only in the concrete figure of an individual.
In a time of the deepest convulsion, of the 
greatest bodily and mental suffering...the 
individual in question...became the occasion of 
bringing the subject-matter into universal 
consciousncss."/rC* This is the function of the 
God-man. Not that he was distinctively the 
unique realisation of the unity between God and 
man, but that with him commenced or was 
inaugurated a process which each person must
40. Ibid., p.776
realise in his own life. He does not complete 
the unity, but merely initiates the turning 
point in the development of the spirit winning 
its own re conciliation.
The above is not surprising, for Strauss 
believed that it was impossible ior spirit to 
manifest itself in a single individual, but only 
on the whole. The archetypicality of the God- 
man, because finite forms are always inadequate 
to the idea, is thereby denied. But this 
rejection of the finality of the God-man and 
assigning him a prophetical role instead of a 
mediatorial function fastens itself on another 
central idea in the Straus si an-Hegelian system, 
namely the idea of God and the idea of humanity.
Some attention has been given to Strauss' 
doctrine of God and of God's relationship to 
history in his Christological reconstruction, 
but, if v/e are to comprehend the reasons why Christ 
or che particular individual God-man could not have 
been the archetype, the primal man which eternally 
and equivocally mediates the Gottsmsnschliches, 
we must refer to the Hegelian-Struassian cnncept 
o- God again. Ig was observed in the preceding; 
discussion that Strauss agrees with what he calls 
"the scientific doctrine of God." A doctrine
which, it is remembered, is anti—supernatural—
istic, end one which preserves the immutability
ox the natural order with its laws and freedom
irom outward inter o sit ions. He says of thid
scientific picture: "Science has conceived
that the infinite has its existence in the
alternate production and extinction of the
finite; that the idea is realised only in the
41entire series of its manifestations• " * This
primary statement succinctly represents the cycle 
which God must passthrough in order to arrive at 
self-consciousness: God, because he does not
know himself or have aseity in eternal absolute­
ness, posits an other; and He alone can know 
Himself in and through this "Ocher". YThen the 
other (the world, finite forms, nature) has been 
posited, these finite forms, because they are 
insufficient and inadequate to mediate God's 
complete self-knowledge, are abolished and other 
forms are posited. An ever-ending cycle which 
does not cease with the positing of any finite 
fom. Commenting on this cyclical process,
Domer writes: "The process required by the
Idea ox God as the mere Spirit of the world, is 
marked by che self-contradictory feature, that, 
in order to its having adequate actuality, it is
41. Ibid., p.777*
compelled on tlie one hand eternally to posit
a non-adeqm ce medium (the world), and on the
otiier hand to do away with the same medium on
the jroun that it is impossible for God truly
and permanently to have his life and abode in
42
any single form." Through the endless series, 
or otoality of finite spirits, God is arriving 
at this realisation as a subject. Moreover, 
regardless of Hegel's and Strauss' efforts to 
maintain the eternal completeness of God apart 
from the continuous flux of time, God Himself is 
in bondage to, and dependent on, the world. He 
becomes Gos through the finite series and if, in 
the endless positing and abolishing process, God 
realises Himself completely, the history of the 
world - because that history is none other than 
the history of God’s actualisation - would, by 
necessity , terminate and stagnate in the completed 
form.
Several Christological ideas are mirrored in 
this context. (1) It is the inadequacy of the 
form to the concent, or the image to the Idea, 
that solicits ever afresh the process of positing 
new forms and abolishing them. The finite, in 
articular the individual form, because it is 
inadequate to the idea and because the idea
43"does not lavish its fullness on one exemplar"
42. Domer, Person of Christ, p. 154.
43. "Life of Jesus',* Vol. I. p.779#
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cannot; represe. t the complete, final oneness of 
God and man. This form may suggest the process 
but, if it embodies the idea fully, the necessity 
for the scheme devised to mediate God's self- 
consciousnes; would terminate with the fulfillment 
of the idea, (h) Every spiritual being must, 
by necessity , pass through the same, or similar, 
state of division and disruption which we have 
noted in Gov . he individual posits his other, 
vis a vis, nature. Through sin and decease he 
breaks with nature and the binding idolatries 
in order to realise his oneness with God. In 
so many word; , his immediate naturality must 
serve as 'che impetus for the actualisation of 
his own self-consciousness. On this base, there 
could not have been a sinles > God-man who was 
exempt from the process. (3) The entire 
process, God's ositing an "other" and returning 
to Himself, only to posit another "other", is the 
self-mediation of God. On this reckoning, no 
place remains for the operation ox a historical 
mediator, (4) On the basis of He .el's ideas on 
sin, which we may be sure Strauss adopts, this 
is implicit in his thought that natural existence 
was the resurrection ox spirit. There was no 
place for the mediatorial office ascribed to 
Christ by the Churth. The salvation of man is
effected not be Christ's person, but solely by 
the eternal idea brought to light in, though 
not bound to, his person. (5) Another point in 
connection with this endless series of finite 
forms which sexve to mediate God's self-conscious­
ness and vf ich, moreover, prohibits Strauss and 
Hegel from assigning any particularity or finality 
to the person of Christ, concerns the abolition 
of personality in the scheme. None of the 
manifol forms which are posited have a veritably 
distinctive s,iritual character. Each is 
inadequate to the idea v/hich it is supposed to 
co vey and onl; in the totality of forms, Humanity, 
is there a pos. ibility for the idea to be effectively 
presented - though there is some question whether
even in the numerous forms the idea can be 
completely fulfilled; for, as we noted, the 
rocess has been designed to allow God to arrive 
at self-knowledge, and, if self-knowledge is 
complete, the process no longer possesses any 
value. (6) The Universal God-mahhood, or 
inc. malic taught by Strauss and Hegel is neither 
derived, nor derivable, from Christ or Jesus, the 
one confessed to be the Christs it necessarily 
robs him of his specific position and puts all 
men on essentially the same level. The one 
confesses to be Christ performs an exemplary
function at the most in St mass * Christology.
He says concerning the Christ:... "every man of
moral pre-eminence, every great thinker, who has
made tlie active nature oi man tneobject of his
investigation lias co: tributed in a narrower or
wider circle towards correcting that idea,
:emeeting or in roving it. And among these
im rovements o_ the Ideal of Humanity, Jesus
stands at all events in the first class. He
introduced features into it which were wanting to
it before ox" had continued undeveloped; reduced
the dimension of others which prevented it
univt sal apglie hon; imported into it, by the
religious aspect which he gave it, a more lofty
consecration, and bestowed upon it, by embodying
44it in his own person.’*' * But, if this remark 
appears to ^ive a higher place to Jesus than has 
been allowed in our other interpretations of 
Strauss’ thought, he says in another context that 
the Ide oi the Christ was further developed, and 
more perfectly .finished, in its different 
features after the historical Jesus.
(7) Another factor in connection with the 
eternal incarnation and the specific incarnation 
of God in a particular finite form concerns the 
agreement which the former idea naturally has with
44. "Life of Jesus", VoUI. p.437-
the version that "humanity", the totality of 
finite forms, is the essence of God, or God 
Himself. Hum n history is, efter all, the 
process of God's becoming the self-unfolding of 
reason under conditions of space and time and, 
in this sense, but no other, the word became 
flesh and dwelt among us. Although faith may 
believe the appearance of the God-man, the 
inci .mation o... God, his birth in the flesh, an 
historical fact, speculative thought considers 
the incama tior of God in no single event which 
once happened, but an eternal determination of 
the essence of God by virtue of which God only 
in so far becomes man in time (in every 
individu 1 man) as He is man from eternity.
The finitude and humiliation and power which 
Christ as God-man endured, God st every moment 
suffers as man. The atonement made by Christ is 
no temporal performed act, but God reconciling 
Himself wit Himself eternally: and the
resurrection and exaltation of Christ is nothing 
else than the eternal return of the Spirit to 
Himself and to His truth. Christ as man, as 
God-man, is man in his universality, not a single 
individual, but a universal individual."
fhile Strauss, along with Hegel, insisted that
45. fair-bum, A .LI. "The Place of Christ in Modem
Theology1,' Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1868, 
page, 265*
at the lie art of all finite trail sections and 
historical ones among the rest, individuals 
stand as ’'the substantiality of the Idea,"
Jesus The Christ may not be spoken ox as he is 
pictured and interpreted in the New Testament.
In the chapel ox the enlightened, Jesus is 
premier inter paras, standing with Emperor 
Alexander Severus, Orphesus, Homer, as companions. 
In his own religious compartment, we may assign 
to him Moses a id Mohammed for his associates.
Concerning Strauss* mythical scheme, we may 
make the following critiques Strauss* fear ox 
relapsing inuo Lie rationalists and naturalistic 
an , to some extent, the hall-mythicist, half- 
rationaliso, reconstruction of the biblical 
history, led him to enunciate two errors which 
ultimately vitiated his attempt to escape from 
the dilemas posed by th< rationalist and super- 
naturalist view ox biblical history.
The first error, that of mythicing the history 
or extricating the mythus from their cent ext in 
•the narrative , overlooked the vital connection 
whic the non-histo.ical story has with the 
preceding and following historical data. 
Schweitzer illustrates this point in connection 
with Weisse*s discussion of miracles. Instead
oi considering the myth or miracle ox the feeding
of the multitude in the context of the narrative,
Strauss proposed to cut away the story from the
surrounding probable historical data and regard it
as pure myth. While Strauss has sufficiently
shown the admixture of myth, legend, and history,
in the narrative and, to some extent, so
Schweitzer says, "he has shown clearly enough
the source o~ the form of the narrative in
question, this does not suffice to explain its
origin." # Schweitzer continues: "Doubtless
there is lythicai material in the story of the
feeding Ox the multitude, but the existence of
the story is not ex lained by rex erring to the
marina in the desert, or the miraculous feeding
of a multitude of Elisha. The story in the
Gospel he3 far too much individuality for that,
and stands, moreover, in much too closely
articulated an historical connection. It must
have as its basis some historical fact. It is
47not myth, though there is myth in it." ( '
3imil rly, with the account of the transfiguration, 
Strauss, instead of considering the possibility 
that the event was partly based on a real 
experience shared by the three disciples, chose 
to overlook I v s connection with the context by a
46. Schweitzer, Albert, "guest of the Historical 
Jesus", page 84.
47* Ibid., p.84.
definite indication of time. Strauss connects 
the six days in Mark 9:2 with Ex. 24:16 and, 
furthermore, he seeks to show that the trans­
figuration narrative was one of the many ways 
the Jev/ish Christians proposed to exemplify the 
splendour of the Messiah. Taking the illumination 
of the countenance of Moses as atype for the 
transfiguration of Jesus, the early Church 
( .otivateu by c- desire to prove the Messiah- 
Ship of Jesus) sou Jit to exhibit in the life of 
Jesus an enhanced repetition of the glorification 
of Moses, an to bring Jesus as the Messiah into 
contact with his two forerunners. Schweitzer 
sys, i: view of Strauss' pure mythical treatment 
of uhe narratives, that.."the substratum of 
historical fact in the life of Jesus is much more 
■ 'tensive than Strauss is x> repared to admit. 
Sometimes he fails to see the foundations 
because he proceeds like an explorer who, in 
working on the ruins of an Assyrian city, should 
cover up the most valuable evidence with the 
rubbish thrown out from another portion of the 
excavations. *  Summarily speaking, Strauss 
eliminates myth in his interpretation. As one 
ascends from the "image", vis a vis the myth, 
to the idea or Kergyma, particular historical
48. Ibid., p.84.
events or the context in which the idea appears 
is eliminated. The ideas (Keryyma) are timeless 
truths which can be permanently divorced from 
the context of history. The kernel, viz. the 
idea of the unity of Go''; and man, can be 
Separated iron the husks which surround this 
unity. 7/ith the tools of reason and enlightened 
philosophy, the mythical, though unconscious, 
inventions can be seen for what they are: 
t re-philosophical means of elaborating truth.
Another error in Strauss* mythicing scheme
occurs in his concern to prove that the New 
Testament ray to. arose from the transference of 
the Old Testament Messianic myths. In the first 
instanc , this simple plan underestimates the 
vital factors which caused this transference, and, 
furthermore, Strauss* plan does not entail a 
discussion of the transxormation and re- 
evaluation of the Old Testament prototypes by the 
Evangelists ana Apostles. The mechanical, static, 
and, to some extent, plagaristic, adoption of the 
Old Testament antitypes, undermines the experience 
ox the early disciples. The Church, instead of 
being created by Christ as a dialectical 
response, creates its Christ virtually out of 
pure imagination.. It then substantiates this 
cr ation by scrutinising and comparing its form
with the previous standards, or composing their 
narratives like a mosaic out of different 
antitypes in the Old Testament. Christ receives 
his majesty rom the community. He did not, as 
Christendom has believed in accordance with . 
John 17:22, 1 Cor. 1:18, import his majesty to 
his disciples. But, if the Church created 
Christ, we are then left with the query: What
created, or who created, the Church? Whom does 
the author v present as the originator of this 
revelation in the world? Apparently no-one.
The origin of Christianity vanishes into the 
thickest mist. It is surely not the 
correspondence in the acts and events of His 
life with ancient predictions that caused his 
reception by the ones confes ing Him to be their 
Christ; but iJ is a presumption, somehow 
existing independently, that he must be the 
Christ that united with the recollection ox 
those prediction's in the people's minds to make 
up the story ox this accomplishment.
We may legitimately ask why were the expect­
ations attached to Jesus? Recognising the 
several Messianic expectations elaborated in 
Jewish history, how were these promises sorted 
out in the minds ox the recipients if we assume,
as Strauss lead us to believe, that the person­
ality of Jesus has such a minimal effect on the 
narrators o^. that history?
A related error concerns Strauss' neglect of 
the influences derived from Gnosticism, Stoicism 
and mystery religions. Ideas from the surround­
ing world in the first century moulded the minds 
of the perpetrators oi the tradition and, to a 
large extent, these syncretistic factors served 
to transform and to universalise the Messianic 
expectations. Rather than inaugurate a 
criticis i o„ the sources and the multitudinous 
ideas lyin at the root of the text, Strauss 
prefe /red to validate his mythical claims on the 
basis of the Cld Testament antitypes. If the 
doctrines could not be found in the Old Testament, 
they were dismissed.
7/e have been principally concerned with Strauss' 
adoptio of Hegel's distinction between Vorstellung 
(Image) and Begriff (Idea). Strauss’ demytholog- 
isin^ method was inspired by- Hegelian philosophy. 
His view of myth, history, and Christianity (the 
Absolute Religion), was determined by his Hegelian 
presuppositions.
There were other periods in Strauss' writings 
which we cannot elaborate. Suffice it to say
th: t in his f,Life of Jesus for the Genian People” 
in 1864, he chose to give what has been called
a "liberal icture of Jesus.” The "arbitrary
spiritualisation of the Synoptic Jesus"^* results,
according to Schweitzer, in an "unhistoricel 
50cm.""' * Schw itzer comments further on this
strange Jesus in Strauss* "Popular Life of
13C4": "The ultim te product of this process
was e r ected to be e Jesus who should be
essential man; the actual product, however, is
Jesus the historical man, a being whose looks
and sayj ere strange and unfamiliar. Strauss
is too purely a critic, too little of the
creative historian, to recognise this strange
being. That Jesus really lived in a world of
Jew's', ide s and held Himself to be Messiah in
h e Jewish sense, is, for the writer of the life
of Jesus, an imrossibility• The deposit which
resists the chemical process for the elimination
of myth, he must therefore break up with the 
51hammer. *!> *
Another period in Strauss* speculative treat­
ment ox Christology is to be noted in his work 
"The Old Faith and the New** which appeared in 
1872. He puts to himself the question, What is 
there ox permanence in this artificial compound
49. Ibid., p.198.
50. Ibid., p.199* 
51* Ibid., p.197*
ox theology end philosophy, faith and thought?
The Hegelian system of thought which served as 
a firm basis for the work of 1840, has fallen 
in ruins. Straus , without the crutch 
afforded by the Hegelian system, endeavours to 
raise himself above the new scientific world­
view enuncicted by Darwin end Feubach. In his 
last worm, Strsuss addressed himself to 
several questions, some of which were: "Are
we still Christians?" "Have we still a 
religion?" "Hov; ere we to understand the world?" 
"How are we to regulate our lives?" To the first 
question, he answers, "Ho." To the others he 
attempts in an impersonal way to base his 
const actions on the scientific theories of 
Darwin*
In our next chapters we shall develop a pattern 
of thought which grew out of the Hegelian- 
Straussian speculations. Beginning with Bruno 
Bauer, who has the distinction of being one of 
the first to deny the historicity of Jesus, we 
shall glance at the Christ-Myth Theorists.
Time will not permit an adequate discussion of 
all the theorists in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Vie have chosen, to 
give some attention to three figures: Kaustky,
J.M. Robertson, and Jensen, principally because 
they rei)resent three fields of enquiry into 
the origins of Christianity - respectively, 
sociology, comparative mythology and religion, 
and archaeology.
CHAPTER III
THE CHRIST-MYTH THEORISTS.
Preface.
We will be concerned in this chapter, and in 
the following chapters in this section, to survey 
the development of a thesis which was set forward 
in the early 19th century by Bruno Bauer - namely, 
the non-existence of Jesus of Nazareth. This 
thesis was inspired, at least indirectly, by 
Hegelian philosophy and the biblical criticism- of 
Frederick Strauss. The men who were influenced 
by Hegelianism in the fields of comparative 
religion, comparative mythology, sociology and 
archaeology, sought to free the world from the 
shackles co which it had allowed the figure of 
Jesus and the Church’s interpretation of this 
figure to bind them. For these men, the Christian 
religion was identified with intellectual dishonesty 
and all the forces of evil in the world. It had 
been a bar to scientific and moral progress. 
Moreover, the Jesus of history, or the Orthodox 
interpretation of Christianity, because it 
depended upon an outmoded world view- entailing 
a belief in the supernatural, miracles and
revelation - encouraged a conservative view of 
the social order. It is the opinion of the men 
we shall study, and others which cannot he 
examined within the limits of our essay, that 
the origin of the Christian movement could he 
understood apart from the outstanding 
personality of Jesus of Nazareth.
But, it must he said in their favour, that 
some of these writers did not initially question 
the historical existence of Jesus. Only when 
their efforts to reanimate Christianity, or when 
their theories made Jesus* existence untenable 
and ridiculous, did they deny the historicity of 
Jesus - at least this is true in some of the 
19th century denials. Another feature in their 
favour concerns their contribution to the study 
of the life of Jesus and the uncovering of many 
problems connected with the study of the New 
Testament. Schweitzer admirably summarises this 
point in his concluding remarks on Bruno Bauer. 
He writes: "Bauer’s ’Criticism of the Gospel
History1 is worth a good dozen Lives of Jesus, 
because his work, as we are only now coming to 
recognise, after a half century, is the ablest 
and most complete collection of the difficulties 
of the life of Jesus which is anywhere to be
found."1* Then the work of the Christ-myth 
theorists, in emphasizing the parallels, actual 
or alleged, to the traditions concerning Jesus, 
enabled sympathetic scholars to grapple with 
many strands in the New Testament which had been 
ignored or given inadequate treatment. Another 
contribution offered to biblical criticism by 
these extremists lay in their emphasis on one or 
another factor which had been improperly 
recognized by Christian interpreters. Kautsky 
and Kalthoff emphasized the first century social 
ferment and how such social uprisings should be 
considered in connection with the rise and 
propagation of the Christian message. Bauer and 
Robertson, Drews and Smith, emphasized the 
philosophical thought in the first century, 
including the various religious movements and 
how they influenced the terminology and arguments 
of the New Testament writers. Another contribution 
of these men to biblical exegesis concerns their 
historical scepticism about the purpose of the 
New Testament witness. That is to say, from a 
prejudiced point of view, some of these men, 
notably the myth-theorists in the early twentieth 
century, sought to show the non-biographical 
interest of the New Testament Evangelists. While
1. Schweitzer, Albert, "The Quest ox the Historical 
Jesus," page 159*
we would question W.B. Smith’s idea of the 
"humanised Deity" which meets us in the New 
Testament, he was correct in saying that there 
was not a point in the New Testament witness 
when Christ was considered a "mere man.” While 
the "liberals" were trying to resurrect the 
"factual" Jesus behing the New Testament witness, 
these men were engaged in an investigation of 
the symbolism in the New Testament, though these 
symbols were, for the most part, considered 
extra-biblical by these myth-theorists .
The main contention of these chapters is, 
that the early Christ-myth controversy in 
Bruno Bauer and the modem Christ-myth arguments 
initiated by Kautsky, Robertson, Jensen, Drews 
and W.B. Smith, owed their inspiration to a 
conflict between the Idea and the historical 
which was inaugurated by Hegel and Strauss. These 
men, (post-Hegelians), were, for the most part, 
monists or pantheists. For them, reality consists 
of a single all-inclusive process and God is 
immanent within it, and not in any sense outside 
and beyond it. To attach special significance to 
an incarnation in Jesus is to obscure the truth 
that God is present in every man and in all
nature and all history. The truth contained in 
the Christian doctrine of redemption may be 
defined as follows: The life of the world is
God’s life: the development of humanity, full
of conflict and suffering, is the history of a 
divine struggle and passion: the process of the 
world is the process of a God who in each 
individual creature, strives, suffers, conquers 
and dies, in order to overcome in the religious 
consciousness of man the limits of finiteness, 
and anticipate his future triumphs over all the 
suffering of the world. The chief obstacle to 
the acceptance of this point of view is the 
belief in the historic actuality of a unique 
and unsurpassed personal Redeemer. So Kautsky, 
Robertson, Jensen, and their colleagues, who 
shared this religious philosophy, set out to 
destroy this hindrance.
Much of what follows is an account of the 
origin of the Christian Gospel when the person­
ality of Jesus has been denied. Why were these 
men chosen and not others? Obviously answered: 
time does not permit a full analysis of all 
points ox view. Only the representative ones 
can be surveyed. We have chosen, beyond our 
brief summary of Bauer’s account in this chapter,
a representative from three fields of study: 
Kautsky from the socio-religious; J.M. Robertson 
from the sphere of comparative religion and 
mythology; and Jensen from the field of 
Archaeology. The primary guide, or central 
presupposition, of all these men is illustrated 
by J • M. Robertson in his "Pagan Christs". Mr. 
Robertson writes: "It is needless here to
challenge afresh the historical value of the 
conflicting records, wherein a slight detail, 
of no historical importance, enters only to 
take varying forms for symbolical reasons.
What we are concerned with is the source of the
p
symbolism." * In so many words, these men did 
not look to the New Testament narratives for 
the historical facts, but to the ideas (their 
own presuppositions) to explain the origin of 
the narrative. In each of the Christ-myth 
theorists, it is their ideas on the origin of 
Christianity which determines how the facts are 
to be interpreted. One interpretor of these 
myth theories says: "Before we examine the case
for the Christ myth, it may be worthwhile to 
observe that it does not appear to convince 
anyone unless he comes to the inquiry with 
certain presuppositions. Doubts regarding
2. Robertson, J.M. "Pagan Christs", page 120.
the historical existence of Jesus Christ are 
advanced only by persons who wish to establish 
preconceived ideas as to the nature of religion, 
or as to the nature of history."^’
The following survey does not pretend to be 
an adequate appraisal ox the various theories, 
nor does it presume to evaluate these theories 
in any detail. This evaluative task has been 
done by many theologians. I should suggest 
several books which perform this function: 
Thorbum, T.J. "Jesus the Christ, Historical 
or Mythical”, "A reply to Professor Drew’s Die 
Christusmythe" (1912): Wood, H.G. "Did Christ
Really Live" 0-938) : Carpenter, Estlin, "The
Historical Jesus and the Theological Christ" 
(1911): Thorbum, T.J. "The Mythical Interpret­
ation of the Gospels" (1916): Goguel, M.
"Jesus the Nazarene, Myth or History" (1925): 
Loofs, Frederick, "What is the Truth about 
Jesus Christ" (1913): Mill, W.H. "Observations
on the Attempted Application of Pantheistic 
Principles to the Theory and Historic Criticism 
of the Gospel" (1861): Beard, J.R. "Voices of
the Church in Reply ot D.F. Strauss" (1845): 
Mackay, R.W. "The Tubingen School and its 
Antecedents" (1863): Guignebert, Ch. "Jesus"
(1935): - to name only a few.
3- Wood, H.G. "Did Christ Really Live", p.17
1 # Bruno Bauer: Christus und die Casaren. Der
Ursprung des Christentums aus 
dem romischen Griechentum.1*
The writings of Bruno Bauer, principally because 
he was the first German theologian in the 19th 
century to question and eventually deny the 
historical existence of Jesus, have an importance 
which must be estimated before later attempts at 
negating the reality of Jesus can be described. 
Bauer laid the germs for the eventual denial of 
the historical Jesus in such men as Kautsky, 
Kalthoff, J.M. Robertson, W.B. Smith and Jensen, 
though the latter never acknowledge their 
indebtedness to Bauer’s speculations. Along 
with these men, Bauer’s negation of the person­
ality of Jesus forced him to account for the 
rise and propagation of the Christian movement 
on extra-scriptural grounds. We shall sketch 
Bauer’s account of the origin of the Christian 
Faith, but, meanwhile, some attention should be 
given to his reasons for arriving at his 
negative picture.
Standing on the Hegelian right, occupying, at 
least initially, a more conservative position 
than Strauss and the other "leftist" Hegelians,
1. Christ and the Caesars: How Christianity
originated from Graeco-Roman Civilization - 
(Schweitzer’s chapter on "Bruno Bauer" in his 
"Quest of the Historical Jesus" is a closely 
packed summary of Bauer’s thought).
Bauer was, at least in his initial enquiries, 
interested in describing Jesus1 unique 
personality and discovering how the artistic and 
pictorial construction of Jesus1 life in the 
Gospels was capable of awakening the Messianic 
Idea, and, moreover, how, in the work and teachings 
of Jesus, mankind, through the centuries, had 
experienced redemption from bondage to the world. 
But, as Bauer’s investigations of the life of 
Jesus proceeded, his conclusions became more 
radical and his judgments more ill-tempered. The 
Personality of the God-qian, traditionally 
conceived as realizable in a single person, was 
soon to mean for Bauer a realisation of the 
Divinity of Humanity. Moreover, Jesus of 
Nazareth never lived and there was no cause for 
Christendom to refer to Him as the unique 
embodiment of Divinity. What are the lines upon 
which Bauer finally reached his negative 
conclusion?
In approaching his investigation of the Gospel 
history, Bauer saw two paths open to him. He 
might choose the historical method which would 
lead him to discover how the Jewish Messianic 
conception became attached to Jesus. Or, he 
could take the literary approach which would
lead him to examine the Gospel texts and 
ascertain, on the basis of the material in 
the New Testament, the way in which the 
Evangelists speak of Jesus and his work. In 
his literary solution, the New Testament could 
be divorced from the literature which preceded 
the writings, e.g. the Old Testament and the 
inter-testament period. Moreover, instead of 
beginning his investigation of the life of Jesus 
from the recognized initial sources, the synoptic 
parallels (a position which, while being accepted 
in part by Strauss, and further substantiated in 
the Marcan hypothesis in the writings of Weisse 
and Wilke), Bauer began his study by examining 
the Gospel of John. Discovering this Gospel to 
be a work of art, e.g. the reflective thought of 
the author fitting the concept of the Jewish 
Messiah into the framework of the Logos conception, 
Bauer surmised that the reflective and creative 
imagination of the author of the Gospel of John 
did not presume to write a biographical account 
of the life of Jesus. Upon the supposition of 
a literary origin of the Fourth Gospel, Bauer 
turns to the synoptic parallels to discover in 
them the historical framework of the life of Jesus. 
Before his explanation of the historicity and unity
of these parallels proceeded on the basis of
the plan of the second Gospel, Wilke and Weisee
had decided on the priority of the Marcan
Gospel. In the so-called Marcan hypothesis,
these writers had concluded that Matthew and
Luke freely used Mark in their expositions.
Where these two gospels differ from Mark, it
was believed that oral and written tradition
had supplemented their sketches of the life of
Jesus and his ministry. The three Gospels drew
upon tradition and were simply literary versions
of a tradition widely circulated in the period.
While allowing for the priority of Mark and the
general historical value of the outline of
Jesus1 life, Weisse and Wilke, according to
Schweitzer, "had not suspected how great a
danger arises when, of the three witnesses who
represent the tradition, only one is allowed to
stand, and the tradition is recognized and allowed
to exist in the one written form only...Will a
2
single one bear the strain?" * The question of 
the purely literary origin did not occur to 
Weisse and Wilke, for they continued to combine 
with Mark the wider hypothesis of a general 
tradition. And, further, these writers believed
2. Schweitzer, Albert, "The Quest of the Historical 
Jesus", page 140.
that Matthew and Luke used the collection of 
"Logia" (written tradition) and also owed parts 
of their supplementary matter to a free use of 
floating tradition.
But, if traditional material, oral and written, 
was allowed, the purely inventive, literary 
origin of the parallels could not he permitted. 
Bauer was not content with this thesis as it 
stood and, on the basis of his emendation, we 
may discover the initial ground for his contention 
that there wqs not an historical person named 
Jesus who was confessed to be the Christ. The 
question posed by Bauer :ITHow was he to show 
that the life of Jesus was derived from a single 
source, i.e., the Godpel of Mark?" Furthermore, 
"how was he to disprove the existence of a 
composite source which was freely utilised by 
other Evangelists, even the author of the second 
Gospel?" Bauer’s central point, one which he 
attempts to substantiate by a careful reading 
of the additional material in Matthew and Luke, 
concerns the literary development of certain 
fundamental ideas and suggestions found by these 
composers in the Gospel of Mark. The Marcan 
hypothesis takes the following form in the 
writings of Bauer. Our knowledge of the Gospel
History does not rest upon any basis of 
tradition, but only upon three literary works.
Two of these are not independent, being merely 
expansions ox the first, and the third, Matthew, 
is also dependent upon the second. Consequently, 
there is no tradition of the Gospel history, but 
only a single literary source.
How does Bauer account for the point which had 
been made in biblical criticism up to his time, 
namely, the common knowledge of Jesus before it 
became fixed in the New Testament writings. 
Strauss and the supematuralist, i.e. 
Hengstenberg, claimed that the life of Jesus was 
the living embodiment of the Old Testament 
picture of the Messiah. And, moreover, the claim 
and traditional belief that the New Testament 
Messiah was the fulfillment of one of the 
Messianic expectations implicit and explicit in 
some parts of the Old Testament.
First, Bauer denies that at the time of Jesus 
there was a general expectation of the Messiah. 
The folk stories or myths which Strauss had 
emphasised as being common knowledge among the 
Jewish people, were now, for Bauer, non­
existent. Accordingly, the Jews had no Messianic 
hnpe at all and no belief in a "King of the Jews"
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that should come. Such traits, therefore, could 
not have been transferred to Jesus. The 
reflective, creative conception of the Messiah 
was not taken over ready-made from Judaism;
That dogma first irose along with the Christian 
community, or, rather, the moment in which it 
arose was the same in which the Christian 
community had its birth. Internal criticism 
of the synoptic parallels convinced Bauer, 
according to Schweitzer, that the conception of 
myth and legend of which Strauss had made use, 
is much too vague to explain the deliberate 
transformation of a personality. In the place 
of myth Bauer, therefore, sets "reflection". The 
life which pulses in the Gospel History is too 
vigorous to be explained as created by legend; 
it is a real experience, only not the experience 
of Jesus, but of the Church. The representation 
of this experience of the Church in the life of a 
Person is not the work of a number of men, but of 
a single author. The events in the Gospel, e.g., 
the temptation, the mission of the twelve, 
passion, are real circumstances, genuine struggles 
and sufferings, but not the circumstance of one 
man or the experience of twelve men.
Three ideas have emerged in our brief survey of
Bauer*s thought. The denial of the Messianic 
expectations and its origin in the community; 
the inventive history of the single Evangelist 
which attached first century ideas to a precise 
historical person; and the real experiences of 
the community which were grouped around a single 
personality in the synoptic parallels. Internally, 
Bauer’s literary hypothesis had performed its 
negative work.
Before we can offer some critique of this 
internal solution, let us glance at the external 
evidence which he amassed for the negation of the 
historical Jesus. The external evidence which 
Bauer uncovers is repeated in every writing which 
purposes to question the historicity of Jesus.
The first evidence concerns the silence in 
profane literature of the time ox Jesus. Such 
early Roman writers as Tacitus and Suetonius, 
while referring to Jesus in a scanty way, cannot 
be depended upon xor any valid information. The 
first definite record of Christianity is given 
in one of the letxers of Pliny, who was Governor 
in Bithynia from 111 to 113 A.D., and already, 
at that time, found Christians living there in 
large numbers.
If these records of Jesus in secular literature, 
even in the Jewish historian Josephus, could be
proven to have been reactions and interpolations 
placed there by the Christians - Bauer and other 
Myth theorists were of this opinion - the 
absence of data in the literature of the period 
went far to prove the non-existence of Jesus. 
These men did not stop to consider the reasons 
why Josephus failed to mention the Messianic 
uprisings in Palestine. Writing for the Romans, 
Josephus wished to show these people the law- 
abiding character end peaceableness of his 
countrymen. To sketch the claims of Jesus, as 
they were being understood in Palestine in the 
period, would have defeated Josephus' purpose.
The second fact which Bauer and others drew 
upon to support the negation of Jesus, involves 
the ideas which were considered of a distinctive 
Christian origin - being found almost word for 
word in the writings of the heathens of that age. 
Many of the writers of the period had spoken of 
brotherhood, providence, peace and faithfullness 
under suffering. Ideas originating in Stoicism 
and neo-Platonism were to be found reduplicated 
in the teachings of Jesus. The mystery 
religions which magnified redemption and release 
from the world into a higher, purified, spiritual 
state, preceded the thoughts of Jesus. Jesus
did not initiate many of the ideas attributed 
to him by the Christians; on the contrary, 
they were ready-to-hand, and, to some extent, 
borrowed and represented in the writings of the 
Christians as new.
Another fact which the Christ-myth theorists 
drew upon to substantiate their thesis, was the 
contradictory nature of the sources in the New 
Testament. On the basis of these contradictions, 
they assumed that these sources were not trust­
worthy. This point, coupled with the silence in 
non-Christian literature, and the parallel ideas 
in other religions, constituted the primary case 
against the historicity of Jesus. Each myth- 
theorist begins to trace the rise and propagation 
of the Christian message with these three factors 
in the background.
Turning now to Bauer's internal criticism of 
the Gospel record: His case on this level
concerned the absence o._ any Messianic 
considerations prior to the Gospel account.
Instead of being taken over from Judaism and 
woven into the aspects of the Gospel which Jesus 
exemplified, the Messianic conceptions first arose 
with the Christian community, or, rather, the
moment in which these conceptions arose, was the 
same in which the Christian community had its 
birth. Relxcive to this cbsence of Messianic 
speculations, was the non-existance of any 
traditional material in the Gospel of Mark. Mark, 
according to Bauer, was an artistic unity, the 
offspring of a single mind. According to Schweitzer, 
Bauer's position on the artistic unity of Mark 
cannot stand when he is forced to recognise 
diverst accounts of an event in the one Gospel.
But, Bauer does nox come to grips with the obvious 
fact that there must have been, in spite of his 
interpolative theory, a weaving in of fragments 
of tradition by the author of the second Gospel.
2* Bauer's view of the rise of Christianity.
The question arises: "If Bauer is convinced
of the non-existence of the figure ox Jesus, how 
does he account for the Christian movement?" What 
motive or motives inspired such a movement in the 
first century? First, Bauer felt compelled, in 
view of the complexities of the problem offered 
by the life of Jesus, to go outside the confines 
of verifiable history for his solution to the 
problem of the Gospel Jesus. He postulates an 
original Evangelist who invents the history - an 
invention to serve an idea. Bauer's book,
"Christus uni die Casaren. Der Ursprung des 
Christentums aus dem romischen Criechentum", 1877 >
(Christ and the Caesars; How Christianity 
originated from Graeco-Roman Civilization) is 
concerned with the question posed. Christianity 
was a hybrid religion, compounded out of two 
personalities, Seneca and Josephus, and the ideas 
which these two men magnified in their teachings 
and writings. The spirit of the new religion 
came from the West and the outward frame was 
furnished by Judaism. In brief, the spirit of 
the religion is concerned with the alienation 
of the self from the world through Roman 
oppression and totalitarianism. At the point 
of estrangement, the spiritual history (hidden 
and veiled from the outward history of the world) 
experienced an alienation from itself and the 
world - a world which must be conquered if the 
self is to know of its freedom from the world 
and nature. In this spirit of resignation, 
produced by certain idealogical forces, Josephus 
prepared the way xor a new principle, namely, in 
the Jewish break with narrow nationalism and its 
claim that its God would take possession of the 
world and make the empire submit to His law - the 
new principle of universalism could flourish. 
Herein lay the possibility in the ancient world: 
the self alienated from the world, resigned to
this state, and the possible victory over the 
world through active resistance to the world.
But this dialectic of alienation and reconciliat­
ion to the world was petrified in Christianity.
In the first instance, Christianity attached 
supreme significance to one individual, vis a 
vis, Jesus of Nazareth - the one who had in hisJ 
person overcome the world. The Christian faith, 
through its emphasis on the imitation of this 
Jesus, has smothered the strength of mankind.
In its absolute interest in one person, the 
Christian religion negated the energy of the world 
in postulating the figure of Jesus as the central 
one to be imitated. In this scheme of things,
according to Bauer, the self remains alienated
as long as it believes Jesus to have been the 
central religious figure. When it is recognized 
that Jesus is a creation of mankind in an age of 
resignation, then the self may arise from this 
position of servitude.
Secondly, when the figure ox Jesus dies for 
mankind, it becomes possible for it to come to a
knowledge ox itself and its central vocation,
namely that of obtaining victory over the world. 
When the Christ of theGospels, the magnified ego, 
relinquishes his hold on mankind, the latter may
arrive at the consciousness that it is Divine.
The preceding paragraphs are the merest sketch 
of Bauer's thought and they do not pretend to he 
adequate, hor do they presume to elucidate all the 
subtleties in his thought. Bauer, the critic, in 
the process of his investigations, gave way to Bauer 
the speculative philosopher. His enquiries were 
initiated on the basis of a search for the 
historical in Christianity. His conclusions were, 
because of the method adopted, implicit in his 
initial criticisms. In the final analysis, the 
Gospel History is an imaginary embodiment of a 
set of exalted ideas. These ideas were the only 
historical reality from first to last.
We have seen in these paragraphs one attempt to 
account for the origin of Christianity. As we 
move into the other chapters in this section, the 
men, though their writings were some seventyfive 
years later than Bauer's, will he concerned with 
the origin of the Christian message. The next 
representative, Karl Kautsky, wrote his book 
"Foundations of Christianity: A study in Christian
Origins", in 1925* He is, as we have intimated, 
writing from the point ox view of sociology, 
seeking to allign his social views with the rise
of Christianity. J.M. Robertson's "Pagan Christs: 
Studies in Comparative Hierology" (1911) and 
"Christianity and L/ythology" (1910) were, as the 
title of the latter book suggests, concerned to 
elaborate his view of the origin of Christianity 
along lines set by a comparative study of 
religions. P. Jensen's "Das Gilgamesch-Epos in 
Der Weltliteratur" (1906) is a comparative- 
archeological study of the origin of the Christian 
faith. In the following pages these theories of 
the origin of Christianity will be described.
CHAPTER TV.
Karl Kautskyfs Socio-Religious Reconstruction 
of the Origins of the Christian Faith.
1. Introduction:
Karl Kautsky's "Foundations of Christianity: A 
Study in Christian Origins" is representative of a 
view of the beginnings of Christianity usually 
associated with the thought of Professor Kalthoff 
(Das Christus-Problem: Grundlinien zu einer 
Socialtheologie). Because the latter's point of 
view is usually discussed by writers in this field 
and because such books as Schweitzer's "Quest of 
the Historical Jesus", Goguel's "Jesus the 
Nazarene: &£yth of History" and Guignebert's "Jesus", 
have ably summarised Kalthoff's theories, we shall 
look to Kautsky as the spokesman for what might be 
termed the socio-religious or Marxist reconstruction 
of the origins of the Christian faith* Whilst 
Kautsky and Kalthoff and their tutors, Marx and 
Engels, were not concerned to investigate the 
meaning of the mythical or to discuss the personal­
ity of the one confessed to be Jesus the Christ, 
they were, in face of their apriori ideas, i.e. 
materialistic conception of history and the 
consequent invalidation of the individual, and 
conceiving religion to be an expedient husk for 
the elaboration of social ideas, erecting on the
empirical evidence discerned in the New Testament 
and the social patterns of the Graeco-Roman 
world, the myth of a "secularised Christ" - the 
ideal personification of the impoverished classes 
in the first century* For these interpreters, 
their materialistic conception of history made 
no place for the individual and, if not for the 
individual, the Christian faith could he 
explained without reference to the personality of 
Jesus. "We may add," according to Kautsky,
"that it is really not necessary to know anything 
about him (Jesus). There is not a single Christian 
thought that requires the assumption of a sublime 
prophet and superman to explain its origin, not onn 
thought that cannot be pointed out before the 
time of Jesus in 'pagan' and 'Jewish* literature."^"* 
While not expressly denying the existence - 
"whether he actually existed or was merely anp
ideal figure of man's visions" - Kautsky does 
not decide. The following statements indicate 
why his thought must be studied in connection 
with the Christ-myth theories. He writes:
"While we may perhaps go so far as to admit the 
probability that Jesus lived and was crucified, 
probably because of an atxempted insurrection,
1. Kautsky, Karl, ,!Foundations of Christianity" -
p. 3 2 6.
2. Ibid., p.364.
there is practically nothing else that can be
said about him. What is regarded as his
teaching has no little evidence to support it,
is so contradictory and so little original, so
full of commonplace moral axioms then current in
the mouths of many, that not the slightest trace
can be assigned with certainty to the actual
3
teachings of Jesus." He continues in another 
context; "It was not the faith in the 
resurrection of the crucified which created the 
Christian congregation and gave it its strength, 
but, on the contrary, it was the vigour and 
strength of the congregation that created the
ZL
belief in the continual life of the Messiah." *
2. Kautskyys Interpretation of History.
The remarks, by way of introducting Kautskyfs 
thought, serve to classify him with the Christ- 
myth advocates. The relationship between Jesus 
and the faith of the congregation must be 
discussed in another connection, but, meanwhile, 
to use Guigenbert's words... "it is evident that, 
if the ‘personality and influence of Jesus disappear* 
from history, the birth of Christianity has still 
to be explained."^* How does Kautsky set about 
his task after he has dealt what he considers to
3* Ibid., p.442.
4. Ibid., p.378.
5. Guigenbert, "Jesus", p.55*
be a fatal blow to its central personality, 
called by him in one context "a proletarian 
seditionist".^* To answer this query, Kaut&y1s 
view of history, his ideas on the function of 
religion, the manner in which he accounts for 
the beginnings of the Christian faith on the 
basis of the analogies existing in the 
development of faith in later Christian sects 
and similar organizations and his central 
hypothesis concerning Christianity being a 
movement of the proletarians of the Graceo- 
Roman world, different in degree but not in 
kind, with many of the revolutionary activities 
in the first and second centuries.
Kautsky*s understanding of the Marist view of 
history may represent what might be termed an 
"inverted Hegelianism". Instead of the "notion" 
or "Begriff" being the factor which by necessity 
resolves itself in history, now, under the 
tutelage of Marx and Engles, matter, the 
processes of production, determine the course of 
history. Kautsky writes in his introduction 
concerning the task of science. "For the task 
of Science is not simply a presentation of that 
which is, giving a faithful photograph of reality, 
so that any normally constituted observer will
6 . Kautsky, "Foundations of Christianity", p.402
form the same image. The task of science 
consists in observing the general, essential 
element in the mass of impressions and phenomena 
received, and thus providing a clue by means of 
which we can find our bearings in the labyrinth 
of reality."'- The clue which performs this 
all-embracing reference point is summarised in 
the preface to the English edition of "The 
Communist Manifesto". Engels writes: "The
manifesto being our joint production (Marx and 
Engels), I consider myself bound to stqte the 
fundamental proposition which forms its 
nucleus, belongs to Marx, that proposition is:
That in every historical epoch, the prevailing 
mode of economic production and exchange, and 
the social organisation necessarily following 
fiom it, form the basis upon which is built up, 
and from which alone can be explained, the 
political and intellectual history of that 
epoch; that consequently the whole history of 
mankind (since the dissolution of primitive 
tribal society, holding land in common ownership) 
has been a history of class struggles, contest 
between exploiting and exploited, ruling and 
oppressed classes; that the history of these 
class struggles forms a series of evolutions
7« Ibid., p.12.
in which, nowadays, a stage has been reached 
where the exploited and oppressed class - the 
proletariat - cannot attain its emancipation 
from the sway of exploiting and ruling class - 
the bourgeoisie - without, at the same time, 
and once and for all, emancipating society at 
large from all exploitation, oppression, class
o
distinction and class struggles." *
The materialistic conception of history, unlike
the ideological or "individualistic theory of
history", which Kautsky considers to be cyclical
in nature - history returning to its initial
point, an eternal repetition of the same drama,
with only costumes changed, and with no real
9
advancement for humanity, ’is, in essence, 
linear, advancing from one cause to an effect, 
from one mode of production and consumption in 
an epoch to a higher one in another era. This 
materialistic, linear conception of history, 
gives rise to a dynamic dialectical process 
which consummates in some classless, non- 
exploitative society. "The economic history of 
man shows a continuous evolution from lower to 
higher forms, which is, however, by no means 
uninterrupted or uniform in direction. But, 
once we have investigated the economic conditions
8. Quoted by : Macintyre, Alasdair, "Marxism:
An Interpretation", p. 72.
9- Kautsky, p. 11.
of human beings in the various historical 
periods, we are freed at once from the illusion 
of an eternal recurrence of the same ideas,
aspirations, and political institutions .
"Once we have ceased to regard political struggles 
as mere conflicts concerning abstract ideas or 
political institutions, and have revealed their 
economic basis, we are ready to understand that, 
in this field, as well as in that of technology 
and the mode of production, a constant evolution 
toward new forms is going on, that no eroch 
completely resembles any other epoch, that the 
same slogans and the same arguments may at 
various times have very different meanings.
Y</ith the knowledge that each age of history is 
to be studied and evaluated in the light of the 
modes of production and consumption characteristic 
of the epoch, the proletarian investigator, so 
Kautsky informs us, is free from biases and 
class interests and the temptation to reconstruct 
the past in the light of the present needs and 
circumstances - prejudices which govern the 
Bourgeoisie historians. The view of history 
which Kautsky espouses will, according to him, 
more easily grasp those phases of primitive
10. Ibid., p. 11-12.
Christianity which they have in common with the 
modem proletarian movement. The emphasis 
placed on economic conditions, which is the 
necessary corollary of the materialistic 
conception of history, preserves us, so Kautsky 
claims, from the danger of forgetting the 
peculiar character of the ancient proletailat 
merely because we grasp the common element in 
both epochs. "The characteristics of the 
ancient proletariat were due to its peculiar 
economic position, which, in spite of many 
resemblances, nevertheless made its aspirations 
entirely different from those of the modem 
proletariat."'1'1* Kautsky comments further in 
the same vein when he writes: "He who accepts
the standpoint of the economic conception of 
history can adopt a completely unprejudiced 
view of the past, even though he is actively 
involved in the practical struggles of the 
present. His work can only sharpen his glance 
for many phenomena of the past, not render it 
dim."12*
The Marxist claim to stand beyond the biases 
and presuppositions which govern "ideological" 
interpretations of history, is, besides over­
looking their own ideological key to history,
11. Ibid., p.12.
12. Ibid., p.14-.
anti-personalistic. Marxism repudiates the
conception of personal responsibility as a
mere "ideology", and considers mam as the
product of his conditions. Marx says in his
introduction to "Capital": "Inasmuch as I
conceive the development of the economic structure
of society to be a natural process, I should be
the last to hold the individual responsible for
conditions whose creature he himself is; socially
considered, however, he may raise himself above
13them subjectively."
A word from Kalthoff's "Rise of Christianity"
illustrates the point of view held in common and
applied io religion. "The value of either
religious or ethical ideas is far higher when
they are conceived as a constructive product
of the organic development of a certain culture
than when, as is done in the individualistic
theory of history, they are regarded as the
14-personal contribution of a single genius.”
Kautsky offers conclusive evidence for this 
viewpoint in his own words: "Individual persons
may influence society, end the delineation of 
prominent individuals is indispensable for a 
complete picture of their times. But, when 
measured by historical epochs, their influence
13- Thomas, M.M. "The Church and the Disorder of
Society" Ecumenical Study, S.C.M. Press, 
London, 194-8, page, 74-.
14-. Kalthoff, "Rise of Christianity", quoted by
Wamshaier, "Jesus or Christ", page, 34-.
is temporary at best, furnishes only the 
surface adornments which, while they may be 
the first portion of the structure that strikes 
the eye, reveal nothing to us concerning its 
foundation walls. It is the latter that 
determine the character and permanence of the 
structure. If we can reveal them, we have 
accomplished the most important work in an 
understanding of the edifice."1 *^
Given such a theory of the way in which the 
rise of religious and ethical ideas ought to be 
conceived - a theory which seeks to reduce the 
share of the individual in the shaping of 
history to a minimum - it is easy to see how 
the events of history will have to be brought 
into conformity with a philosophical system; 
not how things have happened, but how they must 
have happened, becomes henceforth the 
preoccupation of the theorist.
This freedom from interest in any one 
interpretation of the past and the pretentious 
claim to transcend all class interests and the 
absence of any concern for personal responsible 
existence are enough to vitiate and distort the 
primary ideas in the Christian message. Kautsky’s
15* Kautsky, p. 43*
case for an unprejudical account of the 
beginnings of Christianity and his anti- 
Christian biases falls on the rocks of his 
unhistorical treatment of the sources and his 
deterministic view of historical events. Kautsky 
does not engage in an historical and literary 
criticism of the New Testament sources. His 
information of the origins of the Christian 
movement is deduced from the behaviour of later 
Christian sects. These later sectarian groups 
furnish an anology to the unknown beginnings 
of Christianity. That a similar sequence of 
events took place in the later Christian 
congregations affords, according to Kautsky, a 
rational, scientific principle for accounting for 
the rise of Christianity. But, yet another point 
determines his treatment of Christianity in 
connection with the principle of historical 
analogy: He writes: "To be sure, such an
argument by analogy does not constitute evidence 
in itself alone, but it may very well give 
support to a hypothesis that has been formed 
in another way. Both these elements, the analogy 
of the later sects, as well as the actually 
preserved remnants of the earliest tradition of
239.
primitive Christian life, are equally definite 
as evidence which might reasonably have 
expected in advance, knowing the proletarian
' T r-
character of the congregations."
The proletarian character of the era in which
Christianity arose is the central thesis of
Kautskyfs "Foundations of Christianity". He
indicates the source of this inspiration when
he quotes Engels in connection with his own
tracing of the similarities existing between
Christianity and socialism. Engels writes in
"Class Struggles in France" - "The History of
primitive Christianity presents remarkable
coincidences with the modern worker’s movement*
Like the latter, Christianity was originally a
movement of the oppressed; it first appeared as
a religion 01 slaves and freedman, of the poor,
the outcasts, of the peoples subjected or
dispersed by Rome • Both Christianity and
Socialism preach an approaching redemption from
servitude and misery. Christianity assigns
this redemption to a future life in heaven after
death; socialism would attain it in this world
17as a transformation of society."
16. Ibid., p#327*
17* Ibid., p.462.
While Kautsky regards Christianity as "The 
precipitation of certain class interests" and 
a product of the economic and moral decay of the 
proletariat in the Roman Empire, the movement, at 
least at its inception, was an "envelope for 
social goals." The liberation from misery 
proclaimed by Christianity was at first quite 
material to be realised on this earth, not in 
Heaven. While at first being a genuine 
revolutionary product of the poor Galilean 
fishermen and peasants and Jerusalem proletarians, 
fired with the Messianic expectations of the Jews 
and the revolutionary upheavals of the era, 
Christianity soon became, under the aegis of the 
state in the fourth century, a powerful legal 
organisation. Attaining the status of religio 
licita, becoming a state Church, the movement 
became a tool of despotism and exploitation,
"more powerful and more gigantic than any that 
have yet appeared in history." It became "a 
prop of suppression and exploitation; that it 
not only did not eliminate the imperial power, 
slavery, thepoverty of the masses, and the 
concentration of wealth in a few hands, but 
perpetuated these conditions. The Christian
organization, the Church, attained victory by 
surrendering its original aims and defending 
their opposite.!|1®# Yet, there was a time, and 
Kautsky is convinced that the later Christian 
editors in the interests of peaceful co-existence 
with the State and vested interest did not extract 
all of the evidence of the nature of early 
Christianity, when Christianity was an insurrect­
ionist, revolutionary movement aspiring to a 
material salvation on earth. The arrest, trial 
and execution of Jesus, however much later 
editors attempted to whitewash the real event, 
can be understood only if Jesus was the leader 
of an unsuccessful insurrection. "The assumption 
that the execution of Jesus was due to the fact 
that he was a rebel is, therefore, not only the 
sole assumption which can make the indications 
in the Gospels clear, but it isalso completely 
in accordance with the character of the epoch and 
of the locality. From the time to which Jesus* 
death Is commonly assigned, up to the destruction 
of Jerusalem, there was no end of restlessness 
in that city. Street fights were a very common 
thing, as well as executions of individual 
insurgents. Such a street fight waged by a little 
group of proletarians, followed by the crucifixion
18. Ibid., p.461
of its ringleader, who was a native of Galilee,
always a rebellious province, might well indeed
have made a profound impression on all the
participants who survived, while history itself
might perhaps not have taken the trouble to
record such an eveiy-day event. In view of the
rebellious agitation in which the entire Jewish
race was living at that period, it was natural
for the sect which had brought about this
attempted insurrection to emphasise it for
purposes of propaganda, thus giving it a firm
place in tradition and, also, naturally,
somewhat exaggerating and adorning such details
19as the personality of the hero." But the
character of the Christian movement soon was
forced to alter its rebellious nature during
what Kautsky calls the "Golden Era" of the Roman
Empire. During this era, from Vespaisian (69 A.D.)
to Co::imodus (180 A.D.), a general condition of
intecnal peace was effected. ’’Under Vespaisian1 s
reign, the military monarchy finally achieved the
financial arrangement that was needed by the
Imperator in order to preclude in advance any
activity of a possible rival in wooing the
favour of the soldiers and thus for a long (
period to stop military rebellions at their 
20source." * Political revolution, formerly the
19. Ibid., p.369.
20. Ibid., p.370.
natural thing, now became most unnatural* 
Submission to the imperial power, patient 
obedience, now seemed not only a commandment 
of wisdom to the cov/ardly but became more and 
more deep-rooted as a moral obligation.
This change in the political and economic 
fortune of the masses naturally had its effect 
on the Christian congregation. In Kautsky*s own 
words, a picture is presented of the change which 
was effected by the new processes of production. 
"The Christian congregation no longer had any use 
for the rebellious Messiah, who had been 
acceptable to Jesish thought. Even the moral 
feeling of the congregation rebelled against 
this rebellious Messiah. But, as the congregation 
had become accustomed to regard Jesus as its God, 
as the incorporation of all the virtues, the 
transfonaation did not involve a relinquishment 
of the rebellious Jesus and the substitution of 
an ideal image of another personality, more 
adapted to the new conditions, but simply meant 
a gradual elimination of all rebellious elements 
from the image of the Jesus God, thus transforming 
the aggressively rebellious Jesus gradually into 
a passive figure, who had been murdered not because 
of an insurrection but simply because of his
infinite goodness and sanctity, end the vicious­
ness and malice of treacherous enviers. n^~ *
But, while the retouching and editing were 
carried out in the interests of the Church's 
position in a sympathetic world, i.e. legalised 
property holder, representing their Messiah as 
opposed to all bloodshed, Kautsky, in the 
interests of his overall theory of Christian 
origins, is convinced that the Church was 
initially concerned with salvation on earth, 
and that only when the economic conditions 
changed did the Christians transfer salvation to 
another world.
While the basis for Kautsky's primary thesis, 
as he finds it mirrored in the New Testament sources, 
demands further explication, the above comments 
concerning the role of Christianity and religion 
in his thinking merit further consideration.
As we are primarily concerned with his treatment 
of Christianity and, in particular, his impugning 
of the personality of Jesus, his ideas on the 
function of religion will bring in focus sone of 
the prejudices which he brings to bear on the 
theme.
It is recognised that Marx postulated a dual 
role for religion. In a class society, religion
21. Ibid., p.370.
performs two essential functions - it buttresses 
the established order by sanctifying it and by 
suggesting that thepolitical order is oidained by 
God, and it consoles the oppressed and the 
exploited by offering them in heaven what they 
are denied upon earth# At the same time, by 
holding before them a vision of what they are 
denied, religion plays, at least partly, a 
progressive role in that it gives the common 
people some idea of what a better older would 
be. But, when it becomes possible to realise 
that better order upon earth in the form of 
communism, then religion becomes wholly re­
actionary, for it distracts men from establishing 
a new possible good society on earth by turning 
their eyes toward heaven. Its sentification of 
the existing social order makes it a counter­
revolutionary force. Thus, in the course of 
building a communis society, the Marxist must 
fight religion, since religion will inevitably 
stand in the path.
Kautsky's thinking does not deviate considerably 
from the well known scheme. For the sake of 
clarity, his thought may be designated as 
positive and negative, remembering that the 
positive is negated when religion vis a vis 
Christianity becomes a tool of the powerful
bourgeoisie clerical minority. Moreover, 
much of the positive value of Christianity is 
negated when the tools of scientific criticism 
extricate the social ideas from the religious 
illusions. Negatively, while religion serves 
to augment the pov/er of the, state and clerical 
minority, it is basically a questionable world­
view. "The gods of religion," according to 
Kautsky, "had at first served as an explanation
for the procession of nature whose casual
22connections were not yet understood." * The 
gods were means of explaining incomprehensible 
phenomena. They were also a means of consol­
ation and aid in situations in which human 
strength seemed insufficient. In the first 
cnetury, due to the disintegration of society, 
and the decline of scientific investigation and 
the luxugient spread of moral preaching, the 
masses were plunged into hopelessness and 
despair. Their initiative was crippled and 
their self-confidence stifled. The widespread 
cowardice and despondency of the era caused all 
to expect salvation only at the hands of extra­
ordinary and supernatural powers. Their only 
support was the hope for assistance from some 
higher power, some redeemer, either by an
22. Ibid., p.178
247.
emperor or a God, not by one's own strength or 
the strength of one's class. Kautsky paints the 
situation quite well in the following lines. "The 
more impotent the individual feels himself to be, 
the more timidly he seeks for a firm support in 
some personality that stands out from the ordinary 
average; and the more desperate the situation 
becomes, the more a miracle is needed to save him - 
the more likely will he be to credit the person to 
whom he attaches himself as a rescuer, as a 
saviour, with the performance of miracles. In 
fact, he will demand these miracles as a test to 
prove that his saviour really possesses the power 
to rescue him. Superhuman powers were assigned 
to the old gods in order to afford an explanation 
of actual events that had been very precisely and 
correctly observed. Now superhuman powers were 
assigned to men, in order to enable them to 
produce effects that no one had yet observed, 
that were entirely impossible." In the 
situation of wholesale despair in the Imperial 
era, not unlike the "unhappy consciousness" 
which preceded the birth of the "absolute
religion" in Hegel's system, the masses were 
helpless victims of any clever imposter, or of 
any energetic, self-confident adventurer. This 
blase indifference and disgust with life caused
23. Ibid., p.130-131
the people to yearn for sensations, marvels, 
hysteria and ecstasy. Any independent resis­
tance to any of the dominant powers was considered 
hopeless. Ih so many words, religious beliefs 
were b o m  of men's dependence upon the irrational 
forces of nature and society, over which man had 
not yet secured control. They are the result of 
the lack of organisation, of the anarchic state 
of society and of the weakness of man. With 
Marx, Feuback, Kautsky and the other dialectical 
materialist, a belief in God is the result of the 
poverty and degradation of man. For man, who is 
aware of his own worth anddignity, belief in God 
will disappear. All the riches of man will be 
restored to him ant there will be no farther need 
for him to transfer these riches into the realm of 
the transcendent. With the advance in the knowledge 
of casual relations in nature and the re­
affirmation of Man's essential dignity and worth, 
which had been falsely projected on God, the 
individual gods become more and more superfluous.
The explanations of phenomena in religions are, 
in reality, alternatives to scientific 
explanations.
While being content to reveal Christianity's role 
in the furtherance of social goals, those which were 
indigenous to it and other Messianic aspirations 
which used Christianity as a platform for espousing
their ideas, Christianity was essentially, 
according to Kautsky, a temporary garment for 
social aspirations which were eternal. But, the 
expedient role assigned to Christianity founders 
on the rocks of Kautsky1s theoretical perspective. 
The positive role assigned to religion was 
effectively performed as long as social goals 
were accessible to the masses in religious garb. 
But, when these qualities, according to Kautsky, 
became reactionary, and constituted only a means 
of retarding progress, and when the religious 
mode of thought was superseded by the methods of 
modem science, Christianity could no longer 
serve as an envelope for new social goals. In 
these conditions, Christianity was cherished 
only by backward classes and the strata ox the 
population residing in backward regions.
In the Imperial era - the period when Christian­
ity arose - only religious organisations could 
maintain themselves,or only religious societies 
were authorised to exist by the empire. "The 
individual could rise beyond uimself only by 
means of a moralising mysticism, and thus attain 
the vision of goals transcending personal and 
temporary well-being. In other words, only by 
means of that mode of thought which is known as
religious..Only religious associations maintained
themselves in the Imperial Period. But we should
have an erroneous understanding of them if their
religious form their moralising mysticism, should
make us overlook the social content inherent in all
these organisations, which gave them their strength:
the longing for a cessation of the existing sad
conditions, for higher social forms, for a close
co-operation and a mutual support for these many
individuals now mentally homeless, who drew new
courage and joy from having banded together for
24high achievement.”
While religious organisations preached a new 
social ideal under a religious cloak, Kautsky 
tells us that if we understand the necessary 
relations ox cause and effect in our experiences - 
a possibility only on the basis of a materialistic 
philosophy - the proposal of great social goals 
may be freed of the religious illusions attached 
to them in the Christian era. "But all the 
necessary prerequisites for the existence of 
such a method were lacking in the Imperial 
period.
It may be said that in this connection the 
purpose of Kautsky's writing is made abundantly
24. Ibid., p.170.
25. Ibid., p.169*
clear. Bringing to bear on Christianity sources, 
literature and history of the era a so-called 
scientixic method iniormed by the materialistic 
conception of history, Kautsky seeks to extricate 
the permanent social ideas from the temporary and 
questionable religious medium. In his scheme 
Christianity differed in no point, not in 
opposition to the spirit of the times. All the 
distinctive ideas in the faith idealistically and 
traditionally associated with the person and 
teachings of the central individual in the faith, 
Jesus the Christ, are to be sought for in an 
explication of the "economic" root of the ideas.
The morality of Christianity, its views on 
slavery, charity, labour and even its doctrinal 
roots, e.g. Monotheism, trinitarienism, the God- 
man, arose from social ideas which were the 
product of the processes of production and 
consumption in the Imperial era.
Now that our author's scheme of reasoning, his 
presuppositions andnegative judgements of 
Christianity, are before us, we may address 
ourselves to the problems of Christianity in his 
writings, i.e., the non-Christian and Christian 
sources, the composition of the primitive 
Christian writings, the reliablity of the teachings
and speeches ox its central personality, and to 
the place given in Kautsky*s account to the 
Christian organisation, the Church.
With one stroke, Kautsky, in line with the 
other mythicists, reduces the references to 
Jesus in non-Christian literature to later 
Christian forgeries and interpolations. His 
approach to the writings of Josephus, Tacitus 
and Seutonius, may be illustrated by his remark 
in connection with the supposed references to 
Jesus in the writings of the Jewish historian, 
Josephus. "We therefore find Christian 
interpolations in Josephus in every step, from 
the very beginning of the second century. His 
silence concerning the principal personages of
the Gospels was sim ly too striking, and had to
26be altered." * Quoting from his precursor in 
the socio-theologicail view of the origins of 
Christianity, Kautsky augments his point. "But 
even if the passage (refering to the passage 
about Jesus in Josephus) were admitted to be 
genuine, it would be no stronger than a spider*s 
line, on which critical theologians would find 
it hard to suspend a human form. There were so 
many pseudo-Christs in the time of Josephus, and 
far into the second century, that we have no more
26. Ibid., p.25
than a summary mention of them. There was a
Judas of Galilee, a Theudas, an unnamed Egyptian,
a Samaritan, and a Bar Kochba. There may very
well have been a Jesus among them. Jesus was a
very familiar name among the Jews - Joschu,
27Josua, the Saviour."
"But," asks Kautsky, "do the Christian sources
flow all the more plentifully?" "Have we not in
the Gospel the most minute narration of the
teaching and influence of Jesus?" After posing
these questions, KautBly cites the example of
forgery and interpolation noted in Josephus and
the other non-Christian sources as the guide to
the excavation of genuine historical material in
the New Testament.
The early Christians, Kautsky explains,were
completely indifferent to truth. "These writers
were not concerned with truth, but with making
their point, and they were not at all delicate in
28the choice of their means." * But, being a 
product ox their times, the Christians differed
in little degree from other writers, Jewish and 
Greek philosophers. With the outlook of the age, 
credibility of miracles, clinging to superhuman 
authorities, the lack of a sense of reality, the
27. Kalthoff, Albert, "The Pd.se of Christianity",
page 2 0 - 2 1
28. Kautsky, p.28.
depreciation of science, the gullibility of the
public, legendry frame of reference in the
Christian writers, ignorance of facts and the
polemical, controversial and non-historical
purpose of the Christian writings, we cannot,
accordingly, treat these sources as historical.
"For a number of generations," Kautsky writes,
"the Christian teaching of the history of its
congregation was limited to oral transmission,
the handings down ox feverishly excited,
incredibly credulous persons, reports of events
that had been witnessed only by a small circle,
if . they ever really took place at all - and
which, therefore, could not be investigated by
the mass of the population, and certainly not
by its critical and unprejudiced elements.
Only when educated persons, of a higher social
level turned to Christianity, was a beginning
made in the written fixation of its tradition,
but, even in this case, the purpose was not
historical so much as controversial, to defend
29certain views and demands."
The teachings and speeches of the Jesus God, 
(Kautsky*s description of the Christ), are not, 
and in view of the interval separating the time 
when they were supposedly uttered and the moment
29. Ibid., p.325.
they were recorded - a half century after the 
death of Jesus, according to Kautskyfs 
reasoning - the words of Jesus. "Why should 
the speeches of Jesus in the Gospel be anything 
but speeches which the author of these records 
wished that Jesus might have believed? As a 
matter of fact, the speeches as handed down 
contain certain contradictions, expressions that 
are at times rebellious, and, at other times, 
submissive, and which can be explained only by 
the fact that various tendencies were present 
among the Christians, each of which would adapt 
the speeches of Christ, in its tradition, to its 
own needs. Kautsky proceeds to illustrate
what he terms the audicious manner in which the 
Evangelists proceeded in these matters. "Compare 
the Sermon on the Mount as reported by Luke with 
the later record in Matthew. In Luke it is still 
a glorification of the poor, a condemnation of 
the rich. In the days of Matthew, many Christians 
no longer liked that kind of thing, and the 
Gospel of Saint Matthew, therefore, transforms 
the poor who shall be blessed info those who are 
poor in spirit, while the condemnation of the 
rich is entirely omitted. If this was the manner 
of treating speeches which had already been set 
down, what reason have we to believe that the
30. Ibid., p.34-
speeches Jesus is alleged to have delivered a 
half century before their recording are faithfully 
repeated in the Gospels? In the first place, it 
is absolutely impossible for mere oral tradition 
faithfully to preserve the wording of a speech 
that was not set down at once, over a period of 
fifty years after its delivery. Anyone who, in 
spite of this obvious fact, sets down speeches 
transmitted only by hearsay, indicates by this 
very act his readiness to write down anything 
that pleases him, or his extreme gullibility in 
believing at itsfhce value everything he has been 
told."51.
It is because the Gospel of Matthew modified 
the revolutionary and socialistic character of
the primitive Christian enthusiasm, and by the 
way, according to Kautsky, this was the reason 
why the Gospel of Matthew was adopted as the 
"golden mean" by the Church. The ecclesiastical 
opportunism made this "watered-down" Gospel its 
standard report of Christian origins and, 
accordingly, so Kautsky comments, the first 
Gospel cannot be trusted as a reliable account of 
the origins of the faith.
In connection with the recorded speeches of
31. Ibid., p.34-35-
Jesus and, in general, the content of the
Gospels, particularly the passion narratives -
"the portion which for nearly two thousand years
has always made the profoundest impression on the
Christian world and stimulated its imagination
32most powerful 1 - there are numerous absurdities
and contradictions growing out of the efforts of 
the Evangelists to retouch the original historical 
events. When Christianity spread beyond the 
borders of Palestine, and, particularly, when 
Jesus was being presented as a social instead of 
a National Messiah, the pagan Christians found 
that the tradition declared that the Romans had 
crucified Jesus as a Jewish Messiah, a King of the 
Jews - in other words, a champion of Jewish 
independence, a traitor to Roman rule. After the 
fall of Jerusalem, this tradition became doubly 
e mb arras ing. Christianity was now in open 
opposition to the Jews, and wished to be on good 
terms with the Roman authorities. It was now 
important to distort the tradition in such a 
manner as to shift the blame for the crucifixion 
of Christ from the shoulders of the Romans to 
those of the Jews, and to cleanse Christ not only 
from every appearance of the use of force, but
32. Ibid., p.396-397
also from every expression of any pro-Jewish,
33anti-Roman i d e a s . T h i s  transformation of
the tradition was an extremely delicate task for
the revisionists; one which, according to Kautsky,
is not performed without leaving traces of the
original tradition. In the case of the rebellious
Messiah, "the proletarian seditionist", this
alteration proved difficult indeed.' In the
present Christian sources, Jesus is represented
as being opposed to all bloodshed, consents to
be chained, and is thereupon executed - while his
companions remain absolutely unmolested. Rut,
if the Messiah was so peaceful, so opposed to
any use of force, why did he permit his friends
to bear arms when they went about with him?
Kautsky is oi the opinion that this contradiction
can only be understood by assuming that the
Christian tradition in its original form must
have contained a report of a carefully planned 
coup d*etat, in which Jesus was captured, a
coup dfetat for which the time had seemed to be
ripe after he had successfully driven the banders
and sellers out of the Temple. The later editors
did not dare to throw out this report, deeply
rooted in tradition, in its entirety. They
mutilated it by making the use of force appear
33. Ibid., p.396. 
34-. Ibid., p.402.
to be an act undertaken by the Apostles against 
the will of Jesia.^*
In their efforts to conceal something (an 
insurrection led by one of the claimants to the 
title of Messiah) at any price, the Evangelists, 
according to Kautsky, invented impossible and 
stupid situations. Judas' betrayal means 
something if he had a secret worth buying. "If 
the report of the coup d'etat that had been 
planned must be eliminated from the story, the 
tale of Judas1 treason also becomes pointless. 
Judas' treason was too well known among the 
comrades, their hatred of the betrayer too great, 
it was impossible for the Evangelist to eliminate 
this event entirely. "But he (the Evengelist) was 
now obliged to construct a new act of treason out 
of his own imagination, in which he did not meet 
with success."^*
When the social conditions of the era, the time, 
the records were compiled, no longer required a 
rebellious, revolutionary and National Jewish 
Messiah, the interpreters conveniantly put the 
Christian doctrine more amiably in order to attract 
the wealthier, the ifomans and others who were not 
familiar with the original condition, and, if they 
were conversant with the actual happenings, these 
would have been too offensive.
35- Ibid., p.366.
36. Ibid., p.367*
37* Ibid., p.3 6 8.
Not only have the Christian sources been
mutilated in their interpretation of the arrest
and the reasons for the collapse of the movement,
but the trial and execution of Jesus could not
stand as they actually took place. The sentence
of death is imposed by the Jewish court after a
hasty trial which took place not according to
Jewish practice. The culprit was tried, not in
the courthouse, as is the custom, but in the
Palace of the High Priest. The condemnation,
while being immediately pronounced, violates the
Jewish ethic. According to their judicial
practice, only a sentence of acquital could be
pronounced by the court without delay; a
condemnation could only be pronlunced on the
38day following the trial.^ * But, in the interest 
of a violent anti-semetism, and the furtherance 
of the Christian movement in the Empire, at the 
time when the records were edited and compiled, 
the Jews must be shown to be the cause of the 
Messiah's death, not the Romans. Pilate, the 
Roman governor, is now depicted as a tolerant 
judge who was willing, if the people so desired, 
to release a prisoner - supposedly a Roman custom, 
but one which, according to Kautsky, was invented 
by the Evangelists to give Pilate and the Roman
36. Ibid., p.399*
justice a way out of the dilemma.
Commenting on this intolerable contradiction, 
^autsky writes, "And we are asked to believe that 
this man was exceptionally just and kind in the 
case of the proletarian seditionist Jesus, besides 
showing a degree of consideration for the wishes 
of the peo le that was of fatal outcome for the 
accused." Commenting further on this version 
of the events, Kautsky writes: "No-<o>ne ever
invented anything more outrageously childish. But 
with this effort to represent the bloody tyrant 
Pilate as an innocent Lamb, andto make the native 
depravity of the Jews responsible for the 
crucifixion of the harmless and peaceful Messiah, 
the genius of the Evangelists is completely 
exhausted. The stream of their invention runs 
dry for a bit ant the original story again peeps 
through at least for a moment. After being 
condemned, Jesus is derided and maltreated - but 
not by the Jews - by the soldiers of the sane 
Pilate who has just declared him innocent. Pilate 
now has his soldiers not only crucify Jesus but, 
first, has him scourged and derided as King of 
the Jews; a crown of thorns is put upon his 
head, a purple mantle folded about him, the
39. Ibid., p.403*
40. Ibid., p.402.
soldiers bend the knee before him, and then
they again beat him upon the head, and spit
on him. Finally, they place upon his Cross the
inscription, "Jesus, the King of the Jews".
This again brings out the original nature of the
denouement. Again the Romans appear as Jesus*
bitter enemies, and the cause of their derision,
as well as of their hatred, is his high treason,
his claim to be King of the Jews, his effort to
shake off the Roman yoke. Unfortunately, the
simple truth does not continue to hold the floor
for long. Jesus dies, and it is now necessary
to furnish proof, in the form of a number of
violent theatrical effects, that a god has 
41passed away." * "In this entire tale, the 
tendency of servility toward the Romans, and 
hatred for the Jews, is laid on so thick, and 
expressed in such an accumulation of monstrosities, 
that one would think it could not have had the 
slightest influence on intelligint persons - and 
yet we know that this device worked very well.
This tale, enhanced by the halo of divinity, 
ennobled by the martyrdom of the proud proclaimer 
of a high mission, was, for many centuries, one 
of the best means of arousing hatred and contempt 
for the Jews, even in the most benevolent minds 
of Christendom; for Judaism was nothing to them,
41. Ibid., p.405*
they kept aloof from it, they branded the Jews
as the scum of humanity, as a race endowed by
nature with the most wicked malice and obstinacy
that must be kept away from all human society,
"42held down with an iron hand.
It is certain, so Kautsky believes, that but 
a small minority of the primitive Christian 
writings really were written by the authors to 
whom they are attributed. Moreover, the original 
text has, as has been illustrated from Kautsky*s 
views on the Sermon on the Mount, the arrest, 
trial and execution of Jesus, been distorted by 
later revisions and additions. What then of the 
Pauline Epistles, the writings which most 
scholars believe to be more reliable, because 
they were the first documents to be composed 
within the circle of the faith? Kautsky extends 
his criticism of forgery to cover these writings 
when he says that the epistles..’do not include 
a single one whose genuineness has not been
disputed. The most brazen of these forgeries is 
probably that of the Second Epistle to the 
Thessalonians. In the imitated letter, the 
author, who conceals himself under the name of 
Paul, utters the following warning: "That ye
be not shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by
42. Ibid., p. 406-40?
spirit nor by word, nor by letters as from us"
(1 1 :2 ), (a forged letter is meant), and, finally,
the forger states: "The salutation of Paul m  th
mine own hand, which is the token in every
epistle; so I write." Of course, it is just
r43these words that betrayed the forgery. 1
While Kautsky recognises the view that Paul's 
letters may constitute the oldest literary 
products of Christianity, they are to be impugned 
on grounds of the silence to the teachings, 
activities and the person of its central figure - 
Jesus of Nazareth.
It may be clarifying at this point to enquire of 
Kautsky: "How, if the sources are so unreliable
and infested with later revisions and forgeries 
motivated by the changed social circumstances of 
the Christians, can the narratives serve to morror 
the nature of early Christianity, as Kautsky 
views it? " "How, if the sources are so 
contradictory and worthless, does Kautsky separate 
the kernel from the husk - the compromises which 
the early congregation made in a sympathetic 
world?” If, in defense of his primary thesis, the 
proletarian communistic structure of the primitive 
faith and congregation, he can say against one 
claiming to find otherfactors in the New Testament..
43. Ibid., p.37.
"the specific teachings of Jesus, of which we 
know nothing definite at all, cannot be used to 
prove anything against the assumptions of the 
early communism" -‘one would enquire of his 
treatment of the text and the source of his 
information, particularly since he has told us 
that the non-Christian sources are not to be 
trusted. Where does he get his information 
for the character of the congregation, if not 
from the mutilated sources in the New Testament? 
His book concerns itself, as has been pointed out, 
with the social conditions in the Graceo- 
foman v/orld, the hopelessness, the despair and 
the hope experienced on every hand for a 
"better day" - a day to be realised with the 
coming of the Messiah. While the social set­
up reflects a desire for improved social 
conditions, does Kautsky justify Christianity’s 
role in the "Imperial Era" when he treats it as 
one expression and one possible fulfillment of 
these social ideals? The sources may be 
unreliable and unhistorical to Kautsky, but 
their unreliability does not prevent their 
utilisation when they supplement his central 
thesis - a thesis which we believed to be 
superimposed on the texts.
44. Ibid., p.337*
Kautsky's use of the sources to validate his 
thesis places him under the same accusation 
levelled by him against the theologians and their 
treatment of Jesus. He says of their vain attempts: 
"In the absence of all historical certainty, the 
name of Jesus has, therefore, become an empty 
vessel for Protestant theology - into which each 
theologian may pour his own intellectual equipment. 
One of them will make Jesus a modem Spinozist, 
the other a Socialist, while the official 
professorial theologians will, of course, view 
Jesus in the religious light of the modem state.
In fact, in recent days, they have represented him 
more and more boldly as the religious advocate of 
all those aspirations that are now claiming 
dominance in the greater Prussian, national 
Theology. r,/^ #
Kautsky's efforts to depict Christianity as a 
personification of the working class movement is 
nowhere better illustrated than in his last chapter 
entitled, "Christianity and Socialism". He quotes 
his agreement with Ernest Renan's words: "If you
will form an idea of the first Christian
congregation drop in at the local section of the
46International Worker's Association." * And still
45. Ibid., p.41.
46. Ibid., p.463*
another writer with whom Kautsky agrees is quoted: 
"The French litterateur who wrote the ecclesiastical 
novel fLes Origines du Christianisme1, a plagiarism 
of German Bible criticism unparalleled for its 
audacity - was himself not aware how much truth 
these words contained. I should like to see my 
old *intemation" who would read, let us say, the 
so-called Second Epistle to the Corinthians, without 
feeling the opening of old wounds at least in a 
certain sense.
But, as Kautsky's book is an apology for a 
materialistic interpretation of history and, in 
particular, the modem worker's movement understood 
apart from the illusions of religion andthe 
crutches 01 an unscientific view of historical 
happenings, Christianity, because of its initial 
communistic leanings, could serve his apologetic.
But, when the Christian movement in the fourth 
century underwent a radical transformation at the 
hands of the revisionists and opportunistic clergy, 
Christianity lost its power to serve as a garment 
for the ideals of the working class. The chief 
bearers of Christianity, the free urban proletarians, 
workers and idlers, strove to live on society, 
without giving any return. Work played no part in
47. Ibid., p.463
their vision of the future. But not so with the
modern proletariat, for it is a proletariat of
1 about and it knows that all society rests upon
its shoulders. In summary praise of the modem
proletariat as against the primitive proletariat,
Kautsky writes: "Thus the primitive Christian
communism was a communism of distribution of
wealth and standardisation of consumption;
modem communism means concentration of wealth
48and concentration of production." * The
primitive Christian communism did not need to be
extended over all society in order to be brought
about. Its execution could begin within a limited
area; in fact, it might, within those limits,
assume permanent forms. Indeed, the latter were
of a nature that precluded their becoming a
universal form of society. Christianity under
these circumstances, and understood in this
manner, became by necessity, according to Kautsky,
a new form of aristocracy. "It (Christianity)
could not abolish classes, but only add a new form
49of domination to society."
Kautsky, in view of his sympathies, is convinced 
that modem communism will not contradict its 
basic goals or, in its development, create an
48. Ibid., p.467*
49. Ibid., p.467.
opportunistic hierarchy. The immense expansion 
of the means of production, the social character 
of the mode of production and the far-reaching 
concentration in the State of the most important 
objects of wealth, prepare the modem communists 
for the realisation of the social goals which, 
for a time, lay embedded beneath the ecclesiast­
ical foims and religious illusions.
A concluding word in this connection illustrates 
Kautskyfs antagonism to Christianity, and his 
optimistic hopes for the Socialist movement as it 
was taking shape in his day. "The period of the 
rise of Christianity is a period of the saddest 
incellecoual decline, of the flourishing of an 
absurd ignorance, of the most stupid superstition; 
the period of the rise of Socialism is a period 
of the most striking progress in the natural 
sciences and a speedy acquisition of knowledge by
the classes under the influence of the Social
50Democracy."^
3* Evaluation of Kautsky's Mythical Jesus.
Y/hat of the Historical, personal, Jesus of 
Nazareth? What place does the figure of the 
Messiah occupy in Kautsky's re-interpretation of 
Christianity? Does Kautsky deny the historicity 
of Jesus? Speaking first to the last question, 
his attitude toward the historical Jesus cannot
50. Ibid., p.471•
be determined on the basis of what he says
about Jesus; rather, what he does not say, or
say by way of implication and in the form of
subtle innuendos, on the existence of Jesus the
Christ. In his chapter, "The Stoiy of Christ's
Passion", Kautsky discusses the two factual
events in Jesus' life which, according to his
reckoning, any scientific historian nay consider
as "extremely probable" - his birth and his
death - "two facts which indeed, if they can be
proved, would show that Jesus actually lived and
was not merely a mythical figure, but which throw
no light whatever upon the most important
elements in an historical personality - namely,
the activities in which this person engages
between birth and death. The hodge podge of
moral maxims and miraculous deeds which is
offered by the Gospels as a report on these
activities is so full of impossible and obviously
fabricated material, and has so little that can
be borne out by other evidence that it cannot be
51used as a source."  ^ Yet, despite these 
fabrications and accretions, the two primary 
facts, Jesus' birth and death may be accepted, 
if for no other reason than they contain as 
naxrated in the text "extremely embarrassing 
circumstances for the early Christians."
51• Ibid., p.395
These facts were so well known to enable the 
authors of the Gospels to invent the facts a? 
substitute their own inventions, a practice 
which they did without hesitation in other 
cases.
The Galilean origin of Jesus, in view of the 
Messianic prophecies which foretold the birth 
of the Davidic Messiah in the city of Jerusalem 
and the peculiar subterfuges in order to connect 
the Galilean with the Davidic promises, demon­
strate the historicity of the birth of Jesus in 
the eyes of our author. "If Jesus", Kautsky 
writes, "had been merely a product of the 
imagination of some congregation with an 
exaggerated Messianic vision, such a congregation 
would never have thought of making a Galilean of 
him." ^
And the evidence for the death of Jesus stands 
on the same grounds. Kautsky believes the 
Gospels, however much they have been forged and 
edited by the demands placed upon the congregation 
when these records were compiled, permit us to 
assume that Jesus had planned an insurrection 
by the use of force, and had been crucified for 
this attempt. The reason for Jesus' death and 
the manner in which he was executed proved so 
embarrassing for the later congregations that,
52. Ibid., p.395* 
53* Ibid., p.395«
on this basis alone, we can assume that the 
facts were not invented. It is too sharply in 
contrast with the spirit prevailing in Christian­
ity at the time when it was beginning to reflect 
on its past and to record the history of its 
origin. Kautsky elaborates his case for the 
historicity of the death of Jesus: "The death
of the Messiah himself by crucifixion was an 
idea so foreign to Jewish thought, which always 
represented the Messiah with the splendour of a 
victorious hero, that only a real event, the 
martyrdom of the champion of the good cause, 
producing an ineffaceable impression on his 
adherents, could have created the proper soil 
for the idea of the crucified Messiah."^* If, 
as Kautsky has said, "we can place no faith in 
the speeches of Jesus, in the early history of 
his life, and surely not in his miracles, what 
is there left in the G o s p e l s ? " ^ *  Are the two 
events, Jesus1 birth and death, capable of 
exercising a function which traditional 
theologians attach to the person and work of 
Jesus the Christ? Is Jesus simply a vehicle for 
the realisation of the proletarian goals in the 
first century, merely a representative, an 
instance of a revolt against class society?
54. Ibid., p.396.
55* Ibid., p.35*
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Is Jesus a receptacle for the hopes of the masses? 
Three ideas, among many others, offer some insight 
into these questions. Firstly, speaking about 
the influence of the personality of Jesus upon 
his disciples, Kautsky comments: "But the
Gospels were not composed by the disciples of 
Christ, they do not reflect the impression made 
by this personality, but, rather, the impression 
made by the narration of the personality of 
Christ on the members of the Christian sect."^* 
After all, Kautsky continues, a tale concerning 
a fictitious person may make the most profound 
impression upon a system of society provided the 
historical conditions are suitable for the 
production of such an impression. In biblical 
literature, particularly in the centuries 
immediately preceding and following the time of 
Christ, invented personages have often exercised 
a very great influence, whenever the deed and 
teachings attributed to them corresponded to 
profound needs among the Jewish people. The 
prophet Daniel, a non-existent figure, according 
to Kautsky, served as a model for all later 
prophecies of the Messiah. The effect produced . 
by this mythical figure is not a proof of its 
historical reality, nor is the effect produced
56. Ibid., p.35«
by the figure of Jesus a validation of his 
historicity.
But what of the effect of the resurrection?
Does not this event, if we are to believe the 
New Testament reports and, in particular, Paul, 
the first to record the event, initiate the 
congregations? Concerning this matter, Kautsky 
writes: "It was not the resurrection of the
crucified which created the Christian 
congregation and gave it its strength, but, on 
the contrary, it was the vigour and strength of 
the congregation that created the belief in the 
continued life of the Messiah. "57*
These two quotations lead us to enquire 
concerning the initiation of the faith and if the 
personality of Jesus is so incidental, the 
survival and perpetuation of the faith. Concern­
ing the initiation of the faith, some ideas have 
been mentioned, but these thought’s and others 
may be focused. Concerning the initiation of 
the faith, Kautsky believes that Christianity and 
religions in general are to be understood not as 
the product of an individual superman, but as a 
social product.^®*
Christianity was a product of its time, a
57* Ibid,, p.378. 
58. Ibid., p.42.
product which was produced, as we have intimated 
in another connection, by the unification of the 
many seetiiing social expressions* The Judasistic 
Messianic expectations formed the basis for the 
general longing for peace and well-being in the 
Imperial Era and the possibility of actualising 
these goals in the Messiah gave rise to the first 
Christian congregation. The impotence of the 
people, their sterility in face of the intolerable 
social conditions, their lack of self-confidence 
and their inability to make an energetic attempt 
to free themselves from these stifling circum­
stances on uheir own strength, led the early 
congregations to postulate a supreme personality, 
a superhuman ideal to guide them through the 
impasse. "The more impotent the individual feels 
himself to be, the more timidly he seeks for a 
firm supnort in some personality that stands out 
from the ordinary average, and the more desperate 
the situation becomes, the more a miracle is 
needed to save him, the more likely will he be 
to credit the person to whom he attaches himself 
as a rescuer, as a saviour, with the performance 
of m i r a c l e s . T h e  decreasing interest in the 
natural sciences, Kautsky believes, and their
59. Ibid., p. 130-131
displacement by a meditation on ethics, involved 
also an abandonment of the critical spirit which 
aims to test the correctness of each proposition 
by actual experience, and a further weakening of 
the intellectual stamina of the various individuals, 
thus producing an increased desire to find a 
support in the person of some great men. Men 
were moved now not by actual proofs but by 
authorities, and anyone desiring to produce an 
impression upon them had to see to it that he was 
supported by the necessary authorities. If these 
authorities did not provide the required passages, 
it became necessary to doctor them a little, or to 
create one's authorities out of whole cloth. In 
Kautsky’s opinion, Daniel, Moses, Jesus, also his 
apostles, were such authorities.
But, Kautsky would have us to believe that, 
while the need for a supernatural redeemer was 
very real in the minds of the early Christians, 
it was, contrary to an individualistic 
interpretation of history, and even contrary to 
the orthodox treatment of the subject, an ideal 
personification. That is to say, the superhuman 
personality was a projection of the needs of the 
time. Christianity, being a social phenomenon,
an organic movement of the lower classes revolting 
against the intolerable conditions of the time, is 
not to be understood on the basis of a certain man, 
Jesus of Nazareth, having fulfilled all the 
supernatural claims made for his person by the 
later congregation. Jesus became a model for the 
congregation and a rallying point for the 
revolutionary drives. Into this model or represent­
ative were poured the needs of the time, particular­
ly the need to make of Jesus a superhuman 
personality, a God who would bolster up their 
weakness and inspire them with confidence. Kautsky 
makes the point quite clear when he writes 
concerning the events which were attributed to the 
Messiah: "What we know of the passion of our
Lord Jesus Christ is, in reality, only an incident
in the history of the sufferings of the Jev/ish
60people." * The needs of the time, the thought 
patterns and the unscientific perspective left no 
alternative for the early congregations and the 
authors of the New Testament narratives: their
social goals were mirrored in a divine personality 
and their impotence in the face of the challenges 
of the day, e.g. demon possession, belief in 
miracles and the overarching power of the Romans, 
forced the early believers to picture their
60. Ibid., p.417*
social goals in a supernatural person. But, as 
we have noted, Kautsky is convinced that, while 
religion may have been an envelope for the social 
goals, this envelope, in view of scientific 
criticism,casual relationships, is no longer 
necessary in an understanding of the origins of 
the Christian faith.
If, then, the initiator of the Christian move­
ment is not to be found in the study and influence 
of a historical personality, but to be understood 
as a social, revolutionary, communistic movement 
couched in religious, individualistic terminology, 
what then of the survival and propagation of the 
faith? What is to distinguish the Christian faith 
from the other faiths in the ancient world? If 
not the speeches of Jesus, his personal influence, 
his writings - of which we have none - and his 
resurrection, what is the lasting influence of 
the Christian faith? Kautsky writes: "Ecstatic
faith in the personality of the prophet, and the 
love of miracles, rapture, the faith in the 
resurrection - all these we find among the 
adherents of the other Messiahs as well as among 
the adherents of Jesus. We may not seek the 
cause for the differentiation of one of them in 
that which all have in common. While it may be
natural for theologians, even the most liberal, 
to assume that, though all the miracles may be 
abandoned that axe told of Jesus, Jesus himself 
remains a miracle, a superman, such as the world 
has never seen - we are forced to deny even this 
miracle. The only point of difference between 
Jesus and the other Messiahs is in the fact that 
the latter left nothing behind them in which 
their personality might be preserved, while Jesus 
bequeathed an organisation with elements that were 
excellently calculated to hold together his 
adherents and attract increasing numbers of new 
adherents... "The other Messiahs had merely 
gathered together bands for the purpose of 
insurrection; the bands dispersed after the 
failure of the insurrection. If Jesus had done 
no more than this, his name would have dis­
appeared without a trace after his crucifixion.
But Jesus was not merely a rebel, he was also a 
representative and champion, perhaps even the 
founder of an organisation which survived him 
and continued to increase in numbers and in 
strength." * It is,then, not in his personality 
but in the creation that is connected with his 
name that we are led to seek the reason why the
61. Ibid., p.376.
Messianic activity of Jesus did not have the 
fate of the similar activities of Judas and 
Theadas and the other Messiahs of that time. 
With the increase of the organisation (the 
Church), as it grew more and more powerful, its 
martyr necessarily occupied the imagination of 
its members more and more, and they necessarily 
became more and more adverse to regarding the 
crucified Messiah as a wrong Messiah, more and 
more impelled to recognise him as the true 
Messiah in spite of his death, as the Messiah 
who would come again in all his splendour. It 
became more natural for them to believe in his 
resurrection, and the belief in the Messianic 
character and in the resurrection of the 
curcified became the characteristic mark of the 
organisation, distinguishing it from other 
believers in the Messiah.
In an effort to substantiate his emphasis on 
the social organisation, Kautsky offers his 
views on the resurrection. "If the faith in 
the resurrection of the Messiah had arisen from 
personal impressions, it would necessarily 
have become fainter and fainter in the course 
of time, being more and more obliterated by 
other impressions, and would finally disappear
altogether with the death of those who had 
known Jesus. But, if the faith in the 
resurrection of the Crucified was a result of 
the influence of his organisation, then this 
faith would become all the more solid and 
enthusiastic with the increase in the organisat­
ion, the less it positively knew concerning the 
person of Jesus, the less the imagination of his
cp
worshippers was fettered by definite details."
The idea of a personal resurrection, according 
to Kautsky, came to mean little more than a 
compensation for the loss of life: an idea to
safeguard the involvement in dangerous social 
struggles. In his own words: "And mutual aid
associations for the sake of personal advantage, 
were reassured as to the endangering of their 
persons by the idea of a personal resurrection 
with a subsequent rich reward; an idea which 
would not have been necessary in order to keep 
up the morale of the persecuted in an age whose 
conditions goaded the social instincts and 
feelings to the utmost, so that the individual 
felt himself irresistibly forced to obey them, 
even to the point of endangering his own 
advantage, his own life. The idea of a personal 
resurrection was, on the other hand, indispens-
62. Ibid., p.378.
able in an age in which all the social instincts 
and feelings had been depressed to an extremely 
low point by the progressive social dissolution, 
not only among the ruling classes, but also 
among the oppressed and exploited.
In the last analysis, this socio-religious
treatment of the origins of the Christian faith
negates the existence of the personality of
^esus the Christ. Kautsky ends his investigation
of the foundation of Christianity” with a
point of view which was explicit in the first
few pages of his treatise. At page fortytwo he
said: ”We say now of Jesus, that we are not
64-even certain that he ever lived.”
In the preceding pages we have resorted to 
Kautsky's own words to clarify his thinking on 
historical Christianity. It is, as he has so 
often said, a temporary shell or framework for 
the social ideals which eventually broke away 
from the initial embodiment. Social conditions 
of the time, e.g. the outlawing of any secular 
organisations by the State, the unscientific 
viewpoint and the religious illusions of the 
period, forced the social goals to take the 
certain form which they were couched in during 
the first centuries. After the temporary shell
63. Ibid., p.380. 
64-. Ibid. , p.4-2.
proved worthless, the need for the framework 
was non-existent.
In our next chapter we pass to a man - and a 
tracing of Christian origins - which is even 
more fanciful. J.M. Robertson and the related 
writers on the points of view elaborated in his 
thought, e.g. Arthur Drews, W.B. Smith, are 
interested in the parallels to the Christian 
message in the first century. The interesting 
thesis of a pre-Christian Jesus ("Der 
Vorchristliche Jesus” - W.B. Smith1 s central 
work) demands our serious attention. On the 
basis of comparative religion and comparative 
hierology, these men decided that the birth of 
Christianity was a hundred years older than the 
customary date. The origins of Christianity 
are not to be located in the mytho poetic 
personalisation ox the community or the 
embodiment ox certain ideas in an individual. 
The human figure is not gradually elevated to 
a divine status, nor is the historical Jesus to 
be understood as human figure which became God 
through his ministry or resurrection. On the 
contrary, Jesus was never a human figure raised 
to divine worth. The Gospels do not depict a
human figure at all; they concern a God that 
progressively became human through the 
imaginations of the early community. Now, let 
us turn to a description of the methodology of 
this school of "new mytHeists" as they are 
called. J.M. Robertson, because he inspired 
the others in their approach to the origins of 
the Christian faith, will concern us in our 
next chapter.
CHAPTER V
"THE PRE-CHRISTIAN JESUS"
J. M. Robertson
1. Introduction
J.M. Robertson summarises the purpose of his 
study and the manner in which it is to be treated 
in the first section of his book "Christianity and 
Mythology ."(1900). The problem of Christian myth­
ology can be best dealt with by placing our ideas 
over against the divergent views current in many 
works on mythology. Dr. Percy Gardner in his work 
"Exploratio Evangelica" says of IJyth..." ’Probably 
at that time (early Christian age) in all the Levant 
the true myth making age was over. But the faculties 
which had been employed in the construction of myth 
were still at work and they found their natural field 
in the adoption of history to national and ethical 
purpose.* Robertson comments on what he regards
as the old, untested, metaphysical conception of myth­
ology implied in Gardner’s idea..."Such language seeros 
to me to confute itself. In any case the whole drift
1. Robertson: Christianity and Mythology: p.XVIII
of the present work is a gainsaying of such divisions 
as the one thus sought to he d r a w n . "2 Robertson’s 
additional remarks in the same connection bring in 
focus his definition of myth and the fight which he 
is to wage against what he terms the "limitary con­
ceptions of myth" and the "separatist fallacies" - 
i.e. myth divorced from religion and ethics in a 
primitive ethos; dividing the raythopoeic and all 
other mental processes; between the different 
aspects of early classification; between myth and 
religion, religion and magic, myth and early morals, 
myth and legend, myth and alloys of myth and tradition, 
myth and supernaturalist biography. Concerning Gardner’s 
conception of myth, Robertson remarks, "Dr. Gardner 
speaks again of the ’vague and childish character of 
the true myth.* I submit that there are all degrees of 
vagueness and childishness in myth, from the grossest 
to the slightest, even in the pre-Christian lore of 
Greece and that, though there may be grading,there can 
be no scientific sunderance. A myth commonly so-called
2. Ibid: p.XVIII
when all is said, is simply a false hypothesis 
(whether framed in had faith or in good faith) which 
once found easy credence; and when inadequate or 
illusory hypotheses find acceptance in our time, we 
see exemplified at once the play on the myth-making 
faculty and that of the norami credulity on which it 
lives.”3 This summary approach to myth, as Robertson 
understands the concept and its application, may 
receive further clarification from some passages 
lifted from the body of his work. Describing raythi, 
he says that they are..."simple hypotheses justifiable 
as such at the time when they were propounded, but which 
fuller experience has proved to be inadequate."^ "%th, 
broadly speaking, is a form of traditionary error and, 
while the definition of mythology turns upon the recog­
nition of the special form, the bane of the science has 
been the more or less complete isolation of it in thought 
from all the other forms...Any form of traditionary error, 
it seems clear, must occur in terms of the general con­
ditions of traditionary error, and such error in general
3. Ibid: p.XVIII
4. Ibid: p.
must "be conceived in terras of raenfs efforts at
explanation or classification of traditionary errors;
and the business of mythology is to trace, as far as
may be, how they (these errors) came to be started
5
and conserved.’1 "Taking myth as a form of tradition­
ary error, we note that such error can arise in many 
ways and, when we have noted all the ways, we have 
barred supernaturalism once for all - be it explicit 
or implicit. Unfortunately the rectification has been 
ignored by those mythologists who are concerned to 
retain either the shadow or the substance of super- 
naturalism and, until the naturalist position is
restated in full, four square to all the facts, they
6
will doubtless continue to obscure the science."
There is for Robertson no distinction to be made 
between the ’true myth-making* age B.C. and that which 
followed. Yfnile modern science makes impossible, 
according to Robertson, the old easy raythopoiesis 
among people scientifically instructed, the educated
5. Ibid: p.2.
6 . Ibid: p.30
world in their allegiance to the Christian myths and 
in their belief in the esoteric cults - e.g. Mormonisra, 
Madame Blavatsky and Mark Baker Eddy - the raythopoiesis 
is still at work..." and there is only a tint of psychic 
difference, so to speak, between their mental processes 
and those which avail to secure the currency of any 
fallacious belief in politics or in science.
Possibly two more introductoiy remarks will serve to 
focus the writings which we will be examining. The one 
concerns his disagreement with the Hegelian approach to 
mythology via metaphysics and Robertson’s claim to 
objectivity in his assessment of the origins of Christ­
ianity. Quarrelling with the Hegelian presuppositions 
of Strauss, Bruno Bauer and B.C. Baur who, on the basis 
of their a priori philosophical reconstructions of the 
biblical text, divided the myth-making stage between the 
ideas stated on a pictorial (Vorstellung) level and the 
philosophical stage, when metaphysics restated the eternal 
truths, Robertson delineates his own approach to myth,
"I claim that, so far as it goes, it (his work) is in
7. Ibid: p. XIX
general more positive, more inductive, less a priori, 
more obedient to scientific canons , than that of the 
previous critics known to me who have reached similar 
anti-traditional results. It substitutes an 
anthropological basis, in terms of the concrete 
phenoma of aythology, for a pseudo-philosophical
Q
presupposition."
His quarrel with the supreme place accorded to the 
"Absolute Religion" by the Hegelians and their reasons 
for doing so will receive additional comment.
J.M. Robertson, a layman - his lay approach to 
Christianity is emphasized - calls himself a naturalist 
one that is i partial and detached in search of truth. 
As a naturalist, not interested in the truth of any 
religion, but in the questions to which religion first 
developed certain beliefs, he is free to reason justly 
on the historical data, and so may arrive at just 
conclusions. Quoting from F.C. Baur, Robertson adds,
" ’There can be no true objective criticism until a 
man stands more or less indifferent to the result and
8. Ibid., p. XXII
frees himself as far as possible from all subjective 
relations to the object of criticism.*"9 Robertson 
broadens his claim to objectivity by contrasting the 
naturalist and rationalist endeavours..."Rationalists 
are thus far divided on the historical issue, partly 
because of the uncertainty of the evidence, partly 
because of the differences or oversights of logical 
method. But in the case of the disputant who sets out 
with a belief in the complete historic truth of the 
Christian religion, miracles and all, impartiality 
is impossible. He holds his own religion to be 
supernatural and true, and every other to be merely 
human and false in so far as it makes supernatural 
claims. Thus for him every question is as far as 
possible decided beforehand. He is overwhelmingly 
biased to the view that any ’myth* which resembles 
Christian ’record1 is borrowed from that; and if, 
in some instances, he repels that conclusion it is 
still, as we shall see in the sequel, for an a priori 
theological reason and not for simple historical
9. Ibid., p.137.
reasons. On such, lines no sound critical results 
can be reached but, whereas the rationalist inquiry 
is in this connection logically free of presuppositions, 
any permanent results it attains are pure gain to 
human science and must finally strengthen the natural­
ist position if that position be really scientific."1^
Commenting on the scholars who reconstruct Christian 
origins at will, Robertson says of their approach in an 
earlier work ("Pagan Christs")..."Their general pro­
cedure is simply that of scholastics debating in vacuo, 
assuming what they please and rejecting what they 
please.. In due time the modern specialists, or their 
successors, will realize that their main positions as 
to Christian origins are equally fabulous; but they 
or their successors will continue to be conscious of 
their professional perspicacity and solemnly or angrily 
contemptuous of all lay criticism of their ’method*.
•Wir Gelehrten vom Fach* they still call themselves 
in German - 'we scholars by profession' - thus dis­
posing of all lay criticism.1,11
10. Ibid., pp. 137-138
11. Robertson, "Pagan Christs", p.XV
But is Robertson's claim valid in view of the 
numerous passages in his earlier work "Pagan 
Christs." ? One in particular must be borne in 
mind as we survey Robertson's unprejudicial 
reconstruction of Christian origins. He speaks of 
the 'utter insecurity of the historical foundation' 
of Christianity and of those who abstractly insist 
on the historicity of Jesus-they "must either 
recede from their position or revert to claims 
expressive merely of the personal equation -
statements of the convincing force of their 'religious
12experience' - or claims to special 'percipience'."
11. Progress of the Science of ethology.
Much like Strauss, Robertson undertakes to give 
a historical survey of the mythological speculations 
and the bearing of the raythus on the origins of 
Christianity. While professing to be objective in 
his treatment he, again with Strauss, brings to bear 
certain implicit and sometimes explicit propositions 
on his writing. Two propositions are developed in the 
two works which we will examine. In his "Pagan Christs"
12. Ibid., p. XVII
and to some extent in "Christianity and %thology " 
the evolutionary nature of religious beliefs and 
the kinship of all religious cults, particularly 
those which involve human sacrifice and theophagous 
sacrament, and those cults which the founder figures 
as an inspired teacher, receive expanded treatment. 
There are three quotations which serve to mirror 
the point. In "Pagan Christs" Robertson writes...
"No historical principle is better established than 
this, that all historic religions run into and derive 
from some other religion, the creeds of all mankind 
being simply phases of a continuous evolution."13 
Again..."There is not a conception associated with 
the Christ that is not common to some or all of the 
Saviour cults of antiquity."^ Again..."In 
fundamentals, in short Christism (Christianity) is 
but paganism re-shaped; it is only the economic and 
doctrinal evolution of the system - the first by 
Jewish practice and Roman environment and the second 
by Greek thought - that constituted new phenomena in 
religious history."1^
13. Ibid., p.284.
14. Ibid.,pp.205-206.
15. Ibid., p.206.
The parrallelism between religions receives 
summary treatment in "Christianity and ethology", 
but his "Pagan Christs" brings in focus the ideas 
which Christianity drew from other cultic systems.
The question which Robertson brings to bear on his 
researches in both books has to do with the origin 
of the stories and the source of the symbolism. It 
is believed, according to Robertson, by Christians 
and even some of their critics that the Gospel stories 
came into circulation at the foundation of Christianity 
and so became accessible to the world. But as to the 
source of these stories - as to how these particular 
miraculous narratives came to be told in connection 
with Jesus - no inquiry is made and apparently the 
difficulty is not seen, though to a scientific age 
the clearing up in some way of the causation of the 
Christian legends is as necessary as to explaining 
how these legends are duplicated in other religions, 
Krisha, Mithra and Buddhism. "It is needless here to 
challenge afresh the historical value of the conflict­
ing records, wherein a slight detail of no historical 
importance enters only to take varying forms for
symbolical reasons. What we are concerned with is 
the source of the symbolism.1,16 while recognising 
the services performed by Strauss and others in 
connection with the origins of the legends and myths 
in the New Testament, and principally the roots of 
these forms in the Old Testament, Robertson goes 
beyond Strauss to the pagan analogies and parallels.
The first proposition, as we have outlined it, 
concerns the evolutionary, inter-related character 
of religion. The second proposition, his understanding 
of myth, is developed in his later treatise, "Christ­
ianity and Mythology". His definition of myth and the 
unitary character of mythical thinking and religion, 
myth and ethic3, myth and magic, must be grasped before 
the parallelism between Christianity and the pagan 
narratives, principally regarded as the source of the 
Christian myths, can be fully appreciated. Robertson's 
central thesis of a pre-Christian Jesus Cult lying 
behind the New Testament is the consequence of his view 
of myth and the organic, evolutionary nature of all 
religions. When the mythical principles have been 
demonstrated the origins of Christianity may be
16. Ibid., p.120.
elucidated. Unlike his predecessors in the field who, 
so Robertson complains, demonstrated the mythical 
character of scripture and fell back on the textual 
analysis of the documents, leaving the question of 
the truth and reason as much as possible in the 
background, Robertson proposes to carry forth the 
findings and follow them out in their logical 
conclusions. The elucidation of the organic nature 
of the myths and the evolutionary character of 
religion takes him into a realm which has been 
called "comparative religion" or "comparative myth­
ology". Robertson's pre-Christian Jesus thesis, 
according to him, is the only solution to a scientific 
understanding of the Christian faith. A survey of 
what he terms the "limitary and separatist versions 
of myth" will clarify his approach to mythology.
111. Limitary and Separatist Versions of Myth.
For the sake of brevity Robertson's ideas will be 
grouped in several general classifications - 
classifications which his discussion warrant but 
which are not made by him. It is evident from his
200 page treatment of the fallacies and dichotomies
that these limitations are all of one kind — a
misunderstanding of the rnythus due either to a
metaphysical or psychological perspective in the
interests of Christianity or Theism. Robertson's
view of myth, as we have inferred, is a form of
traditionary error which can occur in many ways and
the process of wrong hypotheses continue to exist
with scientific consciousness, oftentimes confounded
with it. An anthropological position, one that
Robertson assumes in his discussion, recognises...
"that primitive man fused instead of discriminating
the states of mind which set up his myths and his
cosmosophy, his ethic and his ritual...The historical
form and ideal purport of eveiy myth or primitive
usuage 'are inseparable and penetrate each other;
and it is only by the abstraction of a later age,
from which all faith in the rayth as such has vanished,
17that they are separated.'" Nothing then is excluded 
from mythological expression, neither morals, nor 
philosophy, neither history nor religion, have escaped 
the spell of that "ancient sibyl". Primitive man's
17. Christianity and Mythology: p-93*
mind was not in watertight compartments.
Scienuifically speaking, the term religion covers all 
the phenomena under notice. Religion in the mass 
has always been mythological, always ritualistic, 
always theological, always ethical, always connected 
with what cosmic emotion or apperception there was. 
These attributes are in themselves phases of human 
tendency which make and make-for-religion. It is 
neither here nor there to say that in explaining one 
we do not explain the other."
But there are those interpreters in the field of 
comparative mythology and more particularly those 
applying the mythical key to biblical exegesis, who 
misunderstand the nature of the rnythus or in their 
understanding limit the application of the mythological. 
If mythological thinking is the common ground in all 
religions, and Robertson is convinced that it is, one 
is driven, according to him, to consider whether the 
Christian religion is not consanguineous with the rest 
in myth and ritual. To prepare the way for this con­
sideration is Robertson's purpose in the section which 
he calls "The Progress of Lfythology" in his book 
"Christianity and Mythology". Grouping the separatist
18. Ibid., p.92.
views of myth, we will outline six approaches to 
myth which Roberts on rejects.
1) The first separatist view concerns the treat­
ment of mythology as a subject having to do with 
reprehensible, immoral practices of the heathen 
gods, or the animization which went on consciously 
or unconsciously in the primitive mind. These 
fanciful stories or these "absurd and offensive 
anecdotes" have nothing to do with civilized man.
In this approach to myth, according to Robertson,.. 
"Lfythology is kept perfectly safe and made to figure 
as an academic science, by being kept to the themes 
of the dawn, the tree, the storm cloud, the earth- 
Mother and the heathen Sun-God; the Sanskirt,
savagery, totems, fairies and folk-lore, plus the 
19
classics." This approach, in the name of some 
form of acquired or inherited prejudice, seeks in 
the name of God to sunder what man primordially 
joined together. As pro-Christian or pro-Thesists,
19* Ibid., p. 15
some interpreters viould isolate the phenomena of
Greek and Roman religious evaluation from the
mass of anthropological aid hierological science,
or their determination to make out that what is
not on the line of evolution of Christianity is
not religion. Robertson says of the scientific
principle which guides his investigation: ’From
its standpoint, Roman religion (primitive ideas
and the religion of the Greeks) is to understand,
certainly, as varying under special determinants
like every other, but as exemplifying universal
20
psychological principles.” "Where his language
gives indications such as in other languages v/e
know to be illusory, the only reasonable course
is to conceive the Roman's mental processes
broadly in terras of those of other races at a
similar culture stage..The comparative method ..
is based upon the fact that our common nature
manifests itself in like ways under like circum- 
21
stances.” "The Romans”, to carry through Robertson's
20. Ibid., p. 86
21. Ibid., p. 88
illustration,"like other races had a native folk 
lore in which tales were told of their Gods.
When they encountered educated Greeks they did 
not drag before them the crudities of their 
father's faith. Like the Yahwistic Hebrews, 
though for different reasons, they lent them­
selves to a wholesale dismissal, so far as 
literature went, of their religious antecedents."
Offering a final word on the chaos produced
by this manner of* separatism, Robertson says:
"When this chaos of pseudo-classification can
be solved, we may reconsider our evolutionary
and monistic conception of religion and myth.
For the present, it seems to offer the sole
23
harbour for scientific thought."
2) Another separatist view concerns the 
psychological fallacy advanced by those who 
conceive of the myth as a species or by-product 
of the primeval mind, something out of touch 
with the normal psychology of those who produce
22. Ibid., p. 88
23. Ibid., p. 90
it, or at best psychologically alien to certain 
other of their mental processes.
Integral to this severance is the dichotomy 
erected between ethics and mythology or between 
religion and mythology. Robertson agrees that 
the raythologist must recognise a division of 
labour between the discussion of the development 
and valuation of reasoned and written religion, 
doctrine and the narrative bases and symbols - 
the latter being the true business of the rayth­
ologist, but he says: "To put aside the mass of
written theology, the argumentative side of the 
later historical systems is one thing and to 
keep out of sight the vital connections and 
reactions of myth and doctrine is quite another. 
Robertson's remarks on the works of Lang focus 
the arbitrariness which to his mind condemns so 
much modern theory. "The one respect in which 
Mr. Lang's books on 'Mythology and Religion' are
24. Ibid., p. 41*
consistent is that in each in turn he looks only 
to one side of the shield — a course so arbitrary 
and so confusing that it can be explained in 
terras of some extra-scientific bias. At the 
beginning of the historic period, ethics and 
religion everywhere inseparably blended with myth; 
and in so far as religion has remained bound up 
with myth and with primitive ethics down to our 
own days, when rational ethic has definitely 
broken away from the old amalgam, it is supremely 
important and supremely interesting to trace not 
merely the earlier forms of myth, ritual and 
religion, but their conjunct development into 
and survival in the latest forms of all. To 
stop short of that, as Mr. Lang and so many 
other mythologists do, is wilfully to impoverish 
and humble the science, keeping it always concerned 
'with the follies of Phoenecians and Greeks', 
always among the ancients or the Hottentots, always 
out of sight or even surmise of the bearings of
"these matters on the creeds and institutions of
25
the civilised nations of our days.” Lang and 
the other priorists in the field of mythology, 
accordingly, find ,highl symbolic origins for 
so many of primitive myths. "We are asked", hy 
these priorists, according to Robertson, "to 
suppose that primeval man (whom all the while, 
by natural inference, we must hold to have had 
animistic habits of mind) began with a ‘high1 
conception of a righteous and benevolent Supreme 
Being, as savages conceive righteousness and 
benevolence: that is, that without a single
preliminary animistic concept (though the ape- 
man had the animistic habit before him) the 
primal man proceeded straight to a universalist 
theistic abstraction —  all the while playing 
the cannibal with trespassers. Then, having 
thought out a *ripiteous* Omnipotent God, a 
* moral Eternal* who represents only his own 
morality, the cave man — or whatever else we
25. Ibid., p. 41*
figure iiim to have been — developed ’ supernormal1
powers which revealed to him all manner of
26
forces that do not existi" Commenting on this 
division, Robertson says:..."it is therefore mere 
scientific perversity on his (Lang’s) pari; to 
revert to a 'high' original for the God-idea 
which, as an evolutionist, he must admit to have 
its roots in primal savage life. When Brugsch, 
another priorist, decides that ’from the root and 
trunk of a pure conception of deity spring the 
houghs and twigs of a tree cf myth, Those leaves 
spread into a rank and impenetrable luxuriance1, 
Iilr. Lang replies that the myths ’flourish like 
mistletoe on the oak, over the sturdier growth 
of a religious conception of another root.* The 
two formulas are alike fallacious. The ’root' 
alike cf the miner myths and the larger is the 
same - the mythopoeic faculty cf the evolving 
man; the God-ideas vhich satisfy Brugsch are 
but the modifications of earlier by later thought?
26. Ibid., p. 67.
and those quasi-higher God-ideas of savages which
so appeal to Mr. Lang are but thought-forms into
which later men put higher moral and philosophical
notions, as they do with so much of •fbe rest of
the savage's vocabulaiy ... To call one aspect
of primitive anthroraophism 'absurd' and another
aspect 'sacred', when both alike are the best
tx.e savage can do t o explain his cosmos, is an
unsciexitific inconsequence. And to condemn
Huxley and others for making a severance "between
savage ethic and savage theology, while affirming
just such a severance between savage ethic and
savage myth, is to give the inconsequence an
27
aggressive anphasis"  With Frazer (Golden
Bough) who, according to Robertson, had no super­
natural axe to grind,we are indebted to our 
savage predecessors for much of what we thought 
our own, and their errors were not wilful 
extravagances or the ravings of insanity, but
27. Ibid., p. 68.
simple nypotheaes, justifiable as such at the
time when they were propounded, but which a
_ __ 28 
iuller experience has proved to be inadequate*
There is no evidenc e that the mentality of
primeval man, according to Robertson, "passed
through successive stages of soul—lore, ghost—
lore and God-lore, adding the second and third
one by one to the first* Neither is it possible
to show in terms of experimental psychology that
a God-idea could come into being only as a fresh
superstructure on concepts of soul and ghost:
rather the naturalistic surmise is that a God-
idea grew up with and in terms of the others, and
was only by a means of reflection or cf priestly
29
institution differentiated from them." The 
inherited lore may be modified from period to 
period either upwards or downwards, either in 
terras of increasing knowledge or in terms of 
deepening ignorance, as the socio-economic 
conditions may bend; or, it may be, alternately
28. Ibid., p. 68
29. Ibid *, p. 44
or conflictingly, in terms of a strife of forces
and institutions* The Hebrew sacred hooks
crystallize round the most disparate nuclei of
older lore and the Christian innovation is
connected with older and lower conceptions of
30
ritual theophagy.
Robertson's unitary view of myth and ethics, 
myth and religion and myth and magic, and the 
continuation and modification of the myth-making 
faculty is particularly evident in what he says 
concerning the ethical standards of the savage 
and the civilized. "There is no vital ethical 
difference, but only a refinement of manners or 
modes between the crude practice of sacrifice 
and the clinging to the theory of divine sacrifice, 
and the fact that a given savage, lacking the 
wherewithal, does not offer sacrifices to his 
God does not make him a better man than the 
slaughterous Hebrews of the past • Nor does the
30. Ibid., p. 45
latter-day Christian in turn salve his case hy
substituting for his compromising sacrificial
idea that of the sacrifice of a contrite heart;
far his Cod remains the cause of evil and his
ethic incurably unsound. Thus the ethic that
for Mr. Lang is ’highest' is intertwined with
mythology just as surely as that of the savage
who, whether sacrificing or not, imagines a God
who punishes wickedness, though according to the
same savage (says Mr. Lang) the same God is the
Omnipotent Creator of all. In fine, all theistic
31
ethic is flagrantly mythological
Robertson's views on the separatist fallacy 
in question - the division between eihics and 
mythology and between religion (the God-idea) and 
mythology - may be further illustrated from his 
words on God-making in his "Pagan Christs". Up 
to this point one idea is clear: From age to
age through channels of custom and emotional 
credulity we are dealing with the same kind of 
psychological problem, e.g. the habit of erroneous
31. Ibid., p. 65
belief in which men are collectively deceived.
This deception persists in all stages of 
civilization and the result is a widespread 
hallucinat i on.
Commenting on the unhistoric figure of Buddha 
and the Gospel Jesus in his "Pagan Christs", we 
learn that each was produced by the mythopoeic 
action of the religious mind in a period±i which 
the primary-God-making had given way to secondary- 
God-making, and in particular to the craving for 
a Teaching God vfa o should originate religion and 
moral ideas as the other Gods had been held to 
originate agriculture, art, medicine, normal laws 
and civilization. "On our Naturalistic view of 
the rise of the religions of the Secondary or 
Teaching Gods, it is sheer human aspiration that 
has shaped all the Christs and all their doctrines; 
and one of the very causes of the total miscarriage 
is just that persistence in crediting the human 
aspiration to Gods and Demigods, and representing
as superhuman oracles the words of human reason. 
Unobtrusive men took that course hoping for the 
best, seeking a short cut to moral influence; 
but they erred grievously. So to disguise and 
denaturalise wise thoughts and humane principles 
was to keep undeveloped the veiy reasoning faculty 
which could best appreciate them. Men taught to 
bow ethically to a Divine Teacher are not taught 
ethically to think: any aspiration so evoked in
them is factitious, vestural, verbal or at best 
emotionally superinduced, not reached by authentic 
thoughts and experience. When haply, the name­
less thinkers in all ages have realised and 
distilled the wisdom or unwisdom given out as 
divine are recognised in their work for what they 
were, and their successors succeed in persuading 
the many to realise for themselves the humaneness 
of all doctrine, the nations may perchaice become 
capable of working out for themselves better 
gospels than the best of those which turned to 
nought in their hands while they held them as
313.
revelations from the skies."
3) Another separatist fallacy, related to the 
preceding one, concerns the corapartmentisation 
of magic and religion. Robertson complains in 
his "Pagan Christs" that, while Frazer and Jevons 
make magic precede religion, these interpreters 
overlook the continuance of magic in the historic 
religions, Judaism and Christianity, i.e. 
propitation of God and the eruption cf God into 
the world. In the name of religion and more 
particularly in the interest of securing a unique 
status for Judaism and Christianity, another 
division is made in the primitive mind. Contrary 
to the thesis of Frazer, Robertson cannot envisage 
a period when a portion cf mankind began to ‘abandon 
magic as a principle of faith and practice and 
to betake themselves to religion instead.1 Frazer's 
arguments, though he fails to take them seriously, 
reveal that men for whole ages practised both 
(religion and magic) concurrently; and that in 
terms of the case they are as likely to have taken
32. "Pagan Christs", p. 263
314.
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33to magic because prayer failed as vice versa*
Dr* Frazer says that.."a tardy recognition of
the inherent falsehood and barrenness of magic
set the more thoughtful part of mankind to cast
about for a truer theory of nature and a more
fruitful method of turning his resources to 
34
account." But, according to Robertson, by
his own showing Frazer has no right; to this
hypothesis. The magic of primitive man "was
part of his way of thinking about what was for
him the ’occult' or inferred side of things,
which way of thinking as a vifoole was his 
35
religion." Moreover, continues Robertson, "we 
are disallowed from charging inconsistency on 
primitive or ancient religious thought in respect 
of divergencies from later conceptions. The 
earlier theologian (as distinguished from his 
sophisticated successors) simply did not realise 
that any charge of inconsistency could arise."
33. Ibid., p. 17
34. Ibid., p. 17
35. Ibid., p. 15
36. Ibid., p. 16
The inconsistency of the early priests, his 
resort to magic and religion is posited by 
moderns on the assumption that they had a 
definite modern conception of the Omnipotence 
of a supernatural power. While on the contrary,
according to Robertson, "This supreme idea, he
37
had not." It is, then, quite beside the case 
to argue, as Dr. Frazer does, that 'the fatal 
flow of magic lies in its misconception of the 
particular laws which govern natural sequences.' 
That is not a differentiation between magic and 
religion; for the religious conception that 
nature is to be affected by propitiatory unseen 
powers is just as fatally wrong; and it arose 
in the same fashion by "association of ideas", 
men assuming that nature was ruled by a personality 
like themselves.
Elaborating his unitary view of myth, magic, 
religion and ethics in connection v/ith the 
severance between religion and magic, Robertson _
37. Ibid., p. 16
says: "The clear solution, as distinguished
from the rebuttal, of all such contradictions 
is to recognise that, however we may grade 
religious conceptions and systems, they are 
all parts of one process, even as are political 
conceptions and systems. To say that magic is 
hostile to religion and science, worship and 
art; and the distinction between art-magic and 
sympathetic magic-made after the express declara­
tion that mere sympathetic magic was 'the germ 
of all magic' is an arbitrary stroke of pre- 
Christian classification, which, nonetheless, 
logically defeats its purpose. For the primitive 
sacramental meal was demonstrably on the plane 
of sympathetic magic inasmuch as, even #ien it 
did not kill the victim in a mimetic fashion, 
it was making friends with the G-od in the way of 
human fraternisation; and it is to this
sacrament that Dr. Jevons, for obvious reasons,
33
accords the special religious rank." .."The
38. Ibid., p. 28-29
scientific course consists not in taking 
advantage of the logical suicide of those who 
conduct the other, hut in setting forth the 
fundamental analogy of the psychological process 
thus arbitrarily differentiated. The 'direct 
consciousness1 of the theist - sheer hallucination 
apart - is simply a reversion to the earlier 
man's confidence in his animistic conceptions, 
doubled with the conscious resistance to 
sceptical criticism seen in eveiy dream-interpreter 
and ghost-3eer of the countryside. The persist­
ence is simply a matter of temperament and degree 
of enlightenment; there are men vh o can transcend 
this like other testimonies of their direct 
consciousness, in learning to see it as a kind 
of hallucination which may be predicted to arise 
in some cases in regard to any theistic conception 
which any thinker may contrive to set up. Where 
there are images of the Virgin, men and women 
will have visions of the Virgin; wrare there are
images of animal-God, there will be visions of
39
animal Gods.” The evolution of religious
39. Ibid., p. 34
mentality and the force of 1 reason” is brought 
out in Robertson's concept of error in the 
religious process"All error being but 
incomplete or illicit induction, 'irrational' 
and relatively 'rational' ideas are alike 
products of the general mental process. The 
recoil from adventurous magic to precatory 
ritual is no more a renunciation of reason than 
the contrary progression; and all changes in 
religion are but better or worse applications 
of judgment under varying conditi ons of psychi- 
suggestion and economic pressure. It is indeed 
true - and be the truth clearly envisaged - 
that with the conscious resort to critical 
reason there begins potentially a process which 
may end in the negation of all the primary 
religious conceptions and propositions, even in 
their most purified philosophical form. When 
that end is reached, we may well say that 
philosophy and religion are differentiated, even 
as science is differentiated at once from magical
and fro.i precatory religion, at the point at which 
it either repudiates or abandons their premises, 
and consciously proceeds on tested induction.
But even this reaction is never instantaneously 
complete: Witness the sociologising historians;
and, on the other haad, there is an aspect or 
function of religion in respect of which it is 
structually continuous with systems of doctrine 
which either abandon or repudiate its premises.
From the first, it belonged to his nature that 
man should connect his ethic with his cosmology, 
since the one like the other grew out of his 
instincts and perceptions and his effort to 
harmonise them. Precisely as he animised Nature, 
so did he moralise it; that is, he conceived of 
it in terras of what moral ideashe had. Thus it 
was that he could alternately resort to 
propitiation and to magic, and alternately feel 
fear and gratitude. Granting that his religious 
conceptions first crystallised on the lines of
his fears, it was inevitable that they should in 
time crystallise also in terras of his satisfactions; 
the one involved the other, and made it not only 
possible but probable that he should at times 
thank the very power he feared. Fear would 
involve propitiation, and propitiation was the 
door to gratitude. And thus it was that his Gods 
were in the long run ethically like unto himself,
”40
neither wholly beneficient nor wholly maleficient.
4) Still another separatist error in the 
interest of preserving a permanent place for 
Judaism and Christianity involves the philological 
definition and handling of myth in the linguistic 
schools. Early man, so these priorists contend, 
knew the sun to be inanimate though his language 
made him call it a person; and his descendants 
consequently regarded it as a person when they 
were able to describe it as inanimate. According 
to these men, called by Robertson, entomologists, 
Sanskritist and 'Aryan' school, myth is a dialect,
40. Ibid., p. 39-40
an ancient farra of language - in point of fact a
disease of the language. The advocates of the
theory of family germs and inherited disease of
language assume that everymyth could he traced
with some certainty to a definite natural
origin. The verbal hlunderings of the ancients
could, in the hands of those with proper tools,
such as were claimed to he in the possession of
the German rationalists of the 18th and 19th
centuries, he detected. Paulus and others
extricated the shell or real events from the
husks, hut this historicist or naturalist school
is vitiated, according to Rohertson "by the
fixed determination to reduce mythic narrative
41
to misinterpretations of real events." In 
Paulus, the method, according to Rohertson, 
approaches burlesque.
In the same vein, Rohertson writes: "So many
myths are inconsistent with themselves; so 
many are hut fumbling explanations of ancient
41. Christianity and Mythology, p. 11
rituals of which tne meaning had been lost; so 
many nave "been oouched up; so many embody 
flights of imagination that are not mere trans­
cripts from nature; so many are primitively 
stupid; so many have heen combined that such 
confidence(reducing them to their natural
42
origins, real events) is visibly excessive.” 
Still another weakness in this limitary 
view of myth has to do with Max Mullerfs 
confidence in concrete myth interpretation in 
terms of names. It has been proven, according 
to Robertson, along the lines marked out by 
Fontennelle and De Brosses, that no single myth 
can stand alone. There were Semitic influences 
on the Greeks and a singular parallelism in the 
mythology of races not known to have had any 
intercommunication. These facts supplied reason 
for a recasting of the mythological scheme, by 
way of recognising that there is more than 1 one 
story* in hand, and that though *the course of
42. Ibid., p. 20-21
the day and the year* covers a great deal of the 
matter, there are some other principles also at 
work.
Another factor which weakens the force of the 
argument advanced by these priorists is the 
forcing of a philological frame upon a psycholog­
ical science. Mythicising, in Robertson's view, 
is a primitive psychosis, ethology, Religion 
and Animism are alike but aspects of this general 
mentality.
5) Closely related to this separatist view is 
the philosophical view of myth, particularly 
associated with Hegel and his disciples, Strauss 
and Bruno Bauer. The Hegelian view may be 
summarised. The raythus in its early forms was 
the infant language of the race and poverty and 
necessity are its parents. Myth is, on this 
view, a forerunner to metaphysics. The childish, 
infantile, pictorial thinking, or the "Vorstellung" 
may be eliminated when the Idea (Notion or Begriff)
1111461*31]ands the thoughts v&iich were, for the 
sake of expediency, so verbalised. In Hegel, 
Strauss and Bauer there was the idea of a myth 
and raythless religion. Christianity, considered 
by Hegel and Strauss to be the "absolute 
religion”, was free from the Vorstellung. On 
the other side of philosophy, according to 
Robertson, Strauss' theorisings strike a 
scientific reader dumb by his naive assurance 
that his long investigation of the life of 
Christ need have no effect on Christian doctrine. 
Commenting on Strauss' assurance that the inner 
kernel of the Christian faith is not to be 
impaired by his critical researches, Robertson 
says: "There are different conceptions of what
constitutes frivolity; and it w>uld have been 
pleasant to have Voltaire's estimate of the 
seriousness of a scholar and theologian who 
produced an enormously laborious treatise of 
fifteen hundred pages to disprove every super-
natural occurrence connected with the life of 
Jesus, and at the beginning and end assured 
everybody that it all made no difference to 
religion, and that those must be frivolous 
who thought otherwise. Only in Hegelian Germany 
could such supernatural flimsiness of theory 
have been conceived as solid philosophy; and 
even in Germany, in the generation of Hegel, 
there was a good deal cf serious if not frivol­
ous comment on Strauss* final Kantian advice to 
the clergy: This was to keep on telling the
mythical stories to the people with due attention 
to the spiritual application, ther eby furthering 
* endless* progress towards the dissolution of
the forms in the consciousness of the community -
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and this in a work in the vernacular.”
Historically and philosophically Strauss' 
work hindered the progress of the science of 
mythology. Historically, in that he confined 
his search for mythic parallels to the legends
43. Ibid., p. 13
of the Old Testament. "On the side of myth­
ological science it (Strauss' 'Life of Jesus') 
was defective in that it overlooked many of 
the Pagan myth elements in the Christian 
cult, above all those bound up with the very
central doctrine of the anthopoic sacrifice
44
and eucharist." Then Strauss, though 
anxious to undercut the rationalistic,
♦
naturalistic approach to histoiy (dealing with 
an event narrated as if it really occurred) (
obscured his research. Robertson says that 
Strauss deals with maiy of the Gospel stories 
on a historical 1 eve], as historical myth,though 
Robertson does not use this terminology.
Robertson's primaiy criticism of the Strauss- 
ian approach seems to be that knowing the 
results of mythical analysis, Strauss still 
treated as great spiritual truths special to 
Christianity, data and doctrines vhich appertain 
to the systems and credences of buried paganism.
44. Ibid., p. 19
Robertson1 s main point, as have had opportunity 
to intimate, is the consanguinity of Christianity 
with paganism in myth and ritual and in the God- 
raan.
On the level of Strauss' and Bauer's recon­
struction, Christianity would be mythless when 
metaphysics was brought to bear on the picture 
language, but Robertson is anxious to point out 
that myth-making continues in Christianity and 
in all the elaborations of Christianity, whether 
in a philosophical reconstruction of Christology 
or in the "Lives" of Jesus written by the histor- 
icists. "Christianity, instead of progressively 
denuding itself of myth and symbol and ritual, 
shows everywhere the tendency to make more of 
them than ever, the Protestant impulse being on 
the way to euthansia in rationalism, while the
forces of the myth-mongers and ritualists expand
45
as the restrictive element is removed." When 
the concrete myth forms are considered along with
45. Ibid., p. 72
the parallelism in the pagan sources, then the 
raetaphaic and ethics which were thought to he 
grafted on th e forms by Hegel, Struss and 
Bauer will be seriously questioned.
17. Svaluation of "The Progress of the Science 
ijy ilio logy^
Summarily speaking, what has our investigation 
of Robertson's sketch of the Progress of 
Bfythology and the separatist errors shown? 
Primarily, Robertson's preparatory means of later 
treating Christianity as a variant of paganism, 
or "paganism reduplicated, reshaped." In order 
to remove the unique claims of Christianity the 
sources for the Christian myths must be located 
in the cults vhich preceded and the idea that the 
same psychosis in thought which produced the 
other cults was (and is now) at work in the 
production of the Gospel myths.
Robertson states his views on mythology in 
connection with the views which have been held 
on the subject and in particular those mythologists
who would limit myth or separate it from the 
other ideas in the primitive mentality; the 
ones who would separate myth from religion, 
ethics and magic; the ones who would make it 
one psychological function alien to the primitive 
mind; or on philological and philosophical 
grounds class myth as an inadequate form of 
language, an infantile mode of speech and 
though which must he justifiably discarded when, 
in the case of the linguistic interpreters, the 
causes for the misrepresentations are uncovered, 
or when, on philosophical grounds, metaphysics 
and abstract discursive reasoning displaces the 
naive mythical phase in mental history.
Ifyth, according to Robertson, is a form of 
traditionary error, a fantasy in thought, a set 
of wrong hypotheses vfoich must be eliminated; 
moreover, hypotheses which are framed by 
primitives and moderns alike fall under Robertson’s 
critique. Lfythical thinking is a thought pattern, 
a form of psychosis which is not limited to a
period 'before the advent of science, for in 
Robertson's own showing, these fallacious assumpt­
ions occur in cultures affected by the scientific 
method. Myth is then not a pre—historic mode 
of thought dealing with the advent of gods and 
their activity in the world. L*yth can be a way 
of framing ideas in a historical period.."Myth 
should be allowed broadly to include not only 
stories of a supernatural cast told of divine 
personages, but many quasi-historical narratives 
which fall short of asserting downright miracle; 
and not only stories of that case told about non­
hist orical personages, but some told about 
historical personages . .Knowing how the human 
mind manufactures these modern false coincidences 
(legends having to do with Julius Caesar, William 
The Conqueror and others), we rather count 
ourselves to have therein a sidelight on 
coincidences of a more sacrosanct sort in olden 
times. When all is said, we have hardly any other
way of divining how primeval men contrived to
tell the same stories with innumerable variations
4-6
of names and minor details.”
Robertson seems undecided on the question; 
whether myths are unconsciously and sp ontaneously 
produced or whether they are wilful, conscious 
fictions. Strauss, we will recall, decided on 
the former attitude, but while Robertson is in 
sympathy with the latter view, there are state­
ments which bring out his ambiguous attitude.
For instance, he remarks: ”If the G-ospel stories
are myths, the question arises: How such a story 
came first to be told? Robertson answers the 
question in connection with the Dionysiak 
miracle. This occurrence may have been a system­
atic priestly imposture, actually repeated year 
by year. However, the story came to be told, 
there was an esoteric idea presumably underlying 
the annual performance. But in the Christian 
tale there is no such, element left above ground. 
In his words: "..We are driven to ask whether
46. Ibid., p. 122
the first narrator of the Christian version was 
other than a wilful vendor of fiction. It is 
hard to see how we can answer favourably; 
certain as it is that any story once written 
down in an accepted gospel was sure to be believed, 
there must have been a beginning in somebody's 
deceit. And if on this we are met with the old 
formula that a wilful fiction is not a myth, we
can but answer that the formula will have to be
recast. For we really know nothing of the precise 
manner of origin of, say, the myth of Isis and 
Osiris. Me only know that it was believed; and 
as a belief it was for all practical purposes on 
all fours with the belief that Alexander was the 
son of Jupiter Ammon, and the belief that Jesus
turned so many firkins of water into wine by
divine volition. They were all traditionary 
forms of error; and the business of mythology is 
to trace as far as may be how they came to be 
started and conserved." Robertson summarises
47. Ibid., p. 121-122
his view on the rise and propagation of myths.
We may quote him in further detail before 
considering the application of his definition 
of myth to the Gospels and the Gospel Jesus, 
as Jesus is called by Robertson.
Robertson writes: "To put the case broadly,at
the end as at the beginning; Primary myth is 
but one of the primary modes in which men are 
collectively deceived; the habit of erroneous 
belief persists thus far in all stages of civil­
ization; and wherever the result is a widespread 
hallucination, transmitted from age to age 
through channels of custom and emotional credulity, 
we are dealing with the same kind of psychological 
problem, and should 3)ply to it the same kind of 
tests. The beliefs that Demeter wandered over 
the wide-wayed earth seeking for Persephone; 
that Isis searched mourning for the body of 
Osiris; that Apollo shot arrows of pestilence in 
punishment among the Greeks; that Athene miracul—
ously succoured her worshippers; that Perseus 
and Jesus and a hundred more were supernaturally 
conceived; that Jesus aid Dionysos and Osiris 
gave men new knowledge and happiness in virtue 
of Godhood; that fezcatlipoca and Yahweh were 
to be appeased by the eating, in reality or in 
symbol, of human flesh and blood; that Aesculapius 
and Jesus raised the dead; that Herakles and 
Dionysos and Jesus went down to Hades and returned 
that Jesus and Llithra were buried in rock tombs 
and rose again; and that the sacrifice of Jesus 
brought salvation to mankind as did the annual 
sacrifice of the God-victim of the Khonds - these 
beliefs were set up and cherished by the same 
faculties for fiction and fallacy as have 
conserved the beliefs about the Amazons, Arthur 
and the Round Table, the primacy of the Pope, 
witchcraft, fairies, the medicinal value of 
charms, the couvade, the efficacy of prayer for 
rain, Jenny Geddes and her stool, Eruce's cave, 
Wallace's Tree, Julian's saying 'Thou has
Conquered, 0 Galilean1, the liquefaction of the
blood of St • Janarius, the miracle of Lourdes,
the miracle of mediums, Boer outrages, the
shooting of the apple on the head of his child
by William Tell, and the consequent establish-
48
raent of the Swiss confederation.”
V. The Gospel ftfyths: Introduction.
Our discussion c£ the progress of the science 
of mythology and in particular, the limitary 
and separatist views establishes a point which 
is vital in Robertson's reconstruction of the 
origin of Christianity, namely his approach to 
the Gospel. If the traditional distinction between 
mythical and raythless religion is erroneous; if 
myth can be considered as conscious,didactic 
fiction; and if the primitive mentality can be 
seen in an organic unitary manner, i.e. a 
relationship between myth and religion, myth and 
ethics, myth aid magic, the way is prepared for 
an interpretation of Christianity which can be
48. Ibid., p. 126
accepted by the Scientific naturalist1. "All
historical religions", according to Robertson,
"Run into and derive from other religions, the
creeds of all mankind being si mply phases of a
49
continuous evolution." If one considers the
naturalness and interconnectedness of all
religions, and the dependence of each religion
on myth, why should Christianity or any other
religion be considered as the "unique" religion?
"The Jesuine system is only one phase in a
continuous development of ancient religion, in
which God after God, name after name, is
associated with the same immemorial and dimly
50
incomprehensible symbols." It is a psycho­
logical habit, Robertson contends, vhich isolates 
Christianity from the other religions of 
antiquity• "The accredited personalities of 
Buddhaand Jesus do make a veiy deep impression.
But is it more forcible than that made anciently 
on men*s mind by the stories of Osiris ana Herakles,
49. Pagan Christs, p. 284*
50 Christianity and Lfythology, p. 385
or than that made in India today "by the story 
of the mystic teaching of Krishna? Is not 
the difference for us simply one of psycho­
logical hahit? Is there any more evidence
for a real-cult founding Buddha than for a
51
real teaching Krishna?” When Christians 
insist on claiming uniqueness far one man, 
one that raised to manhood in one generation 
a humanity vdiich had remained childlike through 
five thousand years of religious speculation, 
they are, according to Robertson, making a 
breach of all evolution. This theory, called 
by Robertson ’psychological catastrophism” can 
be refuted by a fuller presentation of the 
proof that nothing the hypothetic Jesus of the 
Gospels nar his immediate followers represented 
any rare originality, whether of feeling or of 
fancy or of thought. How does Mr. Robertson go 
about impugning the historicity and uniqueness 
of the Gospel Jesus?
51. Ibid., p. 281.
Remembering his evolutionary view of religions 
and the constant interaction of myth and history, 
idea and fact, in the primitive mind, in the 
bible and even in a scientific period, his 
investigation of the genesis of Christianity is 
predetermined. But we should allow him to 
designate his methods • In his tfPagan Christs1 
he describes his approach to the New Testament 
in the following manner: ,fIt is needless here
to challenge afresh the historical value of the 
conflicting records, wherein slight details of 
no historical importance enters only to take 
varying forms for symbolical reasons. What we
are concerned with is the source of the symbol-
52
ism." Concerning the narratives, he comments: 
"We are not dealing with a generally credible 
and corroborated narrative in which a single 
episode raises surmise of' extraneous factors 
not recognised in the text, but with one which 
begins and ends in absolutely and immortal myth 
and is stamped with supernaturalism in every
52. "Pagan Christ^’ f. 120
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sentence." But if the New Testament narratives 
are of no value in accounting for the rise of 
Christianity and the confusing historical 
accounts are not to be understood as varying 
reports of factual events, what source or 
supplementary source is to yield a "scientific 
picture of the genesis of the movement?" We are, 
it is clearly stated in his two works, to 
explain Christianity on the basis of its ante­
cedents an3 more particularly, on the assumption 
that the narratives are mythical extensions by 
way of explaining multiple understandings of 
ritual practices vhich pre-date the Christian 
cultus. It is acknowledged, according to 
Robertson, "that a great deal of the hetero­
genous narrative of the biblical books has long 
been satisfactorily identified as normal 
primitive mythology - as clearly so as other 
portions have been shown to be purposive 
s acre dotal fiction - and that when rational 
tests are more rigorously and more vigilantly
53. Ibid., p. 147
applied, much that still passes as history will
54
probably be resolved into manipulated myth."
But what is the assumption here? What are the 
rational tests to be sp plied? Some clarificat­
ion of his ground plan may be seen in the 
following words rtiich illustrate why the New 
Testament narratives are not to be examined:
"We ought not to look to the current narrative
of the origins of a rite for the historical fact,
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but to the rite for the narrative.” "Proceed­
ing on the main that the myth is always long 
posterior to the rite which it pretends to 
explain, we must suppose that before the 
composition of the legends concerning the Titans 
and the birth, death and re-birth of Dionysus, 
such a primitive rite as the legend describes
56
had actually been performed." The point which 
is being elucidated concerns Robertson*s belief 
that ritual usuages are the fountains of myth and 
that myths are framed to explain the rite. In 
his "Christianity and Mythology" Robertson*s
54* Christianity & Mythology, p. 93 
55. Pagan Christs, p. 147 
56. Ibid., p. 132
approach "to myth and the source of myth is
succinctly stated: "So far as myths oonsjst
of explanation of ritual their value is
altogether secondary; and it may he affirmed
with confidence that in almost every case the
myth was derived from the ritual, and not the
ritual from the myth; for the ritual was
fixed and the myth was variable; the ritual
was obligatory, and faith in the myth was at
57
the discretion of the worshipper*"
Before pursuing our discussion of Roberts on fs 
treatment of "the Gospel JSsus", let us pause 
to take stock of his arguments. There are two 
points which delineate Robertsons approach to 
Christianity, his treatment cf the narrative 
and his account of the ritual vhich the 
mythical narratives describe. Firstly, he is 
not interested in the narrative itself. The 
historical inaccuracies and contradictions in 
the New Testament records are not to be accounted
57. Christianity & Llythology, p. 178
for by estimating the narrative but through , 
discernment of the rituals which have been 
mythically described in the narrative. 
Harmonization of the conflicting accounts, 
particularly those describing the crucifixion 
of the Gospel Jesus, may be done on the basis 
of the existence of a ritual or rituals of 
crucifixion or quasi-crucifixion, variants of 
ich have figured the two procedures of 
breaking the legs of the victim and giving him 
a narcotic. The conflicting accounts of the 
two incidents being insoluable and unhista*ical 
on any other level, the only clue, accordingly, 
is a psychological hypothesis of a known 
ritual of a crucified Saviour God who had for 
universally recognized reasons to appear to 
suffer as a willing victim.
Along with this sacrificing ritual existing 
about the beginning of the Christian era, there
343. ,
is a complementary theory of human sacrifice 
who, as being specifically Divine, is the 
subject of a Eucharist. The sacrifice of a 
divine vie tin and the eucharist are combined 
in the Mediterrian world. The Eucharist 
stories, according to Robertson, stood both 
in the myth and in the nature of the cult in 
the closest relation to the act of human 
sacrifice; and to explain the latter without 
reference to the former is to miss part of the 
problem.
1 • The Crucifixion-i*tyth: A Iflystery-Drama.
Robertson's theory of the crucifix!on-myth is 
summarized in two main propositions vtfiich are 
stated thus: (1) "That the Gospel story of the 
Last Supper, the Agony, the Betrayal, the 
Crucifixion and the Resurrection is demonstrably 
not originally a narrative, but a mystery-drama 
which has been transcribed with a minimum of
modification”: and (2) ’That the mystery-
drama was inferrably an evolution from a
Palestinian rite of human sacrifice in which
the annual victim was ’Jesus, the Son of the 
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Father’” The second proposition involves 
three distinct inquiries. When once the 
dramatic character of the Passion-story is 
demonstrated, it is necessary to show that the 
details are derived from a ritual of human 
sacrifice. Next, it must he shown that the 
Jews were familiar with human sacrifice, or 
better still actually practising this barbaric 
rite at the time when Christianity arose. 
Finally, grounds must be produced for inferring 
that such a practice was associated with an 
ancient pre-Christian cult of a hero-god called 
Jesus or Joshua. The first proposition will be 
the subject of our first inquiry.
That the concluding sections of the gospel-
58. Pagan Christs, Preface to Second Edition, p .XI
—narrative are demonstrably a transcript of a 
raystery-drama is supported from two internal 
characteristics of the narrative j the extra­
ordinary compression of events and the utter 
absence of descriptive detail. The first 
proposition entails the crowding of the 
betrayal and trial into one night and the 
"unity of time" presupposed in the transcription 
of the events. The second contention involves 
the avoidance of descriptive detail in the 
narrative. The transitions are made from place 
to place, e.g. from the upper room to G-ethsemane^ 
without any of the descriptive touches character­
istic of ordinary narrative, such as places or 
persons. The rapidity with which the events 
transpire and the improbability of some of the 
particular events recorded warrants Robertson’s 
thesis, according to his reasoning. The absence 
of conversational details and the rapid transitions
effected in the movements stamps, according to 
Rohertson, the stories as unhistorical. These 
omissions would not have been made if the 
events were historical . On these and other 
minor points Rohertson concludes that the 
enaction of the raysteiy-play was ’’the very
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womh and genesis of the whole Christian fight.” 
Rohertson*s thesis at this point supposes 
the Jews to have had a religious use and sense 
of Drama parallel to Greek-mystery dramas.
Also, his hypothesis supposes that the Gospels 
were decidely Hellenistic and not Palestinian 
and Jewish. Mr. Rohertson has rightly discerned 
the dramatic qualities belonging to Mark's Gospel 
hut he does not extend this quality throughout 
Mark and the other Gospels . This dramatic 
quality is a feature of the Gospels not confined 
to the last chapters or to the crucifixion- 
resurrection events. Rohertson contends that the
59. Ihid., p. 203
five-act story of the Supper, the Agony, the 
Capture, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection 
was added to the earlier sections of the Gospels 
which described the teaching and public 
ministry of Jesus. The mystery-drama is 
separate from all that is told of Jesus as 
teacher and healer. But it is questionable that 
any modern biblical critic would agree with 
Robertson on the point that the passion-narrative 
is a later addition to the Gospel of Jesus. On 
the contrary, most critics believe the last two 
chapters in Mark (XIV and XV) belong to the 
earlier stratum of the traditions concerning 
Jesus. There was, according to biblical critics, 
a '’Primitive Gospel” with no story of the 
passion. Moreover, there never was a story of 
the passion which did not imply a knowledge of 
the events of the public ministry of Jesus both 
in Galilee and Jerusalem. A theory #iich assumes
that the story of the Cross comes from a group 
vfoich knew only the mystery-cult of a dying 
and rising God and which was unaware cf a divine 
teacher, finds no support in textual evidence 
and literary analysis.
Robertson’s second contention concerns the 
sacrificial development on which the crucifixion 
drama is supposedly based. If the story of the 
Cross is not dramatic in character it may still 
be sacrificial in origin. The events, real or 
supposed, that form the subject-matter of the 
narrative may reflect an elaborate ritual of 
human sacrifice. We turn now to consider the 
claim that 11 anthropological research leads us to 
trace the gospel-story of the crucifixion back 
to a ritual of many variants in the East.” It 
is assumed that the gospel-drama took the place 
of an actual sacrifice, and Robertson in his 
discussion points to probable instances of such
a substitution of drama for ritual in the
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history of human sacrifice in Rhodes. But 
his thesis does not rest on this individual 
instance. Even if there is no record of any 
modification or transformation c£ human 
sacrifice into drama, the internal evidence 
from certain features of the gospel-story 
would still suffice to confer some probability 
on the sacrificial theory. Y/e shall summarize 
Robertson's views; In the first place, he 
attempted to show that several particulars in 
the narrative of the Cross correspond or coincii e 
with details of human sacrifice among savages 
the world over. Most features of the gospel 
passion-narratives can be accounted for as 
definite sacrificial practices, and what features" 
are unintelligible can s oon be takei in account 
if their sacrificial origin is elaborated.
The details in the gospel narrative which 
figured in pre-Christian sacrificial rites are:
60. Ibid., p. 187
the crucifixion of two thieves along with Jesus,
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or the sacrifice of three victims; the wine 
mingled with gall which was offered to Jesus on 
his way to the Cross hints at some such sacri­
ficial ritual; the breaking of the victims’ 
legs ang the piercing of the side of Jesus with 
a spear refer to a sacrificial detail borrowed 
from a sacrificial ritual, e.g. the Khonds; 
the price paid to Judas by the priests comes 
from a sacrificial system in which the victim 
had to be purchased. Robertson links together 
features of the gospel-narrative to attain the 
proof of the one end of the story - the apparent 
willingness of the victim to suffer. He arrives 
at the following scheme of development ifihich 
seemed to him convincing, because it was so 
logical. The scheme is given in Mr. Robertson’s 
words :
1) Originally a 'willing victim1 is desiderated; 
and willingness is secured by a bribe of a period
1. Ibid., p. 115 
2* Ibid., p. 121.
of ease and licence.
2) This kind of victim becoming hard to 
procure, one ’bought with a price* was 
substituted, as representing a voluntary 
offering by his owi er or owners.
3) Still seeking the semblance of a 'willing* 
sacrifice, the sacrificers first broke the 
limbs of the human victim.
4) Feeling (on some reformer's urging) that 
such a mangled victim was an unseemly sacrifice, 
they resorted to narcotics.
5) At a higher stage of social evolution, 
recoiling from the sacrifice of an innocent 
victim, men fell back upon condemned criminals, 
and these in turn are stupefied, from humane or 
other motives .
6) Being next persuaded that the stupefied 
victim was either an unseemly or an inefficacious 
because non-suffering, sacrifice, or being on 
other grounds inclined to abandon human sacrifice
they substituted the old sacrifice of an
animal, givirg it in certain cases human
attributes, and in others some of the
privileges formerly accorded to the taboo
human victim. In the case of the animal it
was not as a rule felt necessary either to
break bones or to use narcotics, though
either plan might be used. But reformers would
stress the avoidance of bone-breaking by way
of showing the superiority of the new
sacrifice; hence the need for a veto on
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imitations of the old pactice."
Robertson was convinced that many details 
of the story of the Gross correspond closely
i
to the various modes employed at different 
periods and in different rituals to secure the 
willingness of the victim. The parallels 
presented so far explain vhy the victim was 
betrayed and bought" for a price; why he receives,
63. Ibid., p. 156
a narcotic and a spearthrust; and why the legs
of his comrades are broken though his own are
carefully kept intact. It remains to explain
on the basis of sacrificial parallels the
royal death and the mocking and scourging of
the victim. Tv/o rites in Rhodes and Phoencia
supply this detail. The Jev/s copied from
these rituals the ceremony of crucifying a
malefactor who, after masquerading as a king
in a crown and royal robe, was hanged or
64
crucified in the character of human.
This brings us to another typical recon­
struction which must be given at length in Mr. 
Robertson's words. He says: "We have now
followed our historic clues far enough to 
warrant a constructive theory. Indeed, it 
frames itself vhen we colligate our main date. 
As thus :
1) In the slaying of the Kronian victim at 
Rhodes, we have an aicient Semitic human 
sacrifice maintained into the historic period,
64. Ibid., p. 161
by the expedient of taking as annual victim 
a criminal already condemned to death.
2) In Semitic mythology, Kronos ’whom the 
Phoenicians call Israel’ sacrifices his son 
Ieoud, ’the only’, after putting upon him 
royal robes.
3) The Feast of Kronos is the Saturnalia, in 
which elsewhere a mock-king plays a prominent 
part; and as Kronos was among the Somites 
identified with Moloch - 'king', the victim 
would be ostensibly either a king or a king's 
son. A trial and degradation were likely 
accessories.
4) Supposing the victim in the Rhodian 
Saturnalia to figure as Ieoud, he would be 
ipso facto Barabbas, ’the son of the father’, 
and in the terms of the case he was a condemned 
criminal. At the same time, in terms of the 
myth, he would figure in royal robes.
5) In any case, the myth heing Semitic, it 
is morally certain that among the many cases 
of human sacrifice in the Graeco-Semitic 
v/orld, the Rhodian rite was not unique. And as 
the name !Ieoud! "besides signifying fthe only1 
was ritually identical with the Greek and Hebrew 
names for Judah (son of 'Israel’) and Jew 
(Yehuda, Ioudaios), it was extremely likely 
among the Jews of the Dispersion to he regarded 
as having special application to their race, 
which in their sacred hooks actually figured as 
the Only-Begotten Son of the Father God, and
as having undergone special suffering.
6) That the Rhodian rite, Senitic in origin, 
was at some points specially co-incident with 1 
Jev/ish conceptions of sacrifice, is proved hy 
the detail of leading the prisoner outside the 
city gates. This is expressly laid down in
the Epistle to the Hebrews, as a ritual condition
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of the sacrificial death of Jesus."
65 . Ibid., p . 186 f
In summary, according to Robertson, the 
following features of the Gospel-story have 
been discovered in different forms of human 
sacrifice; the betrayal for money, the trial 
and degradation of a mock-king, the use of a 
narcotic, the draught of wine (two items 
unnecessarily separated in the Gospels), the 
breaking of the legs, the spear-thrust, the 
royal dignity attributed to the sufferer,and 
above all the custom of regarding the sufferer 
as the only begotten son of the Father. All 
these elements in the Gospel-story of the Cross 
are links in the chain of evidence which points 
to a human sacrifice as the basis of the Christian 
mystery-play.
Then, on Robertson's showing, or according to 
his reasoning, human sacrifice evolved and 
certain usages in relation to human sacrifice are 
supposed to have succeeded one another, culminat­
ing in the ritual depicted in the Gospels.
While it is difficult to examine each of 
Robertson's elaborations and chains of 
inference in detail, it has been pointed out 
by his critics that these levels of human 
sacrifice were not successive; rather were 
many aspects co-existent. There s eems to be 
no reason for Robertson's developmental scheme, 
e.g. limb breaking to be a later practice than 
purchase, nor purchase a later practice than 
licence. What Robertson has done in his 
researches into human sacrifice v/as to trace 
certain practices among the Khonds and certain 
other practices among more civilized peoples, 
and then to link these together by an arbitrary 
and unsatisfactory principle, viz. development 
from lower to higher forms of sacrifice.
It seems that Robertson has presented a 
hybird rite which could never at any period of 
human history have been performed. In the 
first instance, Robertson has assumed that the
victims were malefactors. It follows, then, on 
his own theory, and in the nature of the case, 
that the victoms could not have been "bought 
with a price". Consequently, the betrayal, as 
he interprets it, cannot belong to the same 
ritual as the crucifixion itself. Nor will it 
do to say one victim was "bought with a price" 
and the others were malefactors. For all three 
were executed as malefactors, and the two 
practices cannot be combined. Furthermore, 
Robertson is anxious to point out that the use 
of criminals comes in when men are civilized 
enough to revolt from the use of innocent victims 
bought with a price. The Jews can scarcely have 
been at one and the same time so far civilized 
as to insist on substituting two criminals for 
two victims out of three, and so conservative 
as to insist on retaining the old inhuman system 
for the third.
Again, Robertson would have us believe first,
that the crucifixion was ai august ritual in 
which the victim perished in royal rohes as 
the only-begotten son of a king, and at the 
same time, the whole procedure was a mock- 
sacrifice.in which the victim is tried and 
degraded and expires wthout any royal robes. 
Now the crucifixion cannot have been at one 
and the same time the solemn offering up of 
the dearest emblem of royality, and the 
practically non-sacrificial execution of the 
poor mock-king of the Saturnalia, nor can the 
victim have perished at once with royal robes 
and without them. What then can be said of 
Robertson's theory which proposes to combine 
in one rite, the -divergent practices and 
motives (1) of the very primitive and degraded 
Khonos,and (2) of the annual sacrifice of a 
criminal to Kronos in Rhodes, and (3) of the 
custom of sacrificing children, especially 
royal children at times of crisis, which once
prevailed in Phoenicia, and (4) of the
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entirely disparate treatment of the raock-king 
in the Saturnalia? Simply this : Roberts on has
sought far and wide for the least item of 
information to substantiate his primary thesis, 
e.g. the performance of an annual raystery-drama 
and the Palestinian rite of human sacrifice in 
which the annual victim was "Jesus, the Son of 
the Father".
But enough of Roberts onfs speculations on the 
raystery-drama which has been transcribed into 
narrative form in the Rev/ Testament. One point 
is clear: The Christian Gospels are a trans­
cript of a mock murder of the Sun-god Joshua 
annually performed in secret by the Jews of 
Jerusalem. Let us turn next to Robertson!s ideas 
on the pre-Christian cult of a hero-god called 
Jesus or Joshua.
2. The Crucifixion Iflyth: Pre-Christian Jesus.
Remembering Robertson’s approach to the New
Testament narratives, e.g. his scepticism of 
their historical veracity and his interest in 
the rite which preceded the mythic formulations, 
we are now prepared to search out his solution 
to the origin of the Christian faith and move­
ment. In his "Christianity and Mythology" he 
says: "The one tenable historic hypothesis
left to us at this stage is that of a preliminary 
Jesus ’B.C.1, a vague cult-founded such as the 
Jesus ben Pandira of the Talmud, put to death for 
(perhaps anti-Judaic) teachings now lost; round 
whose movement there might have gradually 
clustered the survivals of an ancient solar or
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other worship of a Babe Joshua, son of Miriam."
There are many hypotheses in this quotation.
Let us take them one by one to discover Robertson's 
reasoning. First, a few preliminary remarks. He 
says in his "Pagan Christs" that: "the Christian
system is a patchwork of a hundred suggestions
66. Christianity & Mythology, p. 284
■67.
drawn from pagan art and ritual usage.”
And.. "Christisra was only neo-paganisra grafted 
68
on Judaism.1 And in another place he writes:
"The figure of Jesus is an alloy of Dionysus,
Osiris, Adonis, Krishna, Aesculopuios, and
fifty other ancient gods and demigods, with
the all-important Sun-God-Saviour Joshua, son
of Miriam; that the story of Peter rests on a
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pagan hasis of myth.”
It is clear from these quotations that 
Roberts on has searched the Mediterrean world 
for parallels to the Gospel stories. The 
slightest resemblance to an event or person in 
the Gospel is enough to validate his theorizings. 
But the important question is: Why does he and
his colleagues, W.B. Smith and Arthur Drews 
select the myth of the Sun-God Joshua as the 
core of the pre-Christian Jesus myth? It is to 
be remembered that Robertson regards the mythical 
Joshua-Jesus as a "composite myth", around which 
clustered all the myths of the pagan world. These
67. Pagan Christs, p. 305
68. Ibid., p. 338 
69« Ibid., p. 340
Christ-rayth theorists believe Jesus, or
Joshua, was the name under which the expected
Messiah was honoured in a certain Jewish
secret society which had its headquarters in
Jerusalem about the beginning of our era. By
Joshua or Jesus, we are not to understand the
personage concerning whose exploits the Book
of Joshua was composed, but a Sun-God. The
Gospels are a veiled account of the sufferings
and exploits of this Sun-God. Dr. Drews, also
an advocate of the pre-Christiai Jesus, says
concerning Joshua: "Joshua is apparently an
ancient Ephraimitic god of the Sun and
Fruitfulness, who stood in close relation to
the Feast of the Pasch and to the custom of
70
circumcision."
Let us follow some of the steps by which 
Robertson and others arrive at Joshua's divine 
status and further, Joshua's identification 
with the Jesus portrayed in the Gospel narratives.
70. Drews, Arthur, "Christ Ify th", p.57, in the 
German text (first ed. 1909, p*21)
First, Robertson thought we might piece
together some hints from the book csf Joshua.
Joshua, it seems, has some of the attributes
of the Sun-God; was, in fact, a solar deity.
The reference to the circumcision and the
Passover in the book of Joshua, Chapter V,
suggests that his name was anciently associated
with these ordinances. It is believed that
Joshua reinstituted the rite of circumcision
and thus in accordance with ancient mythological
ideas has been regarded as the god of the rite.
The miracles of making the sun stand still is a
greater prodigy than any attributed to Moses,
and he must have ranked as high as Moses. These
things (institution of circumcision and the
miracle of the sun standing still) are not to be
explained save on the view that he held divine 
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status .M
Secondly, Joshua,we are told, was probably "an 
Ephraimite deity" analogous to Joseph whose legend
71. Pagan Christs, p. 163
has such close resemblance to the myth of 
"Tammuz-Adonis .1 This point would run as 
follows: Joseph is an Ephraimite god; Joshua
is the same. Joseph resembles Adonis; there­
fore Joshua may have been like Adonis.
In the next place, in Exodus XXIII, 20-23,
God promises to send an angel to go before
Israel and bring the people into the place
prepared for them. God's name is in or on
the angel, and if the people obey him he will
drive out from before them the Amorites and
Hittites and Perizzites and Canaanites and
Jebusites. Now in Joshua.XXIV, 11, the same
list appears with the addition of the Girgash-
ites, as representing the conquests effected
by the Lord through Joshua. Must we not
conclude, thai , that Joshua is pseudo-
historicallv identified with the promised 
72
angel?
The next stage in the argument must be
72. Pagan Christs, p. 163
carefully watched. Joshua was identified with
the angel hy some person or persons unknown,
presumably when they noticed the parallel
between Exodus XXIII and Joshua XXIV. But the
angel "in virtue of his possession of themagical
'name' is in the Talmud identified with the
mystic Metatron, who is in turn identifiable
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with the Logos." We may here interpose that 
the mystic Metatron is by some derived from the 
Greek meta thronon - "behind the throne" and by 
others is supposed to be a corruption of Mithras. 
The more generally accepted view connects the 
name with the Latin, Metator - guide. Metatron 
belongs to the Roman period of Judaism. This 
mysterious power behind the throne is sometimes 
identified with Michael. However, the points 
established are that some readers of the books 
of Exodus and Joshua may have identified Joshua 
with the angel. Some Rabbinic authorities in 
the Talmud actually do identify the angel with
73* Ibid., p. 163
the mystic Metatron which others again identify
with the Logos. We are now ready for the
amazing conclusion. "Thus the name Joshua -
Jesus is already in the Hexateuch associated
with the conceptions of Logos, Son of God and 
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Messiah."
But if this evidence is not satisfactory,
Robertson offers more proof. There is a
Kabbalistic prayer attached to the Jewish
liturgy for the New Year, which contains an
obscure reference to Joshua as Prince of the
presence, whatever that may mean. Then,
according to Robertson, a Mr. Hershon in his
Talmudical commentary on Genesis drew attention
to the fact that according to some Jews "the
week of the Son" (circumcision) was called the
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rite of "Jesus the Son". Great we^it attaches 
to these items of evidence for "neither Jewish 
nor Christian commentators latterly face the 
fact that in Jewish Talmudic tradition there was
74. Ibid., p. 164
75. Ibid., p. 166
a * Jesus, the Prince a£ the Presence1 and a
rite of the Week of the Son1 called by some
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'the Week of Jesus the Son.1'1 The first item 
confirms the identification of Joshua with the 
Angel, and the second confirms the association 
of his name with circumcision.
But we are not at the end of our resources. 
There is a Persian tradition which makes Joshua 
the son of Miriam. Then in the Hexateuch Joshua 
was the son of Nun, aa d Nun means "fish" and a 
fish was an early Christian symbol. Further, 
in Jude 5, ”1 will put you in remembrance how 
that the Lord, having saved the people out of 
the land of Egypt, afterward destroyed them that 
believed not", we must accept the variant reading 
"Jesus" as original and substitute it for "the 
Lord" and affirm without question that by "Jesus" 
is meant the Joshua of the Old Testament. It 
will follow from verse 6 that Joshua must have 
been conceived as a divine or supernatural being,
76. Jesus & Judas, p. 207
since in verse 6 he judged fallen angels, and 
sitting in judgment on fallen angels was a 
function of the heavaily Messiah according to 
the book of Enoch.
The case for the pre-Christian Jesus may he 
rounded off by citing a passage from the 
Sibylline Oracles where the crucified Jesus of 
the Christians is confused with the Joshua of 
the Old Testament, and by recalling instances of 
the use of the name of Jesus in exorcism.
But we could spend much time organising 
Robertson's arguments and even disproving his 
theses on biblical grounds, e.g. analyzing texts 
and comparing philological similarities. Instead 
of this method, let us pass to the general 
presupposition of the author. Robertson's 
motive in his treatment of Joshua and the origin 
of Christianity is transparent. He selected from 
the book of Joshua those items vfoich helped him 
to imagine ai Ephraimite deity like unto the
Christian Jesus. Do the Christians place Jesus 
above Moses? Then the Ephraimite Joshua must 
have had a divine status equal if not superior 
to that of Moses. Is the Christian Jesus 
associated with the Passover? Then the 
Ephraimite Joshua must have been closely assoc­
iated with the Passover. Did the Christian 
Jesus reinstitute or, as would rather appear, 
institute the rite of baptism? Then Joshua 
must have reinstituted or, as would rather appear, 
instituted circumcision. Y/as baptism in the 
name of Jesus? Then circumcision must have beai 
the rite of Joshua the son. Is Jesus judge of 
men and angels? Then Jude must have regarded 
Joshua in the same light. Was Jesus regarded as 
the Logos? Then already in the Hexateuch Joshua 
must have been so regarded. Did Jesus die and 
rise again? Then the Ephraimite deity, Joshua, 
must have resembled Adonis. Furthermore, in his 
anxiety to connect the pre-Christian Jesus with
a sacrificiaL ritual, Robertson turned to the
story of Abraham and Isaac for assistance.
"The Syrian form of the name, Jeschu, closely
resembles the Hebrew name Yishak, which we read
Isaac, and that Isaac was in earlier myth
sacrificed by his father is a fair assumption.
We have here the inferrable norm of aa ancient
God-sacrifice, Abraham's original Godhead being
77
tolerably certain, like that of Israel." But 
the weakness of Robertson's linguistic argument 
is sufficiently exposed in the following words 
of Rendel Harris, as quoted by H.G. Wood in his 
"Bid Christ Really Live". Br. Harris writes: 
"For the identification of Isaac (Yitzchak) and 
Joshua (Yehoshua), Mr. Robertson should have 
adduced some parallels. It is true that if we 
take the English spelling cf Isaac and the 
Arabic spelling of Jesus, we do obtain some 
similarity. In the Hebrew, however, the two 
names do not agree, either in consonants or
77. Pagan Christ s, p. 267
vowels, except as regards the initial letter.
The proper parallel to he quoted would he Romeo
and Rosemary, or better still, Monmouth and 
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Macedon." Mr. Wood adds: "No philology,
however elastic, will enable us to merge 'Jesus, 
the son of the Father* in * Isaac, the son of 
Abraham'. Mr. Robertson would have appreciated 
the Shakespearian allusion, however reluctant he 
would have been to admit its devastating effect 
on his argument.
At this point we must attempt to limit our 
treatment of Robertson's arguments for the 
existence of a pre-Christian Jesus G-od. He 
appeals his case by discussing references in the 
"Apocalypse of St. John" and "The Teaching of 
the Twelve Apostles". We shall content ourselves 
with a brief summary of the "core" of the 
"composite myth" of the pre-Christian Jesus cult. 
In the next place, some of the elements in the
78. Wood,. H.Gr. "Did Christ Really Live", p.140-141
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raystery-drama (a drama which ceased to he acted
when it was reduced to writing as part of the
gospel) are deserving of our attention. This
point is clear: The central event of the annual
raystery-play reduced to writing was the annual
death and resurrection of a solar or vegetation
god, whose attributes and career were borrowed
from the cults of Osiris, Adonis, Dionysus and
company. We look now to some of the situations
in the stories of the gods which were incorporated
in the pre-Christian Jesus cult.
(1) The Virgin Birth:
Robertson writes: "In the special machinery
of the Joseph and Mary myth - the warning in a
dream and the abstention of the husband - we have
a simple duplication of the relations of the
father and mother of Plato, the former being
warned in a dream by Apollo, so that the child
79
was virgin-born."
79* Pagan Christs, p. 293
Again, just as the Christians chose a 
"solar date" for the birthday of Jesus, so 
the Platonists, according to Robertson "placed 
the master's birthday on that of Apollo - that 
is, either at Christmas or at the vernal equinox."
With a mere change of names we could write of 
Plato what Robertson writes of Jesus. Let us 
do it: "The gospel Jesus (read dialogist Plato)
is as enigmatic from a humanist as from a super­
naturalist point of view. Miraculously bom, to 
the knowledge of many . ( read of his nephew 
Speusippus of Clearchus whose testimony 'belongs 
to Plato's generation', of Anaxilides the 
historian and others), he reappears as a natural 
man even in the opinion of his parents (read of 
nephew Speusippus and the rest); the myth will 
not cohere. Rationally considered, he (Plato) 
is an unintelligible portent; A G-alilean (read 
Athenian) of the common people, critically
untraceable till his full manhood, when he
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suddenly appears as a cult-founder".
80. Ibid., p. 308
81. Ibid., p. 282
(2) Other incidents in the Gospels "borrowed from 
Pagan sources :
Why did the solar God Joshua-Jesus scourge the
money-changers out of the temple? Answer:
Because it is told of Apollonius of Tyana "that
he expelled from the cities of the left "bank of
the Hellespont some sorcerers who were extorting
money for a great propitiatory sacrifice to
82
prevent earthquakes".
Why did Jesus make a scourge of cords with 
which to drive the sheep and oxoi out of the 
temple? Answer: "Because in the Assyrian and
Egyptian systems of scourge-hearing god is a 
very common figire on the monuments .. it is 
specially associated with Osiris, the Saviour, 
Judge and Avenger. A figure of Osiris, rever­
enced as 'Chrestos' the "benign God, would suffice
to set up among Christists as erstwhile among
83
Pagans the demand for an explanation".
82. Ibid., p. 285
83. Ibid., p. 297
Who was Peter? Answer: An understudy of
’Mithras, who in the monuments hears two keys; 
or of Janus, who hears the keys and^ the rod, 
and as opener of the year (hence the name 
January) stands at the head of the twelve 
months.
Why did Peter deny Jesus? Answer: Because
Janus was called hifrons.
Who was Joseph? Answer: Joseph must he
regarded as "a partial revival of the ancient
adoration of the God Joseph as well as of that
84
of the God Daoud”. He was also, seeing that 
he took Mary and her child on an ass into 
Egypt, a reminiscence; or, shall we not say, 
an explanation of ’’the heelhe old man leading 
an ass in the sacred procession of Isis, as 
described by Apuleius in his Metamorphoses”.
Who was Mary, the mother of Jesus? Robertson 
and Drews believe Mary» the mother of Jesus, was 
a goddess. This Mary appears among the Persians
84. Ibid., p. 303
as the "virgin” mother of Mithras. As Myrrha 
she is the mother of the Syrian Adonis; as 
Semiramis, mother of the Babylonian Ninus (Marduk). 
In the Arabic legend she appears under the name 
of Mirzara as mother of the mythical saviour 
Joshua; while the Old Testament gives this name 
to the virgin sister of that Joshua who was so 
closely related to Moses; and according to 
Eusebius, Merris was the name of the Egyptian 
princess who found Moses in a basket and became 
his foster mother.
Who were the twelve disciples, or where did 
the idea of twelve disciples originate?
Answer: The apostles are Zodiacal signs, and
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their leader is Janus, the opener of the year.
Why was Jesus crucified? Answer; "The story 
of the Crucifixion may rest on the remote datum 
of an actual crucifixion of Jesus Ben Pandira, 
the possible Jesus of Paul, dead long before, and
85. Ibid., p. 347
represented by no preserved biography or
86
teachings whatever". But this Jesus Ben
Pandira was hanged some hundred years before
the opening of the Christian era in the Gospels.
Robertson is convinced that this Pauline Jesu$,
who taught nothing and did nothing, was "a
doctrinal evolution from the Jesus of a hundred 
87
years before". We must "perforce assume such 
a long evolution". Otherwise it would not be 
"intelligible that, even if he had been only 
hanged after stoning, he should by that time
88
have come to figure mythically as crucified". 
Robertson is quite ready to admit that "if the 
Jesus of Paul were really a personage put to 
death under Pontius Pilate, the Epistles (of 
Paul) would give us the strongest ground for 
accepting an actual crucifixion". But, alas, 
the Jesus put to death under Pontius Pilate is 
no more than an allegroy of Joshua,the ancient 
Palestinian Sun-god, rolled up with a vegatation-
86. Christianity & Mythology, p. 378
87. Ibid., p. 379
88. Ibid., p. 364
god and other mythical beings, and slain 
afresh once a year. There is thus no 
alternative left but to identify Paul’s 
crucified Jesus with Jesus Ben Pandira. But 
how did Robertson arrive at his certainty that 
Jesus Ben Pandira died in the reign of Alexander 
Jannaeus, B.C. 106-79? Answer: From the
Talmudic tradition which alludes to the birth 
of Jesus of Nazareth. Dr. Saziuel Kraus, in his 
exhaustive study of Talmudic notices of Jesus 
of Nazareth (Das Leben Jesu nach judischen Quellen, 
Berlin, 1902, p. 242) assumes as a fact beyond 
dispute that the Jeschu or Joshua Ben Pandira 
(or Ben Stada or Ben Satda) mentioned in the 
Toldoth Jeschu is Jesus of Nazareth. In the 
Toldoth he is set in the reign of Tiberius.
This Toldoth is not earlier than A.D. 400, and 
took its information from the pseudo-Hegesippus .
The Spanish historian Abraham b. Daud (about 
A.D.1100) already noticed that the Talmudic
tradition alluded to by Robertson set the birth 
of Jesus of Nazareth a hundred years too early; 
but the same tradition corrects itself in that 
it assigns Salome Alexandri to Alexander Jannai 
as his wife, and then, confusing her with Queen 
Helena the proselyte, brings the incident down 
to the right date. "The truth is" says Hr.
Kraus (p.183) "We have got to do here with a 
chronological error. Lightfoot, to whose 
"Horae Hebraicae" Robertson refers in his foot­
note (p.363), also assumed that by Jesus Ben 
Pandira, or son of Panthera, the Talmudists 
intended Jesus of Nazareth* Celsus (about A.H.
170) attested a Jewish tradition that Jesus
Christ was Mary's son by a Roman soldier named
Panthera, and later on even Christian writers
worked Panthera into Maryfs pedigree. Such
is the origin of the Talraudic tradition exploited
by Robertson. It is almost worthless; but, so
far as it goes, it overthrows Robertson*s hypothesis.
Concerning the teaching in the Gospels, 
Robertson and his friends contend that such 
teaching was inspired by parallel passages in 
the Talmud aid the Apocrypha, aa d these rayth- 
theorists argue for the priority of the Talmud 
and such other documents. The TaLmudic 
parallels to any part of the Sermon on the 
Mount cannot, according to Robertson, conceiv­
ably have been borrowed from the Christian 
gospels.
We could continue for several pages to 
describe the myths which Christianity borrowed 
from paganism and to show how the Christian 
legend, in its present terminology, is demon­
strably an adaption of a mass of pre-Christian 
myths, we have endeavoured to point to the 
centre of the pre-Christian cult, e.g. Joshua, 
the Sun-god, who was annually crucified, and we 
have shown from Robertson's pages the parallels 
to several incidents narrated in the New Testament.
Before we can close this chapter, we should 
like to pass over to another Christ-myth 
theorist, W.B. Smith. There are three argu­
ments in his writings which deserve some 
mention: the name Jesus of Nazareth which
signifies a cult movement; the statement "the 
things concerning Jesus" designating a mythical 
god; and, the "brethren of our Lord" or the 
term "brother^1 of our Lord, meaning the spiritual 
fellowship of many instead of actually existing 
brothers of Jesus. In the first instance,
Smith in his "Pre-Christian Jesus" (Her 
Vorchristliche Jesus) drew upon the passages in 
Acts XVTII, 24, to substantiate his main argument. 
The phrase which occurs in this passage "the 
things concerning Jesus" refers not, as the 
context would seem to require, to the history 
and passion of Jesus of Galilee, but to the 
mysteries of a prehistoric Saviour-God of the 
same name. The name Jesus, according to Smith,
means what the word Essene also meant, a 
Healer. Smith tries to find support for his 
conjecture in a chance phrase in a magical 
papyrus of Paris, No. 3009, edited first by 
Wessely, and later by Dieterich. This papyri 
was supposed to have been composed around the 
second century B.C. Because Jesus is referred 
to as Hebrew God and exorcism was practised in 
his name, Smith thinks he is warranted in 
saying that a pre-Christian cult worshipped 
Jesus and the "things concerning Jesus" refers 
not to Jesus of Galilee but to Jesus v&iich 
existed prior to that time.
A critic of Smith's theories attempts a 
paraphrase of the passages in Acts vhich is 
drawn from the speculations of Brews and 
Robertson. We may quote this as an illustration 
of the meaning which Smith derived from this 
reference to Jesus in Acts.
"A certain sun-rayth hero, as his name Apolios
signifies, came to Ephesus, which, being the 
centre of Astarte or Aphrodite worship, was 
obviously the right place for such a h ero to 
pilgrimage unto. He was mighty in the Jewish 
Scriptures, and had been instructed in the way 
of the Lord Joshua, the Sun-G-od-Saviour of
i
ancient Ephraim. He spake and taught carefully 
the things concerning this Joshua (or Adonis, or 
Osiris, or Dionysus or Vegetation-god, or Horus - 
for you can take your'choice among these and 
many more) . But he knew only of the pre-historic 
ritual of baptism of Cadmus or of Oannus-Ea, the 
ancient culture-god of the Babylonians, who 
appeared in the form of a Fish-man, teaching me 
by day and at night going down into the sea - in 
his capacity of Sun-god. This Cadmus or Oannes 
was worshipped at Jerusalem in the cryptic sect 
of the Christists or Jesuists under the name of 
John. His -friend Apollos, the solar demi-god, 
began to speak boldly in the synagogue. Priscilla
(preaumably Cybelle, mother of the gods), and
Aquila, the Eagle-God or Jupiter heard him;
she took him forthwith and expounded to him the
way of Jahve who also was identical with
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Joshua, the Sun-god, with Osiris, etc."
Another basis of Smith’s pre-Christian 
Jesus theory is the prophecy in Matthew 2:23, 
to the effect that the Messiah should be called 
a Nazoraean. This prophecy is declared to have 
been fulfilled in so far as Jesus was taken by 
his parents to live at Nazareth in Galilee.
What prophecy the evangelist had in mind is not 
known. But 7/.B. Smith jumps to the conclusion 
that the Christians were identical with the 
sect of Nazoraei mentioned in Epiphanius as going 
hack to ai age before Christ; and he appeals in 
confirmation of this hypothesis to Acts XXIV,5, 
where the following of Jesus is described as that 
of the Nazoraei. This sect of pre-Christian 
Nazoraei worshipped a God Joshua.
89* Conybeare, F. "The Historical Christ", p.38.
Many critics have examined this contention 
(Goguel, Guigenbert) and they have decided that 
the evangelist (Matthew) meant by Nazorean a 
dweller in Nazareth, and that he gave the word 
that sense when he met with it in an anonymous 
prophecy.
Finally, W.B. Smith hopes to substantiate his 
thesis of a pre-Christian Jesus cult by reference 
to the passages in the New Testament which concern 
the "brothers" or "brethren" of Jesus. Smith 
believes that when Paul calls James a brother of 
the Lord, he does not "imply any family kinship" 
but one of a "class of earnest Messianists, 
zealots of obedience" to the Mosaic Law. Smith 
appeals in confirmation of his cobjecture to the 
apostrophe of Jesus when his mother and brethren 
came to arrest him as an ecstatic (Mark 111,31-35):-
Who is ray mother and ray brethren?...whosoever 
shall do the will of God, the same is my brother 
and sister and mother.
He also appeals to 1 Corinthians IX, 5, where 
Paul alludes to "the brethren of the Lord" as 
claiming a right to lead about a wife that is 
a sister. And he argues that those who in 
Corinth, to the imperilling of Christian unity, 
said - some: "I am of Cephas"; others: "I am of 
Christ"; others: "I am of Apollos" were known 
as brethren of Christ, of Cephas, etc. It is 
certainly true that Paul and other early 
Christian writers regarded the members of the 
Church as brethren or as sisters, just as the 
members of monastic society have ever styled 
the mselves brothers and sisters of one another. 
But there is no example of a believer being 
called a brother of the Lord or of Jesus. The 
passage in Mark and its parallels are, according 
to Smith, purely legendary and allegorical, since 
he denies that Jesus ever lived; and he had no 
right, therefore, to appeal to them in order to 
decide what Paul intended by the phrase when he
used it, as before, not of a mythical but of 
a concrete case. However, if Smith is intent 
on appealing to the Gospels, then he must allow 
equal weight to such a text as Matthew XIII, 55:
"Is not this the carpenter’s son? Is not his 
mother called Mary? and his brethren, Janies and 
Joseph and Simon and Judas? And his sisters, are 
they not all with us?
Did all these people, we may ask, including his 
mother, stand in a merely spiritual relationship 
to Jesus? But W.B. Smith is anxious to prove that 
Jesus did not live and to admit that he had "blood 
brothers" would damage his initial presupposition. 
Smith appeals to Jerome (Ecce Deus) to validate 
his case. Jerome says, according to Smith:
"No less an authority thaa Jerome has expressed 
the correct idea on this point. In commenting on 
Galatians, 1, 19, he says (in sum): "James was 
called the Lord’s brother on account of his high 
character, his incomparable faith, and his extra­
ordinary wisdom; the other apostles are also called
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brothers' (John XX,17)"
But at this point Smith withholds frora his 
readers the fact that Jerome regarded James the 
brother of Jesus as his first cousin. It is 
just as difficult far a mythical persorage to 
have a first cousin as to have a brother.
Moreover, the reasons vfaich actuated Jerome to 
deny that Jesus had real brethren was - as the 
Encyclopaedia Biblica (art. James) points out:- 
"a prepossession in favour of the perpetual 
virginity of Mary, the mother of Jesus".
It is strange that Smith relies on the Gospels 
aid Epistles to substantiate his thesis when, on 
his own showing, these writings are regarded as 
unhistorical and untrustworthy. Smith's postulate 
is that he, i.e. Jesus of Nazareth, never lived, 
and so never said anything to anyone. How, then, 
can he appealto traits in the picture of Jesus in 
the New Testament to describe his pre-Christian 
Jesus? If the Gospels are to such an extent merely
90. Smith, W.B., "The Pre-Christian Jesus", p.45
an allegorical romance, and we must not assume
their authors to have believed that Jesus ever
lived, how can we possibly rely on them for
information about such an obscure matter as a
secret and esoteric pre-Christian Nazarene
sect? But in defiance of all his postulates,
Smith writes as follows: "On the basis, then,
of this passage alone (i.e. Mark IV,10-34) we
may confidently affirm the primitive secrecy of
91
the Jesus cult".
We have attempted in this section of our 
chapter to describe the theories of Robertson, 
Smith and to some extent Arthur Brews' agreement 
with these themes. We could cite more examples 
of their speculations, but enough ground has been 
given for some evaluation of this situation, lie 
shall now turn to several appraisals of the 
theories devised to negate the historical Jesus 
of the New* Testament.
91. Ibid., p. 40
V I . Critical Evaluation:
The most unusual assumption in the writings 
of the men we have surveyed in this chapter 
concerns what they have called "the humanized 
God". The received notion in Christendom has 
been reversed by these writers. I refer here 
to the human picture of Jesus in Mark's account 
aid the process of deification in John's Gospel.
In Robertson, Smith and Brews, the Saviour-God 
is gradually humanized in the Gospel record and 
there is, according to these men, a humanizing 
process going on in the Gospel tradition. The 
common starting-point of all three writers, Brews, 
Smith and Robertson, is that the earliest Gospel 
narratives do not describe any human character 
at all; on the contrary, the individuality in 
question is distinctly divine and not human, in 
the earliest portrayal. As time goes on it is 
true that certain human elements do creep in, 
particularly in Luke and John... In Mark there is
really no man at all; the Jesus is God, or at
least essentially divine throughout. He
wears only a transparent garment of flesh. Mark
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historizes only".
It may he said that this initial premise was 
basic to their theory of a pre-Christian Jesus 
God who was never human. This point enables 
the authors in question to pass from any 
consideration of the historical details in the 
New Testament record to their fanciful myth 
speculations.
The second source of concern to us in these 
writers involves their disinclination to sift 
sources and test documents. This negligence 
prompts them to take en bloc sources and 
documents which arose separately and in 
succession. As an example, we may elaborate 
on their insistence that the belief in the 
Virgin Birth of Jesus was part and parcel of 
the earliest tradition. This doctrine cannot 
be borne out by a careful reference to the
92. Smith, Ecce Deus, p. 73
evidence in the New Testament, for the earliest 
Gospel (Mark) does not have the idea, nor does 
other sections in the New Testament. Only 
Matthew and Luke begin their account of Jesus1 
ministry with this idea.
But the insistence on the Virgin Birth is 
integral to their theses; for it is assumed 
that the worship of the one God under the name, 
aspect or person of the Jesus, the Saviour, was 
the primitive and indefectible essence of the 
primitive teaching and propaganda. Jesus, 
according to these writers, was from the first 
worshipped as a slain God.
Relative to the mixing up of different 
phases of the Christian religion, is their lack 
of concern for the so-called "synoptic problem". 
Suffice it to say that in the three Gospels, 
Mark, Matthew and Luke, and in the fourth 
Gospel and Pauline Epistles there are different
pictures of Jesus the Christ presented. At 
one time, many theologians believed they could 
trace the gradual deification of Jesus from the 
earlier sources to the later formulations, but 
modem biblical criticism is despairing of 
this easy, off-hand treatment of the New 
Testament pictures. Instead of this scheme, 
e.g. at one point human and another point divine, 
we are being led to realize that from the 
earliest reference to Jesus in the first 
chapters in Acts, there was ro point v\hen 
Jesus was merely a man. The difference in these 
non-biographical, post-resurrection documents, 
or the difference between the Synoptic Gospels 
and the other literature of the New Testament - 
including the Fourth Gospel - is that the former 
give the picture on which the assertion that 
Jesus is the Christ is based, while the latter 
give the elaboration of this assertion and its 
implications for Christian thought and life.
This distinction is not exclusive, for it is 
a difference in emphasis, not in substance. 
According to Paul Tillich, "The New Testament 
witness is unanimous in its witness to Jesus 
as the Christ. This witness is the foundation
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of the Christian Church".
In the third place, these writers abuse the 
comparative method. When applied discreetly 
and rationally, this method helps us to trace 
myths and beliefs back to their homes and 
earlier forms. But viien applied haphazardly, 
e.g. taking the most superficial resemblance of 
sound as a reason for connecting words in 
different languages, the comparative method 
loses its significance. These writers never 
concern thenselves with the context from which 
various words aid ideas are lifted and further­
more, they never ascertain whether the stories 
they connect bear any real resemblance to one
93* Tillich, Systematic Theology, 11, page 117-118
another. For example, what have the Zodiacal 
signs and the Apostles cf Jesus in common 
except the number twelve? The scene of the 
Gospel is laid in Judea, where from remote 
antiquity the Jews had classed themselves in 
twelve tribes • Is it not more likely that 
this suggested the twelve missionaries sent 
out by Jesus to announce the oo ming Kingdom 
than the twelve signs of the Zodiac? Even if 
the story of the twelve be legendary, need we 
go outside Judaism for our explanation of its 
origin? Many other resemblances cited by 
these authors founder on the basis of' their 
inadequate use of the comparative method.
Fourthly, the tendency of all these authors 
to condemn as an interpolation any text which 
contradicts their hypotheses. The documents 
are not examined for their veracity but ideas 
are lifted which agree with their thought and 
others rejected as interpolations if they fail
to connect with their central then es.
Lastly, the genesis of Christianity as 
these authors present it, is much more 
mysterious aid obscure than before. Their 
explanation needs explaining. '/That was the 
motive and end in view of the adherents of the 
pre-Christian Jesus or Joshua in writing the 
Gospels and bringing down their God to earth, 
so humanizing in a story their divine myth?
The essence, the central idea and active 
principle of the cult was a protest against 
idolatry; a crusade for monotheism. But this 
central theme is difficult to discover in the 
Gospels, Epistles aid other New Testament 
writings. It is assumed that Jesus' audience 
were monotheists like himself; for Jesus speaks 
as a Jew to Jews and perpetually reminds them 
of their Father in heaven. Moreover, the 
monotheism of those who stood around the teacher 
is ever taken for granted by the evangelists,
and in all the precepts of Jesus not one can 
he adduced that is aimed at the sins of 
polytheism and idolatry. Jesus1 message 
concerns the immediate advent of the Messianic 
kingdom, and the need of repentance ere it 
came. Even Paul's letters read as if those 
for whom he wrote them were already proselytes 
familiar with the Jewish scriptures.
A brief word in conclusion, far we must 
examine another myth-theorist. That Jesus 
never existed is not really the final conclusion 
of these researches but is instead an unproven 
assumption. Robertson, Brews aad Smith began 
their investigation, as we outlined Robertson's 
on another page, with the thought of reconstruct­
ing the origin and propagation of Christianity 
apart from Jesus of Nazareth. To substantiate 
their negation of the historical figure, they 
sought parallels in the ancient world to 
resemble the events in the New Testament•
We cannot pause to refute this school of
thought in every detail. We must pass on to
>
another rayth-theorist: P. Jensen's "Das Gil- 
gameach Epos in der Weltliteratur" (1906) 
will he the subject of our next chapter. We 
shall describe how Jensen sought to negate 
the Jesus of history on archaelogical grounds, 
by comparing the stories narrated in the Gospels 
with those told of Gilgamesch. This is yet 
another use of the comparative method to 
predicate the non-existence of Jesus.
CHAPTER VI.
"JESUS AND THE ANCIENT BABYLONIAN GILGAMESCH LEGEND" 
P. JENSENfS CONSTRUCTION OF THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY.
Dr. P. Jensen, in his "Das Gilgamesch Epos in 
der Weltliterature", sees in the Jesus story a 
duplicate of the ancient Babylonian Gilgamesch 
legend. In the points of contact which he 
unearths between the stories told of Gilgamesch 
and those told of Jesus, Jensen is convinced that 
the Jesus of the Gospels is a fresh reflex of 
Gilgamesch, and that the events surrounding his 
life were directly copied from the Gilgamesch 
legend. The Babylonian epic is the sole source 
for the Jesus legend.
It is commonly acknowledged, even by the 
orthodox interpreters of the Old Testament, that 
the Hebrews borrowed their myths of creation and 
of the origin and early history of man from the 
more ancient civilisations of Babylon. The 
undoubted occurence of Babylonian myths in the 
book of Genesis has provided some less critical 
and cautious scholars with a clue, as they 
imagine, to the entire context of the Bible from 
beginning to end. It is as if the Jews, all 
through their literary history of a thousand
years, could not possibly have invented any 
myths of their own, still less have picked a 
few up elsewhere than in Babylon. Accordingly, 
in a volume of 1,030 enormous pages, P. Jensen 
has undertaken to show that the New Testament, 
no less than the Old, was derived from this 
single well-spring. Moses and Aaron, Joshua, 
Jeroboam, Rehoboam, Hadad, Jacob and Esau, Saul, 
David, Leban, Zipporah, Miriam - sister of Moses - 
Dinah, Simeon and Levi, Jethro and the Gibeonites 
and Sichemites, Sarah and Hagar, Abraham and 
Isaac, Samson, Uriah and Nathan, Naboth, Elijah 
and Elisha, Naaman, Benhadad and Hazael, Gideon, 
Abimelech, Jephthah, Tobit, Jehu, and almost any 
other personage in the Old Testament, are 
duplicates, according to him, of Gilgamesch or 
his companion the shepherd Eabani (son of Ea), 
or of the Hierodule or sacred prostitute, and of 
a few more leading figures in the Babylonian 
epic. There is hardly a stoiy in the whole of 
Jewish literature which is not, according to 
Jensen, an echo of the Gilgamesch legend; and 
every personage, every incident, is freely 
manipulated to make them fit this Procrustean 
bed. No combinations of elements separated in
the biblical texts, no separation of elements 
united, therein, no recasting of the fabric of 
a narrative, no modifications of any kind, are 
so violent as to deter Dr. Jensen. At the top 
of every page is an abstract of its argument, 
usually of this type: "Der Hirte Eabani, die
Hierodule und Gilgamesch. Der Hirte Moses, 
sein Weib und Aaron." In other words, as Moses 
was one shepherd and Eabani another, Moses is 
no other than Eabani. As there is a sacred 
prostitute in the Gilgamesch story, and a wife 
in the legend of Moses, therefore wife and 
prostitute are one and the same. As Gilgamesch 
was companion of Eabani, and Aaron of Moses, 
therefore Aaron was an alias of Gilgamesch.
Dr. Jensen is quite content with points of 
contact between the stories so few and slight as 
the above, and pursues this sort of loose 
argument over a thousand pages. Here is another 
such rubric: "Simson-Gilgamesch’s Leiche und
Saul-Gil game sob.'s Gebeine wieder ausgebraben, 
Elisa-GilgameschTs Grab geoffnet." In other 
words, Simson, or Samson, left a corpse behind 
him (who does not?): Saul's bones were piously
looked after by the Jabeshites; Elishafs bones 
raised a dead Moabite by mere contact to fresh 
life. These three figures are, therefore,
ultimately one, and that one is Gilgamesch; 
and their three stories, which have no discern­
ible features in common, are so many disguises 
of the Gilgamesch epos.
But Dr. Jensen transcends himself in the New 
Testament. "The Jesus-saga," he informs us,
"as it meets us in the Synoptic Gospels, and 
equally as it meets us in John's Gospel, stands 
out among all the other Gilgamesch Sagas which 
we have so far (i.e. in the Old Testament) 
expounded, in that it not merely follows up 
the main body of the Saga with sundry fragments 
of it, like so many stragglers, but sets before 
us a long series of bits of it arranged in the 
original order almost undisturbed."1* His 
words in German read: "Die Jesus-sage nach den
Synoptikem - wie auch die nach Johannes - 
unterscheidet sich nun aber von alien anderen 
bisher erorterten Gilgamesch-sagen dadurch, 
dass sie hinter dem Gros der Sage nicht nur 
einzelne Bruchstucke von ihr als Nachzugler 
bringt, sondem eine lange Reihe von Stucken 
der Sage in fast ungestorter ursprunglicher 
Reihenfolge," etc.
Jensen's assumption gives him cause to speak
1. Jensen, page 933
about the delusions and ignorance of Christians, 
who, for two thousand years, have been erecting 
churches and cathedrals in honour of a Jesus 
of Nazareth, who all the time was a mere alias 
of Gilgamesch.
Suppose we test some of the arguments by which 
this remarkable conclusion is reached. Let us 
begin with John the Baptist (page 811). John 
was a prophet who appeared east of the Jordan.
So was Elias or Elijah. Elijah was a hairy man 
and John wore a raiment of camel's hair; both 
of them wore leather girdles.
Now, in the Gilgamesch story, Eabani is 
covered with hair all over his body (page 579 - 
"am ganzen Leibe mit Haaren bedeckt ist").
Eabani (page 818) is a hairy man, and presume- 
ably was clad in skins ("ist ein haariger Mann 
und vermutlich mit Fellen bekleidet"). Dr. 
Jensen concludes from this that John and Elijah 
are, both of them, equally and independently, 
duplicates or understudies of Eabani. It 
never occurs to him that, in the desert, camel's 
hair was a handy material out of which to make 
a coat - as, also, leather to make girdles of - 
and that desert prophets in any story whatever 
would inevitably be represented as clad in such 
a manner. He had, indeed, heard of Jo.Weiss's
suggestion that Luke has read the LXX, and 
modelled his picture of John the Baptist on 
Elijah; but he rejects the suggestion because 
he feels - and rightly - that to make any such 
admissions must compromise his main theory, 
which is that the old Babylonian epic was the 
only source for the Evangelists. No (he writes) 
John’s girdle, like Elijah*s,came straight out 
of the Saga ("wohl durch die Sage bedingt ist") 
Nor (he adds), can Luke’s stoiy of Sarah and 
Zechariah be modelled on the Old Testament 
examples, as critics have argued. On the 
contrary, it is a fresh reflex of Gilgamesch 
("ein neues Seiteustuck"), and is copied direct 
We must not give in to the suggestion thrown 
out by modern critics that it is a later 
addition to the original evangelical tradition. 
Ear from that being so, it must be regarded as 
an integral and original constituent in the 
Jesus-saga ("So wird man zugestehen mussen, 
dass sie keine Zugabe, sondem ein inter- 
grierender Urbestandteil der Jesus - sage ist") 
From this and many similar passages, we 
realise that the view that Jesus never lived, 
but was a mere reflex of Gilgamesch, is not, 
in Jensen’s mind, a conclusion to be proved, 
but a dogma assumed as the basis of all
argument, a dogma to which we must adjust all 
our methods of inquiry. To admit any other 
sources of the Gospel story, let alone historical 
facts, would be to infringe the exclusive 
a priority, as a source, of the Babylonian epic; 
and that is why we are not allowed to argue up 
to the latrer, but only down from it. If, for 
a moment, he is ready to admit that Old Testament 
narrative coloured Luke’s birth story, and that, 
for example, the angel’s visit in the first 
chapter of Luke was suggested by the thirteenth 
chapter of Judges, he speedily takes back the 
admission. Such an assumption is not necessary 
("allein notig ist ein solche Annahme nicht").
"So much," he writes (page 818), "of John’s 
person alone." Let us now pursue the Jesus 
further.
In the Gilgamesch Epic, it is related how the 
Hunter marched out to Eabani with the holy 
prostitute, how Eabani enjoyed her, and 
afterwards proceeded with her to Erech, where, 
directly, or in his honour, a festival was held; 
how he there attached himself to Gilgamesch, and 
how kingly honours were by the latter awarded to 
him. We must by now, in a general way, assume 
on the part of our readers, a knowledge of how
these events meet us over again in the Sagas 
of the Old Testament. In the numerous 
Gilgamesch Sagas, then (of the Old Testament), 
we found again this re-encounter with the holy 
prostitute. And yet we seek it in vain in the 
three first Gospels in the exact context where 
we should find it on the supposition that they 
must embody a Gilgamesch Saga - that is to say, 
immediately subsequent to John’s emergence in 
the desert. Equally little do we find in this 
context any reflex of Eabani’s entry into the 
city of Erech, all agog at the moment with a 
festival. On the other hand, we definitely 
find, in its original position, an echo of
p
Gilgamesch’s meeting with Eabani." *
This passage in German reads accordingly:
"So weit von Johannis Person Allein.
Verfolgen wire num die Jesus-Sage weiter.
Im Gilgamesch Epos wird erzahlt, wie zu 
Eabani in der Wuste der Jager mit der Hierodule 
hinauszieht, wie Eabani ihrer habe geniesst, 
und dann mit ihr nach Erech kommt, wo grade 
oder ihm zu Ehre ein Fest gefeiert wird, wie 
er sich dort an Gilgamesch anschliesst und 
ihn durch Diesen Konigliche Ehren zuteil 
werden. Welche Metamorphosen diese Geschehnisse 
in den Sagen des alten Testaments erlebt haben, 
darf jetzt in der Hauptsache als bekannt 
vorausgesetzt werden. In zahlreichen
2. Jensen, p.818
Gilgamesch Sagen fanden wire nun die Begegnung 
mit der Hierodule wider. Aber vergeblich 
suchen wir sie dort in den drei ersten Evangelien, 
wo ihr Platz ware, falls diese etwa eine 
Gilgamesch-Sage enthalten sollten, namlich 
unmittelbar hinter Johannis Auftreten in der 
Wuste. Ebenso wenig finden wire an dieser Stella 
etwa einen Reflex von Eabani ’s Einzug in das 
festlich erregte Erech. Wohl dagegen treffen
wir an urspunglicher Stelle ein Wiederhall von
2
Gilgamesch’s Begegnung mit Eabani."
Let us pause a moment and take stock of the 
above. In the epic, two heroes we et each other 
in a desert. John and Jesus also meet in a 
desert; therefore, so argues Jensen, John and 
Jesus are reproductions of the heroes in 
question, and neither of them ever lived. It 
matters nothing that neither John nor Jesus was
a Nimrod. This encounter of Gilgamesch and 
Eabani was, as Jensen reminds us, the model of 
every Old Testament story in which two males 
happen to meet in a desert; therefore it must 
have been the model of the evangelists also 
when they concocted their story of John and 
Jesus meeting in the wilderness. But how 
about the prostitute; and how about the entry 
into Erech? How are these lacunae of the 
Gospel story to be filled in? Jensen’s
2. Jensen, p.818
solution is remarkable; be finds the encounter 
with the prostitute to have been the model on 
which the fourth evangelist contrived his story 
of Jesus1 visit to Martha and Mary. For that 
evangelist, like the synoptical ones, had the 
Gilgamesch Saga stored already in his 
escritoire, and finding that his predecessors 
had omitted the prostitute he hastened to fill 
up the lacuna, and doubled her into Martha and 
Mary. In this and many other respects, so we 
are assured by Jensen, the fourth evangelist 
reproduces the Gilgamesch epic more fully and 
systematically than the other evangelists, and 
on that account we must assign to John’s 
setting of the life of Christ a certain 
preference and priority. He is truer to the 
only source there was for any of it. The other 
lacuna of the Synoptic Gospels is the feasting 
in Erech and Eabani’s entry amid general feasting 
into that city. The corresponding episode in 
the Gospels, we ^re assured, is the triumphant 
entry of Jesus into Jerusalem, which the Fourth 
Gospel, again hitting the right nail on the head, 
sets at the beginning of Jesus’ ministry, and 
not at its end. But what, we still ask, is the 
Gospel counterpart to the honours heaped by 
Gilgamesch. on Eabani? How dull we are! "The
baptism of Jesus by John must, apart from other 
considerations, have arisen out of the fact that 
Eabani, after his arrival at Gilgamesch*s palace, 
is by him allotted kingly honours." ^ The 
German reading: "Jesu Taufe durch Johannes
ware sonst auch daraus geworden, dass Eabani, 
nach dem er an Gilgamesch’s Hof gelangt ist, 
durch Diesen Koniglicher Ehren teilhaft wird."
So then Eabani, who, as a hairy man, was 
John the Baptist, is now, by a turn of Jensen's 
kaleidoscope, metamorphosed into Jesus, for it 
is John who did Jesus the honour of baptising 
him. Conversely, Gilgamesch, who began as 
Jesus, is now suddenly turned into John. In 
fact, Jesus-Gilgamesch and John-Eabani have 
suddenly changed places with one another, in 
accordance, I suppose, with the rule of 
interpretation, somewhere laid down by Hugo 
Winchler, that in astral myths one hero is apt 
to change with another, not only his stage 
properties, but his personality. But fresh 
surprises are in store for Jensen’s readers.
Over scores of pages he has argued that John 
the Baptist is no other than Eabani, because he 
so faithfully fulfills over again the role of 
the Eabanis we meet with in the Old Testament. 
For example, according to Luke (1, 15, and 
VII, 33), John drinks no wine, and is, therefore,
3« Ibid., p.820.
a Nazirean, who eschews wine and forbears to cut 
his hair. Therein he resembles Absolom, who, 
as an Eabani, had at least an upper growth of 
hair. And as the Eabani of the Epic, with the 
long head-hair of a woman, drinks water along 
with the wild beasts in the desert, and as 
Eabani, in company with these beasts, feeds on 
grass and herbs alone, so, at any rate according 
to Luke, John ate no bread.
Imagine the reader’s consternation when, after 
these convincing demonstrations of John’s 
identity with Eabani, and of his consequent 
non-historicity, he finds him a hundred pages 
later on altogether eliminated - as from the 
Gilgamesch Epic, so from the Gospel. Eor the 
difficulty suddenly arises before Dr. Jensen’s 
mind that John the Baptist, being mentioned by 
Josephus, must after all have really lived; 
but if he lived, then he cannot have been a 
mere reflex of Eabani. Had he only consulted 
Dr. Drew’s work on the "Witnesses to the 
Historicity of Jesus" (English translation, 
page 190), he would have known that "the John 
of the Gospels" is no other than "The Babylonian 
Oannes, Joannes, or Hanni, the curiously-shaped 
creature, half fish and half man, who, according 
to Berosus, was the first law-giver and inventor
of letters and founder of civilisation, and 
who rose every morning from the waves of the 
Red Sea in order to instruct men as to his 
real spiritual nature.11 ^
Why could not Dr# Jensen consult Dr# Drew 
’hs to the real spiritual nature" of John the 
Baptist? Why not consult Robertson, who 
overwhelms Josephus’s inconvenient testimony 
to the reality of John the Baptist with the 
customary "suspicion of interpolation." But 
Jensen appears to lack their resourcefulness, 
and is able to discover no other way out of 
his impasse than to suppose that it was 
originally Lazarus and not John that had a 
place in his Gilgamesch Epic, and that some 
ill-natured editor of the Gospels, for reasons 
he alone can divine, everywhere struck out the 
name of Lazarus, and inserted in place of it that 
of John the Baptist, which he found in the works 
of Josephus. Such are the possibilities of 
Gospel re-act ion as Jensen understands them.
One more example of Dr. Jensen’s system - 
in the Gospel, Jesus, finding himself on one 
occasion surrounded by a larger throng of 
people than was desirable, took a boat in 
order to get away from the crowd, and passed 
across the lake on the shore of which he had 
been preaching and ministering to the sick.
4. Drews, Arthur, "Witnesses to the Historicity 
of Jesud", p.190.
The incident is a commonplace enough one, but 
nothing is too slight and unimportant for Dr. 
Jensen to detect in it a Gilgamesch parallel, 
and accordingly he writes thus of it: "As for
Xisuthros, so for Jesus, a boat is lying ready, 
nnd like Xisuthros and Jonas, Jesus "flees" in 
a boat." ^ The German reading:- "Wie fur 
Xisuthros, liegt fur Jesus ein Schiff bereit, 
und, wie Xisuthros und Jonas, ’flieht’ Jesus in 
ein Schiff." Xisuthros is the name of the flood- 
hero in Berosus. Hardly a single one of the 
parallels which crowd the thousand pages of 
Jensen’s writing is less flimsy than the above. 
Without doing more violence to texts and to 
probabilities, one could prove that Achilles 
and Patroclus and Helen, Aeneas and Achates 
and Dido, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza and 
-^ulcinea, were all of them so many understudies 
of Gilgamesch, Eabani and his temple salve.
How shall we evaluate this - yet another 
attempt to negate the historical Jesus? ]%ch 
of what was said about Robertson, Smith and 
Drews applies to the work of Jensen. In brief, 
we shall summarise what to us appears to be the 
weaknesses of Jensen’s effort. (l) Dp. Jensen 
has not troubled himself to acquire any 
knowledge of modem textual criticism. He has
5* Jensen, p.838
no sense of the differences of idea and style 
which divide the Fourth from the earlier 
Gospels, and he lacks all insight into the 
development of the Gospel tradition. He takes 
Christian documents out of their historical 
context and ignores their dependence on the 
Judasism of the period B.C. 100 to A.D. 100.
He has no understanding of the prophetic, 
Messianic and Apocalyptic aspects of early 
Christianity, no sense of its intimate 
relations with the beliefs and opinions which 
lie before us in the apocryphs like the Book 
of Enoch, the Fourth Esdras, the Ascent of 
Isaiah, the Testaments of the Patriarchs.
He does not realise that in the four Gospels 
he has before him successive stages or layers 
of stratification of Christian tradition, and 
he accordingly, like Robertson, Smith and Drews, 
treats them as a single literary block, of which 
every part is of the same age and evidential 
value. Like his Gilgamesch Epic, the Gospels, 
for all he knows about them, might have been 
dug up only yesterday among the sands of 
Mesopotamia, instead of being the work of a 
sect with which, as early as the end of the
first century, we are fairly well acquainted. 
Never once does Jensen ask himself how the 
authors of the New Testament came to have the 
Gilgamesh Epic at the tips of their tongues, 
exactly‘in the form in which he translates it 
from Babylonian tablets incised 2,000 years 
before Christ. By what channels did it reach 
them? Why were they at such pains to transform 
it into the story of a Galilean Messiah 
crucified by the Roman Governor of Judaea?
And, as Paul and Peter, like everyone else 
named in the book, are duplicates of Gilgamesch 
and Eabani, where are we to draw the line of 
intersection between heaven and earth? Where 
fix the year in which the early Christians 
ceased to be myths and became mere men and 
women?
Implicit in these remarks is the misuse of the 
comparative method by Jensen. The slightest 
resemblance and similarity of detail is lifted 
from its context and made to explain an event 
or person.
Jensenfs survey of the origins of Christianity 
has one thing in common with Bauer, Kautsky, 
Robertson, Drews and Smith, namely, after 
reading his account we need some explanation of
his explanation. If there are many passages 
in the New Testament, such as the Revelation of 
St. John and the Second Coming passages, which 
are mysterious and esoteric, the reader has not 
become fully acquainted with esotericism or 
abstruse writing -until he has pursued the 
voluminous writings of these men.
We have sought in these chapters, called by 
us "the Christ-Myth theorists", to describe the 
account of the origin of the Christian message 
by men who initially rejected the historicity of 
Jesus of Nazareth. While we have not proposed 
to treat these const mictions in a n y  chronological 
manner, nor have we endeavoured to refute their 
arguments on biblical, textual and theological 
grounds, we have undertaken this aspect of our 
general discussion - The development of ’myth* 
and ’history* from Hegel to Bultaann to relate 
the movement away from history which began, 
at least for our thesis, with Hevelian 
philosophy. Our general theme has been the 
priority of idea as opposed to the mere fact in 
the Hegelians and the Christ-myth theorists.
In our next section we shall be concerned with 
the mere fact as opposed to the idea. The 
reaction to the recoil from history began in
the middle of the 19th century in the search 
of the historical Jesus. The systematic 
formulation of the quest for factual data and 
the anti-metaphysical ideas was given by 
Albrecht Ritschl and his disciples at the turn 
of the 19th century.
PART TWO
THE RETURN TO HISTORY.
CHAPTER I.
"THE Q.UEST OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS"
Between Strauss1 first "Life of Jesus" in 
1835 and the Ritschlian theological school in 
the latter part of the century, the so-called 
liberal Jesus picture was drawn by innumerable 
theologians, historians and religious novelista 
Possibly one way of showing the many-sided 
contours of this picture is to list a few of the 
books which were published during that interval 
and to select from them some general themes and 
presuppositions. From these titles we may 
discern some of the obvious assumptions and 
perceive some overall impression of the 
reactions which were made to Hegelianism by 
these writers. Strauss’ "Popular Life of 
Jesus for the German People" in 1864- set the 
stage for the many efforts at constructing the 
Life of Jesus when the legendary and mythical 
aspects of that picture were eliminated. Such 
works as: Theodore Keim’s "The Human Develop­
ment of Jesus" (1861); Hughes’, "The Manliness 
of Christ" (1879); Newman’s, "Hebrew Jesus" 
(1895); Tschern’s "The Man Jesus"; Wienel’s 
"Jesus, a man, not the Son of God, a Challenge
to the false Christianity of the Churches"; 
Blatchford’s "Altruism: Christ’s Glorious 
Gospel of Love against Man’s Dismal Science 
of Greed" (1898); Ghillany’s, "Theological 
Letters to the Cultural Classes of the German 
People"; and the many books entitled, "The 
Life of Jesus", and the innumerable works on 
the Synoptic tradition and the Synoptic Problem • 
Each, in their separate and often similar ways, 
depicted the historical Jesus in terms of the 
problems, social, theological and psychological 
which were foremost in the era. These "Lives 
of Jesus", according to Schweitzer, were 
composed with a rationalistic bias. "The 
bias leads them (the writers) to project back 
into history what belongs to their own time, 
the eager struggle of the modem religious 
spirit with the spirit of Jesus, and seek, in 
history, justification and authority for its 
beginning. The consequence is that it creates 
the historical Jesus in its own image, so that 
it is not the modern spirit influenced by the 
spirit of Jesus, but the Jesus of Nazareth 
constructed by modem historical theology, 
that is set to work upon our race."'*'* Comment­
ing on the Jesus which was created by the
1. Schweitzer, Albert, "Quest of the Historical 
Jesus", page 311•
liberals after their own likeness, in their own 
image, Schweitzer writes: "What is admitted as
historic is just what the spirit of the time 
can take out of the records in order to assimilate
p
to itself and bring out of it a living form.” * 
One German scholar, Frenssen, betrayed the secret 
of his perspective when he confidently super­
scribes the narrative drawn from the latest 
critical investigations with the title "The 
Life of the Saviour portrayed according to German 
research as the basis for a spiritual re-birth 
of the German Nation."^* Another commentator 
on those liberal portraits - one who was led 
to question and deny the historicity of Jesus - 
says: "Jesus has been made the receptacle into
lL
which eveiy theologian pour his own ideal." * 
Examples of this sort of reading into history 
one’s own assumptions and being convinced that 
the figures and events - in this instance those 
in the New Testament - portray their own concerns 
and mirror their own ideals, is not a modem 
device, nor is it necessarily liberal. The 
conservative interpretation of the Bible ha$ 
to use Tillich’s terminology, always practiced 
^this "jumping over"^view of history. That is
2. Ibid., p. 307.
3* Ibid., p. 307.
4. Kalthoff, "The Rise of Christianity”, p.37*
5* Tillich, Paul, "Advanced lectures in Systematic
Theology", p. 205, from 
stenographic copy compiled by 
Peter John, 1954.
to say, many interpreters, regardless of their 
theological persuasions, have sought to see in 
Jesus the things which mirror their own 
temperaments, e.g. the meek, mild and gentle 
Jesus of the Pietists and the superman of Billy 
Graham. But, the liberals in the 19th century, 
on the basis of their use of historical science, 
attempted to get hehind the Apostolic, Evangel­
istic picture to the "factual" Jesus. Once 
behind the "Christ of dogma", these writers 
attempted to reconstruct the Jesus of history 
in some biographical detail.
We cannot hope to elucidate the investigation 
of the historical Jesus from Strauss to Ritschl 
and we are not concerned to trace the various 
portraits of Jesus which emerged, e.g. Ethical 
Reformer, the Johannine Christ, the Synoptic 
Jesus, Renan’s Romantic Jesus, the Spiritualised 
Christ of Strauss and Schleiermacher. Our 
primary interest in these decades broadly 
covering the years between Strauss’ "Popular 
Life of Jesus for the German People" (1864), and 
Ritschl’s "Justification and Reconciliation" 
(1870 - 1874, translated into English by 
H.R. Mackintosh in 1900), and into the first
decades of the twentieth century, is the 
discernible return to history, at least to 
one interpretation of the historical. We can 
describe this interpretation by pointing out 
some of the guiding predispositions of the 
writers.
These years, according to Schweitzer who 
has sketched the "Lives of Jesus" in his classic 
"The Quest of the Historical Jesus", were a 
period of historical experiment instead of a 
period of historical research. In these 
"’Lives of Jesus’...a series of experiments 
repeated with constantly varying modifications 
suggested by the results furnished by the 
subsidiary sciences."^* Tentative hypotheses 
and arbitrary, sometimes violent conclusions, 
e.g. Bauer, Kalthoff, Kautsky and others in 
the early twentieth century, were postulated.
What then are some of the principles upon 
which these liberal Jesus-pictures were drawn.
(1) Schweitzer points out that the historical 
investigation of the life of Jesus did not 
take its rise from a purely historical interest. 
These investigations turned to the Jesus of 
History as an ally in the struggle against the 
tyranny of dogma. Christianity must, according 
to these interpretors, be emancipated from rigid
6. Schweitzer, op.cit., p.9*
foms and petrified expressions before it could 
be made intelligible in an age when men were 
no longer influenced by the first century world­
view. The liberation from forms, and the 
consequent efforts to make the message of the 
New Testament intelligible to the modem mind, 
constituted the guiding principles during the 
period. Weinel’s book, "Jesus, a man, not the 
Son of God: A Challenge to the False Christianity 
of the Churches", has these words in the title 
page: "The activity of love - not the
absurdities of Creed." These studies in the 
life of Jesus and into his teaching and 
activities "were eager to picture Him as truly 
and purely human, to strip him of the robes of 
splendour with which he had been apparelled,
and clothe him once more with the coarse
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garments in which He had walked in Galilee."
The supernatural halo which had surrounded
Jesus must be removed before the human,
historical Jesus could be appreciated.
(2) This humanising or historising process, 
called by one critic of the liberals, "the
O
Humanitarian Christ", developed their portraits 
on the lines that a reliable knowledge of the 
life of Jesus could be discovered in the Gospel
7. Ibid., p. 4-5*
8. Warfield, "The Person and Work of Christ",
page, 135•
of St. Mark. This Gospel, considered to he the 
earliest formulation of the tradition concerning 
the acts and teachings of Jesus, was designed, 
according to £hese inteipretors, to set forth a 
definite view of the course of development of 
the public ministry of Jesus. The historical 
critic, it was believed, without imposing 
psychological connections in the Second Gospel 
or psychological explanation of motives which 
guided the Evangelist in his writing, could 
discover in j?he simple outline the main 
divisions in the course of Jesus’ ministry.
By sifting the events in the text, excluding - 
on naturalistic grounds and scientific 
determinations,- the supernatural embellishments, 
the historical kernel of the life could be 
recovered. The picture thus drawn on the basis 
of the Marcan data was regarded as the picture 
of the unmistakeable historical Jesus in 
distinction from the Christ of the Dogmas. Each 
critic of the sources in the New Testament 
retains whatever portion of the traditional 
sayings which can be fitted into his cnnstruction 
of the facts and his conception of the historical 
possibility, and rejects the rest.
(3) These liberal reconstructions of the
historical Jesus were influenced by the social 
ideas of their time. There was, so to speak, 
a liberal joy in culture and a robust optimism 
associated with learning and the products of 
an age alligned with romanticism. In this 
era there was an emphasis placed on the Christ 
which appeared not in the extraordinary, but 
in the common, in the daily life of the family, 
in the integrity of trade, and in the peace of 
nations. The increase of justice and truth, 
of knowledge and love, the diminution of 
suffering and disease, of ignorance and greed 
and the living for others, were some of the 
characteristic patterns of the middle and late 
nineteenth century. The spirit of the age was 
discovered in the New Testament Jesus, and 
each interpretor of Jesus created Him in 
accordance with his own character. That is 
to say, the Jenus that was discovered behind 
the affirmations in the Synoptic Gospels was 
more of a reflection of the men discovering 
this Jesus than it was of the figure of Jesus.
(4) Weinel’s chapter in his "Jesus in the 
Nineteenth Century" - entitled "Jesus as 
Preacher of Reform" - points to another
principle championed by the liberal interpretors 
of Jesus, namely the ethico-religious emphasis 
which was discovered in Jesus1 preaching. The 
purpose of Jesus, according to this ethicising 
of the sources, is to establish a community of 
which His disciples are to be the foundation, 
and, by means of this community, to bring about 
the coming of the Kingdom of God. In the moral 
organisation of mankind, through action from the 
motive of love, the Kingdom of God, as this 
Kingdom was lived and taught by Jesus, became 
one of the primary emphases in the nineteenth 
century. The historical Jesus which was 
rediscovered desired only to be a reformer, the 
spiritual deliverer of the people of God, to 
realise upon earth the Kingdom of God which 
they were all seeking in the beyond, and to 
extend the reign of God over all nations.
From Jesus1 teachings on the Kingdom of God, 
these nineteenth century interpretors inferred 
an ethical portrait of Jesus. His personality 
was to be known through his deeds and actions, 
moreover, as we will note in the Ritschlians, 
the Christology of these liberal Lives of Jesus 
was characterised by the emphases laid upon
Jesus’ faithfulness under suffering, and by his 
obedience and fidelity to his ethical vocation.
The Deity of Jesus is to be derived from the 
goodness and value to be disnemed in His historic 
manhood. The primary basic reality is the man 
Jesus, His relation towards other men, His effect 
and power upon them, is what is considered to be 
His Godhead.
(5) Still another guiding principle in these 
interpretors concerns what Schweitzer has called 
the a priori "natural" psychology which governed 
their interpretation of the Jesus which was
discovered behind the Apostolic witness or
9
Eergyma. ’ Bringing to bear on the narratives 
which did not stipulate motives or connect 
events (their) psychological tools, these men 
attempted to give some historical unity to the 
Marcan account. Schweitzer illustrates what he 
terms this modem psychologising process by 
taking many incidents from the New Testament 
which were used by these "liberal psychologists."^* 
We shall attempt to illustrate the general 
pattern which Schweitzer accuses them of imposing 
upon the New Testament narratives. These 
reconstructionists associated an a priori view 
of the development of Jesus in the Marcan accou nt.
9* Schweitzer, Albert, "Quest of the Historical Jesus 
10. Schweitzer, Op.cit., p.212.
His ministry was sharply divided between the 
periods of success and failure. In the earlier 
part of His ministry, it was believed that He 
endeavoured in Galilee to found the Kingdom of 
God in an ideal sense; that he concealed His 
consciousness of being the Messiah, which was 
constantly growing more assured, until His 
followers should have attained by inner 
enlightenment to a higher view of the Kingdom 
of God and of the Messiah; that almost at the 
end of His Galilean ministry He declared Himself 
to them as the Messiah at Caesarea Philippi; 
that on the same occasion He at once began to 
picture to them a suffering Messiah, whose 
lineaments gradually became more and more 
distinct in His mind amid the growing opposition 
which He encountered, until, finally, He 
communicated to His disciples His decision to 
put the Messianic cause to the test in the 
capital, and that they followed Him thither and 
saw how His fate fulfilled itself. Concerning 
the periodical flights and retirements of Jesus 
and His Disciples, another "liberal" 
psychologist, Keim, decides for Mark why Jesus 
fled on these occasions. While the Evangelists
are silent on the motive for these retirements 
and leave us to suppose that Jesus made His 
journeys to Caesar', a Fhilippi and the neighbour­
hood of Tyre and Sidon in the middle of winter 
from mere pleasure in travel, or for the 
extension of the Gospel, and that He made His 
last journey to Jerusalem without any external 
necessity, Keim and ohters'seek to fill in the 
picture for us- Keim writes: "Jesus fled
because He desired to preserve Himself for 
God and man, to secure the continuance of His 
ministry to Israel, to defeat as long as 
possible the dark designs of His enemies, to 
carry His cause to Jerusalem, and there, while 
acting - as it was His duty to do - with 
prudence and foresight in his relations with 
men, to recognise clearly, by the Divine 
silence or the Divine action, what the Divine 
purpose really was which could not be recognised 
in a moment. He acts like a man who knows the 
duty both of examination and action, who knows 
His own worth and what is due to Him and His 
obligations towards God and man."^* Schweitzer 
says that "the net result, from the historical 
point of view, of the study of the life of Jesus
11. Ibid., p.212.
in the P o s t-Straus si an period...is the recognition 
that the natural psychology is not here the 
historical psychology, but that the latter must
IP
he deduced from certain historical data."
But Schweitzer, who we shall not he concerned 
with, has his own a priori scheme. He believes 
that, before the advent of eschatology, critical 
theology was, in the last resort, without a 
principle of discrimination, since it possessed 
no reagent capable of infallibly separating out 
modern ideas on the one hand, and genuinely 
ancient New Testament ideas on the other. Amos 
Wilder, among others, has offered a profound 
critique of Schweitzer’s scheme in his excellent­
ly written "Ethics and Eschatology in the New 
Testament"
We may conclude our intorductory chapter by 
pointing again to the central purpose of these 
writers. Summarily speaking, they attempted to 
disengage that which is abiding and eternal in 
the life and personality of Jesus from the non- 
essentials. Weary of speculation and distrust­
ful of traditional ways of expressing the 
significance of Jesus, these men were intent 
on unearthing the "real" and the "genuine"
12. Ibid., p.221.
stratum in the New Testament. With the tools 
of historical and psychological science and the 
enlightened, optimistic world view of the 
nineteenth century, these men believed that the 
Christian faith could defend itself in the 
"courts of Caesar" if the original, initial 
historical "facts" of the faith were made plain. 
The facts behind the records, behind the symbols 
of his reception as the Christ, were diligently 
sought. On the basis of these empirical facts, 
the "Life of Jesus" was sketched.
While the history of these attempts to write 
a "Life of Jesus", has been elaborated and 
criticised by Albert Schweitzer in his early 
work, "The Quest of the Historical Jesus", these 
efforts, while not producing the desired result, 
did prepare the way for modem theology. Accord­
ing to one interpretor of the modem theological 
scene, "The present situation in Christology is 
one which could not have emerged before the 
’Jesus of history* movement, but only after
H Z
it." D.M. Bail lie proceeds to elaborate the 
essential gain of "the rediscovery of the Jesus 
of history" movement. While contemporary 
theologians may "wish to repudiate as hopelessly
13* Baillie, D.M. "God Was in Christ", p.9*
inadequate the account of Jesus given by the 
’liberal Protestants* or the ’modernists* of 
a generation ago, and may even complain that 
these myssed the truth by reason of their 
prejudice against admitting the ’supernatural*.... 
now the belief in the full humanity of Christ 
has come into its own, and, if this new 
realisation was part of ’the rediscovery of the 
Jesus of history*, it has not passed away with 
the passing of that particular movement, but 
lives on in the work of those ’catholic* and 
’dialectical* schools to which the theology of
1 h
that movement is most uncongenial." * Bail lie 
illustrates the ways in which the full humanity 
of Jesus has left behind the cruder forms of 
docetism and monophysitism. While contemporary 
theologians may quarrel with the ’liberal* view 
of history, and their Christological biases, 
they can no longer minimise the humanity of 
Jesus who was confessed to be the Christ.
In the next four chapters, we shall be concerned 
to sketch the theological formulation of the 
"quest of the historical Jesus" in the Ritschlians. 
The so-called Ritschlian system of thinking was 
centered in the teaching of Albrecht Ritschl,
14. Ibid., p.11-12.
who was horn at Breslau on March 21, 1922 and 
died as Professor of Theology at Gottingen on 
March 28, 1880. It was not until 1870-1873 
that his important work on Justification and 
Reconciliation (Die christliche Lehre von der 
Rechtfertigung und Versohnung), was published, 
and it was not long after that his reputation 
as an able and independent thinker was 
established. He speedily gathered around 
himself a group of attached disciples who became 
known as the school of Ritschl, even although 
they did not follow their "master" all the way.
Of the theologians who may be classed as the 
"School of Titschl”, the following is a list of 
the outstanding, ones:
1. W. Herrmann in Marburg.
Works.
(1) Die Religion im Verhaltniss zum Welterkennen
und zur Sittlichkeit, 1879*
(2) Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott, 2nd edition
1892 (1st edition 1886, English Translation 
of 2nd Edition 1895)*
2. Julius Kaftan in Berlin.
Works.
(1) Das Wesen der Christ, Religion, 1881 (2nd 
edition 1888).
(2) Die Wahrheit d. Christ;. Religion, 1889 
(English Translation 2 Vols. 1894).
3. A. Hamack in Berlin.
Works.
(1) Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 2nd Edition
1888-1890. (1st. Edition 1887-1889;
English Translation of 3rd Edition 1897).
£2) Grundriss d. Dogmengeschichte, 2 vols.,
1889-1891• English Translation 1893*
4. H. Schultz in Gottingen.
Works.
(1) Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi, 1881.
(2) Altestamentliche Theologie, 3rd Edition
1889; English Translation, 2 Vols., 1092.
5* J. Weiss (Ritschl's son-in-law) in Marburg. 
Works.
(1) Die Fredigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, 1892.
(2) Die Nachfolge Christi und die Predigt der
Gegenwart, 1893*
We note from the titles of the above works their 
concern for the Kingdom of God, one of the primary 
Ritschlian emphases. Other names to be included 
in the list would be Lobstein, in Strassburg; 
Haring and Gottschick, in Tubingen; Troeltsch, 
in Heidelberg; Sell, in Bonn; A.C. McGiffert in
New York. In order to show how varied the 
departments of interest of these men are, it will 
he interesting to notice: Hamack and McGiffert
with Church History and History of Doctrine;
Schultz with Old Testament Theology, Wendt with 
New Testament Theology; Troeltsch with Christian 
and Social Ethich; etc.
Obviously, we cannot investigate each Ritschlian 
theologian in the limits set in our essay. Many 
interpreters of Ritschlian Theology, e.g. James 
Orr, Alfred Garvie, Albert Swing, John Mozley, 
Leonhard Stahlin, Ernest Edghill, have performed 
this task for us. We shall be concerned with 
four Ritschlians: Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm
Herrmann, Ernst Troeltsch and Otto Pfleiderer.
The last two thinkers, while reacting against 
many of the Ritschlian emphases, may be said to 
form a bridge between the 19th and20th centuries. 
Our primary theme, beyond discussing the "theory 
of Knowledge" which Ritschl elaborated, is the 
interpretation of history in the Ritschlian school. 
Their interpretation of history will unfold in 
our discussion, and in our evaluations of each 
theologian we will attempt to focus the points 
which bear upon their view of history and the 
historical Jesus.
CHAPTER II.
THE THEOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL.
1• Introduction•
While the post-Hegelians, left and right, were 
interpreting Christianity along the dialictical 
lines set by their master, leading eventually to 
a negation of the historical Jesus and a 
dehistorisation of the narratives, there were 
others during the century, as we have intimated 
in our last chapter, who were concentrating on 
the teachings of Jesus, in particular the ethical 
aspects of His message, including a decided 
predelection for the synoptic portraits in contrast 
to the theological, speculative pictures in the 
Eourth Gospel, the letters of Paul and the Epistle 
to the Hebrews. While these ethical portraits 
and innumerable "Lives of Jesus" were inventive 
and imaginative in their efforts to recapture 
the personality of Jesus and the initial fac^s 
of the Christian Gospel, it was not until the 
latter half of the century in the Ritschlian 
school that the historical approach inaugurated 
in these diffuse writings received some systematic 
treatment. Because the Ritschlians, commonly 
called for their generic methods and aims in
theology, considered the historical revelation 
in Jesus of Nazareth to be the central datum of 
theology, it is to their positions which we turn 
for the culmination of the thinking of the 
period.
The school of Ritschl, or the theological and 
epistomological methods associated with Albrecht 
Ritschl, Hermann, Kaftan and Hamack, was a 
reactionary, corrective theological movement. 
Their views, especially the thought of the 
theologian whose name has been given to the 
school, were always stated in opposition to the 
positions elaborated by their predecessors and 
contemporaries. As with every type of corrective 
theology, even those in our own day, e.g. Barth 
and R. Niebuhr, the ideas enunciated were born 
in the heat of controversy. Inconsistency, 
continual vacillation and restatement will 
characterise the men under discussion. John 
Mozley, an interpretor of Ritschl’s theology, 
makes this point in his book, "Ritschlianism, 
an Essay" - "What often makes Ritschlfs 
theology so difficult is that it is constructed 
in opposition to rival views and is continually 
determined by polemical motives. Hence arises 
contradictions sometimes of a glaring nature, 
and his positive thought is hard to grasp."1'
1. Mozley, John, "Ritschlianism, an Essay" - p.42.
Moreover, along with these correctives, it 
must he remembered that the theological ideas 
under observation "broke fresh ground", as it 
were. Paced with the challenge of scientism 
and speculative idealism, these men sought a 
resuscitation of thefaith which would prove 
adequate to these danger. While exercising 
restraint and fairness in our explications of 
the "Ritschlian" motifs, our primary concern 
will be to discover their interpretation of 
history. But, as Ritschl does not develop this 
interpretation to any appreciable degree in his 
writings, it will be necessary for us to search 
out his interpretation. We have chosen to 
facilitate our primary enquiry by developing 
Ritschl’s methodological approach to the 
Christian message, including his theory of 
cognition and value judgments. After we have 
set the stage for Ritschl’s theological system, 
we shall consider his treatment of the Person 
and Life-Work of Jesus the Christ. His approach 
to history will, at certain points, be observed, 
and the last section of our essay will be devoted 
to drawing together his conception of history.
We have said the Ritschlian school was a
corrective position. What sort of corrective 
was thought necessary, and upon what lines did 
the restatement take? Essentially, the men 
connected with this school sought to offset the 
intellectualism of the Hegelians - to break the 
yoke which hitherto bound philosophy and 
theology together. If theology was to do its 
proper work, it must be freed from the chains 
which its union with philosophy had cast around 
it, and to bid it go forth free and independent.
The philosophical subtleties and alien 
principles introduced into theological writing 
constituted the greatest stumbling block. 
Describing their common aim, H.R. Macintosh 
remarks: "Back to the New Testament by way of
the reformation - this is the motto that guides
p
him (Ritschl) steadily." * These men desired a 
Gospel, a Jesus freed from idealism, Hellenic 
philosophical categories and metaphysical 
abstractions. The traditional "two nature theory", 
vague mystical absorptions and ecclesiastical 
terminology had stifled the Christ. A ground of 
certainty in religion which should be independent 
of , and unassailable by, all critical theories 
and metaphysical speculations constituted the 
principle drive of the school. "The religious
2. Macintosh, H.R. "Types of Theology" - p.139.
instinct," according to one interpretor of 
Ritschlianism, "refusing to be stilled, yearned 
for a satisfaction in a region where reason 
could not intrude with its questionings, nor 
science enter with its doubts."^* Natural 
science and empirical methods were driving out 
belief in the supernatural. The philosophical 
solutions were varied and essentially inadequate 
to the strains which had been placed on faith 
through the antagonism between supernaturalism 
and rationalism, between faith and science.
The type of certainty which the Ritschlians made 
it their task to offer would make the Christian 
independent of these extraneous difficulties.
The certainty of faith springs immediately out 
of experience of the revelation of God in Christ. 
Herrmann, probably the finest theologian of the 
group, writes of the immediate impression of 
Christ on the soul in the following manner:
"Our certainty of God is rooted in the simple 
fact that in Jesus we meet with a man who must 
hold His own against the world. For he who 
experiences such a compulsion through the image 
of Jesus that he is obliged to concede to Him 
this dignity, receives with this at the same
3. Orr, James, "Ritschlianism, Expository and 
Critical Essays" - P*7*
time the thought of a Power over all things, 
which is not otherwise actuated than through 
the disposition from which the life-work of 
Jesus has proceeded. God gives Himself to us 
to be recognised as this Power which is with 
Jesus. But then we are compelled to say that 
the existence of Jesus in our world is that 
fact through which God so touches us that He
h
opens up intercourse with us." #
Faith in the God revealed in the Son being 
immediate is also free from historical 
criticism, viz. establishment of the genuineness 
and historicity of the records before faith in 
Christ was possible. This freedom is articulated 
in Herrmann's greatest book, "Communion of the 
Christian with God". He writes: "The doubt
whether the image of Jesus which works on us in 
the Gospel belongs to legend and not to history 
is forthwith excluded. The evidence of the 
historical reality of Jesus always rests for the 
believer upon the significance which the knowledge 
of Jesus has won from him. Only after this has 
been taken to heart as an indubitable fact of his 
life does that which testifies for the historical 
reality of Jesus stand out clear and visible
4. Herrmann, Vtfilhelm, "The Communion of the 
Christian with God" -p31•
before him...A judgment resting on grounds of 
historical investigation could only claim 
probability. But to Christian faith it is 
certain that Jesus has lived as the man who, 
with His message of a Kingdom of God, has 
opened to men the possibility of an eternal 
life, and who, at the same time, was conscious 
that the existence of His Person in its life 
and death will realise this Kingdom of God for 
all who do not pass Him by."-'*
This immediate encounter with Christ, free 
from historical criticism, even from mystical 
Bpeculations, will be the centre of our survey 
of Ritschlian theology in a later context. The 
factuality of the revelation in Christ forms 
the supposed groundwork of the Ritschlian approach 
and, yet, the authenticity of these "facts’* or 
their understanding of the "evangelical facts” 
does not seem to impair their approach. But, 
before this paradox can be considered, we must 
pass to another certainty in religious things - 
a certainty which Ritschl would have us believe 
is a prerequisite for understanding even the 
revelation in Christ. This assurance is derived 
from his metholology: a method of approach to
religious truth which is concerned with how we
5• Ibid., p. 72.
443.
know what we know. The epistomological canon 
of the school, adopted from Kant and Lotze, 
says that we know things exclusively as they are 
for us in their effects, not as they are in 
themselves. On the basis of the predicates, the 
effects and signs, we speak of the subject which 
lies behind the phenomena. Theoretical knowledge 
of the numenon, viz. G-od-in-Himself, via 
idealistic speculations or scholastic proofs for 
his existence, are unwarranted.
While this is one way of describing the 
"Ritschlian method", other factors may also be 
included. The method may be described as a 
separation of theology from philosophy. In a 
more positive vein, the acceptance of the 
principle that the revelational value of Christ 
is the ground of knowledge for all problems of 
theology. Everything in theology is derived from 
the pure source of revelation in the person of the 
historical Christ. In the apprehension of the 
revelational value, or worthship, of Christ, the 
theologian must reckon himself a member of the 
Christian community. There are numerous ways of 
stating the method. "The highest principle of 
the Ritschlian theology," according to one of its 
expert interpretors, "is to take all in one view,
the sole revel at ion-value of Christ, in contrast 
with all commingling of Christian faith with 
philosophy or nature-knowledge, and under the 
condition that the theologian has his standing 
within the Christian community as one who shares 
its faith and experience."^* Yet, another 
interpretor of the "Ritschlian method" augments 
Dr. Orr's description. Swing writes: "Ritschl
stands then in this school not for definite 
views, critical or doctrinal, but for a certain 
starting point and method...The danger of 
subjectivism belonging to Schleirmacher's method 
had shown itself in conservative, liberal and 
mediating theologies alike, both in the direction 
of speculation and in that of mysticism. Ritschl, 
in the view of his school, has his main signific­
ance in the fact that he broke with this method, 
that he started not from the 'pious consciousness' 
but from an objective fact, the Gospel, or, more 
definitely, the historical person of Christ Jesus,
as the one thing supernatural, the only and
7
sufficient revelation of God."
But, whatever may be the numerous understandings 
of the method and its ability to handle theological 
doctrine, one must allow the theologian himself 
to describe what he believes to be his own
6. Orr, James, "The Ritschlian Theology" - p.49* 
7* Swing, Albert, "The Theology of Albrecht
Ritschl" - p.35* Swing quotes from Porter 
in the "Andover Review" 1893 - P - 4 4 5 *
distinctive approach. In the introduction to his
third volume "Justification and reconciliation",
Ritschl says: "The formally correct expression of
theological propositions depends on the method we
follow in defining the object of cognition, that
is, on the theory of knowledge which we consciously
8or unconsciously obey." * It appears that Ritschl 
considers his theory of knowledge to be the crux 
of his method. We shall have opportunity to discuss 
his theory of knowledge and those theories which 
he opposes in another context; meanwhile, another 
epistomological canon - another certainty - should 
receive summary treatment. This second canon 
involves the separation of theoretic and religious 
knowledge. The latter knowledge depends primarily 
on practical judgments, and the truth or false­
hood of which is to be tested by practical standards 
alone. In religion we have to do only with 
"judgments of value" (Werthurtheile), that is, not 
with the objective or scientific aspects of truth, 
but solely with their relation to our practical 
ends - the ends in this case being those of religion, 
namely the attainment by the help of superior 
powers of freedom from the hindrances or limitatio ns 
of the natural life. Because these certainties are 
to be attained in and through Christ's revelation of
8. Ritschl, "Justification and reconciliation" - p. 15*
forgiveness, and in the extension of this Power 
in the Community, the Kingdom of God, Christianity 
is certified as true, independently of any other 
evidence. Again, this canon, or a fuller under­
standing of it, will occupy us at a later stage 
in our essay.
Before his theory of knowledge and value- 
judgment can be discussed, a summary of the 
generic features of the school may be noted.
Through these points we may ascertain the lines 
which the corrective theologies were to pursue.
(1) The exclusion of metaphysics from theology, 
drawing a distinction between religious and 
theoretic knowledge. The question really concerns 
not the total exclusion of metaphysics - that 
Ritschl and his school never actually do - but "What" 
metaphysic is to be valid appears to be their question.
(2) The rejection of a type of metaphysic leads the 
school to question speculative theism, viz. any sort 
of knowledge of the numenon or the "thing-in-itself" 
or a knowledge of God-for-Himself. (3) The 
condemnation of ecclesiastical dogma as an 
illegitimate mixture of theology and metaphysics.
(4) The antagonism shown to religious mysticism as 
a metaphysical type of piety. (5) The practical 
conception of Christianity and religion. (6) The
consequent contrast between the subject and its 
predicates with the dictum that we can know only 
the subject through its attributes and manifold 
relationships. This phenomalism dictates their 
treatment of the Christ. Furthermore, this 
approach elevates Christ's work and vocation to 
a primary place. Moreover, the emphasis on the 
predicates excludes from theology everything which 
lies outside the earthly manifestation of the Christ 
including speculation on the pre-existence as the 
Eternal Son, the origin of the personality of Christ 
the inter-relationships of the Trinity and any 
eschatological ideas. (7) The emphasis laid on the 
historical revelation of God in Christ as opposed to 
any natural revelation, or even - at least to some 
extent - the history of revelation which preceded the 
advent of Christ. (8) The use of the category of 
"Kingship" ox Christ and the Kingdom ox God as the 
regulative principle of Christian dogmatics. (9)
The tendency to limit theological investigation to 
the contents of religious consciousness, though 
this is more evident in Herrmann and Troeltch.
2. The Ritschlian Method.
Because the theological ideas of the school 
depend on the theological method used by the men -
to the extent that the method of treating the 
content of the Christian message is conditioned 
by the methodological assumptions - we should 
endeavour to make clear what this method entails.
But, a difficult task awaits us - a task which 
Ritschl on more than one occasion failed to 
carry through. Rather than dwell on the details 
of the method, Ritschl always showed a certain 
impatience With "so-called questions of principle," 
being eager to pass on to what he considered the 
actual business of dogmatics. "Our exposition of 
Ritschl*s principle and method," according to 
John Baillie, "is rendered more difficult by the 
fact that he himself was more interested in using 
them than in describing them...His meagre occasional 
statements concerning these questions (which include, 
however, one polemical pamphlet on Theology and 
Metaphysics), seem clearly to bear upon them the 
marks of this impatience. They appear to be 
insufficiently thought out; they betray a real 
uncertainty of mind, having been constantly 
subjected to serious revision in a second or third 
edition of the books containing them; and they 
champion difficult, if not indeed quite indefensible, 
positions without much apparent awareness of the 
objections that may be takne to them."^*
9. Baillie, John, "The Interpretation of Religion" -
p. 283.
Ritschl remarks on this difficulty in a letter 
written during the composition of his magnum 
opus. ftI have once again been struck by the 
unsatisfying nature of all these so-called questions 
of principle...The art of theological interpretation 
has indeed fallen quite out of practice, and I am 
doubtful if I can myself practice it sufficiently 
well to escape making a fool of myself; but all 
these prolegomena still make me think of such 
processes as the mixing of colours, the stretching 
of the canvas, the drawing aside of the curtain, 
the placing of the model, the washing of the hands, 
and to waste time over these things is not very 
attractive to me."^'
After these warnings against expecting too much 
clarity from Ritschl, we may follow his reasoning 
in his introduction to the third volume of his 
primary work. It has been said that Ritschl sets 
his approach against that of his contemporaries ! 
and the traditional theological procedures. He 
describes the traditional schemes as proceeding 
outside the Christian community. Their threefold 
method has to do with postulating man’s original 
perfection, elaborating the universality of 
inherited sin and deriving from this state man’s 
need for redemption. "Then follows, at the third
10. Ibid., p.284, Quoted from "Albrecht Ritschl
Leben" - Vol.II. p.106.
stage of the traditional theological system, the
knowledge of Christ’s person and work, and its
application to the individual and the fellowship
of believers. Not until it has to deal with
this topic does theology take up the standpoint
of the community of believers, but it does so in
such a way that the. .rational conception of
redemption is held to throughout the exposition
11of its actual course." ' Criticising this
scheme, the theology moulded on Melanchthon*s
Loci, Ritschl remarks: "No system can result
from a method which thus traverses three separate
points of view in accomplishing the different
parts of its task. A method which is so
predominantly inspired by purely rational ideas
of God and sin and redemption is not the positive
theology which we need, and which can be defended
12against the objections of general rationalism."
What then is the positive theology Ritschl proposes? 
What is the "rounded exposition of theology," 
represented as a "single surface" which Ritschl 
employs? He believes that an understanding of 
forgiveness, justification and reconciliation 
which are assured through Christ can be comprehended 
only so far as we consciously and intentionally 
reckon ourselves members of the community which
11. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation" -
p. 5.
12. Ibid., p.5.
Christ has founded. Only if theology takes up
this point is there any hope of constructing a
theological system which deserves the name. We
can know God only if we know him through Christ -
and it follows, we can know Him only if we belong
to the community of believers. "Not only,
however, are God and all the operations of His
grace to be constructed through the revelation
in Christ, but even sin can be appreciated only
in virtue of the forgiveness of sins which is
18Christ’s special gift." Christian theology, 
moreover, should possess the marks of the 
regenerate life. This sort of theology, 
emanating from the Holy Spirit and the experience 
of forgiveness, can be written from the standpoint 
of the community of believers and not, according 
to Ritschl, if it is built on the substructure of 
pretended Natural Theology, the rationalistic 
arguments of Augustine about original sin, and 
those of Anselm about the nature of redemption. 
These theologies, because they take their stand 
outside the sphere of regeneration - a sphere 
which is coterminous with the community of 
bwlievers - cannot do justice to the unique 
revelation in Christ.
13* Ibid., p.7
The Ritschlian method up to this point, 
summarily speaking, entails two things: the
revelation-value of Christ as the ground of 
knowledge for all theology, and this revelation 
can only be known within the community of 
believers. In this context, and not outside the 
regenerate community, the full impact of the 
ethical message of the Christ can be apprehended.
The method takes on a further significance 
when the author states his "idea of the Christian 
Religion". "Christianity," according to Ritschl, 
"resembles not a circle described from a single
centre, but an ellipse which is determined by
14two foci." ’ This dual character of the 
"monotheistic form of faith" vis a vis, 
Christianity, concerns its religious and ethical 
nature. Religiously, Christian knowledge proceeds 
from redemption through Christ, but, ethically, 
Christianity is concerned with the purpose of 
this redemption being embodied in the Kingdom of 
God. The latter idea, neglected in the history of. 
Christianity, and, if not neglectbd, accorded a 
pietistic, individualistic interpretation, 
constitutes the teleological aspect of Jesus1 
vocation. Jesus, Ritschl informs us, saw in the 
Kingdom of God the moral end of the religious
14. Ibid., p.II.
fellowship he had to found. He did not
understand by the Kingdom the common exercise
of worship, bmt the organisation of humanity
through action inspired by love. "Freedom in
God, the Freedom of the children of God, is the
private end of each individual Christian, as the
Kingdom of God is the final end of all. And
this double character of the Christjnn life -
perfectly religious and perfectly ethical -
continues, because its realisation in the life of
the individual advances through the perpetual
16interaction of the two elements." The 
Kingdom of God is God’s final end. Through the 
Kingdom of God, God is completed. Ritschl 
appears to mean that God is born or given birth 
to in the minds of men in the Kingdom which His 
Son founded. We shall have opportunity to 
discover his meaning in another connection.
"Christianity, then," according to Ritschl, "is 
the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and 
ethical religion, which, based on the life of its 
Author as Redeemer and as Founder of the Kingdom 
of God, consists in the freedom of the children 
of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the 
motive of love, which aims at the moral 
organisation of mankind, and grounds blessedness
15* Ibid., p.13
454.
on the relation of sonship to God, as well as
1 f)on the Kingdom of God.”
But yet a further approach to the Ritschlian
method, possibly the facet which has drawn more
attention, concerns Ritschl’s theory of
knowledge. "The scientific truth of the several
truths of Christianity," Ritschl contends,
17"depends on their correct definition." ( * The
first task of systematic theology is correctly
and completely to outline and clearly to settle
the religious ideas or facts which are included
T Rin the conception of Christianity. * While 
biblical exegesis isolates particular incidents 
for consideration and Biblical Theology attempts 
to define these ideas, some method must be devised 
which considers the organic relation to the whole. 
Each definition can only be made complete as it 
receives its place in a system of theology, for 
the truth of the particular can be understood only 
through its connection with the whole. How can 
these particular divergencies be related to the 
whole? How may they be defined with logical 
correctness, and at the same time avoid being 
mutually contradictory? Ritschl is of the 
opinion that "the correct expression of theological 
propositions depends on the method we follow in 
defining the object of cognition, that is, on the
16. Ibid., p.13*
17» Ibid., p.14.
18. Ibid., p. 14.
theory of knowledge which we consciously or
19unconsciously obey." What is the theory of 
Knowledge adopted for this correct handling of 
theological data? As on other issues in his 
theology, he states the traditional view and 
offers his as a corrective. But his theory does 
not receive the precision which he employs in 
interpreting the opposing views.
By way of introducing his method of cognition, 
he has us to understand that his theory "is 
identical with the doctrine of the thing or
on
things which form the first part of metaphysics."
But, as the Aristotelian and Platonic systems 
understand the doctrine of the "thing" or "things" 
as the superstructure of nature, the universal 
ground of Being which precedes and gives birth 
to the operations of Being, Ritschl is forced to 
distinguish his concept of "thinghood" from these 
systems. Furthermore, the superstructure of Being, 
or thing or things os identified with the 
conception of God; especially is this identification 
made by Christian philosophers. "That is done, 
however, when Aristotle gives the name of God to 
the idea of the highest end which he postulates 
as winding up the cosmic series of means and ends,
21*and so as an expression of the unity of the world."
19. Ibid*, p.14.
20. Ibid, p.15-16.
21. Ibid., p. 19.
But, these conceptions of world-unity, 
prof erring proofs for the existence of the 
unity on teleological and cosmological speculat­
ions are unwarranted in theology. If theology’s 
positive and proper character is to he 
maintained, any proof which adduces God from 
nature, or identifies Him with a Higher unity, 
is to be eschewed. The thought of God, according 
to Ritschl, is given. The nature of religion, 
being the worth of man as he distinguishes 
himself from the phenomena which surround him 
and from the influences of nature which press in 
on him, precludes any knowledge of God devised 
from theoretical, abstract speculations. While 
not quarrelling with the "given-ness" quality of 
religion, we may desire further distinctions 
from our author. His point of view on the 
matter is, however, clarified by examining the 
three forms of the theory of knowledge which, 
so he informs us, have been recognised in 
European thought.
These three forms of epistomological thcugbt 
are the Platonico-scholastic, the Kantian and 
the lotsian. The first is due to the stimulus 
received from Plato. This form found a home 
in the realm of scholasticism. This theory
Ritschl defines as the notion that the thing- 
in-itself abides as an unchanging, identical 
unity, behind the masks or qualities through 
which it acts upon us. On this view, in their 
separation of the essence and attributes of God 
and God’s operations in the world, the thing- 
in-itself can be known apart from its effects.
"The fault of this conception of the thing 
or object of knowledge appears in the inconsist­
ency that the thing is conceived to be at rest
and, at the same time, is to work upon us by its
22manifested qualities." * Ritschl considers 
that this view of the subject makes it impossible 
for us .to understand the phenomenal marks as 
marks of the thing-in-itself separated from them. 
When, therefore, Kant declared the thing-in-itself, 
or the things-in-themselves, to be unknowable, he 
pronounced a correct judgment on the scholastic 
explanation of the thing. But, with regard to 
Kant’s restriction of the knowledge of the human 
understanding to the world of phenomena, which is 
the second form, Ritschl remarks that a world of 
phenomena can only be "posited" as an object of 
knowledge on "the supposition that in them 
something actual, namely, the thing, really appears 
to us, or becomes the cause of our sensation and 
perception."2^ * Otherwise, "it must be treated as
22. Ibid., p.19*
23. Ibid., p.19.
mere show and seeming by employment of the 
conception of phenomenon or appearance." 
Therefore, Kant contradicts his own position, 
"that actual things are unknowable."
A third form of the theory of cognition is 
that of Lotze: "In the phenomena which undergo
changes in a limited space, in limited compass, 
and in a determinate order, we cognise the thing 
as the cause of the marks by which it acts upon
us; as the end subserved by the marks as means;
24as the law of their constant changes." * This 
is Ritschl’s own reproduction of Lotze*s theory 
of cognition, and to it he gives his adhesion. 
According to the context, the thing which he 
maintains we know in the phenomena - appealing 
in support of his view to Lotze - can be nothing 
other than the actual thing. For it 3s only on 
condition of its manifesting itself in the 
phenomena that we are saved from the necessity 
of treating phenomena as "mere seeming." Now, 
comparing Ritschl *s judgment on Kant’s theory 
of cognition with what, according to his 
representation, Lotze teaches and he himself 
approves, we are warranted in stating Ritschl *s 
view as follows: Actual things are knowable
but only in phenomena, not as they are in and 
by themselves (not in their aseity): the thing-
24. Ibid., p.20
in-itself remains uncognisable. If this be the 
understanding of Ritschl, he may be said to 
distinguish actual things which we cognise in 
phenomena from things-in-themselves which we 
cannot cognise. But, there is some inconsistency 
in Ritschl *s point, or at least in the ways he 
elaborates his theory and separates it from 
Kantian notions.
He assures us that actual things are the cause
of our sensations and perceptions. It would
seem that the actual things which Ritschl deems
to be the cause of our sensations and perceptions
must be identical with things-in-themselves.
But, in his expodtion, he himself designates the
things which Kant pronounces unknowable as actual
things, while, a few lines before, he had made
the remark that Kant declared things-in-themselves
25to be unknowable. These same things which Kant 
considered unknowable, Ritschl defines at one time 
as things-in-themselves, at another as actual things. 
It would appear, therefore, that he deems the actual 
things to be the things-in-themselves; and that 
he is unable to uphold the distinction which he 
himself had posited between them.
An inconsistency like this, occuring in the 
space of a few lines, shows how impossible it is
25. Ibid., p.19*
to distinguish the one from the other. The 
things which, according to Ritschlrs teaching, 
we know in phenomena, either have no real 
existence in distinction from the phenomena, or 
they possess actual, objective reality. But, 
if these actual things are the cause of our 
sensations and perceptions, they must be 
identical with the things-in-themselves, Again, 
if the two are identical, there are only two 
alternatives - either, the actual things are as 
unknowable as the things-in-themselves, and 
then we know nothing actual at all, our know^ - 
ledge is unsubstantial and without object; or, 
things-in-themselves, in some sense which 
cannot here be more exactly determined, are, 
like the actual thiigs, know able. This being 
the case, we should know things-in-themselves 
in phenomena, and the former could no longer, 
therefore, be abstractly separated from the 
latter. In other words, the thing-in-itself 
must be held to manifest itself in the 
phenomenal. We should thus have a theory that 
presevered the objectivity and reality of 
human knowledge. But, this is not Ritschl rs 
intention. Had he adopted such a theory of 
cognition as the groundwork of his theology,
the latter would have had to undergo a radical 
transformation. He rather asserts the 
unknowable ness of the thing-in-itself, yet he 
is at the same time anxious to hold fast the 
reality of the phenomenal, for he teaches that 
something actual is presented in it, which is 
different from the phenomenal and gives it 
reality - though it is not the thing-in-itself.
Ritschl refers all who wish to gain a fuller
understanding of his theory of cognition to his
treatise on "Theology and Metaphysics." This,
accordingly, we must extract a statement from;
we read there as follows: "The phenomena
which are perceived in a limited space-form
as always existing or succeeding each other in
the same way, and undergoing alteration with
defined limits and in a defined order, our
faculty of representation combines into a
unity called thing after the analogy of the
cognising soul, which feels and resembles
itself to be an abiding unity in the midst of
26every changing sensation." * According to 
this statement, a tiling is a unity which we 
ourselves confer in our conception upon a 
sum of perceived phenomena; in other words,
26. Ritschl, "Theology and Metaphysics" - p.10.
it is merely a represented, not an actual unity;
nay more, a unity which we form after the
analogy of our own soul. Then, by thing, or the
actual, it would appear is to be understood a
unity which we for our minds constitute out of
a sum of phenomena. The thing as such, therefore,
so far as it is opposed to and isolated from
phenomenon, is, according to Ritschl, "a purely
27formal conception without content.11 But 
then, if things as such, in distinction from 
phenomena, are purely formal concepts, it 
becomes impossible to maintain their reality. 
Ritschl teaches that a world of phenomena can 
be regarded as an object of knowledge "only 
on the assumption that something actual, namely, 
the thing, manifests itself in them, or becomes 
the cause of sensation and perception; otherwise, 
phenomena must be treated as mere illusion.11 In 
other words, the reality of phenomena rests 
on the fact that something actual, namely,, the 
thing, manifests itself to us. But, what is 
that which appears in a phenomenon and which we 
know therein? The answer is given - purely 
formal concepts appear or manifest themselves 
therein; in other words, mere modifications or 
functions of our understanding. It would seem 
that the world of phenomena is thus transformed
27* Ibid., p.18.
into the shadow of concepts. If the thing 
itself; as distinguished from phenomenon, he 
declared to be only a purely formal concept, the 
reality of phenomena is jeopardised. The same 
dissipation of the thing-in-itself may be ' 
levelled against RitschlTs theory. He appears 
to identify the thing-in-itself with the memory 
image. These memory-images are of actualities 
which themselves have no existence, save of 
phenomena of consciousness.
Concerning the "abiding unity", viz. the soul
in the midst of ever-changing sensations, his
strictures on the scholastic psychology might
be levelled against his assumptions. The
psychology which gives rise to the self-enclosed
life of the spirit, the scene of the unio mystica,
exists behind the special activities of feeling,
thinking and willing. The soul, according to
Ritschl fs understanding of this view-point,
remains at rest in its self-equivalence, as the
28unity of its diverst powers, the faculties.
This separation between the activities of the 
soul and its self-existence lies at the root of 
the individualistic, pietistic doctrine of 
salvation - a doctrine which Ritschl is anxious
28. Ritschl, "Justification end Reconciliation" -
page 20.
to oppose. While rejecting the result of this 
scheme, it does not appear that Ritschl realises 
that the so-called organising faculty, the 
cognising soul, must be to some extent at rest 
behind the manifold activities and functions.
Yet, we are told in his discussion of the 
doctrine of unio mystica that we are not to 
assume that the soul has a different, a more 
proper or real mode of being behind volition 
and cognition; on the contrary, the soul is 
present in the functions which are its phenomenon. 
But, where is the essentially real soul which was 
supposed to underlie our volition and cognition, 
of which volition and cognition are the 
manifestations or activities? There ds no such 
thing as the soul-in-itself, if all things-in- 
themselves are to be treated as mere abstractions. 
The soul on this reckoning is a mere representation 
a unity of its qualities. The qualities are these: 
these qualities we represent to ourselves as a 
unity; and this representation is the soul, a 
mere product of the synthetic impulse of 
consciousness. These remarks force us to the 
conclusion that there is no religious subject of 
which religion can be predicated. Dr. Garvie in 
his "The Ritschlian Theology", quotes an
indictment made against Ritschlfs views by
Pfleiderer. "It explains (Ritschlfs ideas on the
unity and manifoldness of the self or the
cognizing soul) the unity of the ego as
appearance, end only the manifoldness of the
functions as the reality; but, how this
appearance could even be brought about, how the
actual consciousness of an identity of the ego,
how the continuity of the consciousness, how
recollection from one day to another, is to be
possible if there were in us only changing
functions and not a permanent unity, from which
they proceed, and into which they return,
depositing there their results; that is, and
"29remains hereby, wholly incomprehensible.
Ritschl attaches primary significance to a 
self-sufficient moral character; and Pfleiderer 
justifiably asks: "Yi/here, then, does there
remain the possibility of such a character, if 
o u r  b e i n g  were nothing else than the ever- 
c h a i n g i n g  current of the conscious activities and 
a p p e a r a n c e s ,  if behind this manifold and 
c h a n g e a b l e  there were not to be assumed an 
existent unity as the ground of the unity of 
consciousness, and as the ordering and ruling 
power in the surging chaos of the appearance 
of consciousness?"^®*
29. Garvie, Alfred, "The Ritschlian Theology"-
p. 139-14-0 - quoted from Pfleiderer1 s 
"Die Ritschrsche Theologie" - p.11-12.
30. Ibid., p. 139-14*0.
While Garvie points out that Ritschl modifies 
his view in other matters, in particular his 
analysis of the idea of personality, it would 
appear his stringent opposition to the idea of 
a self at rest behind the phenomena - the idea 
of mysticism, Platonism, Heo-Platonism and 
Scholasticism - prevents him from inferring that 
the subject, while being manifest and active in 
its attributes and operations, is not exhausted 
or fully comprehended by these empirical 
variations. Concentrating on the signs and 
predicates of the subject, as we shall note in 
Ritschl's Christology, he remains agnostic or 
opposed to any inferences concerning the nature 
of the self or cognizing soul which lies behind 
the phenomena.
But, Ritschl*s theory of cognition, whether 
Kantian or Lotzian or a modification and 
adaption of both, does not concern us. We are 
more interested in the effects which his 
epistolomogy had on his theological system. 
Consequently, in the elaboration of his 
methodology, we may take two fubher points which 
follow from his theory of cognition, viz. 
the separation of religious knowledge from 
theoretical knowledge and the notion of value
judgments. The latter being the way religious 
objects are to be known and received.
The separation of religious and theoretical 
or scientific knowledge may be termed the 
second epistomological canon which Ritschl 
adopts. This principle is implicit in Ritschlfs 
definition of religion and the function of 
religion. He comments on the essential task of 
religion and his position enables us to grasp 
the separation which is effected between two 
branches of knowledge, e.g. spirit and nature. 
"All religions aspire," according to Ritschl, 
"with the aid of the Higher powers which man 
reverences, to the solution of the contradiction 
which he recognises as existing between himself 
as a part of the natural world and himself as a 
spiritual personality claiming to rule the world. 
Considered from the one point of view, man is a 
part of nature, without independence, hemmed in 
on all hands by other things; considered from 
the other point of view, that is, as spirit, 
his aim and destiny are to assert and maintain 
his independence. Situated thus, there springs 
up in him the faith in superior spiritual powers 
by whose help his own power is in some way or 
other to be supplemented, or raised to the rank
of a whole sui generis, capable of resisting
51the pressure of the natural world.” *
The contrast between manfs inner freedom and 
his outward dependence on nature constitutes for 
Ritschl the root of religion. Being at one and 
at the same time part of nature and independent 
of nature, when man reflects on his situation, 
attempting in the process to maintain his 
independence to nature, religion comes into 
existence. This view of the origin of religion 
springs from one of Kant's ideas. One of the 
things postulated of the practical reason, he 
tells us, is the existence of God as a cause of 
nature distinct from nature - a cause which 
brings nature into harmony with morality, and 
this supplies a basis for the concord of 
happiness and duty. The reflective moral 
consciousness is basic and the religious 
content seems secondary. Religion becomes 
in this reasoning no more than a stop-gap 
or makeshift until such time as man can 
realise himself.
Surely Ritschl does not mean to give such a 
utilitarian view of the matter. Xet, in his 
definition of the religious and what values it 
accords man, viz. blessedness and independence, 
he does seem to call, into question the
31. Ritschl, ”Justification and Reconciliation” -
page 199.
constitutive nature of religion. Religion and 
the blessedness which stem from God and being in 
the Kingdom of God, are means to an end - not 
ends in themselves.
It may be noted in a later context that God 
realises Himself in His supreme end, the Kingdom 
of God. It would appear that God becomes 
subservient to man and must become complete, 
fulfilled in man. In His final end, the 
Kingdom of God, God is, or God realises, Himself. 
Of course, in this scheme it must be remembered 
that Ritschl, working on his theory of knowledge, 
cannot infer any determinations in God before God 
is known in and through His Son and through the 
Son, the author of the Community, in the Kingdom 
of God.
The function of religious knowledge and its 
distinction from theoretical knowledge may be 
detected on another level - a level which may 
touch on Ritschl1s third epistomological canon, 
that of the value-judgment.
He says concerning the knowledge of God.. •
(It) ’’can only then be shown to be religious 
knowledge when God is concerned in guaranteeing 
to the believer a position in the world such as 
counterbalances the hindrances which arise from
the world* Apart from this value-judgment through
faith, there is no knowledge of God which can he
32considered worthy of the name.” * Religious 
knowledge is concerned with the relation of the 
blessedness guaranteed by God and aimed at man, 
to the entirety of the world created by God and 
directed to the end He has in view.
Properly speaking, Ritschl was concerned to 
emphasise the distinction which had been blurred 
by traditional metaphysics, between nature and 
spirit. He was, at least in his first volume, 
in agreement with Xant’s proof for the existence 
of God. Garvie gives us a summary of this point 
as it is contained in Kant's ’’Critique of 
Judgment”. • .’’On the one hand, the idea of God 
herein suffers no mutilation, as God is expressly 
recognized as rational and moral author and guide 
of the world; end, on the other hand, the 
knowledge of the laws of our conduct is at the 
same time theoretical knowledge; that is, 
knowledge of the laws of our spiritual life.
And theoretical knowledge has also the task 
to seek a law of the co-existence of the two
33systems of reality, the sensuous and the moral.
As it stands in this context, science and 
religion are related at a theoretical level.
Mozley and Garvie, in their discussion of the
32. Ibid., p.200. 
33- Garvie, p.84.
Ritschlian system, point out Ritschlrs 
agreement with this unification of the spheres 
of nature and of ethics, natural and moral good. 
But, in the interests of a more radical distinction 
between the practical value of religion and the 
inability of speculative reason apart from the 
Christian faith to solve the problem of existence, 
Ritschl states his positions "This acceptance 
of the idea of God is, as Kant observes of 
practical faith, and not an act of theoretical 
knowledge...If, accordingly, the correspondence 
of Christianity with reason is hereby proved, it 
is still taken for granted that the knowledge 
of God finds expression in another kind of 
judgment than that of theoretical knowledge of 
the world.
In the interests of the moral life, and not 
theoretical, detached observation, the idea of 
God must be assumed. This assumption of God, 
the worth of God to the practical reason, leads 
us to discuss possibly one of the most debataable 
Ritschlian ideas, the value-judgment theory.
Rather than concentrate on the two domains of 
knowledge, that of science with its disinterested 
pursuit of unity and of religion with its
34. Ritschl, "Just. & Recon." - p.222.
functioning in the moral sphere of the world, 
and the various vacillations and polemical 
thought thrust forward to justify this dualism 
in knowledge, we msy move to some consideration 
of his judgments of value. This canon of 
knowledge, or the manner in which knowledge is 
to be appropriated, will be of inestimable 
worth when Ritschl *s Ghristology is presented.
Ritschl poses the questions "How is religious
knowledge related to theoretical or philosophical
35knowledge?"^* He endeavours to give an answer 
to the question by assessing the material dealt 
with by each discipline. Each knowledge deals 
with the world as a whole; each knowledge 
attempts to comprehend the Universt under one 
supreme law. Thus, no principle of 
discrimination between the two kinds of knowledge 
is to be found in the object, namely, the world, 
with which they both deal.
If not the object or the content distinguishes 
the two types of knowledge, may we not reach some 
distinction through assuming the manner in which 
the object is appropriated, or, that is, what ways 
are used to determine the value of and nature of 
the object? Ritschl says that all knowledge, 
whether philosophical, scientific or religious,
35* Ibid., p.203
is appropriated from the vantage point of 
interest. On the basis of the two-fold function 
of spirit, pain and pleasure, knowledge becomes 
valueable to the person who assesses these 
sensations. "Value-judgments, therefore, are 
determinative in the case of all connected 
knowledge of the world, even when earned out 
in the most objective fashion.. .Without interest 
we do not trouble ourselves about anything." * 
But, if the two types of knowledge deal with 
the same object from the same motive, vis a vis 
interest, how are we to distinguish between 
these disciplines? Ritschl postulates the 
distinction in his two-fold value-judgment 
theory. Concomitant or accompanying value- 
judgments pertain to theoretical cognition, 
while independent judgments have to do with 
practical, religious knowledge. Describing 
the latter, he says of the realm in which they 
are made: "Religious knowledge moves in independ­
ent value-judgments, which relate to man's 
attitude to the world and call forth feelings 
of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys 
the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by 
God, or feels grievously the lack of God’s 
help to that end."^# Religious judgments
36. Ibid., p.204. 
37* Ibid., p.205*
formed on the basis of the elevation of the 
person above the world in the Kingdom of God, 
indicate the value of this attitude taken up 
by believers towards the world* Religious 
knowledge, unlike scientific knowledge, which 
proceeds on the basis of observation and 
ascertainable laws of human cognition, deals 
with the blessedness which is assured by God 
and sought by man. When scientific knowledge 
seeks for a unified view of the world, it, so 
Ritschl claims, betrays an implicit religious 
impulse - one that should be distinguished from 
the cognitive methods they follow. When this 
knowledge deduces the world as a whole, it 
departs from the strict application of the 
philosophical method. This heterogenous 
mixture of two principles, on the one hand, the 
empirical, and, on the other, the intuitive and 
imaginative, does not satisfy the religious 
conscience. The rigidly unified view of the 
world gained by this philosophic approach 
runs counter to, and is incompatible with, the 
religious view of the world. The religious 
desire for a complete view of things is not 
properly distinguished from scientific cognition; 
thus, the claim, called by Ritschl, "self- 
deception", that the laws of theoretical
knowledge are the laws of the human spirit
38in all its functions. * On this base, 
philosophy relegates theology to the region 
of the fanciful. In this philosophy, eg* 
Pantheism, the personality of God and man is 
called into question. But, in Ritschl’s 
violent anti-Hegelianism, does he understand 
how much his Kingdom of God idea, regardless 
of the value he attached to the individual, 
may be accused of the same subjugation of the 
individual to the community, the particular to 
the regulative principle, the Community or the 
Idea of Community?
Defining religious knowledge more precisely, 
Ritschl states his agreement with Luther. The 
latter bases religious apprehension on the worth 
of such knowledge for the person concerned. The 
nature of God and Christ are known only in their 
worth for us. "Apart from this value-judgment of 
faith, there exists no knowledge of God worth 
of this content."^* The content here signifying 
the position secured to the believer in the world 
which more than counterbalances its restrictions. 
God and faith to Luther and Ritschl, according
38. Ibid., p.210.
39. Ibid., p.210.
to Ritschl, are inseparable conceptions.
’’Faith, however, confessedly does not consist
in abstract knowledge, or knowledge which deals
40with merely historical facts.” The ’’goodness
and power” of God, on which faith casts itself,
is revealed in the work of Christ alone. Apart
from this independent judgment - a judgment
which excludes the possibility of ’’disinterested”
knowledge of God - there can be no knowledge of
God in Christ. Ritschl’s point is that...”in
religious cognition, the idea of God is
dependent on the presupposition that man opposes
himself to the world of nature, and secures his
41position in or over it by faith in God.”
Ritschl seems to detect the accusation of 
’’dualism” in the realm of knowledge when he 
discusses Kant’s inability to co-ordinate these 
two heterogenous orders of reality, the practical 
and the theoretical reason. While Kant abandons 
the attempt to discover a principle which would 
unify spirit and nature, practical and theoretical 
reason, Ritschl believes that it is the task of 
cognition to seek some unity in,and co-existence 
of, the two ways of knowing. God, on the basis 
of Kantian philosophy, can be adequately
40. Ibid., p.212.
41. Ibid., p.219•
demonstrated for the practical reason. The
reality of God is rooted solely in the use of
freedom according to moral laws, and does not
arise out of the investigation of nature, and
thus possesses only subjective-practical 
4 2reality. * Kant does not, according to Ritschl 
interpretation, start from the idea of God, nor 
from a preconceived idea of the world; rather, 
he finds the final unity of his knowledge of 
the world in the Christian idea of God, and that 
too, in such a way as to limit that idea to the 
sphere of religious knowledge. But, Ritschl 
quarrels with Kant’s separation of the practical 
and theoretical spheres of knowledge. ”He,” 
according to Ritschl, ’’failed to estimate the 
practical Reason at its proper value. If the 
exertion of moral will is a reality, then the 
practical Reason is a branch of theoretical 
cognition. These two positions Kant never 
reached. The reason of this failure lies in 
the fact that, with him, sensibility is the 
characteristic mark of reality. Therefore, too, 
he declares the conception of God to be 
theoretically impossible, and abandons it to the 
practical Reason.. .Kant wrongly let himself be
42. Ibid., p.220.
persuaded by this specific quality of the
spiritual life, (that is to say, the practical
laws which declare spirit to be an end in
itself), to oppose Practical Reason as one
species of Reason,to theoretical Reason as
another.. .And yet, knowledge of the laws of
action is also theoretical knowledge, for it is
43knowledge of the laws of spiritual life.”
How does Ritschl propose to integrate these two 
realms? His argument is rather sketchy in 
places but he seems to use the same method as he 
condemns in Kant. While Kant abandoned the 
attempt to discover, by the methods of theoretical 
cognition, a principle which would unite spirit 
and nature in one, and bids us explain the 
combination of both in a single world through 
practical faith in God, conceived as endowed 
with the attributes which Christianity ascribes 
to Him, Ritschl is convinced that he knows 
Kant’s reason for this division. ”One 
circumstance which co-operated to produce this 
conclusion is doubtless the fact that all 
knowledge of nature, as subject to law, depends 
on the practical presupposition that nature exists 
for the human spirit.”^ *  But, does not Ritschl 
come to the same impasse when he remarks: ”Now
4-3. Ibid., p.221-222.
44. Ibid., p.223.
the impulses of knowledge, of feeling, andof
aesthetic intuition, of will in general and in
its special application to society, and, finally,
the impulse of religion in the general sense of
the word, all concur to demonstrate that
spiritual life is the end, while nature is the
means* This is the general lav; of spiritual
life, the validity of which sc:mce must maintain
if the special character of the spiritual realm
45of existence is not to be ignored."
And, further, when he announces the manner in
which the two realms are unified, he perpetuates
a duality. "Now we must either resign the
attempt to comprehend the ground and lav; of the
co-existence of nature and spiritual life, or
we must, to attain our end, acknowledge the
Christian conception of God as the truth by
which our knowledge of the universe is 
46consummated." * If science refuses to 
acknowledge that nature is knowhble and is known 
only because it exists for spirit, science would 
disobey tha impulse to complete itself. But, 
such a renunciation does not impair the 
practical validity of religious faith in God 
in the Christian sense. Nature, we are told by 
Ritschl, is viewed in two ways. Theoretical
45. Ibid., p.222.
46. Ibid., p.223*
knowledge treats it as something which exists 
for it. Practical knowledge treats it as 
something which exists for it. Practical 
knowledge considers nature as something 
which is directly a means to the realisation 
of the common ethical end which forms the final 
end of the world. If nature is subservient 
to spirit, and the moral fellowship transcends 
nature, then the ground of both lies in a 
Divine Will which creates the world with 
spiritual life as its final end. "To accept the 
idea of God in this way is, as Kant observes, 
practical faith, and not an act of theoretical 
cognition. While, therefore, the Christian 
religion is thereby proved to be in harmony 
with reason, it is always with the reservation 
that knowledge of God embodies itself in 
judgments which differ in kind from those of 
theoretical science,,,As Kant was first to show, 
the Christian view of God, and'/the world enables 
us comprehensively to unify our knowledge of 
nature and the spiritual life of man in a way 
which otherwise is impossible. .When we have once 
got a true conception of this point, a review 
of the moral constitution of man, based upon
481.
the principles of Kant, will serve as the
ratio cognoscendi of the validity of the
Christian idea of God when employed as the
47solution of the enigma of the world.”
Has Ritschl gone beyond the Kantian dualism? 
While noting the separation of the spheres of 
knowing, disagreeing with the lack of unity in 
Kant, Ritschl, in his characteristic manner of 
going around the point, posits the same 
dichotomy. But, to return to value-judgments 
for some further light on Ritschl Ts view of 
knowledge.
The Ritschlians, in their emphasis on value- 
judgments, endeavour to distinguish the kind 
of evidence on which our common experiences 
of the world rests from that which underlies 
our moral and religious beliefs in goodness, 
God and the significance of the Christ.
The theoretical judgments are concerned with 
causes, and the value-judgments with purposes. 
The former relate each object to its 
conditions in the world-whole; the latter 
relate it to the ends which man sets before 
himself; the former answer the question how, 
the latter the question why; the former end
47. Ibid., p.225-226.
in a metaphysic, the latter in a theology. 
Herrmann says this of the distinction: "When 
I seek to represent the world-whole, because 
I wish to comprehend the multiplicity of things 
in a never-failing context of law, then I go 
in the way of metaphysics. When I seek to 
represent a world-whole, because I do not wish 
to lose myself as a person conscious of my 
highest good in the multiplicity of things;
48then I receive the impulse to religious faith.”
On their reckoning, the investigation of causes 
can never lead to the discovery of the secret of 
the universe, while the interpretation of 
purposes may. The theoretical judgments cannot 
give an intelligible unity to the world-whole, 
but the value-judgments can. The theoretical 
judgments are subordinated to value-judgments 
by the nature of the approach and ends pursued 
by the latter.
Yet, there are varying interpretations in the 
Ritschlian school. Kaftan, for instance, moves 
£he epistomological canon on another level 
when he says that religious knowledge consists 
of theoretical propositions which are bases on 
vake- judgment s. The theoretical judgments
48. Garvie, p. 175*
express a fact and the value-judgments or 
religious propositions give expression to the 
attitude taken toward the fact.
On Ritschl1 s view of value-judgments, it would 
appear that religions knowledge never gets 
beyond the consciousness of its subjective 
certainty, whereas, according to Kaftan, it may 
attain a consciousness of objective validity, 
although reached only by subjective evidence.
This pinpoints the difficulties which Ritschlian 
thought, while endeavouring to break loose from 
this objective-subjective way of thinking and 
speaking, incurs. They are so intent on 
distinguishing the kind of evidence on which our 
common experience of the world rests from that 
which underlies our moral and religious beliefs 
in God and Christ that they seem to withdraw 
religion into a small province of its own. This 
withdrawal of religion encourages subjectivism 
and illusionism. Though it must be remembered 
that Ritschl, on the other hand, attached a rather, 
shall we say, nciive realism to objective facts.
As we shall soon see, the Ritschlian attachment 
to the particular historic facts concerning 
Jesus is, as one writer has described their view,
ILQ
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Value-judgments m a y  b e  t h e  w a y  t h e  f a c t s  a r e  
interpreted by t h e  r e l i g i o n s  m i n d ,  h u t  t h e s e  
f a c t s  are i n  e v e r y  s e n s e  o f  t h e  w o r d  o b j e c t i v e ,  
r e a l  a n d  ' h i s t o r i c a l l y  v e r i f i a b l e .  B u t ,  a s  w e  
s h a l l  s o o n  d i s c o v e r ,  R i t s c h l  a n d  h i s  f o l l o w e r s  
w e r e  c a u g h t  i n  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e - s u b j e c t i v e  w a y  
o f  viewing r e a l i t y .  I n  t h e i r  s w i n g  f r o m  
i d e a l i s m  . a n d  t h e  r o m a n t i c i s m  o f  S c h i i e m a c h e r ,  
t h e y  m o v e  t o w a r d ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  
t r e n d s  o f  t h e i r  e r a ,  v i e w i n g  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  
a s  t h e  r e a l .
3.  C ' h r  i s t o l  O ' g i e a l  P r o b l e m s :
T h e  P o s t - H e g e l i a n s ,  B o  m e n  . a n d  R o t h e  a n d  t h e  
s c h o o l  o f  3 c  h i  e i  m a c  h e r ,  h a d  t r i e d  t o  e x p l i c a t e  
the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the h i s t o r i c  C h r i s t  
. a n d  t h e  C h r i s t i a n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  B u t ,  t h i s  
" m e d i a t i n g ? *  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  a s  i t  h a s .  b e e n  
t e r m e d ,  c o u l d  n o t  r e p l y  t o  t h e  H e g e l i a n i s m  o f  
S t r a u s s  w h o  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  o n l y  t o  i d e a s  
a b o u t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  C h r i s t  t h a t  t h e  p a s s a g e '  
r e a l l y  l e d .  R i t s c h l ,  e s c h e w i n g  . a n y  v a g u e  
s p e c u l a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e '  n a t u r e  of C h r i s t  03? h o w
49- Quick, Oliver, "Liberalism, Modernism .and
T r a d i t i o n "  -  p . 5 «
we travel from Christian experience to the 
historic Christ, endeavoured to give an answer 
to this difficulty by bringing in focus the 
"facts" or "record” of the historic Christ.
Simply stated, the effect wrought by viewing the 
portraits of the Christ and the New Testament, 
or by hearing of these from those who had been 
spiritually recreated by the viewing, is the 
only source of religious experience. The 
knowledge of God lay in the actual happenings 
of the facts. The actuality of the events 
perform their work through the record in the 
present. There is produced in the individual, 
from the reading of the facts, a correspondence — 
a correspondence of something with themselves, 
with something in Christ as he stands revealed 
in the pages of the New Testament record:. 
Christian experience and the historic Christ 
are given togehter; and in knowing anything of 
the first you must and do know the second as its 
source.
In this summary treatment, we detect the 
Ritschlian method inferring from the effects to 
the source, deriving the subject from the 
predicates. In our brief survey of Ritschl*s
Christological construction, a primary question 
will concern the nature of the "facts" of the 
revelation. Are these facts of one piece with 
secular history, or are these so-called facts 
significant only to the Church? Does Ritschl 
tregt these "facts" in a vacuum, that is, 
completely secularise all history except that 
bound up with the revelation. As we examine 
his Christology from a closer range, we will 
want to bear in mind whether the ground plan of 
his theology and Christology, e.g. centering 
everything in the "historic record" or New 
Testament "facts", is theologically sound. In 
the background, we should allow his definition 
of the function of religion, viz. the 
consciousness of freedom and victory over the 
world, of deliverance and uplift into a 
spiritual realm, and the aim of Christianity, 
as the establishment of a community of moral 
and free men, to prepare us for the steps which 
Ritschl will take in developing his Christology.
As a preparatory step, or the foreshadowing 
of his handling of the historic Jesus, we must 
record Ritschl Ts distinction from any of his 
predecessors and contemporaries in the general 
place given in his theology to the revelation 
of the Son. In his third volume, he says of
t h e o l o g i c a l  k n o w l e d g e :  " A s  t h e o l o g y  h a s  t o
d o  w i t h  t h e  G o d  r e v e a l e d  in Christ, this is
justified scientifically as the only
practicable*form of the conception of God.
T h e  content of the Divine Will is to be
deduced from the revealed reciprocal relations
b e t w e e n  C h r i s t  a n d  G o d ,  a n d  f r o m  n o  o t h e r  
5 0 *
p r i n c i p l e • *  I f  G o d  i s  c o n c e i v e d  a s  l o v e ,  
a n d  i f  H e  i s  k n o w n  e x p e  rent a l l y  a n d  e x p e r i m e n t a l l y ,  
H e  i s  k n o w n  i n  a n d  t h r o u g h  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  H i s  
W i l l  t o  H i s  S o n  a n d  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  t h e  
K i n g d o m  o f  G o d . . " H e  ( G o d )  i s  n o t  c o n c e i v e d  a s  
b e i n g  a n y t h i n g  a p a r t  f r o m  a n d  p r i o r  t o  H i s  s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  a s  l o v e . . G o d  i s  l o v e ,  i n a s m u c h  a s  
H e  r e v e a l s  H i m s e l f  t h r o u g h  H i s  S o n  t o  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y ,  w h i c h  H e  h a s  f o u n d e d ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
f o i m  i t  i n t o  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  G o d ,  s o  t h a t  i n  
d e s i g n i n g  f o r  m e n  t h i s  s u p r a - m u n d a n e  d e s t i n y ,
H e  r e a l i s e s  H i s  o w n  g l o r y ,  o r  t h e  f u l f i l l m e n t  
o f  H i s  p e r s o n a l  e n d . . .  H e r e i n  i s  t h e  l o v e  o f  
G o d  p e r f e c t e d ,  t h a t  w e  l o v e  o u r  b r e t h r e n  i n  t h e  
K i n g d o m  o f  G o d .  ( 1  J o h n  I V .  1 2 ) .  B u t ,  a s ,  f r o m  
o u r  p o i n t  o f  v i e ? / ,  t h i s  c o n s u m m a t i o n  a l w a y s  
a p p e a r s  a s  o n e  y e t  t o  b e  a t t a i n e d ,  o u r  p r o g r e s s  
t o w a r d s  it i s  g u i d e d  by o u r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e
5 0 ' .  R i t s c h l ,  p . 2 3 7
truth that,for us, the love of God, in his 
relation to His Son our Lord, is an assured
51
fact*” * Describing this regulative principle,
e.g. the Kingdom of God, Ritschl focuses his
point in another vein. "The creation of this
fellowship of love among men, accordingly,
is not merely the end of the world, but, at the
same time, the completed revelation of God Himself,
beyond which none other and none higher can be
conceived. This principle supplies a basis
for that religious and theological way of
looking at the world, which sets itself in
opposition to those Areopagitic conclusions
whose baneful after-effects are present in all
forms of Orthodoxy. Instead of holding with
Thomas Aquinas that God's personal end has no
relation to the end of the world, we find not
only that God's personal end and the end of the
world are one, but, also, that the knowledge of
the end ofthe world is attainable by us,
coincides with the Christian idea of the nature
52and the completed revelation of God." * Ritschl 
states the self-end and completion of God 
realisable in the Community in a more obvious 
manner in a later context••"The end (the creation
51. Ibid., p.282.
52. Ibid., p.291.
of the Kingdom of God) embraced as it is in the
Divine self-end, stands nearer to His eternal
will than the creatures, which are merely means
to its realisation .Accordingly, the idea
of the community fs etemai election denotes
only the value which belongs to the community
of the Kingdom of God, as the divine final end,
in contrast with the world, which is, in
53comparison, merely a means.
While Ritschl, in these passages, endeavours 
to reckon with the eternality of God’s purpose 
viz. "the Kingdom of God as the correlate of 
His loving Will’,’ by beginning with the empirical 
community founded by the Son, he throws some 
doubt on the "completeness" of God prior to His 
realisation in the community. Trying to explain 
the "intention" of God and the realisation of 
His purpose in the preparatory creations,
Ritschl’s theoiy of Knowledge is strained to the 
breaking point. Hot only do his views on the 
"absoluteness" and "completeness" of God come in 
for serious questioning, but when he says.... 
"the creatures (the world).. • .are means to its 
(eternal will) realisation," he encourages a 
criticism which has been levelled against
53* Ibid., p.301.
Hegelianism - namely, without the world God 
would not be God. In these above passages, God 
seems lost in His Kingdom and, in the process of 
becoming completed, the means (His creation) is 
depersonalised. But, these thoughts are not' 
central to our primary enquiry - that of 
determining the place of the historical Jesus 
in Ritschlfs grand scheme. Before we lose 
ourselves in these digressions, though each 
seems to be an important facet of Ritschl fs 
point of view, we may turn to his Christology. 
let, we must turn our attention to another 
sidelight, called by Ritschl "the regulative 
principle" of his theology: the Kingdom of God.
The theologian who looks disdainfully on any 
speculative theology undermines his case when 
he comes to specifying his ideas on various 
Christian doctrines. According to Ritschl,
"It is of the greatest importance for the 
systematic procedure of theology that this 
difference, between individual religious 
thinking and the form of theological cognition 
sub specie altemitatis, should never be 
forgotten. Our self-consciousness is bound up 
with time,' and it is never given us to survey
the v/hole of the divine order within which we
move as parts, so that we simply cannot but
regard and judge our relation to God under the 
‘54-form of time.”'' # Yet, this theologian, in 
postulating God’s final end in the Kingdom of 
God, the correlate of his Love, engages in a 
flight of speculation similar to the metaphysical 
theories of which he is so polemically critical. 
While rejecting the metaphysical forms of theology, 
Ritschl, in his Kingdom of God idea, gives us a 
speculative deduction of the Kingdom of God from 
the love of God. HJ.S argument, called by Brunner 
some form of ethical metaphysics, may be summarily 
treated. God is love, inasmuch as He reveals 
Himself through His son to the community founded 
by Him, in order to develop it into the Kingdom 
of God, so that He realises in this supermundane 
purposeful distinction of men His fulfillment of 
His purpose of Himself.
Through the importance which Ritschl attaches to 
his own theory - an importance which stands out 
the more clearly in view of his highly critical 
comments on those who dissented from it - we may 
be led to feel that Ritschl Ts severe strictures 
on all speculative metaphysics, as distinct from 
any particular metaphysical system, are not 
warranted by his own practice# Professor Orr’s
54-. Ritschl, p.525*
striking indictment of the system should be
noted at this stage.."Through its avowed
dependence on a ’theory of knowledge’; it is
controlled at every point by metaphysics. The
question, Ritschl says, is not as to whether,
but as to what mebaphysics is to be employed in
t h e o l o g y . * Though Mozley, in his study of
Ritschlianism, takes issue with this indictment,
saying that we cannot identify a theory of
56.knowledge with a metaphysic, we may say with 
Dr. Garvie that Ritschl identified the two. 
Couching his disagreements with Plato and Kant in 
an epistomological manner may be justifiable so 
far as their theories of knowledge extend, but, 
when Ritschl proceeds to speak of the Thing-in- 
itseif and the Thing-for-us, he derives some 
sort of metaphysic in the process. Swing points 
out that Ritschl recognised that in using a 
theory of knowledge he is using a metaphysical 
aid. Swing quotes from Ritschl to substantiate 
his observation. "It is an inconsiderate and 
incredible assertion that I exclude all 
metaphysics from theology..I follow a theory of 
knowledge which, in the determination of the 
objects of knowledge, is governed by a conception
55* Orr, "The Ritschlian Theology" - p.257*
56. Mozley, "Ritschlianism, An Essay” - p.15*
of the thing, and, consequently, it is
metaphysical. Consequently, the controversy
"between Luhardt and myself, when rightly
formulated, is only as to what metaphysics is
57justified in t h e o l o g y # *
These additional preparatory remarks bring in
focus two things# (1) It is from the revelation
in the Son that theology takes its leave, and
(2) The Son is an agent through which God was
to realise His final end in the Kingdom of God.
Who then is the Son? How is His Person to be
spoken of? Ritschl *s Christology is based
primarily on Christ fs human achievements and,
on the basis of Ritschl*s ‘theory of Knowledge*,
e.g. the subject is known through the
predicates or effects, this is not surprising.
Through these achievements, and not some objective,
detached formulae.."His Godhead becomes for His
People manifest, conspicious, intelligible,
winning our xaith, not in the form of assent
to an unintelligible dogma, but of personal
58trust for our salvation."^ * To approach his 
meaning for us, we have, so Ritschl remarks, 
a new idea of faith. Paith, according to 
Ritschl, is no longer an assent to revealed
57. Swing, p.76-77, quoted from Ritschl*s
"Theology and Metaphysic" - p*58.
58. Ritschl, p.394-.
dogma, but faith consists in confidence toward 
God. It follows from this, confidence is a trust 
in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit and a 
recognition of the Godhead of Christ and ofthe * 
Holy Spirit. "Knowledge of God," Ritschl informs 
us in another section of his system, "can be 
demonstrated as religious knowledge only v/hen 
He is conceived as securing to the believer such 
a position in the world as more than counter­
balances its restrictions. Apart from this 
value-judgment of faith, there exists no 
knowledge of God worthy of this content. So 
that we ought not to strive after a purely 
theoretical and fdisinterested* knowledge of God, 
as an indispensable preliminary to the knowledge 
of faith. .The trust rather is that we know the 
nature of God and Christ only in their worth for 
us. For God and faith are inseparable conceptions; 
faith, however, confessedly does not consist
in abstract knowledge, or knowledge which deals
59with merely historical facts. That is, as we
are told, the religious estimate of Christ - an 
estimate which Luther distinguished from a 
theoretical exposition of the Christological 
dogma. It is, then, not to the abstract,
59* Ritschl, p.212
4-95.
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theoretical claims of His person, but to His 
vocation, his own experience of realising that
independence toward the world which through 
Him has become the experience of the members of 
His Community, that must form the fabric of a 
Christological discussion.
The r e l i g i o u s  significance and worth of Christ 
i s  d i s c o v e r a b l e  in His work and whan this work 
has e f f e c t e d  in the Conmnmity • "The nature of 
G o d  a n d  t h e  D i v i n e  we can only know7 in its
e s s e n c e  by determining its value for our
60salvation." This primary factor, called by
61
R i t s c h l ,  a  "direct value-judgment",' *is contrary 
to the disinterested, scientific knowledge of the 
e a r l y  C h u r c h  formulae of two natures. The 
G o d h e a d  of C h r i s t  is an attribute revealed to us 
in H i s  s a v i n g  influence upon ourselves. "We 
m u s t , "  we are cautioned by Ritschl, "first be 
a b l e  to prove the Godhead that is revealed 
before we take account of the Godhead that is 
e t e r n a l . ..If the exalted Christ or the eternal 
Godhead is to be reckoned with in the Christian 
faith, it must be demonstrated to- us in the 
historic Christ. Moreover, it must be laid 
down cl early that the attribute of Godhead thus 
ascribed to Christ is based on the personal
60. Ibid., p . 398.
61. Ibid., p.398.
62experience of his disciples.” The Godhead of
Christ, by way of elaborating this essential
criterion, must find its form in the historical
figure of Jesus. The Godhead or Universal
Lordship of Christ must be apprehended in definite
functions of his historical life, as an attribute
of his existence in time. For what Christ is in
virtue of His eternal destiny, and what the
influences in which He exerts on us because of
His exaltation to God, would be wholly beyond
our ken if we did not also experience the effects
of the same in His existence in them. Unless the
conception of His present Lordship receives its
content from the definite characteristics of His
historical activity, then it is either a meaningle
formula or the occasion for all kinds of extra-
63.vagance.
The religious estimate of the Godhead or 
divinity of Christ is rooted in the historical 
Jesus and, more specifically, in his visible 
conduct and ethical convictions. Our concern, 
according to Ritschl, is not with the endowment 
of His Person with inborn qualities or powers.
He exerts an influence only through His ethical 
action and not, as is traditionally assumed, 
through the supremacy of His Person.
62. Ibid., p.406.
6 3« Ibid., p. 406.
Faced with the claim that Jesus* ethical 
apprehensions were often inapt by present-day 
Western conscience, Ritschl asserts that J e s u s *  
religious dignity does not depend upon the 
unbroken completeness of His ethical views, nor 
does it simply mean th&t Jesus provides a moral 
code for the details of life. The founder of 
a religion, **the bearer of the perfect spiritual 
religion, had for his central mission the end of 
God - the union of mankind through love. Through 
Him, men are led in accepting their view of the 
world. The theological solution of the problem 
of Christ’s Divinity must, therefore, be based 
upon an analysis of what He has done for the 
salvation of mankind in the form of the community. 
What Christ is for us must verify itself in the 
transferring of His worth to us. The recognition 
of Jesus as the Christ has for us no meaning 
unless through Him we know ourselves raised to 
Kingship or dominion over the world, and to 
priesthood or undisturbed communion with God.
Only in relation to these practical ends will 
even an objective theological discussion of the 
statements of the Creed satisfy the religious
interest.^*
64. Ibid., p.417.
65. Ibid., p.418.
After choosing from Ritschl *s position 
several themes which determine his Christology, 
we may turn now to the essential work of the 
Christ. The purpose of the work, it is 
remembered, is to secure for men freedom with 
regard to the world and with regard to sin, and 
freedom in their intercourse with God. The 
essential contribution which Ritschl clams to 
make to a discussion of Christology lies in 
bringing the specific significance of the 
Person of Christ for the Christian view of the 
world and the sense of personal worth into 
relation with the attainment of our own perscnal 
independence over against the world. The 
origin of the Person of Christ - how His person 
attained the form in which it presents itself 
to our ethical and religious apprehension - is 
not a subject for theological inquiry, because 
the problem transcends all inquiry, according to 
Ritschl fs *bheory of knowledge*.
Traditional Christology based its discussion 
of Jesus on the three offices or functions, 
i.e. Priestly, Kingly and prophetic. But, these 
divisions of the work of Christ, according to 
Ritschl, have tended to fragmentise the life
instead of devising some ultimate unity.
Organic unity may be arrived at if the three 
offices are understood not as separate or 
distinct functions, but as coalescing and reaching 
some matrix in the foundihg and maintenance of 
the community of believers. The regulative 
principle for understanding theology and the 
proper task of theology, vix. explicating a 
knowledge of God through His Son, is the Kingship 
of Christ or the Kingdom of God. (Jesus)...
"as the founder of the Kingdom of God in the world, 
ih other words, as the Bearer of Godfs ethical 
Lordship over men, occupies a unique position 
toward all who have received a like aim from 
Him; therefore, He is that Being in the world in 
whose self-end God makes effective and manifest 
after an original manner His own eternal self­
end, whose whole activity, therefore, in dis­
charge of His vocation, forms the material of 
that complete revelation of God which is present 
in Him, in whom, in short, the word of God is a 
human person."^*
66. Ibid., p.45*
Vocation: Mission of Jesus:
Ritschl considers the work of Jesus in a two­
fold manner. In describing thevocation of Jesus, 
what Jesus accomplished becomes the goal and end 
of the Community. Ritschl selects two traits of 
Jesus* character which become the center of his 
Christological constructions. We shall allow 
these two ideas tell the story of Ritschl*s 
doctrine of the Person and Work of the Christ.
(1) Though born an Israelite, Jesus raided 
Himself above these particular earthly limitations 
of His existence. In His oyjil person he realised 
that Universal human nature which is required by 
the idea of His vocation. wThe fact of His 
belonging to one particular nation in reality 
only serves Him as a means of fulfilling His 
vocation; inwardly He is untrammeled by any
constraint of earthly prejudice reflecting the
67narrow spirit of the family or the nation.**
His religious judgment of Himself was independent 
of all Old Testament standards. This exercise 
of the supremacy over the world, especially 
when the exalted Christ is considered, is not 
through might or power. It is (the supremacy)., 
"anything but a fact of objective and palpable
67* Ibid., p.459•
experience.. .the power, over the world which Paul 
ascribes to the Christian, and which must serve 
as our guiding analogy in interpreting the 
original assertion of Christ, falls entirely 
within the sphere of the spiritual, and cannot 
become palpable or evident in any corresponding 
degree. If, therefore, our caicem be to find 
in the historical portrait of Christ other proofs 
than those already quoted of His characteristic 
independence of the spirit of His nation, the 
inconspicuous character of these proofs cannot 
afford any ground for doubting the correctness
(2Q
of the result." * It is within the sphere of the 
invisible, according to Ritschl, that we..."can 
trace the advancing povrer of Christ over this 
world at all. *
Besides the universal human nature which Christ 
exemplified in his person, His patience under 
suffering is the other primary Ritschlian motive.
(2) This patient endurance is a consequence of 
His loyalty to His vocation and the test of His 
unique power over the vrorld. "Jesus,” according 
to Ritschl in an effort to substantiate this 
second aspect of the work of Christ, "recognises 
His suffering to be the yoke by which He is led
68. Ibid., p.460.
69* Ibid., p.460.
of God, by whom He, the Son is first recognised." 
Through His exemplary patience under sufferings,
His eschewing of self-preservation, He evokes the 
religious motive of patience under tribulations. 
When He calls to Himself those who would fain 
crave not their own fate and are succumbing under 
the obstructions to their freedom, His aim is to 
lead them to see in their burdens dispensations 
of God; on these terms the said burdens will 
become light, because, by the patience which 
springs from the religious motive, men lift 
themselves above their misfortunes and the world... 
This is the proof that Jesus Himself offers us of 
the supremacy over the world which belongs to 
Himself through the mutual knowledge existing 
between Himself and God."^*
These two aspects of Christfs vocation, His 
faithfulness manifested in the discharge of His 
vocation and the loftiness of his self- 
determination as compared with the particular 
and natural impulses which spring from the world, 
are the features in the earthly life of Christ 
which are summed up in the attribute of His 
Godhead. This patience and faithfulness have
70. Ibid., p.463*
71. Ibid., p.463*
their source in the desire inspired by His 
vocation and sustained by His unique knowledge 
of God, to set up the Kingdom of God among men 
as their supra-mundane final end.
In the community belong those, according to 
Ritschl, who experience this same Lordship in 
themselves. Members of the community, through 
conduct prompted by universal brotherly love and 
possible manifestation of supremacy over the 
world and independence of the same, display in 
themselves the successful issue of Christ’s 
peculiar work.
Bjxt, what is the relationship between the 
initiator of this exemplary behaviour and the 
members of the community who may experience 
"this same Lordship in themselves?" As the 
historical Founder of the community, we are 
assured that Christ is necessarily unique in 
His own order. While others may approximate 
His world-conquering patience, these would stand 
in historical dependence on Him. While those 
who succeed Him in the realisation of the Kingdom 
of God, the fact that this end is the self-end 
of God has for Him quite a different meanirg •
For the members of Christ*s community come to
take this attitude as those who have had within
them originally, another bond ox will; whereas,
the figure of Christ cannot be understood at all
unless it is His original and distinguishing
characteristic, that He find his own personal end
in the self-end of God. If Christ is thus the
personal revelation of the Will of God as
essentially love, then certainly, from the point
of view of degree, the love of God finds its
perfect revelation in the fact that the members
of the Kingdom of God fulfill the law of
brotherly love; but from the point of view of
kind, these manifestations of brotherly love
in their widest sense must be regarded as the
intended result of the Divine Lordship
introduced through Christ in grace and truth
72.and spritiual freedom over the world.
The **world conquering will" of the Christ and 
not the speculations concerning the essential 
nature of Christ, is, according to Ritschl, His 
true essence. "If Christ is to be fudged by 
categories that are applied to no other object 
than Himself, then He is rendered unintelligible 1^ 
It is worth, then, of his human achievements Y/rought
72* Ibid., p.466.
73* Ibid., p.468.
for our salvation which mark Him as the God-man.
His patience under suffering, His universal love 
and his faithfulness to his vocation to establish 
the universal ethical fellowship of mankind which 
is God’s end, denote, the characteristics of His 
Godhead. These are, as we have learned from 
Ritschl’s Christology, to be inferred from the 
portraits of the Hew Testament Christ and from 
His life lived in history.
We have sketched Ritschl’s Christology and 
given some attention to the various facets of 
his system which are presupposed in his Christology, 
e.g. theory of knowledge, doctrine of the Kingdom 
of God, value-judgments, with the intention of 
elucidating his thinking on the historical Jesus 
and His place in the Ritschlian theology. It is 
from the records of the earthly Jesus that we are 
to learn of Him, and moreover, it is only through 
the Christ of the records that God is to be 
apprehended. Apart from these reports, God 
cannot be known. In one stroke, this is to 
exclude what Tillich has called "the History of 
Revelation". That is to say, in Ritschl’s 
exclusive emphasis on the historical Jesus as the
only source of the Revelation of God, he has 
divorced the event of Christ from events and 
thought patterns which preceded the "event".
And, if this is not enough, Ritschl has further 
severed the Rev; Testament Jesus from the Jesus 
who was confessed to be the Christ since the 
Hew Testament age. In a word, Ritschl’s Christ 
is "bottled up" in the Hew Testament. How does 
Ritschl’s exclusive emphasis on the Hew Testament 
Jesus, or his "Christocentrism” affect his view 
of history and his conception of the work of the 
Holy Spirit?
Before we may feel free to comment on this 
ambivalence in Ritschl’s system, we should turn 
our attention to his understanding of the priestly 
work of the Christ. The ethical view in the light 
of his vocation has, we are informed, followed 
essentially the point of view expressed in the 
"Kingly Prophethood of Christ."'^** The ethical 
view found its appropriate sequence in the 
religious estimate of His life as the revelation 
of the love of God, and of that freedom which, 
as the characteristic power over the world, is 
the mark of Godhead. But, how does the ethical
74. Ibid., p.472.
view ox the priestly character which has been
claimed for the life and suffering of Christ
resolve itself in the religious point of view?
As Priest, if Christ is to he thought of in
this way, the character of His priestly activity
is contained in each moment of His unique
consciousness, that as the Son of God He stands
to God as Father in a relation of incomparable
fellowship, which is realised in his Knowledge
of God, in the surrender of His will to God's
providential guiding, and in the security of
75feeling which accompanies the same. But,
Christ is, first of all, according to Ritschl,
a Priest in His own behalf..”He is the subject
of that true and perfect religion, compared with
which no other has been able to bring men to the
desired goal of nearness to God. For, since
Christ was the first to possess complete and
exhaustive knowledge of God, He is, therefore,
also the first who was qualified in the true and
final manner to exercise that fellowship with God
which is the aim of every religion, and to
experience in Himself in its fullness there,
76.reciprocal and saving influence of God.”
75. Ibid., p.476.
76. Ibid., p.475*
But, under what conditions are we to understand
that Christ's loyalty to His vocation as a whole,
and, more especially, His willingness to endure
death as a consequence of that loyalty, have the
significance of priestly service for others?
The traditional interpretations, concentrating
on Christ's meritorious sacrifice and the
propitiation of an angry God on the behalf of the
punishment due man for his inherited guilt, are,
accordin to Ritschl, urfenable. ,fJust as the
assured conception of original sin obscures the
particular guilt of individual men, so the penal
%
satisfaction offered by Christ is made the 
equivalent of the eternal damnation due to all 
mankind, and is by no means fitted to counteract
77the sense of guilt of each separate individual(( * 
Commenting of these inadequate atonement 
theories, Ritschl explains his problem, "If the 
individual sense of guilt is to be met by the 
thought of the penal satisfaction offered by 
Christ, then nothing is left us but the hypothesis 
that Christ in His sufferings had a distinct and 
separate experience of the amount of punishment 
due to each separate individual of all mankind*
The impossibility of this supposition is at once 
apparent, for there is as little evidence in the
77* Ibid*, p.4-80.
history of Christ's life, as there is room 
within the range of His human consciousness for 
an omniscience of this kind; so that we have 
here a conclusive reason against the interpretation 
of Christ's sufferings as the conscious experience 
hy Him of the punishment due to all mankind.
But, if Ritschl rejects the depravity of man
which he assumes the meritorious sacrifice to be
a further implication, what is the mediatorial
position of the Rounder of the community of
Universal Love? Jesus, we are told, in His
exercise of Lordship over the world through
willing acceptance and patient appropriation of
suffering, realised directly in His own person
that eternal life which is opposed to the
changes of material things. We may become a
part of this community.. .by "attachment to His
79.person, and by appropriation of his aim."'^*
We possess eternal life and gain Christ's 
attitude to the world by, it would appear, 
imitating fesus. The principle enunciated by 
Jesus, and which He was the first to realise, 
i.e. spiritual freedom of the individual and 
the revelation in his suffering and obedience 
of the universal final end of the world,
78. Ibid., p.4-82.
79. Ibid., p.504-.
constitute the priestly, ethico-religious 
significance of Christianity. Ritschl comments 
on the task of each individual Christian in the 
matter of receiving the mediating function of the 
Christ in the following manner: "By directing
our wills to God as the unchangeable Father < from 
whom comes every good and nothing but good (James 
1 : 1 7 ) ,  who, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ 
claims our firm trust unbroken by any wavering 
of aim (1.5, 11.1), we raise ourselves above the 
world. For the elevation of soul, in which the 
Christian glories even in his lowliness, i.e. in 
the midst of persecution, marks him off from the 
real lowliness of the man who is rich in the world 
who passes away like grass before the scorching 
wind ( 1 . 9 - H ) .  Faith, moreover, which is 
immovable and firm, and includes in itself a 
treasury of riches, i.e. a peculiar emplitude of 
power, raises itself above the traditional 
conditions of worldly society, the precedence of 
the rich over the poor ( 1 1 . 1 - 5 ) . " ^ *  This 
steadfast, unchanging direction of our wills, is 
eternal life. What then are we to make of the 
forgiveness of sins?
"In the place of the complicated condition of
80. Ibid., p.505*
guilt, separation from God and bondage to the
world, there is to come its exact opposite,
trust in God, not audaciously and arbitrarily
and prematurely entertained, but pervaded by
reverence toward Him - trust, moreover, which
introduced the soul to the promises and task of
the Kingdom of God, and thus brings his will to
direct itself to God's end, and which, finally,
makes the motives which spring from the vtorid
subordinate to the Divine final end - then his
81sin must be forgiven, and his guilt removed."
This neat Ritschlian scheme is highlighted by 
a phrase which appeared above, namely, "we raise 
ourselves above the world." Moreover, man 
"brin s his will to direct itself to God's end." 
Such is the optimism and absurdity which 
Ritschl gave voice to in his ethico-religious 
theory of the work of theChrist.
Our discussion of some of theRitschlian motives 
has prepared a sufficient base for his interpretat­
ion of history. As we pointed out earlier, Ritschl 
does not address himself, at least specifically, 
to the problem of history. He assumes that his 
readers were not asking of his understanding of 
history and historical events. As we move into
81. Ibid., p.529*
this aspect of our essay, we shall expect to 
deduce many of our interpretations of Ritschl's 
"interpretation" from his theological system as 
we have chosen to present selective sections 
from his major work, "Justification and 
Reconciliation",
5• Ritschl *s Interpretation of History:
Ritschl has emphasised the importance of the 
historical and especially the supremacy of the 
history associated with Jesus Christ, hut he has 
not examined his terminology or subjected his 
view of 'history' in the way he attempts to 
distinguish his theory of knowledge from other 
theories utilised by theologians. In the heat of 
controversy, and in the violence which charactera­
ised his reaction to speculative and dogmatic 
theology, much of the necessary semantic clarity 
and scrutiny of ideas is missing in his theology. 
In view of Ritschl's total system, or the parts 
which we have surveyed, we shall be forced to 
imply his interpretation of the historical.
In the first place, his theory of knowledge 
implies an emphasis on the phenomenal over the 
metaphysical, of the particular operations of God
through His effects over the general, unrevealed, 
unveiled character of God. Utilising the 
inductive method which deals with established 
facts, Ritschl determines the objects and limits 
of religious knowledge. The value-judgments of 
religion indicate the worth of religious knowledge. 
While these judgments constitute the subjective 
form of knowledge, Ritschl did not intend that 
apprehension, appreciation and appropriation of 
religious truth should minimise its objective 
content. Historical facts, comprising this 
revelation, recorded in scripture and experienced 
by the first community, exist actually and really, 
quite independent of the wishes and hopes of the 
individual believer. Value-judgments appropriate 
the facts, apprehend and assign personal worth 
to the particular events recorded in the New 
Testament. Christianity is, accordingly, a 
religion which concerns a historical person and a 
historical community. While some of Ritschlrs 
disciples, particularly Herrmann, connect and 
co-ordinate the present appropriation or 
reception of the facts with the initial "event" 
or "events" in the New Testament, Ritschl does not 
concern himself with that aspect of the "factual" 
events. His primary task, as we understand it, was 
to expound the groundwork of Christianity, i.e. the
New Testament facts.
But, is Ritschl's understanding of the "facts" 
clear to him? That is to say, is Ritschl certain 
in his own mind of his interpretation of the 
New Testament "facts"? Within his theory of 
knowledge, it is clear, so it would appear from 
our own understanding and interpretation of his 
methodology, that the effects of a personality, 
the deeds and actions, the seen and obvious, 
constitute the primary knowledge. The real or 
actual, the thing-in-itself is known and perceived 
in its effects and predicates. From these empirical 
data and from these manifestations and operations, 
we may devise a system of knowledge, or how we 
know what we know. But, as we have chosed to 
point out in several instances, clarity of mind
was absent on this primary methodology. In one
place, in his 3 r d volume of "Justification and
Reconciliation", Ritschl wants to say that his
view of reality differs from the Kantian idea,
to the effect that sensibility was the
82characteristic mode of reality. * Yet, it would 
appear from his m n  phenomalism that sensibility 
and the appearance of a thing, is the primary
82. Ibid., p.221.
way we know what we know. On the other hand, 
in his "Theologie und Metaphysic” he brings the 
appearances into some relationship with the 
cognising soul that integrates and assigns the 
appearances into some manageable order.
In view of the ambivalence in Ritschlfs system 
on one of his primary points, i.e. his theory of 
knowledge, we shall expect vagueness and 
vacillation in his understanding of the New 
Testament "facts”. In one context, referring 
to the supremacy of the Christ, Ritschl speaks 
of the non-objective evidence of this might and 
power. The power of Christ is..."anything but 
a fact of objective and palpable experience."
It is not "palpable or evident" that the Christ 
exercised supremacy.over the world, nor is it 
plain or "factually" evident that this supremacy 
is exercised by a believer in the Christ. It is, 
according to Ritschl, within the sphere of the 
invisible that we can trace the advancing power 
of Christ over this world at all. But, does 
Ritschl's theory of knowledge provide for these 
views? And, are we doing him an injustice by 
implying a naive, realistic understanding of 
facts? On the evidence which we have uncovered 
in his system, we do not think so. Yet, there is
83. Ibid., p.4-60
enough ambivalence in his thinking to cause us 
to say that Ritschl, while emphasising the 
supremacy of the "facts" of the historical 
revelation in Jesus, had a confused interpret­
ation of these facts. For example; He isolates 
the New Testament history of the redemptive act 
in Christ from the history of redemption in the 
Old Testament and the development and understand­
ing of these redemptive events within the New 
Testament and beyond the Apostolic witness. All 
history is secular except the history associated 
with the Christ event. Possibly this natural- 
supernatural view of history, designating the 
New Testament history as supernatural - though 
not in an obvious maimer - explains why Ritschl 
could consider, on the one hand, the palpable 
objectivity of historical events not associated 
with the Jesus of history, and on the other, the 
events connected with Jesus as belonging to a 
special sphere of their own. In other words, the 
natural-supernatural, secular-sacred view of 
history plagued Ritschlfs view of the Christian 
message. V/hile eschewing the traditional ways 
of appropriating the Christian faith, e.g. 
through dogmas and alien theories of knowledge, 
Ritschl fs theology is, with some exceptions,
guiltily of the same error which he
associates with the traditionalists, though
his error has taken on a different guise. In
his system, the historical in the New Testament,
despite his reminder that "faith does not
consist in abstract knowledge, or knowledge
84
which deals with merely historical facts," * 
is the source of faith. The historical "facts" 
in the New Testament are, it would seem, in a 
realm of their own - free from criticism or 
investigation. It would also appear that the 
historic Jesus which Ritschl elevates from the 
background in the Old Testament and from world 
history before and since the first century, is 
an abstraction. This Jesus of Ritschl fs portrait 
is abstract no less surely than the metaphysics 
of the Athanasian Greed or than the Hegelian 
"Divine Humanity".
It remained for one of his followers, Wilhelm 
Hermann, to move beyond Ritschl Ts error. 
Hermann, as we shall see in our next chapter, 
was concerned with the freedom of the Christian 
from dogmas and the probabilities of historical 
events narrated in the New Testament. Herrmann 
was intent on describing another side of the
84. Ibid., p.212.
Christian message, i.e., the present historical 
appearance of the Christ in the sphere where we 
live. The Christian faith did not rest on a 
scientific certainty that the New/ Testament events 
occurred in the way they are described; on the 
contrary, faith had its root in the present 
appropriation of the historical Christ as He 
appears today.
These men are searching for a solution to the 
dilemma which their theory of knowledge has 
placed them in. On the one hand, the objectivity 
of the events, the eventfulness of the happenings 
must be safeguarded, and, on .the other hand, the 
worthship, quality and significance of these 
happenings must be declared. The objectivity of 
the event guards against the subjectivism of 
Schleiermacherian theology and the mysticism of 
speculative philosophical theology. The value- 
judgment of faith assigns the objective event its 
worth, but the event is actual and real. The 
actuality and realness of the "events” associated 
with theChrist, as these events were related to 
Ritschl*s theory of knowledge, created a conflict, 
it would appear, in Ritschl*s own mind.
It is this conflict between the objectivity 
a n d  subjectivity of the event, its past 
relevance and present significance, which 
carries us a step away from the master to one 
of his finest disciples, Wilhelm Herrmann.
CHAPTER III.
THE THEOLOGY OP WILHELM HERRMANN.
1. Introduction.
We turn to the theology of Wilhelm Herrmann for 
an interpretation of history and the historical 
Jesus which we are warranted in saying lies 
implicit in the thought of Ritschl. Herrmann, 
as we shall soon discover, devoted attention to the 
problem of the historical Jesus, while Ritschl took 
for granted that his point of view was understood. 
There is, as we shall soon see, some attention 
given to the ambiguity which we noted in Ritschl *s 
view, i.e. concerning the true basis of faith in 
the historical Jesus. While Ritschl’s thought is 
clarified and advanced in Herrmann’s writings, he 
left us with another glaring ambiguity which proves 
rather disturbing.
Hermann,s most important treatise, "The Communion 
of the Christian with God", elaborates his 
interpretation of the ’Gospel facts.T He is 
concerned to refute two interpretations of the 
Christian Gospel, both of which he considers to be 
legal in nature. The first, on the left wing of 
the Gospel of Jesus, centre their knowledge of Jesus 
in the rule of doctrine. Through accepting certain 
doctrines about Jesus.."they wish to become or 
reckon that they are Christians."^* This interpret­
ation bases their Christianity on general ideas and
1. Herrmann, Wilhelm, "The Communion of the Christian
with God" - p.7*
eternal truths which must be acknowledged. The 
right wing of the Gospel of Jesus, according to 
Herrmann’s description,.."count it part of their 
glory that with them the sum of doctrine is much 
more comprehensive, end embraces at the least all 
that is reported or taught about Jesus in the Newp
Testament." * This point of view in its legalistic 
character seeks to map out the way all must go 
before they can become Christians. Herrmann 
brings two objections against his opponents who 
consider assent to an extract of biblical doctrine 
to be the way to Truth. First of all, this 
demand is morally impossible, and, secondly, a 
convenient substitution for what is really 
necessary. It is Herrmann’s central idea, stated 
by him in this context, that he uses to refute 
these positions in his book. He writes: "One
who comes under the grasp of the spiritual 
character of Jesus wins a right appreciation of the 
doctrines about the Person of Jesus, so that he can 
find in even them that one thing great and precious 
to him above all else in the world, the power of 
this personal spirit over men who are yearning to 
become conscious of God. .For he now sees in their 
essential characteristics, (the doctrines), the 
expression of what he himself has experienced. And 
the rest of what is there he puts calmly aside until
2. Ibid., p.8.
it shall please God that it too shall appear as
originating in him."-'*
Placing himself decisively against the concept
of T,facts which demand faith/1 when by these
facts are meant the miracles reported in the Holy
Scriptures, or, indeed, anything that is an event
of the past and not something that can be experienced
here and now, Herrmann proceeds to...,fset foifh
and expound the communion of the Christian with
4.
God which is mediated through Jesus Christ." *
This is, according to him, the first business of 
theology. It is the task of historical science to 
state New Testament doctrines. The theologian^ 
task is not fixity of doctrine, but his business is., 
"to open men’s eyes and lead them to see that 
nothing can be revelation to them except what 
actually lifts them into communion with God."
Prom within the standpoint of faith, Herrmann 
describes the inner life of faith and the under­
standing which faith places on the objects of faith. 
While Roman Catholic and Protestant Orthodoxy 
believed their great task to be the systematising 
of the thoughts of the classic witnesses to 
Christianity, Herrmann is intent on going further 
than this. "We desire," he writes, "to show how 
those thoughts arise in the course of communion with
3. Ibid., p.3-4-*
4. Ibid., p.4.
3. Ibid., p.39.
God in the Christian soul that has been set free 
to enter into this enterprise. Thus we exhibit 
these thoughts, not as something handed down by 
tradition, but as something in vital growth at 
the present moment, as, in short, thoughts of 
faith.Tt^* The processes within the soul by which 
the individual appropriates salvation are not to be 
understood as a human accomplishment, a Y/ork which 
unredeemed man is obliged to do before he communes 
with God. These thoughts are initiated when, 
according to Herrmann, we are transplanted into 
that inner condition of mind in which such thoughts 
begin to be generated in ourselves, and this happens 
only when God lifts us into communion with Himself. 
After this experience, the Bible is seen as a means 
of the revelation of the grace and of the 
judgment of God.
Unlike the theologians who concern themselves 
with doctrinal formulations, Herrmann sees his 
exposition as concerned with the connection of the 
religious life with the objective reality which 
we find around us. The inner life of faith, and 
the foundation of this life in the personal life 
of Jesus on the basis of Luther’s insights, 
though Herrmann chooses to depart from Luther at 
several critical points, is Hermann’s essential 
concern.
6. Ibid., p.40-41.
Our enquiry is concerned with what Herrmann calls 
the fact of Jesus1 appearance in history; which 
fact is within the realm of history to which we 
ourselves belong. In our circumstances, according 
to Herrmann, we encounter this fact of the Man 
Jesus as an undoubted reality. This interpretation 
of Jesus’ presence in our history raises many 
questions - questions which we will want to 
illuminate in our exposition. Does Herrmann 
justify his use of "fact" in connection with the 
appearances of the person of Jesus to us in our 
present history? Is the "fact" on a same level 
with the other "facts" of history? That is to say, 
can the personal life of Jesus be grasped only 
by those within the fellowship through faith and in 
faith, or can it be grasped as a real fact of 
history by a man who has no faith? What 
significance is to be attached to historical 
criticism of the narratives? Do the probabilities 
of history jeopardise the foundation of faith?
In our exposition we shall follow the reasoning 
of Herrmann, even to the point of quoting and 
paraphrasing his arguments. This method is aimed, 
first, at setting forth his own thoughts and, 
secondly, at showing the ambiguity of his thinking 
on two issues which concern us in our inquiry -
namely, the "fact" of the personal life of Jesus 
in the realm in which we live, and the past "fact" 
of Jesus’ appearance in the first centuiy. The 
latter problem involves a discussion of the 
significance of the "fact", or the significance 
which we should place on the "facts" of the faith 
and the ways in which the "facts" become real to 
us in the "place where we stand in history." We 
turn now to the "fact" of Jesus’ appearing in the 
first century and the bearing of that fact on faith.
2. The "fact" of Jesus.
Jesus Christ is "that fact which can make us
certain, as no other fact can, that God communes 
7
with us." But, the Orthodox theologians, 
finding their support for certainty in doctrines 
concerning God and Christ which are vouched for 
by others, and Rationalists who have their 
authority in an inner peace founded upon eternal 
truths which they grasp in and through their 
reason, will consider, according to Herrmann, the 
proposition an exaggeration. Besider considering 
the communion of God with us an inward 
experience into which external facts do not 
intrude, these two interpretations bring two 
objections to bear on the proposition. First,
7* Ibid., p.63.
that the person of Jesus is a fact vouched for 
by quthorities and, secondly, that it is a fact 
of the past. The second objection forbids us to 
say that, strictly speaking, Jesus Himself is an 
element of the reality in which we stand. The 
proponents of this view hold that such can be 
said only of the tradition concerning Jesus.
The second objection to Herrmann’s proposition 
also forbids us to say that God communes with us 
by this fact, i.e. the Person of Jesus, because 
this fact is a thing of the past, whereas God’s 
communion with us must be a thing of the present. 
The first objection to the proposition is 
concerned with the tradition of Jesus, which 
tradition is mediated by others and supremely 
in the New Testament. How can Jesus be an 
undeniable element in our environment, if we are 
dependent on the story of Jesus, or picture of 
Jesus, given by others? By examining these two 
objections, we may, according to Herrmann, arrive 
at some interpretation of history which reaches 
beyond the errors in traditionalism and rationalism.
Pirst of all, Herrmann continues, the tradition 
mirrors what others have experienced in their 
history. Yet, while incorporating the facts into 
our picture, we must appropriate the content of
these facts, that is to say, the interpretations 
placed upon the facts. We may do this in a more 
elementary fashion "by trusting the narratives of 
the events. But, in religious faith, especially 
in matters which concern the vital interests of 
religion, "a believer cannot base his very 
existence entirely on what may be given him by 
other men.r'°* The Roman Chinch, when it accepts 
the appearance of Jesus on the authority of the 
narratives, transforms the Person of Jesus into 
a symbol or stimulus to the imagination. This 
religious interpretation of the Person of Jesus 
places the Jesus of history to one side as soon 
as the deepest religious interest comes forward 
for consideration. But, according to Herrmann, 
this is not the correct appropriation of the 
contents of the narratives. We must bring to 
bear on the stories a historical principle of 
appropriation, namely by combining with the 
narrative something which the tools of historical 
criticism supplies. These tools enable us to 
consider the circumstances which influenced 
the narrator and they further equip us with some 
means of assessing the probability of the contents 
of the narratives, and, hence, how to decide now 
which of the contents may be incorporated into
8. Ibid., p.69
our picture of what actually happened. On the 
basis of these probable factors, viz. literary 
documents, philological considerations and 
archaeological findings, modifications may take 
piece. "It is obvious," Herrmann continues, 
"that such decisions from the standpoint of the 
mere (secular) historian we may ascertain the 
fact that Jesus lived from the fact of the 
existence of His church and its historical 
significance. Even as a mere historian, we may 
discern the correctness of certain features in 
that portrait of Jesus which His followers
9preserved in the records of the New Testament." 
While as historians we may explain away some of 
the interpretative features as due to embellish­
ments, exaggerations, and the transfiguring 
enthusiasm of his disciples, we cannot commit 
ourselves to the absurd supposition that all 
traces of Jesus1 earthly life have disappeared.
But, if much is established on grounds of 
probability... "we do all include His picture 
with its well-known features as a part of the 
historical reality amid which we live, and here 
we are evidently in no way dependent upon the
9* Ibid., p.70.
authority of the chroniclers who give us those 
features of the life of. Jesus. On the contrary, 
the decision which we reach that these things are 
facts, proceeds from our own independent activity, 
and is based upon that which we regard as real 
at present, exactly as the decisions of historical 
criticism are. It is thus perfectly clear that 
we are quite in a position to detach the content 
of a narrative both from the narrative itself and 
from its author, and to regard it as an element 
of the reality to which we have to adjust our 
lives."10'
But,' if historical probability and historical 
investigation of the factual origins of the faith, 
favourable or unfavourable , cannot decide for or 
against the basis of the faith, or if the faith 
cannot be formed or destroyed by historical 
judgment, the questions arise: Upon what grounds
does the certainty rest? Upon whqt basis or 
levels is the picture of Jesus mediated?
Herrmann answers our questions in the following
m a n n e r ”If we have that picture at all, we have
it as the result, not of our own efforts, but of
11the power of Jesus Himself.!T * Elaborating this 
answer, he lays an emphasis on the Christian 
fellowship which has been the recipient of the 
’inner life of Jesus.’ Within this fellowship,
10. Ibid., p.71.
11. Ibid., p.72.
through cohtact with the testimony of others
who have been ’impressed* by Jesus, the power
of Jesus and the remembrance of His saving
activity, and the continual working of this
activity, are communicated. ”If we would
understand what is most important in history,”
Herrmann believes, ” we must look not only to
the records, but also to the men whose actual
12present life expounds those records to us.”
But, does not this mediation of the ’inner 
life’ of Jesus through others take the place of 
the story or the records of the probable facts? 
Herrmann thinks not, for, according to him...
”He who has found the inner life of Jesus 
through the mediation of others, in so far as 
he has really found it, has become free even of 
that mediation.”1 *^ ’’Within our own sphere of 
reality,” Jesus reveals His inner life to us.
In this free revelation, initially detected in 
the Hew Testament records and in the testimony 
of others within the fellowship, the touch of 
the living one, to use Herrmann’s phraseology, 
becomes for us real and present. Whoever has 
come to see the Person of Jesus under the impress 
of that inner life that breaks through all the 
veils of the stoiy, will ask no more questions
12. Ibid., p.73*
13* Ibid., p.74-*
as to the trustworthiness of the Evangelists.
It is not to he thought that this impression of 
the inner life depends upon what we make of the 
story. On the contrary, it is what the contents 
of the story make of us. The prerequisite is not 
scientific accuracy or factual correctness. The 
condition on our part lies in our yearning after 
a fullness for our ovm life. This yearning can 
perceive the strength and fullness of that soul of 
Jesus which meets us in the story, underneath the 
contraditions and imperfections discernible by 
historical criticism. The personality of Jesus, 
His own inner life shines through these dis­
figurements. Within this framework, Herrmann 
says that historical criticism of the New 
Testament writings may have full play. Criticism 
constantly changes and yet the basis of our faith 
is something fixed?’1'’ This faith is born out of 
a moral experience - an experience in Yrhich the 
personel spirit, vis a vis the inner life of Jesus, 
wins power over us. The Christian faith is safe 
from the findings of historical criticism. "So 
far as establishing our faith is concerned, 
historical work on the New Testament can bring us 
no nearer, and neither by this nor by any other 
means can we compel any other men to recognise
14. Ibid., p.76.
even the hare reality of that which has an effect 
upon ourselves so powerful as to give us courage 
to believe on God."^* It is, in summary, the 
certainty which the Person of Jesus establishes 
in us which is superior to every doubt and 
incomparably safe from historical criticism.
But does this mean that historical criticism is 
valueless, or, because our certainty lies on 
another level, a science to be excluded?
Herrmann thinks not. He outlines two 
contributions of historical criticism. Firstly, 
historical criticism disposes of the all too 
common notion that the narratives in themselves 
serve as reliable bases for faith. No scientific 
process can determine what the Person of Jesus 
should signify for the Christian. This may be 
termed the critical function of historical 
study. Secondly, historical criticism has a 
constructive function. In the various researches 
carried out on the documents, the Christian 
believer is called upon, to use Herrmann’s 
expression, "to compose afresh that portrait of 
Jesus which he carries within him as absolute 
truth, with the relative truth obtained by 
historical research. And this helps us not to 
forget that the most important fact in our life
15* Ibid., p.76.
cannot be given to us once for all, but must be 
continually laid hold of afresh with all our 
soul.1,16# Historical study cannot give us the 
revelation of the personal life of Jesus - this 
is always a miraculous revelation - but neither 
can it over take this from us by any of its 
discoveries.
But, having spoken of the external happenings 
received and interpreted in the records, the 
extreme probability of some of the events, and 
the place pnd limit of historical study,it may 
be asked, "by what means then do we attain certainly? 
Or, how do we receive the historical Jesus in our 
own experience? What is the meaning of some of the 
terminology which Hermann employs, particularly 
the apprehension of the event "in our own sphere 
of reality?" What is to be understood by the 
statement, "It is only out of life in history 
that God can come to meet us. In proportion as 
what is essential in our historical environment 
becomes an element of our consciousness, we are 
led into the presence of those facts which can 
reveal God to us. If our souls do not awake to 
a clear consciousness of these facts, if we simply 
endure our relationship to other men, instead of 
living it, then the personality within us to which
16. Ibid., p.77-
God desires to reveal Hj_mself remains dormant, 
and we do not see the facts through which alone 
God can reveal Himself to us."
If no-one is awakened to true religion through 
allowing himself to be persuaded that religion in 
the heart must begin with an absolutely unhesitating 
confidence in narrators, and if only a saving faith 
is known as one is inwardly transformed through 
"God’s working upon himself where he stands", what 
are the implications of such an experience? This 
Jesus, Herrmann contends, "stands before us, as an 
undeniable part of what is real to ourselves."
It is not the historical, external facts which 
are to be absolutely believed; it is not doctrines 
and narratives which are presented to man as the 
main thing in which he must beljsre in order to find 
the Redeemer. If this be the case, assent must be 
a "work" performed by man. These are merely 
New Testament witnesses to Jesus, not ideas which 
are demanded or laws to be assented to. It is 
when the Person of Jesus touches us as a fact 
that is real to ourselves that the Gospel is 
heard. Only when it pleases God to reveal His 
Son in us can we know the fact of Jesus. This 
happens, so we are informed, when our minds, 
intent on examining our moral judgment and
17. Ibid., p.65.
satisfying our religious need, come in contact
with the biblical tradition regarding Jesus.
Before we can illumine how Herrmann thinks this
’inner life of Jesus* meets us in history, in the
place where we are standing, we should point out
the features of the portrait of Jesus which
Herrmann isolates for special consideration. They
are, to a large degree, the features which Ritschl
had emphasised. (l) The conflict into which Jesus
comes with pious Judaism and His consequent rising
above these nationalistic claims and aspirations.
’’The Christ of the New Testament shows a firmness
of religious conviction, a clearness of moral
judgment, and a purity and strength of will, such
1 Pas are combined in no other figure in history.”
(2) The faithfulness which Jesus maintained over
against the opposition of this world and, in his
death, the perfect love and trust in God which he
exemplified, sets him aside as man’s "never-
19equalled prototype.” The incomparable moral 
strength of Jesus and His perfect love and deepest 
understanding of duty, marks Jesus out as unique 
and final in the history of mankind. Through 
these qualities, "He has thus become an integral 
part of all that is real to ourselves; and He
18. Ibid., p.83*
19• Ibid., p.88.
fills with light all the world in which we stand
He is not only the clearest ideal for man, hut,
He.."as the Messiah, claimed not merely to set men
a task, hut to give to them God's perfect gift."21*
Unlike the Buddha and Plato, Jesus does not point
men to His teaching hut to Himself, His own Person.
It is not looking to the benefits derived from
His Person and to formulae devised hy the Church
Councils that we know Jesus in all His redemptive
force. In our history, standing before us, it is
the Person of Jesus that we are directed to - not,
however, the "mysterious redemptive forces which
are to proceed from Christ, and which for that
22reason are not Christ Himself." * In Jesus'
perfect submission to the sovereignty of God,
understood as the Kingdom of God, He 'stands
before us...The truth of His claims may be tested
by every one who has at all learned to see the
23 •Person, the human soul of Jesus."
The awakening of the consciousness of a living 
God through the impression Jesus makes upon us, is 
"a present fact in our own life...The existence of 
Jesus in this world of ours is the fact in which 
God so touches us as to come into a communion
20. Ibid., p.92.
21. Ibid., p.92.
22. Ibid., p.94.
23. Ibid., p.97.
Oh
with us that can endure." Though there be a 
gulf between Jesus and ourselves, it is only through 
communion with Him that we recognise the God of 
Jesus Christ to be our God. Through an apprehension 
of the good amidst the inward strifes and confusions 
in our spirit, we "come to understand the fact that 
Jesus belongs to this world of ours."2 *^ While 
"our moral striving seems to exhaust itself in vain 
attempts, yet we have still the consolation that we 
stand in and belong to a historical movement in 
which the good wields ever greater sway, for Christ's 
work must reach its goal, and we know through God's 
communion with us that we are assisting in that 
work.”2^’
The communion with God of Christians rests, 
according to Herrmann, "on two objective facts, 
the first of which is the historical fact of the 
Person of Jesus. The second objective ground of the- 
Christian consciousness, that God Communes with him, 
is that we hear within ourselves the demand of the 
moral law."2*'7* The first fact, Herrmann contends, 
is not a past event; on the contrary, it is a 
fact, an element in our own sphere of reality. The 
second ground of objectivity concerns the hearing 
within ourselves the demand of the moral law. In 
the Person of Jesus and His power over , us, "The
2d. Ibid., p.98*
23* Ibid., p.100.
26. Ibid., p.101.
27. Ibid., p.102.
moral conviction that rules our inmost soul 
acquires the form of a personal life."28* Life 
in personal fellowship implies moral obligations 
as the eternal conditions of life on earth. In 
Jesus, these moral conditions are particularised - 
the unconditional demands are concretised in a 
historical life. These are not subjective 
assertions; for these two facts, the appearance 
of the historical Jesus and the witness of 
conscience, force themselves upon us as undeniable 
elements in the reality in which we stand. It is 
subjectivism, according to Herrmann, when the 
Christian appropriates as contents of faith any 
conception which does not arise out of the fact 
that God comes into communion with us. This 
subjectivity is involved in a false attachment to 
creeds. While dressed in ecclesiastical garb, 
these arbitrary adaptions of traditional formulae, 
apart from the objective reality of the personal 
life of Jesus, can be devastating and disastrous 
for faith. The capricious assent to doctrinal 
formulations is not of the same order as the 
vision of the personal life of Jesus which is 
exercised most forcibly in the sphere of conscience. 
This present power of the inner life of Jesus
28. Ibid., p.103-
is the basis and vital principle of true 
religion, and the vision of the personal life 
of Jesus is mediated through the preaching of the 
Gospel and in the practical Christian life. 
Moreover, the vision of the inner life of Jesus, 
or the knowledge derived there from, is 
inseparable from faith. This vision is given 
within the community - within the commuhity which 
has remembered the life of, and the testimony to, 
Jesus.
Continuing his discussion of the inner 
processes of the Christian religion, Herrmann 
poses the question: "Whether God manifests
Himself as a real power working upon us, so that
we are conscious of it just as anything else in
29this world?" It is not in Jesus' teaching
or as a compendium of doctrines and information
concerning God and Christ which mirror the power
and presence of God. We have that power,
according to Herrmann, "through Jesus only when
we apprehend His personal life to be new and for
us a present part of the real world, and powerful
30.enough to compel us to see God as a real power."' 
Yet, can we be certain of the features of the inner 
life of Jesus through historical science? Can 
this science assure us that what the story offers
29. Ibid., p.112.
30. Ibid., p.112-113.
us is an actual pant of the history to which 
we belong? Herrmann thinks not, and if historical 
doubt is to be assuaged it must be through 
"looking to the contents of what we learn to know 
as the inner life of J e s u s . T h e  witness of 
the disciples to the Jesus which impressed Himself 
on their lives is the central source of the picture, 
and not the science whose business it is to find 
out what can be proved to be real. If, Hermann 
contends, we decide to bow ourselves before this 
personal life, we may not wish for an exact 
historical account of the personality which 
we cannot comprehend in its actuality. This 
portrait of the inner life of Jesus cannot be 
drawn adequately by anyone, nor are we to depend 
for our picture of Jesus on any doctrinal or 
scriptural formulation. "Each man can win this 
portrait for himself only when he sees that in all 
that touches his inner life, there is nothing more 
important than the tradition regarding Jesus and
the traces of His power that meet him in his oy®.
32immediate environment.* ... "God comes into
communion with us in the very event Y/hich makes
33us certain of Him."^^°
31. Ibid., p.113.
32. Ibid., p.114. 
33* Ibid., p.116.
Through childhood, this inner life of Jesus 
is impressed upon us by the home and the fellow­
ship of believers, but, as we take moral 
responsibilities, we yearn for a more decisive 
proof of the presence of God. Turned to moral 
freedom, we long, according to Herrmann, for a 
fuller realisation of the faith which once we 
professed as children on the strength of testimony. 
In these maturing years, various concerns are 
opened for us. We can accept Christian doctrines 
on the testimony of others; we can abandon our 
training; separate moral ideas from their religious 
context; or we might be open for the fuller 
revelation of the character of God seen through 
and in the sublime and pure life of Jesus.
Through the strength of Jesus' inner life, He makes 
clear to us both our moral powerlessness and the 
reality of God. When this experience - the 
apprehension of Jesus' inner life frees us from 
the world and awakes our moral self-consciousness - 
occurs... "the world wherein this has befallen us
is no longer to our eyes a weary stretch of
34.numberless and perplexing events." * This 
experience destroys self-confidence, creates trust 
in God, and makes the person a new creature.
34. Ibid., p.123.
The reality of this Man in history, touches 
man as the redeeming action of the Personal God 
upon man's own soul. This fact has become a 
part of a man's own life. It differs from assent 
to mere doctrine or confidence in the events 
narrated in the text. In the human life of Jesus, 
the personal God turns toward those who are 
overpowered by Jesus' spiritual and moral force.
Concerning the Deity of Christ, Hermann approves 
of Luther's essential treatment of the doctrine.
We are forst to be touched by the Man Jesus before 
we arrive at a conception of His Divinity. "We
•35must begin from below, and after that come upwards.’1-^ *
If we approach Jesus with the presupposition that
He is the Son of God - the practice which Luther
called the method of the worldly-wise - this is
beginning from above to build the roof before they
have laid the foundation. Bor Luther and Hermann
it is the apprehension of Christ first as man, and
only afterwards as God. "The Man Christ to whom we
cling will Himself bring it about that He shall
3 6appear to us as God."^ It is not by first 
affilming that in Jesus the Divine substance was 
united with Human nature. The certainty of the 
Christian does not reside in some mysterious
33. Ibid., p.165.
36. Ibid., p.168.
divine substance, but in a "living power, acting
upon him, overwhelming him and announcing the will
ox the Personal God. In Jesus, as his historical
work shows Him to us, we have before us the inmost
will of God, to which everything is sxibject, and
we experience it to be a power construing and
37emancipating our souls." Herrmann gives us a 
valid insight into his reasoning on the subject 
of Christ's Divinity when he writes: "The question
whether we are right in speaking of the Deity of 
Christ when we find God turning towards us in the 
disclosure of Jesus' personal life, must be decided 
according as we conceive God to be in His nature 
a substance on the one hand, or, on the other hand, 
a personal Spirit who asserts His nature by the 
energy of a will directing itself towards ends
38and preserving in itself a certain disposition."^ “
If the former way is dhosen for describing God,
then the Deity is spoken of as a divine substance
in Christ. If the latter conception is followed,
as it is by Herrmann,... "then it is self-evident
that the Deity of Christ can only be expressed by
saying that the mind and will of the everlasting
God encounters us in the historically active will 
39of this man." This latter theory, according to
37. Ibid,, p.176-177.
38. Ibid., p.177.
39. Ibid., p.178.
Herrmann, is the only one represented in sacred 
scriptures, and the only one permissable in the 
Christian community.
The two-nature theory, Herrmann contends, is a 
scientific invention. It attempts to describe the 
unity or Christ and God, which we experience in 
our faith, in terms of a previously established 
conception of Divine and human nature. We know, 
on the basis of Herrmann's reconstruction, the 
Divinity of the Christ through our encounter with 
the Man Jesus who, by his Personal Spirit, compels 
us to think of Him as the Lord who holds in his 
grasp both ourselves and that infinite realm by 
which our life is conditioned.^8* Through the 
phenomena of the inner life of Jesus, we arrive 
at the result, i.e. Christ * s Divinity, which 
result is not set as a condition, as in the 
orthodox view, but is a consequent affirmation 
of faith.
But, is not the historical Christ a fulfilment 
centuries ago in order that ever afterwards men 
may become Christians? Herrmann quotes Luther 
on the point: "To me it is not simply an old
song of an event that happened fifteen hundred 
years ago; it is something more than an event
40.o Ibid., p.180.
that happened once  ^for it is a gift and 
bestowing that endures for ever."^1* It is not 
some general knowledge separable from the historical 
deed of redemption. The deed is historical (as a 
past event) and yet present in that the individual 
soul is touched and caused to cometo it through 
the continual working of God in the Man Jesus. In 
one's present environment, through the preaching 
of the Gospel, every Christian has or can have this 
redeeming experience.
The community, because it is the place where
alone the historical event is remembered and
perpetuated, is the central place where the
~42creator and redeemer are met.‘ * The Church.... 
"becomes to us on this earth an element in that 
divine act by which we know that, in the midst of 
this world, we have been set within the Kingdom of 
God."^* In Christian preaching which gives an 
expression to our particular conditions, and 
through the Christian life lived in communion and 
fellowship with believers, the personal life of 
Jesus becomes a reality in the world, "standing 
before our eyes." 1 The Church on this reckoning 
is not conceived of as a place containing certain 
mysterious redemptive powers which are to save us 
when we submit to their operation.
41. Ibid., p.186.
42. Ibid., p.190.
43. Ibid., p.190-191.
44. Ibid., p.191.
But, if the Church is conceived as a fellow­
ship - a place where the divine act of revelation, 
i.e. the Christ of History, the historical, 
present, redemptive action of God in Christ - may 
become an element in our present life," all the 
events we pass through begin to utter the speech 
of God."45,
Is faith assent to historical facts, narrative 
material or doctrinal formulations? Is it a Y/ork 
required, a theoretical activity which bases 
belief on certain formulae? Should there be 
assensus before fiducia in order that faith may 
exist? Indeed not I The burden of Herrmann's 
argument has been to show that faith is a 
confidence awakened in human hearts by Godfs
revelation, not assent given to doctrines to which
a man must bring himself, and for which he is to be 
rewarded by forgiveness. Baith is thus really a 
confidence in an event which has taken place in the
Christian's own life. It is not based on the
credibility of a report or the truth of a doctrine. 
The portrait of Christ in the Hew Testament and the 
picture which is drawn for us by participating in 
the Christian fellowship do not rest on conclusions 
favourable or unfavourable, reached by historical
45. Ibid., p.194
science. If faith is to be understood as not
a human work, then faith is free from the
historical uncertainties uncovered by the scientist.
It is the significance which the story has gained
for our life. "It is only when the Christian
has taken this story to heart as an unquestionable
fact in his own life that all that testifies to
the historical reality of Jesus shines out before
4 6him and is clearly and easily grasped." ’ Herrmann
summarises the two-fold nature of faith in the
following manner: "...first, faith is trust in
an event which moves us so that we interpret it
to mean that God is seeking to admit us to His
favour by this event; and, secondly, for us this
event is first and foremost the fact that we are
brought under the influence of the Christian
4 7brotherhood, its life and teaching."
Addressing himself to the further argument 
propounded by his opponents to the effect that 
faith involves the acceptance of the features of 
the historical Jesus, e.g. miracles, etc., Herrmann 
writes: "For if the inner life of the Christian
reaches such seriousness and depth that faith on 
the one hand, and the acceptance of these 
narratives as true on the other, are seen to be 
quite distinct things, then even the faith which
46. Ibid., p.226.
47. Ibid., p.227.
God awakens in the breasts is c cntaminated and
made impure by impotent human efforts. As soon
as acceptance of those narratives as true is
honoured as the most important element, or
beginning, of faith, then at once there will
also appear the injurious consequences of founding
faith thus on human endeavour. A faith in which
there lurks an element so utterly different from
confidence in God is not felt to be a work of
God, however strongly it be asserted that He
48brings it about." * If the miracles in the 
narrative and the resurrection of Jesus are the 
presuppositions of faith, "we should have to 
redeem ourselves by our own resolve...No miracle 
of which others tell us has of itself the power to 
influence us so that it shall appear unquestionably 
real in our eyes. Bor us everything depends on 
this, that something shall come before us which 
has not first to be made a fact by our desiring 
to believe it, but which simply is a fact...The 
traditional record may appear doubtful; but the 
essential content of that record, namely, the 
inner life of Jesus, has the power to manifest
itself to the conscience as an undeniable fact.
49That means everything."
48. Ibid., p.234.
49. Ibid., p.233-236.
We have hesitated to bring the two points which
concern us in Herrmann's exposition into critical
focus. These considerations are: (l) The
influences of the historical Christ in the first
century which initiated the communion with God,
and (2) the living God which is to be experienced
as a 'fact', i.e., in the personal life of Jesus,
in the "realm where we live." This may seem like
an arbitrary decision - one which is unwarranted
in view of Herrmann's efforts to relate the
historical Jesus in the first century with the
historical Jesus as he appears to us in our
century; but, if this distinction seems
unjustifiable, one must be referred to Herrmann's
distinction between the personal life of Jesus
and the exalted Christ. The former "can be,"
he says, "grasped as real fact in history by a
man who has no faith, or even after the power of
50faith has been extinguished in such a man."v
While the latter in all that it implies,!©.
resurrection and glorification, is grasped "only
51when our faith is already fully matured."^ * In 
this contexjr, and in his wording, Herrmann implies 
that a grasp of God working in the personal life 
of Jesus is distinct from God acting in the risen 
Christ. It is unwarranted, Herrmann further says,
50. Ibid., p.292.
51. Ibid., p.292.
for the believer to fly beyond those limits 
which are drawn around him in his earthly 
experience. Within the limits of his experience 
he may experience God working in the personal 
life of Jesus, but he cannot know the hidden­
ness of the risen Christ.
While the above remanks appear to be a digression 
from the two critical points which concern us, it is 
well to bear in mind the questionable distinction 
which Herrmann makes between the Jesus bf history 
and the Risen Christ, or the Christ of Faith. 
Admittedly, the Christ of faith may be known and 
apprehended in relationship with the Jesus of 
history, but the invalid distinction of the tv/o 
aspects of faith forces the question: What is
the nature of the appearance of Jesus in the 
realm of history where we stand?
In order to explicate our question, first, let
us confine ourselves to the ways the personal
life of Jesus is known, or to use Herrmann’s
words, "What are the experiences out of which
52.
Christianity may arise?”
Enough has been said to point to the historical 
basis of Christianity - within the life a 
definite people, at a particular time and place 
in the world, a man was confessed to be the Christ.
52. Herrmann, "Systematic Theology” - p.35»
Herrmann is not concerned to define the historicity 
of the Christian message. His inquiries in his 
"Communion of the Christian with God" and in his 
small hook "Systematic Theology", "are directed 
to the end that we experience the living person of 
Jesus as supreme in the infinite reality that 
surrounds us."yy It must be repeated in this 
context. While we are concerned with Herrmann’s 
ideas on the historical Jesus, in particular the 
aspects of the life of Jesus which he isolates for 
special emphasis, our central concern is with the 
ways in which Christianity becomes an "indubitable 
Fact" in our own history. We will, in this section, 
attempt to draw together the ways faith comes to 
conceive of Jesus Christ as living and present 
with us.
3. The Mediums of Faith:
(1) We may lay hold of the ’inner life’ of 
Jesus through the tradition which has come down 
to us in the Christian Brotherhood, In the glory 
of Jesus* appearance as it stands before us in the 
Gospels, we see God’s approach to us and God’s 
presence with every one of us. In the faith of the 
first disciples we perceive the "picture of the 
historical Christ" which He Himself has fixed in the 
faith created by Him and handed down to us in the
53- Ibid., p. 129.
New Testament.* In the community, the figure 
of Jesus as history records it, touches us with 
such power that it draws our confidence to itself 
as a revelation of Go d . * Christian faith in 
its commencement aid. development is nothing else 
than trust in persona and in the powers of 
personal life. In our religious intercourse 
with Christians and through our reverence for 
them, we, who have received such a turning k>
God by the power of the personal life which the 
Gospels set before us, "see the living naturalness 
of the historical portrait of Jesus, and the 
importance of any doubt as to its historical 
truth."56.
It is, then, primarily through the picture of 
the Christ in the New Testament, mediated by the 
personal love of men who have been grasped by 
this portrait in their present circumstances, that 
faith is born and nurtured. Herrmann puts the 
point in a more categorical vein in his "Systematic 
Theology". He writes: "The picture of Jesus there 
given, i.e. hew Testament, is for us the means of 
our salvation. . .The person of Jesus becomes to us 
a real power rooted in history, not through the 
historical proofs, but through the experience 
produced in us by the picture of His spiritual
54. Herrmann, "Communion with God" - p.282.
55. Ibid., p.228.
56. Ibid., p.229.
life which we find for ourselves in the pages 
of the Hew Testament."-^'7*
(2) Another mediatory function, complementary
to the Brotherhood and the picture of the Christ
in the New Testament, is performed by the Kingdom
of God which Jesus Himself brings. But, this
Kingdom, while having the possibility of being
embodied in the community, is not an institution
or to be identified with the visible Church...
"This Kingdom is presented only where pure love
rises up in persons and goes out to persons. For
only in such love and such activity does God reign
58in persona and for persons."^ * The inward 
yearning towards this Kingdom of God, and the 
turning, of God towards us, create faith.
(3) The ’inner life of Jesus’, ’the personal 
power of Jesus’, and the ’picture of the historical 
Christ’, are mediated through preaching. Christian 
preaching points the congregation to that which 
alone can create faith in its members. Herrmann 
speaks of the reality which confronts us in 
Christian preaching as..."a Man (Jesus) whose 
appearance at every moment is to us the mighty 
Word of God, snatching us out of our troubles and 
making us feel that God desires to have us for
His own, and so setting us free from the world and 
from our own natural impulses."80* Commenting on 
the function of Christian preaching on the Easter
57* Systematic Theology, p.51-52.
58. Communion, p.205*
59. Systematic Theology, p.127*
60. Communion, p.305*
Story, Herrmann broadens his ideas on the context 
of preaching. In his "Systematic Theology" he 
writes; "Christian preaching must confine itself 
strictly to that which is presented to it as 
indubitable fact, If we accept such fact as God’s 
gift to us, this real obedience of faith will help 
us then to have unqualified joy even in the 
narratives of the appearances of the Risen Lord 
(contradictory and obscure though they are to the 
historian), and of His communion with the disciples. 
It will, then be enough for us that this at any 
rate was the way in which the picture of these 
events established itself in the minds ox those 
men who, as the first generation of a new humanity, 
lived in the power of the Person of Jesus. The 
fact that what happened at that time remains by 
God’s will veiled from us will then cease to 
trouble us.”^*
(4) In the realm of moral conduct and order, 
we may experience the true sovereignty of God. 
Through moral experience, abiding under the 
pressure of duty and under the discipline of 
people of whom we think: with reverence, Christian 
piety may arise. Herrmann makes the following 
radical remarks "Christian piety can only arise
61. Systematic Theology, p.127*
in the field of men’s moral experience• "Our
aim,” Herrmann says in this connection, "mixst 
he to live in that eternal thing which we human 
beings can understand, namely, in the morally 
good.. .There is no true search for God without 
those painful conflicts which the desire to live 
in the Eternal causes every child of the world, 
and, if we have no joy in the sovereignty of the 
Eternal over the temporal in the realm of moral 
conduct and order, there is no true finding of Him. "63
We have outlined in the briefest way the various 
ways in which Herrmann thinks the historical Christ 
to be mediated and the conditions which prepare 
the entrance of the person into the "realm of 
history where we stand." We must turn now to 
another aspect of Herrmann’s thought, namely the 
present experience of the person of Jesus which is 
independent of the veracity of the narratives in the 
New Testament, free from doctrinal formulations and 
ecclesiastical foims, and even to be understood 
apart from any item or feature of the "picture of 
Jesus" in the New Testament. It is, Hermann 
emphasises in each of the writings we have used in 
our exposition, the present turning of God in 
Jesus which frees us from a counterfeit faith which
62. Communion, p.205*
63. Ibid., p.206-207.
must base certainty in the historical accuracy
ox the narratives or in the current assent to
doctrines. While Jesus is no longer sensibly
present to us as was the case with the first
disciples,."we like them can receive God’s
forgiveness through our own experience of the
power of the Person of Jesus. . *When we see God in
Christ, the trustworthiness of the tradition will
be established for us by something vhiich we need
not learn first from the tradition, since we see
it for ourselves." * It is, as we have pointed
out in numerous instances, at the place where we
stand, within our own historical surroundings, and
amidst our own concerns and activities, that
the Man Jesus appears as He appeared to the "first
66 xgeneration of the Hew Humanity." Faith is not
our willingness to accept as veritable history the
Hew Testament accounts of the communion of the
first disciples with the Risen Lord, but in the
fact that we are now really able to interpret the
story of our own life as His dealing with us.
"We shall," according to Herrmann, "find significance
in all these things that are told of Him, but not
until we have come to know Jesus Himself in His 
66inner life." * Faith, Herrmann never tires of 
saying, finds its basis only in the experience
64. Systematic Theology, p.123*
63. Ibid., p.127•
66. Ibid., p.50.
which produced it; that is to say, faith is
self-authenticating. Christians, not the.
unredeemed natural man. ."are the only people who
find this occurrence in a fact which cannot he
obscured for us by any new experience, since we
have only to think of it to see it standing
before us again as something indestructible and
67incomparably great." 1 * "We are," Herrmann
believes, "really on the path which the Apostles
trod when we in our position become certain of God
and of His grace in the same way in which they in
their position gained that certainty, namely,
through the Person of Jesus. Thus, we have the *
same faith which they had and can rise to the
level of their thoughts. The thoughts amid
which their faith moves become, in such a case,
no longer a prescription which we are to try to
follow outwardly, but a means whereby we may
gain inward enlightenment. They are to be a help
to us in that task which is really incumbent upon
us, namely, that we afe to live with a faith of
our own; they are not to be a law which prevents
68us from seeing the one thing needful." * It is 
the living God who, by the entrance of the 
historical Christ into our life which we experience,
67. Ibid., p.76.
68• Communi on p•240.
initiates our turning to Him. This God is not 
the mere contents of a doctrine, nor the author 
of an event long past. To us, He is present in 
power and in the undeniable fact of the inner life 
of Jesus.
Are we to understand by the "fact" of Jesus’ 
inner life a fact which can be known and perceived 
in a sensuous manner in our time, despite Herrmann’ 
disavowal of the "sensible presence of Jesus?" Is 
Jesus sensibly present in our history as a "fact" 
as He was present to the first disciples? Can the 
personal life of Jesus be grasped as a real "fac^" 
in history by a man who has no faith, or is it a 
"fact" of a different order? While these naively 
realistic questions seem unwarranted, Hermann’s 
ambigious answers to them are worth cans idering. 
Hermann, as we noted, speaks ox the "fact" being 
grasped within the sphere of the brotherhood, 
through a mediation of the picture of the 
historical Christ in the Hew Testament, and the 
inability of those who are outside, i.e. the 
unredeemed man, to discern the "fact" or interpret 
its meaning for faith. But, he has a curious and 
contradictory sentence in his "Communion with the 
Christian God" which may mirror his vacillation
on the nature of the "fact". In the context 
of a discussion on the Exalted Christ, Herrmann 
is concerned to say that what we know and say 
of the self-revelation of God in the Personal life 
of Jesus is to be distinguished from our knowledge 
of the Exalted Christ. While we may be certain of 
the historical Christ within the limits of our 
earthly experiences, the Christian must admit that 
the Risen Christ is still hidden from him. It is 
not for believers to try to fly beyond those 
limits which are drawn around him while as yet 
his faith has to conflict with earthly experiences. 
Now, it is understandable that the Christian does 
not yet behold the full implications of his faith; 
but, does the New Testament warrant the separation 
which Herrmann and Ritschl make between the historical 
Jesus and the Exalted Christ? Is not our picture of 
the Christ determined by the two states, the 
historical and the Eternal glorification? But, this 
is not the primary contradiction which concerns us 
in this context. Herrmann says, contrasting God 
and the Exalted Christ, the one we experience now 
and the other which will be known when our faith is 
fully matured: "Quite otherwise do we think of God
Himself, the God who reveals Himself through the 
Christ of history. For the personal life of Jesus
560.
can be grasped as a real fact in history by a man
who has no faith, or even after the power of faith
has been extinguished in such a man. And it is
because the invisible God uses this fact to make
men certain of Himself that we can say He communes
with us. In this fact of self-revelation, He
reaches down into the realm of our earthly 
69experience."
The obvious meaning to be attached to this 
expression is one that concerns the "personal life 
of Jesus" and the texture of faith. On Herrmann’s 
repeated showing, faith is created not by belief or 
disbelief in the historical facts or doctrinal 
formulations. But, does he not risk serious 
misunderstanding of his argument, especially when 
one considers the features of the personal life 
which he outlines - such features which are 
remembered and interpreted by the believing 
community - when he says this life can be grasped 
as a real fact by the historian or one who 
disinterestedly views the personal life of Jesus.
He has, in an earlier section of our edposition, 
shown that the historian may not disprove the life 
of Jesus, but does the further remark on the "facts" 
being perceived in their "worth" place the events
69. Ibid., p.292.
and the interpretations of the events on a level
with secular history, or with an interpretation
of history which would not allow the Jesus of
history the supreme place accorded Him by Herrmann
and Christendom? He seems to want to make the
"undeniable fact" of one piece with all history,
and yet, he grants to retain these "facts" as "facts"
to be inferpretated within the fellowship of faith.
In his words on the task of theology, he says:
"Evangelical dogmatic has rather to obtain from
the scriptures (called in the same context the
classical expression of the spiritual life which
is effected within the community and mediated
through the personal faith of the theologian) the
knowledge of the reality hidden from the natural
70man and unveiled to the eye of faith."
How shall we estimate this incongruity in 
Herrmann’s thought, or what appears to us to be 
incongruous with some of his other statements? We 
may say that there are two interpretations of 
history to be discerned in his writings. These are, 
(1) He wants to emphasise the historical nature of 
Christianity, seen through certain facts which 
occurred in the first century. Through these 
sensuous, obvious facts, discernible by the 
scientific historian, God’s self-revelation took
70. Systematic Theology, p.63•
place. Yet, in these facts something was commun­
icated. which the eye of natural man could not see; 
nor could the tools of natural man either prove 
or disprove the reality which was given in these 
"facts". There was something suprahistorical, 
though Herrmann does not use this particular 
description of the numinous quality inherent in 
the "facts" when faith receives them, in the 
events which clustered around the life and work 
of Jesus. In faith, these historical happenings 
served to bring man to the realisation that God 
was speaking to him. In this thought patter, there 
is an objective event and a subjective appropriation. 
There is an outer occurrence and an inner appreciat­
ion. (2) In his second interpretation of history, 
Herrmann is anxious to show how faith becomes 
historically real apart from a belief: in historical 
facts, the verification of which is probable, and 
further, how faith is independent of do chines which 
we may be required to believe. In other words, to 
show how revelation is present and an undeniable 
element in our world, is Herrmann’s objective. 
Herrmann is at pains to explicate how the 
appearance of Jesus belongs as much to our reality 
as the coat which we put on, or the house in which 
we dwell. Revelation on this showing, is not a
historical event of the distant past, but a 
personal experience in the immediate present.
The Ghrist in Herrmann’s theology is brought 
into the same relation to every believer as he 
bore to his first disciples. We are now a part 
of the revelatory events through our reception 
of the Christ.
But, how can this be so? Does Herrmann’s 
thought avoid mysticism, which, on his own 
interpretation, abandons the concrete, historical 
surroundings in favour of some idea or absorption 
into a general level of life? He insists that 
this type of thought runs counter to the serious­
ness of the historical fact of Jesus’ presence to 
us. Are the facts of Jesus’ personal life 
evident to the eyes of natural men? His words, 
as we have noted, seem to infer this'possibility. 
But, could it be that Herrmann in some of his 
expressions is anxious to avoid the accusations 
which may be levelled against his theology by the 
radical expiricists of his day, namely, subjectiv­
ism and mysticism?
These two interpretations of history, i.e. the 
historicity of the events in the first century, 
and the historical nature of the appearances of 
Jesus in the present, lie beside each other. It is
to others in the school that we must turn for some 
clarification and modification of these points.
The thought of Pfleiderer and Ernest Troeltsch 
will afford illumination. Herrmann wants to say, 
it would appear, that, while we are necessarily 
dependent on the scriptural portraits for our 
picture of the Christ, and while the testimony 
of Christians within the sphere of the Brotherhood 
is vital in our experience of faith, we are 
brought into fellowship with the inner life of 
Jesus through and in the historical surroundings 
in which we stand. The picture of Jesus in the 
New Testament and our finding ourselves in the 
brotherhood serve as mediums of the revelatory 
process, but this historical occurrence, viz. the 
historical appearance of Jesus to us, happens in 
our history. Herrmann certainly leaves us with 
several questions, some of which are: (1) What 
is the nature of the historical? 'The complexities 
of the ’historical* will become clearer when we 
examine Troeltsch’s point of view. (2) Can the 
life and person of Jesus be interpreted in the 
phenomalistic, naively realistic mamer in which 
Ritschl and Herrmann seem to envision? ( 3 )  How 
can we really enter into or approach the ’inner 
life of Jesus’?
Is this participation in the ’inner life of 
Jesus’ really possible on the basis of the theory 
of knowledge which limits Herrmann’s exposition?
His phenomalism dictates the objects and limits 
of his theology and Christo logy, but, as we have 
pointed out, Herrmann’s piety and devotional 
participation in the Christ point to some other 
interpretation of history and knowledge which is 
not confined to his Ritschlian bias, e.g. we know 
a thing through its effects or predicates. On the 
other hand, is Jesus’ piety the foremost feature 
of the New Testament picture of the Christ? This 
would seem an oversimplification. The figure of 
Jesus as the Christ in the whole New Testament, 
of course, points to an inner relationship between 
God and Jesus, but this is not the primary feature. 
The picture of the Christ in the New Testament, 
as Paul Tillich, John Knox and others are careful 
to point out, is a total reality. This total 
reality does not disclude Jesus’ sub-conscious, 
unconscious, and bodily existence. It includes 
His Jewish past, the history recorded in the Old 
Testament, His individual self in His individual 
character. All this is included in the reality.
This is the reason why the early tradition was 
so much interested in the ancestory of Jesus, in his 
bodily generation, in the sociological surroundings 
and condition: "Nazareth", "carpenter", etc.
IV. Evaluation of Herrmann’s Theology.
We conclude our exposition of Herrmann’s thought 
by pointing to the object of his theological task.
He proposed, we will recall, to inquire into the 
process whereby the individual spirit appropriates 
the Christ event. Ritsrhl had led the way in 
determining the primary object of Christian theology, 
viz. the historical revelation in Jesus, and 
Herrmann sought to discover how we are to speak of 
the historical Jesus narrated in the New Testament 
record. Herrmann’s positive contribution to 
theological investigation of the historical Jesus 
is contained in his conviction that faith does not 
depend for its certainty on the scientific 
validation of probable historical data. Moreover, 
Herrmann’s discussion of the limits of historical 
investigation removes or over-rules the thought 
that empirical factuality is the groundwork of 
faith. Surely Paul Tillich was influenced by 
Herrmann, his teacher, when he writes in his 
"Systematic Theology" Vol.II, the following lines - 
"Exactly what can faith guarantee? And the inevit­
able answer is that faith can guarantee only, its • 
own foundation,, namely, the appearance of that 
reality which has created the faith.. .Faith is the 
immediate (not mediated by conclusions) evidence
of the New Being within and under the conditions
of existence....One must say that participation,
not historical argument, guarantees a personal
life in which the New Being has conquered the old
being....The concrete biblical material is not
guaranteed by faith in respect to empirical
factuality; but it is guaranteed as an adequate
expression of the transforming power of the New
71Being in Jesus as the C h r i s t . * Leaving aside 
Tillich’s special terminology, e.g. "New Being", 
and Tillich’s more inclusive picture of the Christ, 
viz, Jesus’ teaching, deeds, personality, inner 
life and suffering mirror and point to the "New 
Being", we may discern the obvious agreement 
between Herrmann and Tillich in their mutual 
grounding of faith in something other than 
probable historical data.
While Herrmann’s interpretation of history is 
ambiguous - to the extent that he failed to 
explicate hb view of the fact of Jesus being an 
undeniable part of the reality where we stand - 
he has advanced beyond the liberal portrait of 
the "factual" Jesus who lay behind the biblical 
records of Jesus as the Christ, He was not 
content to rest on the Ritschlian idea of the
71. Tillich, Paul, "Systematic Theology" - Vol.II.
page 114 - 115*
"revelational-value of Jesus” being the sole
source of theology. He inquired further into the
"historical Jesus" and his anxiety to show the
contemporaneous value of this revelation in Jesus
was a real advance over Ritschl’s Christology.
While Herrmann’s questions and answers were
directed to the present encounter of the Christian
with the historical Jesus , another Ritschlian,
standing on the left of Rjfcschl, sought to inquire
into the nature of the "historical”. "The
comprehensive problem he (Troeltsch) sought to
grapple with was the relation that must obtain
between specifically Christian thought and the
intellectual principles at work in the hi glib r life
of our time - its science, literature, political
72and economic thought.” * Troeltsch writes of
historical research and its importance in his
"Historism and its Problems”; "Historical research
is now not merely one side of our way of
interpreting tilings; it is not merely a partial
satisfaction of the cognitive impulse; it is the
basis of all thinking about values or norms; it is
the means by which the race takes stock of its own
73essential being, its origins and its hopes.
72. Macintosh, H.R. "Types of Theology" - p.188.
73. Ibid., p. 196-197.
Another Ritschlian., also on the left of Ritschl, 
is concerned with another aspect of the problem of 
history neglected in Ritschl and Herrmann. Otto 
Pfleiderer’s Gifford lectures, "Philosophy and 
Development of Religion", place an emphasis upon 
"development". Development is opposed to origin 
as the essence of Christianity, and Idea is opposed 
to fact as the basis of Christianity. The 
exclusivism of the Ritschlians, viz. their primary 
attachment to Jesus, even a form of Jesusolatry, is 
avoided in Pfleiderer and Troeltsch. In their 
efforts to postulate the development of Christianity, 
they went to the opposite extreme of underestimating 
the historic "event" in the first century.
In the Ritschlian school, as we shall soon 
discover in the next two chapters, we have a broader 
conception of history. Two interpretations of 
history clash: the emphasis on the origin of
Christianity, viz. the New Testament picture 
divorced from the refinements of this picture in 
succeeding generations, and the emphasis on the 
organic, developmental character of Christianity 
through the centuries. Canon Quick, in his 
discussion of the themes of "Liberal Protestantism" 
and "Catholic and Evolutionary Modernism", pinpoints 
the tension in the Ritschlian school, though 
without the variations between the Ritschlians in
mind, when he writes: "It seems that history as
such possesses two different kinds of value for
religion; there is, on the one hand, the value
of objective givenness or independent reality in
the certain particular facts which history
establishes, and there is, on the other, the value
of the general law of growth and development in
nature and human institutions which history as a
whole exemplifies. There is the value of the
particular fact standing established above time
the same forever, because it did happen thus, and
there is the value of the continuous growth and
change which go on all the time, bringing new
facts with them, and of which time is the very
stuff. History may be made to emphasise either of
these two values, that of jdie particular fact or
that of the continuous growth, and if Liberal
Proc estantism has drawn out the first of these
values, it certainly seems to have neglected the 
74second."'
We move now to the neglected emphasis which was 
rectified within the Liberal Protestant camp, that 
is if we are warranted in considering Troeltscjt and 
Pfleiderer initially in this camp. In these two men 
we discover a reaction which places them outside the 
Ritschlian interpretation of history, but in other 
facets of their systems they are in agreement; with 
Ritschl and Herrmann, and to a large extent reveal 
their Hegelian and idealistic heritage.
74. Quick, "Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition"-
p.25.
CHAPTER IV.
THE THEOLOGY OF ERNST TROELTSCH.
1. Introduction:
We move in the Ritschlian school to a man who 
v^ as called at his bier, "The Hegel of our day."1* 
Ernst Troeltsch, also known as the foremost 
exponent of the Religio-Historical school, was 
indeed as versatile as Hegel and in many respects 
as influential. There were developments in his 
thought - developments which placed him against 
his tutors, Ritschl and Frank, and developments 
which emphasised his kinship with the Idealists 
in the 19th century, Hegel, Schelling and others.
The theology of Ernst Troeltsch, according to one 
interpreter, "was eclectic, constantly seeking for 
middle ways and prevailingly critical. Consequently, 
in his synthesis of the various mystical, romantic, 
philosophic, and scientific tendencies of his
milieu, it soon became apparent that he did not
2
quite agree with anybody."
Tn order to create some sort of creative synthesis 
or resolvement of the tensions left by the 
Schliermache]>*Ritschlian emphasis on the exclusivity 
of Christianity and the consequent cleavage erected 
between religion and philosophy, religion and science,
1. Sleigh, R.S. "The Sufficiency of Christjagjty" -
2. Ibid., p.33«
Troeltsch was forced to draw upon the ideas 
inherited from this line of reasoning and couple 
them with thought patterns which had been rejected.
He wrote, according to one interpretor of his 
thought, "to anchor those who are adrift upon the 
modern troubled seas, for whom Christianity is 
only of use when it is offered to them as a living 
force of thought, and not as the mere beauty and 
static finality of ancient tradition.”-^* In a word, 
how to resolve the eternal conflict between. 
Christianity and Civilisation was his sleepless task. 
H.R. Macintosh summarises Troeltsch’s aim in the 
following manner: "The comprehensive problem he 
sought to grapple with was the relation that must 
obtain between specifically Christian thought and 
the intellectual principles at work in the higher 
life of our time - irs science, literature, 
political and economic thought.""1* In his efforts 
to effect some rapprochement between the realms of 
knowledge which had been separated in the one­
sided phenomalism of Ritschl and in the natural- 
supernatural dichotomy of the official ecclesiastic­
al theology, Troeltsch drew on thought patterns 
condemned by these two points of view. These 
phemomalists and supernaturalists would both 
dissociate themselves from any type of Hegelian 
speculative theology designed to relate and
3. Ibid., p.24.
4. Macintosh, H.R. "Types of Theology" - p.188.
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integrate realms of knowledge.
Possibly Troeltsch is recognised primarily for 
his three volume history of "The Social Doctrine 
of the Christian ^hurches", and, in particular, 
for the three types of ethical activity stemming 
from the three interpretations of the Church - 
the Church, Sect and Mystic. Rheinhold Niebuhr 
and Richard Niebuhr and other Christian writers 
on ethics have made these distinctions well-known 
in their treatises. Troeltsch*s exploration of 
the Max 'Weber thesis - the relationship between 
Calvinism and Capitalism - has been an invaluable 
guide in contemporary ethics. But, these ethical 
emphases in no wise exhaust the variety and rich­
ness of his theological activity. His thinking 
is too wide and diverse for considered treatment 
in our exposition. Our interests are mainly three: 
(1) We shall want to indicate his break with the 
Ritschlian positions. (2) This rupture will 
encompass his view of religion and, in particular, 
his so-called "Religious A priori". (3) Troeltsch*s 
interpretation of history and, in particular, his 
interpretation of Christian history and the place 
of Jesus, will be vital in our exposition. We 
shall want to understand Troeltsch*s "historising 
of life."
In our exposition we will be guided by an 
excellent and sympathetically written book.
R.S. Sleigh’s study of Troeltsch*s religious 
philosophy, called "The Sufficiency of 
Christianity", develops Troeltsch*s thought with 
particular regard to the "religious a priori" 
and some of the other points which interest us. 
Because this a priori is determinative of any 
just appraisal of the differences existing between 
Troeltsch and his Ritschlian colleagues, and because 
the a priori constitutes his important advance in 
the interpretation of the relationship between 
history and faith, we shall want to concentrate on 
Sleigh*s formulation of the theological system.
It is rare indeed, particularly after surveying 
commentaries on Troeltsch*s thought, to find an 
interpretation which gives some attention to the 
historical developments in Troeltsch*s thinking 
and which, moreover, attempts to outline and 
criticise the problems to which Troeltsch addressed 
himself. However, we are not, simply because of 
the movement in our central thesis, i.e. the 
relationship between history and myth, concerned 
with Troeltsch*s philosophy of religion in its 
entirety.
Our first concern will be to indicate in the 
broadest fashion Troeltsch*s break with Ritschl.
His rupture is twofold, historical and 
philosophical. In his interpretation of 
history, Troeltsch, unlike Ritschl and Herrmann, 
was concerned to emphasise the unity and homo­
geneity of all historical phenomena - the only 
assumption which he thinks it is necessary and 
possible for the modern scientific consciousness 
to make, but which at once excludes all 
possibility ox admitting a specifically Christian 
casuality in revelation or in miracle. History is 
relative, and the ideas and institutions appearing 
in history are conditioned and expressed through 
thought forms appropriate to the era in which 
they appear. The ecclesiastical-dogmatic approach 
of Ritschl and Herrmann is invalid on historical 
and philosophical grounds. Historically, the 
absolute approach to historical phenomena, 
whether taken by the Ritschlians or supernatural­
ists, is incapable of relating the events which 
are thought to occur objectively kn history to the 
ones apprehending these events. RitschlTs 
ecclesiastical-dogmatic conception of history, 
while paying homage to the principle of spiritual 
autonomy in its repudiation of all external 
church authority, cannot supply a scientific 
comprehension of history or any sort 01 scientific
justification of personal spiritual conviction#
The dogmatic interpretation, because it rests on
the assumption of the dual nature of history as
natural and supernatural, cannot escape the
meshes of historical relativism, or avoid the
abyss of sheer subjectivism, or rebut the reproach
of positivism. The dogmatic method makes an
untenable distinction between historical research
concerned with saving facts and untroubled by the
thought of relativity, and on the other hand, a
form of historical research which is profane or
secular, criticsl or relativistic. But, the
historical method, as Troeltsch understands it and
utilises it in his writings, puts this distinction
aside and works on the principle that all history
is on one level and of one quality. Speaking of
historical research and its importance, Troeltsch
writes these words in his "Historism and its
Problems". "Historical research is now not merely
one side of our way of interpreting things; it is
not merely a partial satisfaction of the cognitive
impulse; it is the basis of all thinking about
values or norms, it is the means by which the race
takes stock of its own essential being, its origins
5.and its hopes."
5« Ibid., p.196-197-
Moreover, the Ritschlian theory of knowledge in 
its exclusive phenomenal interpretation of events 
precludes the mind from knowing reality as it 
actually exists, but only as it appears to us. 
Historical events, the manifold phenomena, are 
unrelated to the mind that receives this material. 
Troeltsch was concerned to show that the manifold 
of experience is not foreign to the mind, purely 
contingent, or mutually indifferent, but has its 
own inherent elements or laws in virtue of which 
all we know, whether in the (natural), moral, 
aesthetic, or religious world, is a recognition 
on the part of our minds of their own characteristics 
in the empirical manifold. These rational character­
istics (or a priori unifying laws, formerly 
considered) may be, or, in fact are, different, 
according as they concern or refer to the trans­
sub jective reality of nature, morality, aesthetics, 
or religion; but, they are always laws of the mind, 
recognised to be interiorly necessary and valid, 
which give to our minds that degree ox unity which 
belongs to them as a whole, or in the individual 
spheres of experience, natural, moral, aesthetic, 
or religious. To point to these laws is xor 
Troeltsch in the religious sphere the justification 
or explanation of religion as a necessary constituent 
of the mind. To point to these a priori unifying
laws is for Troeltsch the explanation of how the 
Divine comes within the conscious mind, or how we 
come into His presence. Religious experience, 
individual and historical, has formal conditions, 
and to indicate these as fully as possible is to 
explain religion and to lay hold on the conditions 
of its experience, control and propagation.
But, in these last remarks, we are moving into 
another difference between Ritschl and Troeltsch 
which must be developed at a later stage in our 
exposition. Meanwhile, to return to the two 
essential differences between Ritschl and 
Troeltsch, historical and philosophical. Philosophic­
ally, as we have to some extent implied in 
Troeltsch*s view of knowledge, he shared the 
confidence of the Hegelian theologians in the 
power of human thought to grasp being and to relate 
the various facets of thought in some coordinate 
fashion. For Troeltsch, the reality or objects 
of science and religion are somehow ultimately one, 
but our modes of apprehension are various, and, 
therefore, there is for Troeltsch no absolute 
distinction between intellect and will, theoretic 
reason and practical faith. The idea of God which 
receives its content only in union with historical 
religious life is an ontological concept which 
signifies the reality in whom all things exist, in 
whom we live and move and have our being. The
finite, in a concrete experience, is related to 
God. Thought and reality are related. ' The idea 
of God, e.g. "the best we think or can think", is 
an ontological concept, which, in relation to Time, 
is to be understood as representing a reality which 
is striving to actualise itself in the temporal 
process, and this process is a historical development 
of the capacities of finite personalities in their 
growing apprehension. H.R. Macintosh says that 
Troeltsch’s "work as a whole rests on a single great 
metaphysical assumption - that, as Hegel put it, 
the real is the rational, the universe a significant, 
because reason pervaded, system of things...The world 
process displays itself as the effect in time and 
space of a supersensible reality." ’ The active 
presence of an absolute spirit is affirmed in the 
"a priori" consciousness and in every historical 
movement which is intelligible in a historico- 
philosophic way. Though this does not imply that 
for Troeltsch the finite and the infinite are simply 
identical. His philosophy was not moulded along 
the static lines tqken by Hegel in the resolvement 
of the infinite and finite in the objective 
realisation of their identity and unity. The 
infinite in Troeltsch*c philosophy is not lost in 
the finite, nor are the irrational, alogical 
characteristics of history submerged in the unity
6. Ibid., p.191
and development of history. The evolutionary
moments of history are individual and concrete.
They are individual, creative expressions, not
logical, mediated links in an overwhelming
process of the inf mite realising itself in the
finite. The metaphysic of history, then, is
always subjective, apprehensible in a personal
ebhi co-religious attitude towards it. Histoiy
is only apprehensible in the activity of ethico-
religious faith, and intuitively felt without our
being able to construct it in any purely speculative 
7
manner.' * There can, then, be no question of any 
Hegelian rationalisation of history, and, therefore, 
the analogies, tendencies, and types of historical 
(religious) evolution are allowed to exist in all 
their individual peculiarities in a non-logical 
relationship. "Thus the metaphysic of history", 
according to Sleigh’s interpretation of Troeltsch, 
"is in every case individual, personal, subjective.. 
And the true religious metaphysic .which delivers us 
from the bondage of historical accident and 
naturalism, as well as from the clutches of mere 
tradition, is a type of philosophical mysticism 
which makes room for real development and for realQ
personality."
But, Troeltschfs ontological emphasis on unity in
7* Sleigh, p.50.
8. Ibid., p.51*
variety and diversity is subject to a form of
dualism. Sleigh describes this as an "existential
9.dualism." * Troeltsch centers history and religion 
in the region of personal choice, and his treatment 
of the a prioris (religion, logic, aesthetic) 
appears to break up the mind into separate 
compartments. While being vigorously anti­
rationalist, or rather anti-intellectualistic, he 
seems to champion a type of religious rationalism,
i.e. a formal atheoretic rationalism, which 
necessarily involves an existential and some type 
of epistomological dualism. In the variations in 
the consciousness, vid a^vid the separate a prioris, 
Troeltsch was led to argue for a dual system of 
knowledge, corresponding to a corporeal and to a 
spiritual reality, whose validity is respectively 
theoretic and atheoretic. There is an inner 
essential difference between the so-called 
productive autonomous principles of the phenomenal 
world, and those of the ethical, aesthetic and 
religious world. Is it not possible to assume 
that we are dealing with one and the same reality, 
which is apprehensible by different modes, or from 
different systematic standpoints, which severally 
have their own specific standards, and are
9. Ibid., p.101.
essentially related to one another through their 
common basis both in the subject and in the object?
John Baillie*s criticism of Troeltsch*s historical 
method may clarify the dualism in Troeltsch*s 
thought* Baillie says that Troeltsch believed 
that he could begin with a mere amassment of the 
phenomena of religious experience without any 
regard to their value* This amassment is the 
psychology of religion, and only when it has 
finished its work can the epistoMological inquiry 
begin. We are in Troeltsch*s view concerned first 
of all with the acts and secondly with the valuation 
of the facts. Empiricism and rationalism are 
considered to be successive stages in the scientific 
inquiry. Instead of selecting certain phenomena 
on the basis of some valuational hypothesis, 
Troeltsch proceeds to amass random facts and then 
evaluate them. Baillie comments on this question­
able procedure..."Description and valuation, 
therefore, instead of being made successive and 
assigned to different branches of study, must 
always work hand in hand with one another. Our 
judgments of value must be our guides in our 
investigation of fact, and our investigation of 
fact must, in its turn, progressively correct our 
judgments of v a l u e . I f  Troeltsch had 
proceeded in the manner Baillie points out, there
10. Baillie, John, "Interpretation of Religion"-
p.140.
would li&ve been a more intimate relation between 
value and fact in bis philosophy.
Troeltsch was concerned, so be says, "only with 
tbe question bow far knowledge of trutb is contained 
in tbe religious consciousness itself.1,11 * His 
treatment of tbe question brings into focus another 
deviation from Ritschl and tbe Neo-Kantians.
Ritschl believed that tbe etbical and moral preceded 
tbe religious state. Religion came into being as a 
product of tbe reflective consciousness. But 
Troeltsch*s starting point is stated in tbe following 
way by bim: "Religion as the special category or
form of tbose psycbic states wbicb result from tbe 
more or less dimly apprehended presence of tbe 
divine in tbe soul - tbe sense of tbe presence and 
reality of tbe superhuman and infinite - that is, 
beyond all doubt, a far truer starting point for
12tbe analysis of tbe rational a priori of religion."
2. Religious a priori.
Troeltschfs philosophy of religion is too intricate 
and manifold for adequate summary in our exposition. 
We are interested in a few facets of bis philosophy 
wbicb will bear upon our primary concern, i.e., bis 
understanding of Christianity as a historical
11. Ibid., p.238.
12. Ibid., p.242.
phenomenon and his interpretation of the place of 
Jesus.
Troeltsch believes the experience of the Divine is 
immediate* This experience is predominantly a state 
of feeling (Gefuhlsgehalt) - an immediate 
presentation which is central, inwardly necessary 
and practically indispensable. This does not imply 
that religion is mere feeling. It is feeling 
(affection, conation and cognition) in unity. Within 
the events of human life, an affective consciousness 
of the absolute is attainable and immediately 
experienced by the finite spirit. The mystical 
experience of the infinite in the present is central, 
while the ethical activity which is provoked, the 
mythic and symbolic descriptions and social 
expressions in worship, and the ecclesiastical 
forms and dogmas are peripheral and secondary. 
Religion is considered to be constitutive to 
consciousness - a possibility which precedes ethical 
and moral activity, and social and doctrinal forms. 
Moreover, religion is understood by Troeltsch to be, 
or to begin in, a naive mystical experience where 
thought and feeling are fused in one indistinguishable 
whole. This naive, mystical experience may produce 
some astonishing mythological machinely which in due 
course serves the purpose of fixing the beliefs of
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the group and, to a larger extent, confirming the 
group in certain forms and practices.
How, then, is this mystical religious experience 
and affimation, with its implications which claim 
to be a knowledge of God and a redemptive experience 
of His life, to be shown to be actually such and not 
illusion and self-deception? While religion over­
flows intellectually into a creed, eventually into 
a cult and vo lit ion ally into a communal way, 
Troeltsch is not, as we have intimated, primarily 
concerned with these expressions. He expresses his 
interest in the following words: TIWe are concerned
only with the question how far knowledge of truth is 
contained in the religious consciousness itself.11^ * 
As we pointed out, there are two stages in 
Troeltsch*s survey of the religious consciousness. 
The first stage he takes to consist in the 
construction of a purely empirical psychology of 
religion, that is to say, a mere amassment of the 
facts of religion without any regard to their 
significance, value, or truth content. But, later, 
in his study of religious phenomena, e.g., the 
naive, mystical experience, the question as to the 
truth of the beliefs and the validity or the 
objectivity of the experiences had to be faced.
This brings us, according to Troeltsch, to the 
second state in our inquiry, but it is a stage to
1J>. Mackintosh, op. c i t . , p .2358.
which we cannot proceed until we have found some 
instrument by which to distinguish the tnue and 
valuable from the merely illusory and subjective.
How does Troeltsch proceed to postulate a universal 
relevance for these mystical experiences — these 
*creative*, *new* and Spontaneous* experiences 
through which the finite and the infinite are 
united?
First, Troeltsch repudiates two positions which 
had held the field as the nonas by which religious 
truth was verified. These two authorities were: 
supernatural ism and a pragmatic, ethical validation 
of religious truth. The first thought pattern 
makes it impossible to speak of the Divine operating 
normally in the historical sphere. Man is 
transformed by a supernatural change and a 
redemptive process which overwhelms him. On this 
view God mechanically steps into the historical 
arena at a given point in time, declearing his 
presence in an Absolute Personality through 
questionable means, e.g., miracles, revelatory 
knowledge, etc. This metaphysic dislikes any 
rational scrutiny of the action of the so-called 
"absentte God", vis a"vis the God who arbitrarily 
and radically steps in and out of time. Moreover, 
this revelatory knowledge is in violent contradiction 
to all other legitimate interests of knowledge.
The second validation, that of the pragmatists 
and utilitarians — Ritschl, Herrmann and Kant, 
according to Troeltsch, are in this group - fails 
to explain how religion is constitutive and 
integral to the subject. Religion viewed as 
useable and practical is in the last analysis 
of a quantitative nature, i.e. statistically 
verifiable on the basis of the majority opinion, etc. 
The theory of knowledge upon which this validation 
of religious truth rests limits reality to 
phenomenal appearances.
But, Troeltsch was concerned to point out that 
knowledge is only possible as it results from the 
recognition of rational characteristics which are 
common both to the subject and to the object 
perceived. There are formal laws and rational 
characteristics inherent in religious experience.
If these unifying principles are indicated, the 
validity of religious experience will not depend 
upon some supematuralistic and pragmatic criteria. 
Although religious knowledge does not preclude a 
concern with that Being which is transcendent or 
with the practical application of knowledge, it, 
i.e., teligious truth, is not initially based on 
these apprehensions.
Starting with Kant, Troeltsch proceeded to 
construct a critique of religion which wqs 
analogous to the constitutive principles formulated 
by Kant in his a priori of nature. Troeltsch*s 
results in his psychological analysis of religious 
experience, with its personalistic and theistic 
implications, together with the results of the 
epistemological analysis and Us similar, though 
independently reached, implications, jointly 
yield what he termed the a priori condition upon 
which the possibility and fact of religion depend.
The religions consciousness of union with the 
infinite is an experience which relates the finite 
centrally to the whole development of life, and 
indicates the ultimate law of its significance and 
moment. In the great religious personalities, 
their ’revelations* are disclosures of this relation­
ship of the finite to the absolute (naively 
apprehended and symbolically expressed, of course), 
which, the more clearly it is apprehended, the 
greater the degree of their fellowship with God, and 
the more urgently it calls for a closer union of all 
the activities of the mind within the religious 
centre - a relation in virtue of which all worths 
are related to an absolute existence in their 
origin and standard. Religion exists in this, in 
short, that it is a law of noimal consciousness,
and is such, both from its feeling of interior 
necessity and obligation and from its organic 
posit ion within consciousness, which later only 
receives through religion its union with and 
relation to an objective world-reason.
The religious a priori is: (1) The epistemolog- 
ical principle of religion. It is a brief expression 
indicative of the fact that there are in 
consciousness, immanent, rational elements, recognised 
by us as unconditionally valid, which alone make a 
doctrine of worths possible, and relate us vitally 
to God, whom these elements presuppose. (2) It is 
the ontological principle of all life. It is that 
which gives a basis to the ideal necessities of our 
nature, logical, aesthetic, and ethical - that is, 
their vital relation to and root in the unconditional, 
the absolute consciousness beyond and beneath all its 
phenomenal manifestationa. (3) It is an epistemological 
and ontological principle, being realised in the 
development of historical religious evolution. It is 
not something ready-made (like Kantfs categories)*
We never come to experience with any ready-made 
standard of fact or of worth, but only with a purely 
formal constraint, necessitating us to relate 
everything to an ultimate worth.
The reiEgifcus a priori, then, is only brought
gradually to light by individual personal 
appropriation of, and approximation to, the 
ultimate impulse and goal of history in communion 
with religious experience in historical evolution. 
Summarily speaking: by the religious a priori 
Troeltsch meant the regulative, creative, epistem- 
ological, and ontological principle of religion.
It gives to the religious state of feeling 
(Gefuhlsgehalt), in itself a purely irrational 
(alogical) factual experience, its fundamental 
quality of rational necessity, and, therefore, its 
principle of the formation of the characteristic 
ideas of religion, the basis of the independent 
dialectic of faith, with its ideas of God, the 
world, man, redemption, and the life to come. The 
ideas of God achieved in religious experience, 
discernible on psychological, epistemological 
and ontological analysis, receives its increasing 
content only in its union with historical life*
To return to our question: The reality and
validity of religious experience and knowledge will 
be assured, Troeltsch maintained, inasmuch as the 
naive, mystical religious phenomena can beshown 
to fall into rational form both in the individual 
and in history, and to partake of the character of 
a universal valid organisation, evaluation, and 
elicitation of what is concretely real.
Troeltsch's religious a priori implies an 
inductive metaphysic of religion - a metaphysic 
which is concerned to draw out the structures and 
laws of the mind in their union with the structures 
and laws of the object. This metaphysic of history 
is not concerned with an absolute, timeless union, 
nor does it rely on absolute norms introduced by 
supernaturalism, e.g., revelation aid miracle, to 
obscure the relative,factual and irrational nature 
of the union. The historical religious experience 
is constantly renewed and continually expressed 
anew in different historical epochs. Moreover, 
the various religions of history are to be 
understood as merely unrelated, concrete phases of 
experience. It is impossible on this understanding 
to merge these historical expression into a 
composite non-historical, purely philosophical 
form of religion. If we select a historical 
religion as the highest expression, the proof of 
demonstration of its supremacy can only be
t
historico-philos ophic •
The foregoing discussion has been illuminating 
in respect of three things: there is a relationship
between the subject experiencing religion and the 
object or subject of that experience. Religion is 
a central self-determination of the whole 
personality towards the being and essence of reality,
as an experienced consciousness of an absolute 
spiritual content and meaning of existence*
Religion is not reducible to morality, ethics, or 
metaphysics, though it may entail these expressions. 
Secondly, Treeltsch’s historical method excludes 
the possibility of the emergence of an ’absolute 
value* in the course of history which might be 
used as a standard. We shall see the bearing of 
this position on his interpretation of historical 
Christianity. Finally, the four groups of ideas 
in the religious a priori of principles - God, 
the world, man, and the life to come - find 
varying, unrelated degrees of expression in the 
historical forms of religion. The religious 
a priori does not determine in advance the nature 
of, or the precondition of, the religious experience.
While the implications of Troeltsch*s religious 
a priori could occupy us further, we must move in 
our exposition to our primary question: What
place can be assigned Christianity as a historical 
expression of a naive, religious experience?
What importance can be attached to the absolute 
claim made on Christianity’s behalf by the Church, 
if Christianity is one among many historical, 
concrete and manifold expressions of the idea of 
God?
3* The Essence of Christianity.
We begin to answer the above questions if we 
give some attention to Troeltsch*s treatment of 
the essence of Christianity. The three-fold 
essence of the Christian religion is summarised in 
Sleigh’s book. The first point concerns the 
criticism of historical Christianity. This 
criticism and evaluation is immanent. Within the 
region of personal appreciation and decision on the 
basis of concentrated historical investigation can 
the truth of Christianity be determined. In the 
second place, the essence is an evolutionary 
principle, a self-developing spiritual impulse 
bearing within itself rich possibilities and 
appropriative capacity. On this principle, a 
complete, perfect revelation of a ’religious 
personality’ is ruled out. Christianity has from 
the outset exhibited not merely its immanent 
consequences, but, also, its appropriative capacity 
in taking up new elements. There does not exist 
any simple historical point or idea which might 
justly be taken to be the noim. There are no 
simple norms within Christianity itself which make 
the reduction of the essence to a simply formula 
possible. These adaptations and appropriations are
constituent parts of the essence. Thirdly, the 
essence is ideal. The meaning of history is never 
exhausted in our mere understanding of the past.
When we consider history we do so in order to 
appropriate from it what is essential to furnish 
ourselves with an effective nom for the future.
This means, of course, that for us the determination 
of the essence arises out of an act of will, a faith 
in the future, upon the basis of a history which 
has been investigated in an historico-scientific 
way. R.S. Sleigh quotes from Troeltsch in the 
following connection: "The determination of the
essence is for us a creative synthesis of tbe past 
with the present for the sake of thefuture; it is 
nothing less than the formation of the Christian 
idea corresponding to our present historical 
situation and needs. The objective never lies 
ready-made anywhere that we might simply take it up; 
it is in every case created anew, and has its 
obligatoriness in an interfusion of what is out 
historical religious possession and of personal 
conscientious further formation and transformation.”^ * 
While Christianity possesses its classic expression 
and witness in the Bible, and is founded upon the 
prophets and Jesiss, it develops its immanent and 
appropriative capacities in its creative syntheses
14. Sleigh, R.S. "The Sufficiency of Christianity” -
p.112-115.
in the course of historical evolution. It is 
never static. It is different in its varying 
historical situation, and is appropriative in 
every epoch by historical feeling and understanding, 
as well as by conscientious subjective and creative 
interpretation and construction.
But, what place does Jesus occupy within the 
historical Christian organism or fellowship? If 
Christianity is to be considered from its manifold 
appropriations and its many creative personalities, 
what place can be assigned to Jesus the Christ?
There is no metaphysical solution, according to 
Troeltsch, to these questions, nor are there 
external norms, e.g. bible, doctrine, etc. The 
centrality of Jesus in Christianity must be 
approached via psycho-epistemological considerations. 
Troeltsch, according to Sleigh’s careful formulation 
of his ideas, does not deny that Jesus had a 
naively absolute relationship to God, nor does he 
deny the possibility that His disciples and the 
Christian community experienced this naive absolute 
in His person. But, we must in our day set aside 
these temporal, mythic embodiments and 
embellishments, since the new religious motives 
which come from our historical heritage, and result 
from our inner religious elaboration of the modern 
scientific outlook, call for new mythic and ideal
expressions. In his historieo-philosophical 
method, Troeltsch allows us to recognise the 
supremacy of Christianity’s conception of 
personality and its confidence that it alone 
points in the direction of the absolute lying 
beyond history. But, his absoluteness, or 
finality, is not to be predicated of one man, 
namely Jesus • Jesus is our efficient historical 
expression of the nature of God, our clearest 
human symbol of the Divine. Jesus is a great 
religious personality, and to contemplate him is 
uplifting. He may be called a type or symbol 
whose place no other can fill. Yet, as a symbol, 
He is relative after all; as Troeltsch might 
have stated the matter, He is eternal but not 
Eternal.
Mackintosh points out that, while Troeltsch as 
a philosopher felt obliged to make Jesus relative 
and at best an exemplary personality, a wqrmer 
faith was ever seeking to intervene. Mackintosh 
quotes some of Troeltsch*s positive assertions. 
"The God of Jesus is the object of faith, and 
Jesus Himself is transformed into the historical 
mediator and revealer....The whole content of 
life and faith in Christianity continues to be 
related to the prototype found in the Ferson of
Jesus, and faith in Him is the one unifying bond 
of the Christian community.*’1^ *
Concerning the finality of the Christian religion, 
Troeltsch’s contention is to the effect that no 
religion, even Christianity, is valid universally 
or forever. Because all faith is but an 
individual form of the pure spirit of religion, we 
ah© prohibited from attaching universal significance 
to any expression of faith. While eschewing 
evolutionary development, to the extent of a future 
embodiment of the absolute faith, his theoiy of 
individual vital forms is stated in the following 
manner: "The universal law of histoiy consists
precisely in this, that the Divine Reason or the 
Divine life, within history, constantly manifests 
itself in always-new and always-peculiar 
individualisations - and hence, that its tendency 
is not towards unity or universality at all, but, 
rather, towards the fulfillment of the highest 
potentialities of each separate department of life. 
It is this law which, beyond all else, makes it 
quite impossible to characterise Christianity as 
the reconciliation and goal of all the forces of 
history, or indeed to regard it as anything else 
than an historical individuality.’*16*
15. Mackintosh, p.208.
16. Ibid., p.212.
4. Evaluation of Troeltsch*s Theology:
Our primary question - which had been raised by 
the right-wing Ritschlians - was how are we to 
understand the presence of Jesus within our realm, 
within the place where we stand? Ritschl, as we 
noted, based a knowledge of God on the historical 
revelation in Jesus, and Hermann sought to draw 
out the implications of this central datum in so far 
as he was concerned to point to the present 
significance of the historical Christ. Herrmann 
left the question concerning the present appearing 
of Jesus in our history open. When his thought 
failed him, he relied on dogmatic, devotional 
language to make his point. He attempted to bind 
the mediating influences, e.g* Bible, community, 
moral law, with the present presentiment of the 
historical Jesus. We saw that further exposition 
of the meaning of history in general, and the 
meaning of religious experience in particular, was 
demanded. We turned to Troeltsch for guidance, 
hoping that the historical significance of 
Christianity as a past phenomenon ardas a present 
possibility would receive some clarification. 
Troeltschfs concern, as we have summarised it, was 
with a fuller explanation and formulation of the 
historical method. History, according to him, is
our only source of nouas, and the philosophy 
of histoiy is our only lamp amid the darkness. 
History is, unlike the Ritschlian dogmatic- 
ecclesiastical position, all of one piece.
History iself, within the realm of personal, 
ethico-religious decisions made in any given 
period, relative and conditional norms are erected. 
There is no notion that within religious experience 
or redemption there is any appropriation of a 
redemptive act of history. Redemption is a 
present experience, arising, out of our idea of God 
as Grace, in which,or through which, God Himself is 
present as Redeemer. An idea which inspires us with 
the power of transcending all the limitations and 
insinuations of our finitude, and enables us to 
make amends and to take our share in working out 
the existential evil of life*
Troeltsch, it would appear, lost sight of the one 
pole of the dilemma, viz. the historical Jesus and 
the importance of the historical picture of the 
Christ as the essential ’circle* within which the 
Christian religious experience is mediated* He was 
concerned with religious experience and not a 
distinctive phenomenology of Christian experience. 
The relationship between the Jesus of history and 
the Christ of faith is virtually overlooked.
Whilst we may agree that religious experience is
unique, and that its norma are fixed on the 
basis of a ethico-religious decision, we should 
want to quarrel with the inadequate attention 
Troeltsch gave to the distinctiveness of the 
Christian experience. While emphasising the 
individuality, concreteness and existential 
nature of the religious decision, Troeltsch*s 
philosophical formulations excluded reference to 
the universality and finality of the Christian 
position. We may agree that the absoluteness of 
the Christ cannot he arbitrarily or heternonomously 
derived, but there would seem to be some basis for 
this predication within the Christian experience.
Troeltsch ideas on the features of the religious, 
even Christian, experience, viz. the naive, mystical 
character of this experience, which later receives 
some scientific formulation, leads us to another 
critical point in his philosophy, namely the 
relationship between the experience and the 
description of the experience. It is not clear 
what Troeltsch wants to mean by the mythic 
embodiment of the Christian experience and the 
unimportance of these temporal, mythic descriptions 
in the present. We may, on the basis of our 
exposition, postulate several points which appear 
to guide him in his interpretation. (1) It It 
obvious that his "demything" of the experience
would be based on the thoughts which come from 
modem science, i.e#, impossibility of miracles, 
supernatural and the first century ways of 
speaking about the transcendence. (2) In some 
degree, despite Troeltsch*s emphasis on 
individual forms and the existential levels in 
concrete experiences, he extracts certain ideas 
or ideals from the Christian religion which he 
considers to be of universal significance, e.g. 
its conception of the supremacy of personality 
and its symbolisation of the absolute which is 
beyond history* In a sense, this may be said to 
be an elimination of the *mythological* descript­
ions and a retention of the eternal ideas in the 
experience. At least, this is the popular 
criticism of the religious—historical school.
Yet, on the other hand, the constitutive nature 
of religion and the mystical quality in religious 
experience points away from such a facile criticism 
of his thought. However, the experience is 
described, it is still in the realm of "feeling", 
and it must be remembered that Troeltsch attached 
a cognitive value to "feeling". He may be trying 
to say that, whatever the period, in the first 
century or in the present, the symbolic, mythical 
nature of religion is necessary and valid. He may
be calling for an interpretation of the primitive, 
mystical and mythical experience and not an 
elimination of the essential ways which the 
experience must be spoken of.
In the last analysis, we have in Troeltsch another 
facet of Christianity elaborated. Ritschl and 
Herrmann, we will recall, placed supreme value on 
the revelation in the historical Jesus. Ritschl 
did not, apparently, tell us what was involved in 
his view of history, while Herrmann drove the point 
home in his analysis of the present significance of 
the encounter with the Jesus of history in and 
through His inner life in the realm in which we 
live. Herrmann left, as we noted, many questions 
open - the main one being his interpretation of 
history. Troeltschfs advance beyond Ritschl and 
Hermann, at least for the purpose of our exposition 
of the theme, the relationship between histoiy 
and faith, lay in his analysis of the "historical". 
He rejected the view of history which had guided 
Ritschl and Herrmann to postulate supreme value to 
Jesus and, yet in his theology, he failed to give 
adequate attention to the central problem which had 
been raised in the Ritschlian school. This problem, 
as we have outlined it, concerns a view of history
which will take into consideration Troeltsch’s 
historical method, viz. the homogeneous nature 
of all history, and, at the same time, provide 
some place in this view for the unique confront­
ation of Christ and the believer in the present.
We are left on the brink of the modern discussions 
of the problem with several facets of our problem 
illuminated, but none of the facets related, or 
even paradoxically considered, in any of the men 
we have surveyed. There are many ways of 
discussing the two trends which we have seen 
working in the 19th century. We pointed to one 
trend in the early decades of the century which 
was expressed in the Hegelians. This was a 
movement away from concrete, particular events 
in history. In a word, the Hegelians began with 
the idea (Begriff) and came to history or the ways 
the ideas were expressed in history. After moving 
in this direction from the thesis to the antithesis, 
the movement came to a rest in the fulfillment in 
the third movement, the static synthesis. The 
other trend which was inaugurated by the "search 
for the historical Jesus" behind the garments of 
faith began with the "facts" and reached out for 
the "idea" or rationale of the "facts". Within 
the theological schbbl which provided the theological
formulation of this "quest”, we have noted 
variations and advances. From the abstract notion 
of the "fact" of the historical Jesus in Ritschl, 
Herrmann sought to clothe the supreme revelation in 
the first century with contemporaneous significance. 
But, Herrmann, persuaded by the Kitschlian bias 
against metaphysics and upon the phenomalistic 
theory of knowledge, could not relate his ambiguous 
interpretation of history. Troeltsch gave attention 
to the nature of the historical, but he sacrificed, 
it would appear, the particular historical event of 
Jesus the Christ to the development which occurs in 
history. In our next chapter - the last in this 
section of the thesis - Otto Efleiderer, in his 
Gifford lectures in 1894, is convinced that we are 
to conceive of the essence of religion in its final 
stages, not in its historical beginnings. The point 
which the Kitschlians feared, i.e., speculation and 
metaphysics, is receiving its rightful place in a 
theological system.
CHAPTER V.
THE THEOLOGY QE OTTO FFLEIDERER.
1. Intro duct ion:
It is debatable whether we are justified in 
discussing Otto Pfleidererfs philosophy in a 
section of our thesis devoted to the "Quest of 
the Historical Jesus." Pfleiderer was one of 
Ritschl’s critics. While he, like Troeltsch, 
had learned from Ritschlfs theory of knowledge 
and his ethico-religious motifs, Pfleiderer, 
again like Troeltsch, endeavoured to erect a 
creative synthesis between. Religion and culture, 
theology and philosophy. While the Ritschlians 
had disparaged philosophy, Troeltsch and Pfleiderer 
sought to correlate the claims of theology and 
philosophy. We give this brief survey of 
Pfleidererfs theology more as a bridge between 
the Ritschlians and their successors in this 
century. Pfleiderer*s and Troeltsch*s thought 
constitute a transition from one or more 
Hitschiian motifs to the theological constructions 
in Temple, Bultmann and Tillich, though it must be 
remembered that these transitional theologies 
retained many of the so-called liberal emphases 
in their thinking, notably their optimistic view 
of human nature. We may now discuss some of 
Pfleiderer*s themes with the purpose of
elucidating his understanding of history and how 
the Jesus of history may be encountered in our
day.
Otto Pfleidererfs "Philosophy and Development 
of Religion", being the Gifford lectures 
delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 
1894, will serve as the basis of our discussion.
The two volumes of the Gifford lectures give the 
essence of Pfleiderer's chief works (The Philosophy 
of Religion, 4 Vols; Paulinism, 2 Yols;
Development of Theology since Schleiermacher).
The correlative method of Pfleiderer may be seen 
in his two lectures, in the first volume, on 
"Religion and Morality" and "Religion and Science". 
In the chapter, "Religion and Morality", Pfleiderer 
claims to disclose that the two conceptions spring 
from one root, and flourish or die together. 
Christianity has made this inner connection of the 
two one of its fundamental principles. "Morality," 
according to Pfleiderer, "has here its fim ground, 
its living root, in the consciousness of our 
sonship to God, in love to God the Father, and to 
Christ, the ideal of the Divine man, in surrender 
to the Universal Divine purpose of the world, 
namely, the Kingdom of God." *
The discussion of the relation of religion and
1. Pfleiderer, Otto, "Philosophy and Development
of Religion" - Vol. I. p.150.
science are equally complementary. Instead of 
the exclusivity of natural realism or subjective 
idealism, the truth is shown to lie in the 
combination of a certain element in both. Faith 
is the basis of all science - religious belief is 
presupposed by all scientific knowledge as the 
base of its possibility. Where science assumes 
that the senses and perception rightly interpret 
outward reality, or the uniformity of nature and 
the reigh of law, these are improvable assumptions; 
assumptions, moreover, that imply that outward 
thihgs are constituted in harmony with our 
reason.
The two chapters (Vol. 1, Chapters V and VI) 
on the revelation of God in nature and in the 
Moral and religious world, which contain Pfleiderer* 
statement of the argument for the Divine Existence, 
are a closely-welded chain of reasoning. In these 
chaptersj the correlative, synthetical reasoning 
of Pfleiderer is carried through on other topics. 
For example, when speaking about the expectation 
with which we come to nature and what we find in 
nature, he says: "How then is this correspondence
between the laws of our thinking, which are not 
given to us from without, and the laws of our 
being, which are not made by us, explained? So 
far as I can see, only from this - that the two
have their common ground in a divine thinking, 
in a creative reason, which manifests its thoughts - 
partly in the order of the real world and partly 
in the thinking of our understanding as it copies 
that order.
It is necessary, to summarise the argument from 
the moral idea and the religious life in man, to 
think of the *idea of right* which the religious 
consciousness recognises as the revelation of the 
holy will of God. He recognises in conscience 
an innate as well as an empirical factor; one 
giving it its self-identical, abiding, formal 
character, the unconditional authority with which 
it speaks, the other explaining its variableness 
and diversity. Suffice it further to say in 
summary fashion that Pfleiderer believes that, on 
the basis of the universal experience, man*s nature 
is so constituted that some kind of consciousness 
of God is inevitable to him. This may be only a 
presentiment of a search, but, in this consciousness, 
we must recognise the original revelation of the 
love of God. "All human consciousness of God 
presupposes a self-communication of God, a working 
of the Divine Logos in the finite spirit."^ ' In 
the Christian doctrine of God as love, revelation 
reaches its highest stage.
2. Ibid., p.145*
5. Ibid., p.146.
But, we are not concerned, to elaborate
Dr* Pfleiderer*s system in any detailed manner.
We are intent on the interpretation given of
Christianity and, more generally, P£leiderer*s
interpretation of history. His views are
governed by two closely connected principles:
First, the theory of development, and, secondly,
the uniformity of the historical process. The
first principle holds that the different religious
systems are stages in a process - Christ and
Christianity representing the goal. Each Christia n
doctrine is derived from, or connected with,
earlier forms in other countries and religions,
these having an organic relationship. The two
propositions are given as the kernel of his theory
in his own words: "All the life of the earth is one
uninterrupted process of development, which has
reached its goal in man, and from this point the
natural process passes over into the historical
process; all the forms of life from the lowest
to the highest are developed out of simple,
fundamental forms, under the co-operation of inner
4.vital impulses and external conditions of life."
The belief in God, or the forms which these 
beliefs have taken, were not ready-made from the 
beginning, but were formed out of pre-historical 
belief in spirits. The descriptions of God and
4. Ibid., p.155-
His nature came from these pre-histo rical beliefs 
in ancestral and nature spirits, through polytheism, 
refined and Greek and Indian speculations, Jewish 
prophetic teaching, and, finally, to a New Testament 
and modern religious conception. But, Pfleiderer 
distinguishes between the historical origins and 
the essence of religion. We are, according to him, 
to conceive of the essence of religion in its 
final stages, not in its historical beginnings....
"in the course of its historical development, 
and most distinctly in the highest culminating 
point - Christianity."^* Christianity is the 
most perfect religious and ethical system, the 
goal and crown of all other religions and ethical 
systems - Greek, Roman, Indian, Persian and Jewish.
The second conspicuous characteristic of PCleiderefs 
system follows from the first one - the uniformity 
of the historical process. In this conception,
God is manifested in the natural order of creation 
and history as well as in the heart of a man.
But, God is not to be thought of in terms of a 
special divine intervention. On the contrary, God 
is to be discovered in the ordinary course of 
things, not in extraordinary events. It may be 
asked: What of the claims of special intervent­
ions, particularly the miraculous incursions?
5* Ibid., p.167
Pfleiderer considers the growth and decline of 
faith in miracles# Miraculous legends are the 
fo m  in which man’s infant faith in God finds 
sensible expression. Their growth is inevitable 
in the first stages of religion. M yth, legend, 
and poetical fables, are the thoughts of man’s 
religious childhood. "Myths and legends are the 
original forms in which man’s impulse to find his 
place in the world sought to satisfy itself; and, 
out of them, proceeded tbs cosmologies which 
everywhere form the beginnings of a philosophical 
explanation of the world. But, as secular 
morality, with the progress of civilisation, 
separated itself from religbn, so, in like manner, 
the impulse towards knowledge did not feel itself 
permanently satisfied by the traditional legends... 
From the need of embodying the first guesses at 
truth in concrete pictures.. .spring these 
miraculous legends, in which historical processes 
become idealised into images andtypes of spiritual 
experiences which always repeat themselves in the 
life of pious souls, or in which supersensible 
truths, ideas and ideals spring from the inner 
world of the spirit, become realised in symbolical
612
processes of the external world."6, Pfleiderer 
says that those who deny the reality of miracles 
will be adked to explain the rise and meaning 
of belief in them. He traces that belief to two 
courses - the idealising of the real andtthe 
realising of the ideal. Men either heighten and 
glorify objects of outward experience, or they 
embody visions and ideas of their mind in 
fictitious histories. The history of all the 
higher religions, and, in particular, of 
Christianity, is rich in examples of such 
miraculous histories in which the historical 
understanding can perceive nothing but a poetic 
realising of religious ideas. These ideal events 
are necessary and true for the time, that is, 
true as husks and vestures of ideas. On this 
reckoning, miracle stories, e.g. the transfiguration, 
the resurrection, Pentecost, the miraculous birth, 
etc., are idealising creations of religious fantasy 
working on the materials of memory and tradition.
On psychological and literary grounds, viz. 
religious experiences of the disciples, the 
existing Messianic idea and H?he literal interpretation 
of the Old Testament, these occurences which had 
made a deep and lasting impression, not merely on
6. Ibid., p.71 - 81.
individuals, but on whole circles of religiously 
excited men, became involuntarily idealised, 
even on the occasion of their being perceived 
by the first eye-witnesses, and still more in 
their reconciliation of them.
But, it may be asked in this context: Does
PfleidererTs theory of the miraculous and mythic 
embellishments of the narrative allow sufficient 
time for this activity? Does the involuntary 
idealisation of the narratives take place in the 
time span which Pfleiderer assigns to this 
heightening process, especially when it is noted 
that he places the composition of the Gospel of 
Mark in the year 70 A.D.? Pfleiderer would, 
perhaps, answer these questions along the 
following line of reasoning: There was not the
separation in the minds of the first centuiy 
between the boundaries of the present world and 
the next. Evne in the oneness of the two worlds 
there was no particular miracle in their minds 
when a person like Jesus was believed to have 
risen again. But, more of the implications of 
Pfleidererfs philosophy in our evaluations.
2. Evaluations of Pfleiderer1s Theology:
What have we learned about our discussion of
history from this cursory glance at Pfleiderer *s 
thought? We may summarise our points in the 
following way: (l) Historical facts are mere
shell and husk, i.e. "venerable vestments of 
sublime truths."^* Abstract ideas are the kernel 
of historical events. (2) Philosophy takes over 
from religion in the interpretation of Christianity. 
The division between Vorstellung and Begriff, 
between image and form, which was made in Hegel*s 
and Strauss* philosophy, is continued and 
buttressed in Pfleiderer*s system. In line with 
Strauss, Pfleiderer*s picture of the "mythless" 
Christ is one which magnifies His perfect and 
moral life. This picture can be detected in the 
following description given to it by Pfleiderer:
"The religious and the moral motives stood in His 
(Jesus) case in the purest harmony and in the 
most fruitful reciprocity...the deepest truth 
which Jesus impressed for the first time on 
humanity, and with a power such as no one else 
ever did, is this - Die and live again. Thou 
findest salvation nowhere but in the unconditional 
and unreserved surrender of thy whole self to 
God and His will of goodness. The soul of man, 
the child of God, cannot find rest and satisfaction 
in the perishing ungodly nature of the world; nor 
is it practicable to divide the heart between 
Mammon and God, as the Holy Ghost will have the 
whole man."8* (3) A separation is postulated
7. Ibid., p.95»
8. Ibid., Vol.II. Chapter 3, p.90.
between Paul and Jesus. Pfleiderer represents 
Paul as the creator of Christian theology, the 
author of dogmatic Christianity. As most of 
Paul’s ideas, e.g. doctrines of atonement and 
justification, his hellenistic mythological 
Christology, etc., are rooted in the ’juristic 
theology of Phariseeism, ’ they ’can no longer 
claim any binding authority over us.* Instead 
of attempting an interpretation of these Pauline 
ideas, Pfleiderer simply strips from the Gospel 
those which his philosophical system will accept.
(4) Christianity is to be appreciated as giving 
birth to some timeless, eternal and general truths.
Our critique, and, for that matter, our 
exposition of Pfleiderer*s system could be more 
involving, but we do not want to side-track our 
general discussion and survey of 19th century 
trends. We are considering another aspect of 
history, i.e. the organic, developing nature of 
historical ideas, and it is merely our purpose 
to reveal some of the theological tension toward 
the close of the 19th and in the early decades of 
the 20th century. In some measure, Troeltsch and 
Pfleiderer on the one hand, and Ritschl and 
Herrmann on the other, represent in their 
theologies the many-sided facets in the 19th century.
Bor exa&ple: The Hegelian-Straussian emphasis
on development of ideas is, with some exceptions, 
made one of the foundation stones in Troeltsch*s 
and Pfleiderer*s system. In these men, philosophy 
again plays its function in their theological 
constructions. But, in view of the reactions in 
the century to Hegelianism and all such 
philosophical theology by those in search of the 
!*f acts" which lay behind the theologl cal portraits 
•of the Christ in the New Testament and in Christian 
history, the theologies at the turn of the century 
were forced to reckon with the "particular", 
"concrete", i.e., Jesus of Nazareth, happenings in 
history. But, while Troeltsch and Pfleiderer were 
not confined to the exclusive revelation in Jesin, 
as were Ritschl and Herrmann, they could not give 
an adequate portrait of Jesus on the basis of 
their Philosophical biases.
We find ourselves, seemingly, at a cross-road 
at the close of the century - and there are many 
ways of describing the alternatives lying before 
us. Pirst, the Hegelian-Straussian-Troeltschian- 
Pfleidererian trend in the century, despite their 
efforts in correlating history and faith, history 
and myth, fact and development, displaced the 
concrete in preference for the idea. This line of 
reasoning considers the core of Christiaiity to lie
in the idea and not in any historic person. 
Another Hegelian in the 20th century states the 
trend in the following succinct manner: Edward
Caird says in his Gifford Lectures on "The 
Evolution of Religion": "The first and last
word of Christianity is the unity of reconciliat­
ion of the human and the divine"?.... In another 
characteristic passage he writes: "As in its
first dawn, Christianity is again beginning to 
show itself...as a principle at once subjective 
and objective which reveals itself not only 
within but also without us, which is immanent 
in nature and in man, and which is working in 
him to still higher issues. But, this lesson, 
wrapped up at the dawn of Christianity in types 
and symbols borrowed from an earlier faith, and 
apprehended ohly by feeling or, at best, by an 
imaginative intuition which had no means of 
explaining itself, is now becoming a reasoned 
conviction which can understand and criticise 
its own nature and evidence. The principle of 
Christianity has come to self-consciousness, 
and it is, therefore, capable of being held 
without that admixture of illusion which was 
inevitable in an earlier age."10’ Canon Quick’s
9. Caird, Edward, "The Evolution of Religion" -
Vol.II, p.291, quoted by Quick, O.C., 
"Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition" - p.40.
10. Ibid., p.41.
incisive comments on these remarks should be
noted. "Thus it is really in the theological
doctrine rather than in the historic person
that Caird finds the true Christian principle.
What fundamentally appeals to him is the idea
of a general law of divine incarnation and
human redemption through self-sacrifice
everywhere working itself out, rather than the
fact of the human goodness of the man Jesus.
Thus, the truth of Christianity is translated
into a principle of idealist philosophy which
the man Jesus intuitively perceived and expressed
IIin mythological form." * In the next section 
of our exposition, we shall follow up this 
particular point of view in one of its most 
persuasive exponents in the 20th century- the late 
Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple.
Meanwhile, the other alternative in the 19th 
century should be focused. This trend, as we 
have noted, began with the "Lives of Jesus" in 
the middle of the century and culminated in the 
theological formulation of the Ritschlians. In 
essence, Christianity consists in reconstructing 
the actual historic facts of the life and 
teaching of Jesus, and in the individual’s
11. Ibid., p.42.
approach to those facts. The facts and the 
individual’s faith which sees in them a gospel, 
these are the only abiding essentials of 
Christianity; these remain the same, a 
distinguishable substratum below all the 
passing systems of theology and ecclesiastical 
order which are, at best, like husks preserving 
a kernel, at worst, like grubs which eat into 
its heart. "Liberal Protestantism," as this 
point of view has been termed by many writers, 
sought to limit God, as it were, to the historic 
Jesus. While its disparagement of speculative 
dogma and metaphysical attempts to formulate 
the Christian faith in a once-for-all system 
was damaging in one direction, i.e., determining 
the ultimacy and cosmic significance of the 
Christian faith, the Ritschlian polemic drove 
theologians in this century to investigate 
history and its bearing upon the Christian faith. 
One of the theologians that we shall want to 
give some attention to in our next section has 
phrased the importance of the "historical" 
in the following words: "The old Christological
struggle has been transformed into a struggle 
about a Christian or a half pagan interpretation
of history: whether the Kingdom of God or a
national kingdom is the centre of history and 
principle of meaning for every historical 
activity with respect to the kingdom of God.
These questions replace the old question as to 
the relationship of these two natures in Christ."^* 
D.M. Baillie expresses modem theology’s debt 
to the ’Jesus of History’ movement in the 
following manner: "The present situation in
Christology is one which could not have emerged 
before the ’Jesus of History’ movement, but only 
after it."13*
12. Tillich, Paul, "Interpretation of History" -
p.261.
13. Baillie, D.M. "God was in Christ" - p.9*
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SECTION III.
SOME 20th CENTURY EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.
PREFACE.
In view of our idealogical survey of the two basic 
trends in 19th century theology, i.e., the movement 
away from history in the Hegelians and the return to 
history in the ’liberals* and Ritschlians, we are 
prepared for the theological problems which must be 
considered in the 20th century. Obviously we cannot bring 
out each question and focus the answers given by 20th 
century theologians. We have outlined two discernible 
trends in the 19th century and these patterns, as we 
indicated in Troeltsch and Pfleiderer, were not as 
opposed as a surface reading of theology would have us 
believe. Instead of an initial movement away from history 
in the Hegelians and a return to history in the liberal 
Jesus pictures and in the Ritschlian school, we are faced 
with various shades of the relationship between faith and 
history, between objective facts and some interpretation 
of these facts in the 19th century. It is the major 
emphases of the two views which allow for any separate 
discussion. In a simplified estimate of the 19th 
century, we have, it would appear, the controversy between 
Athens and Jerusalem, between Hellenism and Hebraism 
resurrected in the two shhools of Idealism and phenomenalism 
or historicism. On the one hand, through relating
Christianity and other disciplines and endeavouring 
to give Christianity a cosmic and ultimate setting, 
the particularities associated with Christianity, 
e.g. events, pictures, images, doctrines, were 
absorbed or clarified conceptually in the higher 
discipline of philosophy. Theology was submerged 
in philosophy. In the higher regions of thought, a 
divorce could be made between the pictorial 
presentations and the abiding, eternal qualities or 
ideas inherent in these portraits, but realiseable 
when the images were eliminated. On the other hand, 
the ethico-religious interest and the desire to 
clothe Christianity with the sort of objectivity 
which had become respected in the empirical sciences 
and, moreover, with the purpose of investigating the 
Christian message and freeing it from the prevailing 
criticisms of illusionism and subjectivism, the 
particulars of the Christian faith became the 
starting point and the objective facts, unadorned by 
later philosophical and doctrinal embellishmeiits, 
constituted the sure rock amidst the storms of doubt 
and confusion. We have briefly surveyed these 
efforts to recapture the "real" Jesus behind the 
obscure and rigid forms. This Jesus did not emerge 
in hiw virginal purity. If he did relinquish his 
place in world history, it was through a projection 
of the images attached to Him by those who would
rehabilitate Him in all his pristine historicity. 
Moreover, this rehabilitation process, this search 
for the Jesus hehind the Christ - however value able 
in estimating Jesus’ humanity - sacrificed or 
underestimated the very things in the New Testament 
picture of the Christ, e.g., his paradoxical 
relationship to God and man, which gave Him 
ultimacy and finality. In Tillich’s terminology, 
the Christ character of Jesus was undermined in the 
liberal formulations.
The century closed with efforts to move away from 
this ’objectified” Jesus picture. In Herrmann, the 
processes of the Christian faith were explicated.
From the present significance of the appearance of 
Jesus in the realm of history and in contemporary 
significance of the inner life of Jesus, the 
Christian communes with God. Unlike some, or most, 
of his colleagues and liberal predecessors, faith 
for Wilhelm Hermann could not be based on a belief 
in the occurrence of probable historical events or 
the assent to ecclesiastical doctrines. From the 
present relevance of the Christ-event in and through 
the experience of communion with God, the past facts 
and questionable interpretations receive understanding 
and clarification.
We found reason to question Herrmann’s ambiguous 
handling of history. He wanted, it would seem, to
declare the events objective and factual in every­
way - as being on par with other events - and yet, 
he wanted to say that faith does not rest on the 
believing of certain factual happenings. We had 
cause to ran ark that Herrmann considered these 
"objective events", as did Albrecht Ritschl, as 
suprahistorical. That is to say, these sacred 
events were in a realm to themselves, subject to, 
and yet free from, historical criticism. The 
suprahistorical facts were separate from and above 
and beyond ordinary historical happenings. While 
desiring to historicise man’s communion with God, 
Herrmann and others perpretrated the natural and 
supernatural duality in a different guise, i.e., 
historical and suprahistorical. Some type of 
metaphysic of history and Christianity was inherent 
in these theologies, though to be sure, the 
theologians desired nothing more than the complete 
elimination of speculative theology.
Ernst Troeltsch set himself the takk of correcting 
this ecclesiastical interpretation of history. With 
his radical understanding of the historical method 
and its applicability to all ideas and occurrences, 
he sought to show that within the realm of history, 
all problems must be solved. But, our brief survey 
of his t h o u g h t ,  while emphasising the homogeneousness
of history, e.g. all of one piece with no super­
natural or suprahistorical. realm beyond, revealed 
Troeltsch’s slight interest in Christian history 
or in relating Christian history to world history.
He seemed to be too engaged in apprehending the 
meaning of history in general to give any 
attention to the meaning of Christian history in 
particular. When Christian history was related 
to ’history*, it seemed to be done on a 
philosophical level. While not explicit in our 
survey, we had reason to believe, despite 
Troeltsch’s emphasis on the individual appropriat­
ion ofthe mystical experience of faith, that he 
sacrificed history in its particular character to 
the Idea of history. In other words, he gave a 
metaphysical interpretation of history which 
departed from the eventfulness of history. Our 
view of Troeltsch appears to be substantiated in 
an evaluation given by Gogarten in his book 
"Demythologizing and History". Gogarten writes:
"It is no doubt Troeltsch who, as a theologian 
troubled by the immensely difficult problem of the 
relation between faith and history, has studied the 
problem of history in its most comprehensive aspects. 
He was determined to be guided by his conviction 
that the real problem of history ’arises from the
inner nature of history itself as soon as it has 
been consciously seen to be history* and that 
consequently it is only in the nature of history 
itself that a solution for these problems can be 
found. As a result of his detailed examination of 
historical thought, he comes to the surprising 
conclusion th&t the key for the solution of the 
problems which this thought raises is ’the 
essential and individual identity of finite minds 
with the infinite mind, and, precisely through 
this, their intuitive participation in its 
concrete contents and its motivated vital unity.1 
Even if one says, as Troeltsch does, that this 
identity of finite minds with the infinite can be 
’only a very conditional one,’ it is still not 
difficult to perceive that modern historical 
thought, in takihg over this idea as the solution 
for the problem of the philosophy of history which 
it involves and consequently also as the initial 
basis for its understanding of history, is in fact 
departing from history and seeking refuge in 
metaphysics. It thus robs of its proper significance 
and force the realisation that history is in itself 
the problem which embraces the whole of human 
reality, man’s own reality as well as that of his 
world.”1*
1. Gogarten, Friedrich, ’’Demythologizing and
History” - p.32*
In the £Oth century we are troubled with the 
interpretation of history, and, according to 
Dr. John Macquarrie, the term history is subject 
to many interpretations. "Here we have a term 
(history) frequently used by theologians but 
rarely examined and subjected to that ontological 
analysis which we saw to be the prerequisite to
p
clear theological thinking." * We are not, it 
may be said in this context, intent on defining the 
term ’history’ or ’myth1. Our purpose is to 
describe the ways in which these ambiguous terms 
are used by certain philosophers and theologians.
The problem of the historical interpretation of 
Christianity, according to a 20th century theologian, 
who has made an effort to elucidate it in his book, 
"is to grasp the Christian faith once more in its 
original historical character, to allow it to be 
historical so that it once more enables the history 
of God to be what it is, and thus enables the 
history to take place in itself ( an sich) instead 
of conceiving it (sich vorstellen) in accordance 
with the subject-object pattern. •• .That is the 
meaning and purpose of demythologization - to 
interpret the mythical form (Gestalt), which is 
found in a number of formulations (central ones) in 
the New Testament message, in such a way that the
2. Macquarrie, John, "Existentialist Theology" -
p.160.
history is perceived to which alone they are 
intended to bear witness. The question in 
dispute between Bultmann and his opponents, 
according to Gogarten, "is not whether the great 
acts of God 'are set before all human existence, 
indestructibly, indissolubly and irremovably.'
For this is affirmed by both sides, and, indeed, 
with no less determination by the 'demytholosizing' 
party than by their opponents, The question in 
debate, the question which must therefore be 
decided, is rather, how - in what way - the history 
of God precedes all the being and doing of man.
On the one side it is asserted that it is in the 
way of 'objective factualness', while on the other 
side it is asserted that, since God's action takes 
place in the destiny of a concrete historical man 
and is accordingly a unique historical event, it 
comes before man as that which is set before his
Z}_
existence in the Kerygma of the New Testament."
3* Gogarten, op. cit., p.67*
4. Ibid., p.68. (In the passage we have two uses of 
'history*. This is not surprising because, in 
German, there are two terms, Geschichte and 
Historie. The former means historical reality 
which, even though it is past, makes a 
continuous impact upon present experience. The 
latter refers to the scientific study of history).
We have allowed Gogarten to phrase the question 
which seems foremost in the 20th century, and the 
question which Bultmann and others have addressed 
themselves to, primarily, because we will want to 
understand how Bultmann answers this question*
But, before we can isolate a few of the problems 
which Bultmann raises in his theology, especially 
his "demythologizing" of the New Testament, we 
shall want to glance at William Temple's philosophy 
and Christology. In our opinion, Temple's theology 
is particularly qualified to mirror the theological 
ambiguities discernible in the 19th century. He 
attempts, as a mediating theologian, to do justice 
to two emphases in his theology, i*e., his liberal 
heritage through the Ritschlian school, and his 
idealistic (Platonic and Hegelian) sympathies 
are focused in his natural theology and in his 
efforts to allow the Christology springing from 
this emphasis to correct the historism of the 
Ritschlians.
In our second chapter, we are interested in 
Brfltmann's approach to 'history' and 'myth*.
Bultmann*s "demythologizing" scheme will be 
compared with David Friedrich Strauss' "demyth­
ologized" Christianity. We shall give particular
attention to the two criteria which both 
theologians use in their separate interpretations 
of myth in the New Testament. Our question being: 
Does Bultmann*s demythologizing of the Christian 
message utilise the scientific and philosophical 
world view of the 20th century as a criterion for 
the truth contained in the Christian message, or 
does he allow the modern world view to criticise 
the mythological world view of the Bible? We shall 
see how crucial this question is when we sketch 
Strauss' elimination of myth on the grounds that 
nothing can be admitted as historical which 
conflicts with the conclusions of science and the 
view of philosophy (Hegelian) which regulates his 
understanding of the New Testament. We shall 
elucidate our -understanding of Bultmann's 
description of 'myth' and 'history' in the New 
Testament in the following way. Firstly, we shall 
give an initial comparison of Strauss and Bultmann's 
demythologizing efforts. Secondly, for purposes 
of comparison and contrast, we will recapitulate 
the Straussian approach to myth in the New Testament 
and his interpretation of history. Thirdly, we will 
describe Bultmann's use of hyth and his understanding 
of the role of science and philosophy as guides
instead of norms for the interpretation of myth in 
the New Testament.
While Bultmann's approach to 'history* will he 
implicit in the foregoing treatment of his thought, 
we shall want to make his interpretation of history 
more explicit by comparing him and his approach to 
the 'historical* with his Marburg teacher, Wilhelm 
Herrmann. Herrmann was, according to Bultmann, 
"struggling (even if he does so with an inadequate 
body of abstract categories) to comprehend human 
being as 'being-in-history *."v*
We believe that Bultmann's understanding of 'myth' 
and 'history' is subject to a theological criticism 
which was levelled against the Ritschlians, viz. 
his renunciation of one of the essential tasks of 
theology, which is to speak of God, albeit 
symbolically. Bultmann's dismissal of cosmic 
symbolism in his theo]qgy, including some aspects of 
Christology, impoverishes the place of Christ and 
his relationship to Creation.
It is at this point where a description of 
Paul Tillich's view of symbol and the place of myth 
in the Christian message exercises a necessary
5* Bultmann, Rudolf, "Essays: Philosophical and
Theological" - (The Problem of Hermeneutics) -
page 260.
corrective* Our evaluation of Bultmann's 
theology through a clarification of Tillich's 
understanding of symbols will serve to illumine 
the defect we believe present in Bultmann, and, 
at the same time, we shall have before us a 
theolofey which attempts to correlate the ethico- 
religious (the existential self-understanding of 
the Christian message) and the ontological roots 
of the message, i.e. Being and the self­
manifestation of Being in Jesus the Christ.
But, in our first chapter we are concerned to 
illustrate, as we pointed out, two emphases, i.e., 
idealism and historism, which lie uncorrelated in 
William Temple's philosophy and Christology. 
Temple's theology should caution us against 
expecting some type of resolvement or synthesis 
of the prevailing trends in the 19th century.
CHAPTER I
"Christus Veritas11 s The Christology of William Temple.
1* Introduction:
William Templet Christology and his interpretation 
of history may form a bridge into the 20th century, 
and his ideas have the possibility of focusing many of 
the problems which are being discussed in this century. 
We turn to Temple for two reasons: Firstly, his
interpretation of history represents the two ideas 
of history which we have discussed in the late 19th 
century. These two thoughts, i.e., an emphasis on 
the organic nature of ideas and their development 
and a concern for the initial data of the Christian 
message, are in conflict in his theology. Secondly, 
there is a conflict in his Christology represented by 
his anxiety to do justice to two types of Christology, 
i.e., the mythological type which affirms God*s 
manifestation under the conditions of humanity,^’ and 
the historical or adoptionist type which emphasises 
Jesus* response to "the Voice that hailed Him at His 
baptism...to begin the Messianic work.11 *
A philosophical background to Temple*s Christology 
may be found in his Gifford lectures, “Nature, Man and 
God11. While Temple's philosophy will not be dealt with 
extensively in our essay, there will be certain ideas 
which we shall want to discuss in connection with his 
Christology.
1. Temple, William, "Christus Veritas11 - p.1^9.
2. Ib id., p. 121.
"Christus Veritas" is a serious attempt to re­
think the whole problem of the Person of Christ 
and to re-interpret His significance for modem 
man. Temple realised, so he informs us in the 
preface of this work, that the idea of God which 
contemporary philosophy reaches precluded His ever 
doing anything in particular in any sense than that 
in which He does everything in general. In order 
to make special revelation intelligible to the mind 
of his day, Temple presents an exposition of the 
Christian idea of God, life and the world, or, in his 
own words, "a Christo-centric metaphysics."^* He 
confesses that this "map of the world"^*is given 
with the Christian revelation presupposed from the 
outset. This early work carries through more fully 
the implications of his closing affirmation in his 
later Gifford lectures: that in Christ the full
revelation of God has been bestowed which meets our 
sorest need.
A further word of introduction and we shall present 
the basic thesis of the book and attempt to appraise 
his ideas. Temple admits that this work "is an essay, 
not a treatise - a sketch, not a picture."^’ With 
this in mind, we shall not expect him to spell out 
completely his philosophical and theological ideas.
3. Ibid., p.5«
4. Ibid., p.6.
5. Ibid., p.10.
For that matter, his earlier work, "Mens Creatrix", 
so he informs us, sets forth his philosophic view, 
while his later woik:, his magnus opus, "Nature,
Man and God" presents his thought in a more expanded 
and developed form. Because Temple's thought is too 
completely one for consideration of any one aspect 
of it in isolation, we will, in places where his 
argument is strengthened and clarified in these two 
writings, refer to some of his related ideas.
Before embarking on our main discussion, which will 
be a consideration of his Christology and an implicit 
evaluation of his interpretation of history, some 
brief consideration must be given to the overall 
structure of his argument in "Christus Veritas".
2. Philosophical Backgrounds.
Temple says for purposes of exposition, he found it 
better to work in from the circumference to the heart 
of Jrhe Christian position, and then out again. The 
divisions in his Christological treatise reve&l the 
fact that he works from the perphery toward the 
centre, finds Christ to be the centre, then pushes out 
into the world suffused with His power. Turning to 
his later work, "Nature, Man and God", we discover 
Templefs thought on his so-called "outer circle".
After understanding his point of departure in 
considering the revelation of God in Jewus the Christ, 
we may move to the Christological reconstruction in 
his "Christus Veritas"•
On the basis of the harmony between the Mind of Man
and the rest of the universe, the inference is made
that the universe is rational. According to Temple,
"there is throughout the World a system of intei>-
relations ®uch that each separate entity affects,
and is affected by, all other things."^* He saw
reality existing in degrees, or stratas. Matter, life,
mind and spirit - this is the hierarchy he envisages
in an unbroken continuity in evolution. The relation
between the degrees is explained by Temple in a
hierarchial maimer. "Every grade in reality finds its
own fulfillment when it is possessed by a higher
grade and that each higher grade uses those which are
7
lower than itself for its expression."'* Temple, 
while not mentioning the term in this work, is 
convinced of a process which may be called 
"emergent evolution" - a continuity in the world 
process.
The most significant episode in the process is the 
emergence of Mind. Though this appears late in the
6. "Nature, Man and God" - p.504. 
7* "Christus Veritas" - p. 147*
evolutionary scheme of things, this does not rule 
out the immanency and latentcy of the principle.
Erom this point Temple moves on to his first 
dialectical transition. Mind is a part of nature, 
then Nature (to contain such a part) must be 
grounded in Mind. In short, we are compelled to
O
assert the reality of a supernatural Creator."
Temple's dialectical transitions - matter, life, 
mind and spirit - establish the basis of his 
"sacramental" philosophy and theology. Through 
these transitions, the way is prepared to receive 
the concept of the Incarnation which is for him the 
crowning principle of the emergent process. Progress 
in Temple's system, according to him, consists in the 
predominance at each state in the process of the 
sacramental higher principle. The emergent process 
culminates in the Incarnation, an act of God, but 
inferable as necessary from the structure of 
reality; and, from the Incarnation there stems the 
Church, the spirit-bearing body. In his thought, 
it is contended that even without revelation one 
can infer the Incarnation as the final stage in the 
process, provided that you accept his doctrine of 
degrees of reality as an account of the world. He 
remarks in his "Christus Veritas": "Even had there
been no evil in the world to overcome, no sin to be
8. "Nature, Man and God" - p. 154.
abolished and forgiven, still the Incarnation 
ijjould be the natural inauguration of the final state 
of evolution. In this sense, the Incarnation is 
perfectly intelligible; that is to say, we can see
that its occurrence is all of a piece with theq
scheme of Reality."
Though Temple says the Incarnation and the 
relation of Deity to humanity in Christ remain 
beyond our understanding, this statement is vitiated 
by his attempts to subordinate the revelation in 
Ghrist to a particular world view. In his scheme of 
Reality, Temple seems to make revealed knowledge 
of Him to be found in the universe as such. Possibly 
we might digress at this point to discuss Temple's 
essay "Revelation and its Mode" in his book "Nature, 
Man, and God". We shall give some attention to his 
effort to harmonise Natural and Revealed Theology.
5« "Revelation and its Mode":
The purpose of Temple's essay is stated in a 
question which he poses near the beginning of his 
discussion. He asks..."how far they (these forms 
religious people have supposed that special 
revelation to have taken) are philosophically 
justifiable, and what are the conditions of a fully
9. "Christus Veritas" - p.159*
satisfactory revelation?*’ This statement of 
purpose is augmented by another word coming the 
conclusion of his essay. He writes.. ."it is very 
much the business of Natural Theology to describe 
the mode of Revelation which is consonant with the 
conclusions which on other grounds are found to be 
most probable concerning the nature of God and of 
His relation to men." His philosophical world view - 
evolutionary transitions through matter, life, mind, 
spirit and culminating in a Personal Self-expression 
establish both the universe to be rational and 
personal in nature. But, what can we say concerning 
Revelation, especially particular Revelation on the 
basis of this evolutionary hypothesis? How does 
Temple, assuming the role of a Natural Theologian 
and accepting the role of the Christian faith in 
advance, pretend to make special revelation 
intelligible in the framework of Natural Theology? 
What does he accept as conditions of a fully 
satisfactory special Revelation - a revelation which 
is supposed to be free of indefiniteness and 
vagueness?
Temple believes that, unless all existence is a 
medium of Revelation, no particular revelation is 
possible. On the basis of this affirmation, he
attempts to prove that the conditions of the 
possibility of any revelation require that there 
should be nothing which is not revelation. God is 
personal, and acting personally, God can break the 
supposed "normal uniform" process. These breaks 
or variations in the uniformity of God's actions 
do not invalidate His constancy; rather, these 
adaptations enhance the constancy of the Personal 
Divine character. The argument of the "infinite 
adjustability" of God to present conditions, 
supported by the fact that a personal God can only 
be adequately revealed in and through persons, 
and supplemented by the thought that all existence 
is revelation, establishes the possibility of 
particular revelations. With this in view, Temple 
proceeds to set up the conditions of a fully 
satisfactory "special Revelation".
His criticisms of Biblical and Crebdal revelations 
and his positive statements concerning the nature of 
the revelations to be derived from these formulae 
deserve thoughtful attention* Despite the general 
argument of the essay, these evaluations of the 
traditional modes of revelation are enough to make 
his thoughts outstanding in contemporary theology.
Temple's discussion of the traditionally 
conceived means of Revelation breaks the ground 
for his primary conception of Revelation,
Revelation, according to Temple, comes through and 
in an event to minds divinely illuminated to 
appreciate the significance of God's eventful action. 
God guides the universe and the minds of men. The 
interaction of the process and the minds of men is the 
essence of Revelation. Though God's uniform process 
of the world can be revelatory for the minds alert to 
its significance, the specially adapted activities 
for meeting certain contingencies provide a fuller 
revelation of God. "All therefore is alike revelation, 
but not all is equally revelatory of the Divine 
character." The special Revelation chooses its own 
occasions and what is offered to man's apprehension 
in ary specific Revelation is not truth concerning 
God, but the living God Himself.
Temple realises that those special activities of 
God (objective self-utteranees) require responses 
from within us, and these responses are themselves 
the movement in us of the Divine Spirit. Does this 
establish a mode of Revelation consonant with the 
conclusions Natural Theology finds on other grounds 
to be the most probable concerning God and His 
relation to men? I think not, and sections of his
essay give me reason to believe that Temple did 
not believe be had taken the risk quality out of 
special revelation. The pinnacle of his 
argument concerning the conditions or modes which 
particular Revelation must take to be declared 
philosophically sound, is reached when he writes: 
"But, if the contention of the last lecture is 
sound, and Divine Immanence is always and only the 
activity of a transcendent Personality, and operates 
after the manner of personal action, by infinitely 
various adjustments which exhibit constancy of 
character in the face of varied situations, then 
there is no need for any dividing line, nor any 
possibility of drawing one." Though Temple posits 
a quantitative correlation between general and 
special knowledge of God, making the latter an 
extension in a straight line of the former, and 
though he assumes that God can manifest himself in 
a particular manner, and though he attempts to root 
special Revelation in the rational coherence of the 
world, he does not, particularly in the role of a 
Natural Theologian, come to grips with what he is 
trying to avoid in the essay, namely, to absolve 
special revelation of its indefiniteness and 
vagueness and to establish rational standards
whereby God's special events can be measured. He 
betrays this fact in several places in his 
discussion. It is possible to criticise Templets 
views on Revelation from many sides, but we will 
utilise his own criticisms; for, in them, he 
exhibits the fact that the Christian faith, though 
not constructively, has served a regulative function 
in his presentation.
The primary place where Temple undermines his 
logical argument is in the question he asks in the 
closing paragraphs of the essay. He asks: "The 
question still remains - By what means does the 
Revelation authenticate itself? From the nature 
of the case it must offer its own credentials; that 
revelation should have to appeal to anything beside 
itself to establish its character as revelation 
would be patent absurdity." This point is 
augmented in at least two other places in the 
discussion. First, in his critique of the Bible he 
acknowledges that the theory of God's mechanical 
dictation of truth is wholly without parallel or 
analogy in the normal relationship between God and 
man and even contradictory of that relationship. 
Though he admits that such a departure is 
unwarranted and unacceptable, he nevertheless says
that the conveyance of God's knowledge is a matter 
of import so transcendent and an activity of love so 
characteristic that it must he regarded as offering 
an adequate occasion as any could ever be for a 
departure from normal procedure. In other words, 
he has discredited the propositional revelation in 
the Bible but he has not denied that God can act 
apart from the logical coherence of the world. Men 
cannot, according to Temple, calculate the actions of 
God. God's word is cradled in the Bible, but this 
does not rule out the fact that He can manifest 
Himself arbitrarily and uniquely apart from our 
preconceptions. How does this view coincide with his 
Natural Theology? Though he acknowledges occasions 
for God's unusual unplanned activity, the possibility 
that the activity, or the interpretation of the event, 
can deviate from normal procedure and logical 
predictability does not seem to be carried through to 
a logical conclusion in his essay on Revelation. 
Granted the fact that he posits the variability of 
God, this adaptability of God is magnified to p 
place beyond the logical constancy set f027th in his 
argument. Why does Temple hesitate and qualify God's 
actions? Sranted that he did not take man's 
alienation firom God seriously, but when a personal 
revelation of God appears under the conditions of
existential separation apart from the normal 
procedure, why does Temple not come out boldly and 
say that this revelation may seem strange and 
contradictory to all human standards and experience? 
Instead of this paradoxical thought, Temple hedges 
the issue and surrenders the uniqueness of special 
revelation to a philosophy which demands proof and 
logical validation of God's revelation.
Second, following his views on eventful revelation, 
he acknowledges that there are truths of revelation. 
That is to say, there are propositions which express 
the results of correct thinking concerning revelation. 
But, he says that these truths do not involve the 
result that there need be anything vague or indefinite 
about revelation itself. The locus, according to 
Temple, is not in the mind, but the historical event. 
On two scores, Temple's thought in this context 
should be examined. In the first place, he attempts 
to safeguard the objectivity of the Christian 
Revelation, but, in so doing, he obscures and 
oversimplifies the problem. In an effort to maintain 
the definiteness of Revelation, he dichetomises the 
event and the interpretation of the event. When he 
attempts to preserve the objectivity of the facts 
themselves, as existing independently of the thinking
and prejudices of the believer, he overlooks one 
vital factor in Biblical Revelation. That is, that 
we can know of the event (Jesus Christ) only 
through the written and interpreted history of 
Revelation. Secondly, Temple's error at this point 
is further mirrored by the way we apprehend the 
objective event. God's direct self-communication to 
the soul of man establishing the appreciation of the 
event illumines the subjective character of God's 
revealing act. There is no subjectivity in the event 
as such, only our accept ion or rejection of the event. 
The event is free from indefiniteness - coming to us 
divested of its irrational character. Natural 
Theology may sympathise with his emphasis on the 
factual, empirical character of the event, but his 
ideas on the Divinely initiated response are 
dissonant with his conclusion about God, man and the 
world. Alan Richardson makes a point in this 
connection in his "Christian Apologetics". Temple's 
emphasis on the objective event and the subjective 
appreciation and incorporation links him, according 
to Richardson, with the Ritschlian concern for the 
factual account of the event narrated in the New 
Testament. Richardson believes that the event and 
the interpretation of the event are so joined even 
in the New Testament that the fact and the
appreciation cannot be separated and designated 
"objective" and "subjective" as the Ritschlian 
school of thought attempted to do.**0*
Temple tried and failed to harmonise Natural and 
Revealed Theology. Revelation in the process becomes 
subordinated to reason. The assumption of the unity 
of revelation and reason, or placing all 
revelation on the same plane with nothing more than 
a quantitative distinction between the two, tends to 
deprive the special revelation of finality. The 
very fact that he believes that special revelation is 
in the same dimension or scale as general revelation - 
with a degree of distinction between the two, serves 
to defeat his general argument, even from the point of 
view of a Natural Theologian. It would seem that 
Revelation ceases to be an encounter with a Thou 
which authenticates itself on its own inherent 
grounds.
But, we may clarify our evaluation of Temple's 
ideas on Revelation by returning to other facets 
of his thought, particularly his view of the 
Incarnation.
10. Richardson, Alan, "Christian Apologetics"
pages145-147*
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4. The Incarnation and Emergent Evolutions
Our discussion to this point has shown that the 
Christian faith provides the spectacles through 
which Temple views reality and through which the 
truth of things can be seen. But, Templefs 
ambiguous formulation of revelation and its 
relationship to reason gave us cause to reflect on 
the adequacy of his understanding of "special 
revelation". By attempting to state the logical 
predictability of the Incarnation and endeavouring 
to fit the Incarnation into a nicely worked out 
theory of emergent evolution, Temple has lessened 
the uniqueness and the sui-genri nature of the 
revelation in Christ. In his concern for the 
continuity between man and God, Temple has 
harmonised general and special revelation to such 
a degree that the latter cannot be but an extension 
along the same lines of the fomer. This assumption 
deprives the "special revelation" of its concreteness, 
onceness and oneness. On this basis, one may know 
special revelation as differing in degree from 
general knowledge, but the former lacks any 
qualitative transcendence or final authenticity.
One can sympathise with a statement made in his essay 
on Revelation in Bailliefs symposium by the same name -
("The particular Christian revelation has its roots 
in the rational coherence of the world and, if these 
are separated, the special revelation becomes itself 
a superstition and a fruitful source of 
superstitions."1'1') But, when the special character 
of the event is taken into a philosophy which 
abolishes its otherness, then we may question 
Temple’s concern for the analogies preceding the 
special activity of God. Certainly, one can believe 
in a positive relation between revelation and reason 
without giving revelation a subordinate place in the 
relationship and bringing revelation into the 
argument at the end in order to add an additional 
corroboration to an already completed rational system. 
We may legitimately ask: "Why cannot the truths 
derived from revelation be accepted as a link in the 
argument on the basis of their own inherent authority?" 
Instead of borrowing practically the entire content of 
the Christian revelation under the illusion that he is 
coming to Christian conclusions solely through a 
rational process, why does Temple hesitate to 
introduce these revelatory truths on their own 
grounds?
The theory of emergent evolution might be 
satisfactory in an explanation of the various levels 
of reality in our world, but the fact of the
11. Baillie, John, "Revelation" - p.97*
Incarnation of God (however understood) appearing 
in the man Jesus is in another category and cannot 
he reduced to the confines of a rational theory*
One may be impressed with the continuity between the 
levels of reality in anture and man, but one cannot 
suppose there exists this same continuity between 
sinful humanity and God* This relationship is 
assumed in Temple’s exposition, and, because of this 
assumption, little evidence of the sense of the 
tragic element in the life of man and very little 
sign of questioning, doubt, struggle, wrestling 
and anguish of the soul are mirrored in Temple’s 
"Christus Veritas". We are led from one point to 
another, and quite easily, on the way to a 
conclusion already familiar to the writer. It is 
agreed that man’s reason should test Christian 
revelation and seek to explain it to human 
experience, but Temple fails to point out that man’s 
reason is affected by pride the same as his other 
powers, and is also in need of enlightenment and 
redemption. Therefore, it is not revelation that 
must be obedient to reason, but reason to revelation. 
Man’s reason is never qualified to stand in 
judgment over revelation, rather, the revelation is 
always judging man’s reason rather than fitting into
its logical coherence.
Another point, related to his statement on the
Incarnation, which will he considered in detail
whfcn we discuss his Christology, concerns what
Temple’s attempt to explain and reconcile special
revelation does to his views on the Work: of Christ.
From the statement, "even had there been no evil
in the world to overcome, no sin to be abolished
and forgiven, still the Incarnation would be the
natural inauguration of the final stage of 
12evolution," *we may surmise that Temple is 
Abelardian in his doctrine of the atonement. That 
is to say, he, along with Abelard and Ritschl, 
places a special emphasis on the revelation of God’s 
love and its power to win men to repentence, though 
Temple’s later writings reveal less of his earlier 
optimism. In 194*0, in his essay, "Thoughts in 
Wartime", he realised more fully man’s 
recalcitrance and God’s sovereignty. He writes:
"The task of presenting the special revelation seen 
in Christ is impracticable. The world of today is 
one of which no Christian map can be made. It must 
be changed by Christ into something very unlike 
itself before a Christian map of it is possible."1 *^
Before considering Temple’s Christology, one must 
admit that criticisms of Temple’s thought arise
12. "Christus Veritas" - p.l39«
13* "Thoughts in War-Time" - p.101.
today which would likely have been quite different 
twenty years ago. For one thing, his philosophy 
of emergent evolution has become suspect. His 
idealistic tendencies hindered him from seeing the 
critical situation caused by man’s separation from 
God, and, because of this fallacy in his thought, 
his view of the Incarnation and the atonement lacks 
decisiveness and power.
5* Temple’s Christology:
A. The Person of Christ:
Special attention has been given to Temple’s claim
that from a study of the various levels of reality we
would expect God to supervene upon mankind and
express Himself through the conditions supplied by
humanity, but more convincingly he argues that
"evil or sin of the world in any case a problem wofcthy
of divine solution, culminates in the self-will of man,
demands a special act of the gracious God to redeem 
14-mankind." This divine act has occured in the 
Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. Since man could 
not save himself from the problem of sin and finitude, 
God appeared in a human life sharing the real 
experience of manhood and thus inserting a "saving 
influence" into the universal body of inter-related 
human beings.
14. "Christus Veritas" - p.261.
In our consideration of Temple fs outer circle, 
i.e., his theory of evolution and the dialectical 
transitions culminating in the Incarnation, we have 
found much to question. But, when Temple expounds 
the Christian idea of the Godhead of Jesus Christ, 
the Person of Christ, and the Holy Spirit and the 
Church, he is again the Church theologian; one who 
was anxious to reconcile the liberal and Anglo- 
Catholic wings of British Theology. Several points 
are assumed by Temple in his Christological treatise. 
Primarily, he was not seriously affected by the 
latest historical criticisms. He believed the Pourth 
Gospel to be thw work of John the son of Zebedee, and 
he accepted the Virgin Birth theory. Moreover, he 
believed the empirical (objective-factual) basis of 
the Christian faith was to be found in the New 
Testament. As we have remarked, he perpetuated the 
Ritschlian interest in the "objective" basis of the 
faith with a "subjective" evaluation.
B. Doctrine of the Trinity:
In "Christus Veritas", Temple declares that the 
best way to describe the Godhead is in terms of love. 
"God is love; therefore, He ^eeks Himself in an Other;
this seeking is the eternal generation of the Son, 
who is Himself the Other that is sought? the Son as 
the Divine Self-utte ranee is the agent of creation 
so that in Him all the universe is implicit; within 
the universe the Creator-Son lives a human life and 
dies and rises again, so declaring to the universe 
the nature of its Creator; thus He calls forth from 
finite spirits the love which is theirs because He 
made them, though by self-will they had obscured it - 
and the same love which the Son reveals to men and 
elicits from them everlastingly unites the Son to the 
Father; this is the Holy Spirit: and this whole
complex of related spirits is the Supreme Value or 
Reality - the Love Divine This idea of God as
dynamic love rather than as a static monad provides 
the basis of Temple fs explanation of the all- 
suffieiency of God within Himself, of the creation 
of the world and the coming of Jesus Christ in 
redemption. God is love; creation and redemption 
are manifestations of that love and the Holy Spirit 
awakens our responsive love to the outgoing love of 
the Father.
Temple utilises a second set of terms to describe 
the Trinity. He declares that the most modem way 
to explain it is in psychological teims of personality.
1>. "Christus Veritas" - p.283*
He ventures this formulation: "The Godhead has
three centres of one consciousness, yet each is
God. God the Father is the ground of all Being;
He comprehends eternity. God the Son or the world
is God’s self-manifestation in time, in Creation, and
in Jesus Christ. The Holy Spirit is a personal
influence witnessing to Christ in the hearts of the
believers. These three persona are co-equal in the
16unity of One spiritual Being." * Temple’s 
description of God as Personality and Person 
strike a note of anthropomorphism which he fails to 
connect with ]^ is thought that God is beyond the 
categories of person as personality. This is, 
among many, an illustration of the side-by-side 
nature of Temple’s theology. That is to say, two 
opposing thoughts are enunciated without an effort 
to connect them, symbolically or logically.
C. Divinity of Christ:
Temple writes: "The Gospel tells a stoiy of a human
life but it is more than human, or super-human - it is 
divine. Most markedly as the human personality reaches 
its complete development being made perfect by 
suffering, it reveals itself as having never been the 
ultimate fact about this human life. Behind, working
16. Ibid., p.117.
through, it, utterly expressed by it so far as 
human nature allowed, but transcending it as God 
transcends humanity, is found the Divine Word 
Himself. *  While Temple does not elaborate the 
Logos doctrine in this essay, he believed - witness 
his discussion in his "Readings on the Gospel of St. 
John" - that the Logos Idea was the central 
explanation of the Divinity of Christ. Jesus’
Divinity was the eternal Word subsuming a Jraman life 
within the orbit of His work. The Word has always 
had its Being within the Deity, but it is not the 
whole of the Deity. It is God’s nature to reveal 
Himself and so the world is the arena of His 
revelation. The Logos is the ground of the existence 
of the world, but all existing thiiigs now exist in 
evil. Only Jesus is wholly in the Logos. Other 
things come to be through the Logos. The light that 
was in the Logos has always shone into the world, 
but in a special way in Jesus Christ. He was the 
"only begotten son of the Rather, full of grace and.- 
truth."
Temple found it difficult to think of the Logos as 
sustainer of the world and at the same time a babe in 
the manger. He decided that it was absurd to think of 
God as ruling the world and’ weeping over Jerusalem at
17. Ibid., p.145-146.
the same time. Therefore, he answered the 
Nestorian difficulty by saying that there were two 
persona, God the Rather, who ruled the world and 
God the Son who was in Jesus Christ. Temple writes: 
"Between the existence of the Son subject to human 
limitations in Jesus of Nazareth and the Son as 
progressively ordering the world according to the 
eternal purpose of the Rather, there is not the same 
distinction as between the Eternal and temporal modes1 o
of the Divine." * Temple gives a further word on 
the Nestorian question which opposes any idea of 
God giving up certain of His characteristics and 
reducing His divinity in order to become man. "The 
Incarnation does not mean that God the Son left His 
usual work of Creation and was active in Jesus. Jesus 
did not control affairs in Mars or China. But, God 
the Son, who is the Word of God by whom as agent 
all things come to be and apart from whom no single 
thing has come to be, without ceasing His creative 
and sustaining work, added this to it, that He became 
flesh and dwelt as in a tabernacle among us so that 
in Him we saw ’the glory as of the only-begotten Son 
of the Rather’. He who is always God became also Man - 
not ceasing to be God the while. R.or the Incarnation 
was effected, not by conversion of the Godhead into
18. Ibid., p.280.
flesh but by taking of manhood into God.”^*
Temple is anxious to steer clear of the Kenosis 
theoiy (reduction in the Godhead). He quotes 
H.R. Mackintoshfs summary of the facts concerning 
this theory. Temple foresees a criticism that 
might be raised against his view, viz. that the 
Incarnation was merely an episode in the life of the 
Divine Son. Men could then say, n0h, yes, He 
accepted suffering and death, but all the time He 
was God and knew He would soon return to His gloiy. 
Therefore, we cannot say that He was really one of us.M 
Temple seeks to point out that God's true nature is 
revealed in the earthly life of Jesus and that the 
Incarnation is a revealing episode in the life of the 
Eternal Son.
In a later context, we shall want to point out how 
Templefs ideas on the union of the two natures in 
Christ jeopardises the Divinity of Christ.
D. Humanity of Christ:
The highest categories that we know in our world, 
according to Temple, are those of spirit and personality. 
However, Temple says, we believe that through our 
study of human beings and their appreciation of values,
19. Ibid., p.140.
there is a transcendent Deity who embodies 
these values and who, from our experience, must 
not be less than personal. In order to reveal 
Himself as all the other grades of reality do by 
supervening upon the next lower grade, we would 
expect Deity to appear in the form of human 
personality as it did in Jesus Christ. The Divine 
Person, the Eternal Word, was the controlling 
factor in that human life,but it was throughout 
a true and full humanity.
Though Temple indicates the points where Jesus was 
truly human as suggested by the Gospel narratives, 
and though he gives an excellent description of 
Jesus' sinlessness as connected with His growth 
and development, and though he presents the 
individuality and universality of Christ's humanity 
in a very convincing manner, there are at least two 
places in his discussion which tend to throw in 
question the humanity and jeopardise the true 
divinity of Christ. In the first instance, Temple 
is prepared to accept the Virgin Birth story. We 
believe that there is little excuse for basing 
Christ's divinity and sinlessness on this theory 
without a clear explanation why this particular 
doctrine occupies such a pre-eminent place. An 
acceptance of the Virgin’birth hypothesis questions 
the full humanity of Jesus and tends toward a 
presentation of a Docetic Christ.
The other point, Christ's relationship to other 
men, does not make clear how Christ was different 
from other men. Temple sought to maintain a view 
of the continuity between Christ and o the rumen.
We believe this relationship to be fundamentally 
sound, but we would, on the basis of Temple's 
evolutionary treatment of Christianity, want to 
question his treatment of the dissimilarity between 
Christ and other men. The only difference, 
according to Temple, between Christ and other 
men was Christ's constant obedience to the will 
of God. It would appear from Temple's thought, 
that Christ is merely our perfect example. His 
acts and deeds evoke sympathy and love for our 
neighbour and free us from self-centeredness.
While being desireous to lift the discussion of 
Christ's Divinity out of the traditional context, 
i.e., in what particular way He was divine,
Temple's emphasis on the exemplary characteristics 
does not do justice to the Person of Christ. This 
ethico-religious emphasis does not coincide with 
Temple's discussion of the Logos Christology. 
Christ, in Temple's thought, is little more than 
a moral leader or a religious genius.
E* Union of the two Persons;
Temple admits that the union of the two persons
in Jesus the Christ is a unique fact which cannot
be fully explained. "Man who is not yet God
possessed, cannot comprehend the perfect union of 
20God and man" ‘and "if any man says that he 
understands the relation of Deity to humanity in 
Christ, he only makes it clear that he does not 
understand at all what is meant by the Incarnation." 
Temple does not attempt to spell out in his essay 
his views on the union of the two natures, but, 
with the ideas set forward in other writings and 
what remains implicit in "Christus Veritas", we may 
suggest his approach to the problem. Slsewhere, 
i.e., in "Mens Creatrix", Temple admits that he is 
in the line of Paul of Samosata who tried to 
express the union of the two natures in Christ in 
terms of will. He believes that he has escaped 
from Paul’s errors because he does not distinguish 
between will and substance as Paul did. Temple 
defines will not as a faculty but as "the whole 
being of a man organised for action." Of all 
human beings, Jesus is the only one who has a 
fully developed will, whereas other men have only
20. Ibid., p.121.
21. Ibid., p.139*
a partially developed will. Therefore, it would 
be better to say that in Christ God and man are
personally one, the person of the man Christ Jesus
22is God the Son.*1 # The human personality does
not exist side by side with the Divine personality;
23 •it is subsumed in it*" The foregoing statements
imply Jesus1 humanity was impersonal. Temple denies
this is what he means when he affirms that f,it is
only because there is this real human will or
personality (ideally interchangeable terms in
Temple’s thought) that there is here any revelation
24to humanity of the Divine Will,” # However, he
attempts to explicate his position, Temple seems
to be forced to attribute a human personality to
Christ which comes through moral effort and
development to the completeness of the Divine Will.
Temple supports historically the doctrine of the
impersonal humanity of Christ because it served
to preserve a theoretical union of the two natures
in one persoh. "Mankind or humanity,” according
to Temple, "is a close knit system of mutually
influencing units and in this sense the humanity
of everyone of us is of mutually influencing units
and in this sense the humanity of everyone of us
is ’impersonal’, and the greater the man, the less
25merely ’personal’ is his humanity.” ■'*
22. Ibid., p.146.
23* Ibid., p.150.
24. Qlbid. , p.150.
25* Ibid., p.151*
After these statements, it appears contradictory 
for Temple to declare that there are two wills in 
Christ and that the human will grew into fuller 
and deeper union with the Divine Will until 
perfect union was revealed in the Complete 
sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Though this 
progressive scheme is affirmed, Temple still contends 
that the human will is never separate and distinct 
from the Divine Will. The human is subsumed in the 
Divine Will so that we see the Divine life 
predominant in the human personality. On the basis 
of these preceding contradictory statements, one 
may believe that Temple does not provide for a real 
unity of Christ’s humanity and divinity through 
the use of the concept of will. When we advance 
the idea of two wills in Christ, we begin with a 
dualistic conception that is difficult to overcome 
on any otherbasis than by saying there was a moral 
or ethico-religious union between the wills.
Because Temple hesitated to affiim this type of 
union, we may expect to find his consideration of 
this problem ambiguous and conflicting.
In another writing, somewhat earlier than the 
present one we are examining, Temple unhesitatingly 
says that Christ was united to God in will. Of
course, according to him, "ChristTs will as a 
subjective function is not the Father's will;
but, the content of the wills - the purpose - is
26the same." * Christ, therefore, is not God, but
God and Christ are one. Christ is a man whose will
is united to God's. Other men's wills are united
to God’s will to a more or less degree, but Christ’s
will is perfectly united to the Father's will.
Temple states the matter as a logician when he
writes: "Formerly (as pure subjects) God and
Christ are distinct; materially (that is in content
of two consciousness) God and Christ are one and the 
27same." So, on the basis of the content of Christ's 
and God’s will, we may say that they are one. The 
Divine Will in Christ is the Logos and the purpose 
of Christ seems to be the purpose of God. These 
statements add up to the idea previously advanced, 
namely, the -union between the human and divine is 
nothing more than a moral and ethical union and 
Jesus is a good moral example.
The criticism of Temple’s position by Martin Creed 
in "Mysterium Christi" substantiates our evaluation. 
Creed's words may be quoted in full. "Temple would 
say that the whole personality of Christ is not 
something given at the start by the existence side 
by side of the Divine and human natures, but
26. Foundations, edited by Streeter, p.248.
27. Ibid., p.249.
something achieved by life's actions, i.e., 
normally...To which aspect of Jesus does His 
self-conscious ego belong, the divine or the 
human? Temple seems inconsistent. As 'Person', 
(entirety of His spiritual being), Jesus is both 
Man and God. 'Yet, the Person of the man Christ 
Jesus is God the Son' - person here being used 
in the more limited sense, that of self-conscious 
subject or ego. But, again he says, fThere being 
two wills in the Incarnate Lord, His human nature 
comes through struggle and effort to an even deeper 
union with the Divine, in completeness of self- 
sacrifice.' Whose, we ask, is the moral effort? 
Surely it is Christ's human consciousness 
subordinating itself to the Father's will, For we 
cannot predicate moral progress of God the Son.
The logical conclusion would seem to be that 
Christ's moral person or self-conscious ego was 
the man Jesus rather than the Logos, though it 
was to the latter's influence, operative in 
unique fullness, that his whole historical person 
owed its unique Divine Sonship. And, of course, 
Temple goes on to say that the real human will or 
personality, through which the Divine Will in 
Christ comes morally to revelation is per sepo
apart from the Incarnate Lord, a man."
28. H.T. Andrews (editor) "Lord of Life" 
Essay by Martin Creed, p.180-181.
If the -anion of the two natures in Christ is 
only a moral union, and this seems to be the case 
in Temple's thought, it is clear that this view 
undermines the divinity of Christ. If the 
Chalcedonian attempt to explain the Incarnation 
in terms of essence, substance and nature, 
represents for Temple "the bankruptcy of Greek 
patristic theology," then we may say that Temple's 
effort to present the Incarnation as the natural 
outcome of an evolutionary theory and to portray 
the union of the Divine and Human natures in Christ 
morally and ethically, represents a return to a 
subtle form of Antiochian adoptionism. Furthermore, 
if these ideas are substantial, our salvation 
rests on what Professor Robert Calhoun has termed 
in his discussion of Nestorianism, "a happy 
accident.”
F • The Work of Chrj^ b:
"What is the difference made for us by the 
manifestation of the Divine life in a human life?"^* 
By way of answering this inquiry, Temple relates 
his view of salvation, conversion and self-sacrifice.
29. "Christus Veritas" - p.220.
Salvation is to be set free from self, and how,
Temple asks, can a life be anything else? We 
are selves, and from self-hood we cannot escape.
Temple further says: What is required is not
that (a man) should become either some one else 
or no-one in particular, but that he should 
discharge his particular function in response to 
the Universal Spirit, the Spirit of the whole - 
"Salvation, therefore, consists in the substitution 
of the Spirit of the Whole for the particular self 
in the control of all life, conduct, thought and 
feeling."^ - Temple terms this as "conversion", 
and he defines conversion as a change in the 
direction of a man’s life taking the form of self- 
sacrifice, the putting aside of what is the good 
for the self and devotion to the "Universal good"!’*'* 
"self-sacrifice is not the price of salvation; it
32is salvation, and salvation is such self-sacrifice."-^ 
How does the transforming power of God in Christ 
reorientate the life of a man toward this particular 
direction? Granted that, according to Temple,...
"When man is really indwelt by God, nature will 
reveal new and entirely unpredictable qualities,
"but, has he given us any clues on the process 
of the re-orientation of mankind? How does a man 
become a "new creature in Christ?" Temple declares
31. Ibid., p.221.
32. Ibid., p.221.
33. Ibid., p.240.
that the work of Christ is the revelation of the 
suffering love of God to men. This work is 
concentrated in the cross of Christ, for there we 
see supremely what sin costs God. This revelation 
of love draws forth man’s repentance and responsive 
love. While Temple has adequately emphasised the 
response in men’s hearts to the revelation of 
God’s love, his doctrine of the atonement is 
inadequate because he does not sufficiently point 
out the objective action of God to save us from 
our sin. Because Temple does not have a realistic 
view of man’s sin and man’s involvement in despair 
and alienation from God, he does not take into 
consideration the possibility that man will not 
and cannot repent before the revelation of Divine 
love. A doctrine of the atonement should include 
both the objective and subjective features, and 
concerning the former aspect of the work of God 
in Christ, no-one can adequately state, but it 
is our conviction that Temple passes over this 
emphasis throughout his Christology.
The Sacraments:
Temple’s teaching concerning the sacraments of 
the Church cannot be understood unless we see them 
in the foreground of a universe which is
fundamentally sacramental. "The Universe is,"
according to Temple, the fundamental sacrament -
extensively - but it only becomes this because
within it and determining its course is the
Incarnation, which is the perfect sacrament
intensively - resulting from the Incarnation we
find the 'Spirit-bearing Body* which is not actually
a perfect sacrament, because its members are not
34utterly surrendered to the spirit within it."^ *
This idea, in Temple's thought, does not cancel
out particular sachamental acts. In a later
writing, he defines sacrament for us when he writes:
"A sacrament - is an instance of a very definite
35and special relationship of spirit and matter."^*
It is a spiritual utilisation of a material object
36whereby a spiritual result is effect;"^ *and the
epithet "sacrament" may be attached rightly not only
to the recognised sacraments of the Church, Baptism
and the Eucharist, but to all Warship in so far
as an "act of Worship, like all other human acts,
must at least have physical expression, and in so
37far as it does, it is always sacramental."^'*
Temple would say that there are differences between 
the sacrament of the preaching of the Word and the
34. Ibid., p.234.
35. "Nature, Man and God" - p.491.
36. Ibid., p.491.
37* "ChristuB Verita" - p.232.
sacrament of the Eucharist. But, nesfcher is to he
put on a lower plane than the other; whereas in
the former the human personality is prominent as
the vehicle of the sacrament, the latter
38emphasises the divine initiative.”
A brief consideration of the two dominical 
sacraments in Temple’s thought will suffice in our 
presentation. The sacrament of..."Baptism is the 
sacrament of regeneration and of incorporation into 
the Church }or into Christ}." * As the 
sacrament of Baptism is the introduction of a man 
into that society of the Church which is the type 
of what is God’s purpose for the society of all 
men, so the Eucharist, in which we partake of the 
Elesh and Blood of our Lord, is the divinely 
appointed means of strengthening and upbuilding 
of the Church as the Body of Christ.
While much could be said concerning Temple’s 
treatment of these two sacraments, his emphasis 
on the close connection between these sacraments 
and reality and his concern that sacramental 
worship and social concern should be seen as 
simultaneous aspects of the true worship of God 
and His Christ strike the writer as being oqb of
38. Ibid., p.232.
39. Ibid., p.235-
the most remarkable achievements of his thought
6. Evaluation.
We have outlined William Temple’s philosophical 
ideas and his Christology for two reasons: In the
first place, we are interested in the efforts in 
the early decades of the 20th century to combine 
the two emphases which prevailed in one form or 
another in the late 19th century, i.e., an 
interest in the historical, factually and 
objectively understood, and an extension of the 
historical to include development and change.
A derivative pattern in the late 19th century which 
is at work in and to some degree unreconciled in 
Temple’s theology and in many theologians in the 
mid-twentieth century concerns the relationship 
between philosophy and theology. Temple, among 
others, utilises philosophical ideas and clothes 
his theological thought with contemporary 
philosophical idioms. In a sense, these 
philosophical patterns provided the framework for 
a non-myt ho logical presentation of the Christian 
message, viz. emergent evolution. While others in 
this century, continuing the Ritschlian distrust 
of philosophical categories and alien speculations,
e.g., Barth and to some extent Bultmann, are 
loathe to use philosophical language. Though 
Barth, according to Tillich and others, makes 
use of philosophy, albeit covertly, in his 
theolgoical language.
This one point we want to establish and we 
believe is has been substantiated in our brief
V
exposition of Temple ’s thought: the convergence
of two interpretations of the historical and the 
potential reconciliation of the use of certain 
categories depicting the ’ultimate * in the 
Christian faith. A summary examination of Temple’s 
theology and philosophy mirrors two essential 
points. (1) Temple is attempting in a language 
and thought foim acceptable to his day to relate 
the motives associated with Hegelianism and 
Ritschlianism, while being in sympathy with the 
ethico-religious aspect of Christianity. Temple 
is cognisant of the other factors in Christiaiifcy 
which have the possibility of grounding this 
ethical interest in some universal context. In 
his Christology, there is an effort to relate two 
Christologies. On the one hand, he desires to do 
justice to the historical Jesus and his particular 
relationship to the Father - a relationship which
was submerged in the early creedal formulations. 
Temple is interested in translating the analogies 
used in Patristic thought, e.g., substance, nature, 
into metaphors and symbols drawn from the life of 
man, e.g., personality, will, etc. On the other 
hand, He does not want to sacrifice, as did his 
Ritschlian predecessors, the mythological ideas 
which depict the ultimacy of Jesus the Christ, e.g., 
the Logos idea, "Hew Creature" and Christ's 
relationship to Creation. His reliance on an 
evolutionary hypothesis and his view of the 
historical process as a dialectical realising of the 
higher forms of life affords Temple a basis in 
history. That is to say, he desires to demonstrate 
upon this "emergent" hypothesis the horizontal 
character of the Christian message. The message of 
the Christ sprang out of the world, in the world, 
and is to be understood and appropriated within the 
world through symbols and analogies drawn from 
history, especially from the realm of personality. 
But, Temple's thought, especially when he begins 
his discussion of the aspects of Christology 
requiring another dimension, i.e., Person of Christ, 
the Trinity and the emergence of the Church and 
Sacraments, relates the horizontal process to a
vertical, transcendent dimension. Though this 
dimension is not wholly reconciled with his 
' philosophical base, especially with his concern 
for natural theology.
It appears to this writer that Temple represents 
in his philosophy and theology and in his 
horizontal and vertical emphases, the conflicting 
patterns in 20th century theology. In Temple, 
there cannot be a return to an idealism - whatever 
the form, that of the early Bathers or Hegel - 
which disregards or runs roughshod over the 
horizontal (historical) qualities in Christianity. 
The Christian message in Temple's thought is 
conditioned, as all interpretations of the Gospel 
inevitably are, by the time in which he wrote. The 
Ritschlian concern for objectivity and the empirical 
basis of the Christian message and the consequent 
evaluation (value-judgments) of the revelation by 
a mind divinely illumined to receive the message, 
lies at the roots of Temple's interpretation of 
history. This objective-subjective interpretation 
of history could not receive the thought that the 
interpretation, however indefinite and vague, was 
part and parcel of the event, objectively viewed.
But, unlike his distinguished predecessors in the
Ritschlian school, he was at variance with 
their primary evaluation of God, viz. through 
His effects and predicates. Temple's theology 
was placed in a framework which entailed some 
symbolic description of the 'ultimate* (God-in- 
Himself) in and beyond the historical process.
Temple is particularly qualified to serve as
a bridge over the years which separate the
Ritschlians and the numerous reactions to the
motives of this school of theology in the 20th
century. Temple retained his interest in the
social message of the Gospel, while attempting
to relate the ethico-religious to the Person of
Christ. His many small books on the social
function of the Church, e.g., "Christianity and
the Social Order", "Christianity and the State",
"Christianity in Thought and Practice", "Citizen
and Churchman", "Christian Faith and Life", etc.,
have made an impact upon contemporary treatment
of social andChristian ethical themes.
Professors John Bennett and Rheinhold Niebuhr of
Union Seminary in New York have expressed their
indebtedness to Temple's clarification of the
role of the Church in society. "The greatest
40theologian in the Church of England,"
40. Forsyth, J. Ford, "The Doctrine of the Churfh 
and its Ethical Significance According to 
Three Modern Theologians, Temple, Brunner, 
Brown, Ph.D. thesis, Union Seminary," p.72.
according to Rheinhold Niebuhr, has made 
contemporary theologians aware of the need for the 
#spiritual transformation of man's life in the v^ orld. 
Many of the motifs associated with Ritschlianism, 
e.g., the Kingdom of God, social salvation and the 
qualities which made Jesus significant, viz. His 
obedience and faithfulness, are given 'body* and 
clothed in a more constructive garment in Temple’s 
theology.
May we point to the reason why Temple was chosen 
to serve as our guide to the 20th century and as a 
bridge connecting the 19th and 20th century. Temple 
is a mediating theologian. His thought siands between 
the liberal and orthodox emphases in contemporary 
theology. He sought to do justice to either claim. 
But, as we had opportunity to point out in several 
instances, the varying concerns in his theology and 
philosophy did not receive incisive integration.
In a word, Temple is dialectical without being 
paradoxical. That is to say, he is intent on 
relating the historical and cosmic in his theology. 
The dialectical character in Temple's thought is 
mirrored in his treatment of the Trinity. But 
Temple, as we remarked, is not paradoxical. By 
paradoxical we mean "against the doxa," against 
the natural world-view, the opinion which everybody
has* What is against this doxa is "para-dox-ical’1. 
There is one event which is against this doxa, 
namely, that udder the conditions of existence in 
which God and man are estranged from each other, 
essential God-manhood appears: this is the
paradox of the Christ. This is against every 
opinion, and cannot be derived from existence. 
While William Temple errs on the side of under­
standing the paradoxical event as an extension of 
reason, Karl Barth errs in another direction when 
he describes the event in supernatural terms as a 
miracle which breaks into reality, from one world 
into another world.
In the next chapters we.shall be concerned with 
another effort to clothe the Christian message in 
some intelligible idiom. In our comparison of 
David Friedrich Strauss ani Rudolf Bultmann, we 
shall focus on the ways in which they use ’modern 
thought* in their demythologizing schemes. We 
move from this initial consideration to a 
description of myth in Bultmann*s thought ^nd the 
criticism of his theology which may be made by 
Paul Tillich.
CHAPTER II
HEW TESTAMENT AND MYTHOLOGY: RUDOLF BULTMANN.
1. Introduction.
Since Rudolf Bultmann1s controversial essay 
"New Testament and Mythology" appeared in 194-1, 
he has occupied the stage of theological debate, 
formerly held for two decades by his teacher,
Karl Barth. With the translation of his work in 
English and his lecturing tours in the United 
States and Britain, he has merited the title,
"the Strauss of the twentieth Century".^ "* His 
theology, in particular that aspect which offers 
a description of myth in the New Testament, has 
set off a theological firecracker which is 
reverberating around the world. Professor Ian 
Henderson led the English world in its consideration 
of Bultmann’s initial essay. While not giving 
a literal translation of Bultmann’s essay in his 
"Myth in the New Testament", Henderson 
paraphrased and critically evaluated Bultmann*s 
theses. Professor Henderson’s discussion of the 
issues, especially Bultmann’s relationship to 
history and his rendering of some of the difficult 
German idioms, has set the stage for many
1. Baillie, D.M., "God Was In Christ" - p.22.
subsequent explorations. Bultmann*s essay has 
since been translated in the first volume of 
/ "Kerygma and Myth**, along with several critical 
appraisals of the work by German theologians and 
Bultmann*s replies. A second volume of "Kerygma 
and Myth1*, not yet in English, continues this 
theological debate.
Probably the best and by far the most thorough 
evaluation of Bultmann*s theology and Philosophical 
roots has been done by Dr. John Macquarrie in his 
"Existential Theology". Dr. Macquarrie compares 
Bultmann and Heidegger and offers the English- 
speaking world a very valueable critique of 
Bultmann*s theology and an original appraisal of 
and translation of Heidegger’s philosophy. When 
Macquarrie(s translation of "Sein und Zeit" is 
complete we shall be in a better position to make 
some of the comparisons which he cites in his 
provocative work.
G.V. Jones has contributed to the discussion in 
his "Christology and Myth in the Hew Testament”, 
but, unfortunately, his contribution suffers from 
an effort to explore too many issues. His articles 
in the "Expository Times", June and July, 1956, 
entitled "Bultmann and the Liberal Theology" offers 
a more incisive evaluation of Bultmann*s thought.
Amos Wilder’s article in the "Journal of Biblical 
Literature", LXIX, 1950, "Myth and the New 
, Testament", and his supplementary remarks in his 
book "Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of 
Jesus", while clarifying the essential issues at 
stake in Bultmann’s demythologization, misses 
Bultmann’s primary emphasis, viz. re-interpretation 
of the mythology in the New Testament. If Wilder 
and Paul Minear ("Eyes of Eaith") were criticising 
Strauss who, unlike Bultmann, sought to eliminate 
myth in the New Testament, their evaluations would 
be more to the point. Unfortunately, these New 
Testament scholars,. along with scores of others, 
seem to be too biased to give Bultmann a hearing.
Paul Tillich’s "Systematic Theology", Vol.II, 
especially his constant use of the word 
"demythologizing", is an indication that Bultmann’s 
theme must be discussed, even by a theologian who 
demythologizes the Christin message from another 
perspective. The word "demythologization" does 
not appear in Tillich’s first volume, but, because 
of the interest shown in Bultmann’s scheme,
Tillich has had to clarify his own position.
The Germans have been veiy prodigious contributors
to this theological debate. Gogarten’s 
sympathetic work has already been cited. Jaspers 
carries on a fruitful debate with Bultmann in a
/
book entitled "Die Frage Der Entmythologisierung".
It is pointless to prolong this brief survey of 
the literature on the subject. No informed 
theologian can bypass the issues raised by Bultmann.
Obviously, we cannot discuss Bultmann’s theology 
in any comprehensive manner. We must choose our 
emphases and generalise on the basis of the trends 
which we discern in his thought. It is proposed 
in the pages to follow to discuss Bultmann’s 
theology and his demythologization of the New 
Testament in the following way. First, we shall 
explore in the region where Bultmann’s scheme 
compares with David F. Strauss* in the 19th 
century. This is done primarily to set the stage 
for some of the issues which Bultmann grapples 
with in his plan. Secondly, we shall recapitulate 
Strauss’ demythologizing of the Christian message, 
giving special attention to the two norms which 
served him in his interpretation of myth in the 
New Testament, i.e., the canons of modem science 
and Hegelian Philosophy. Thirdly, we will turn to 
Bultmann’s essay "New Testament and Mythology" to 
discover his aim, his concept of myth and the ways
in which he attempts to avoid having his scheme 
subjected to the same criticism levelled against 
Strauss, viz. capitulation to a modern world-view. 
Finally, it is evident that Bultmann’s demyth- 
ologizing programme cannot be understood apart 
from his total theological perspective. At this 
point we will use the thought of Paul Tillich to 
estimate the deficiency we discerned in Bultmann’s 
theology. As we proceed, something will be said 
about Bultmann’s relationship to the Ritschlians, 
particularly Herrmann.
2. D.F. Strauss and Rudolf Bultmann: Approach to 
the problem of Myth in the Hew Testament.
D.F. Strauss and Rudolf Bultmann, while living 
in different centuries and influenced by different 
ideas and offering dissimilar solutions for the 
problems which they address themselves to, brought 
identical questions to bear on the Christian 
message. The former asked in his "Life of Jesus", 
in 1835 • "Is the Gospel history true or reliablep
as a whole, and its details, or is it not?" * In 
other words, on the basis of what we know of 
history, science and philosophy, and, in particular, 
the character of God, what is true and valid for all
2. Strauss, "Life of Jesus".
time, and. what, in the light of casual and 
temporary circumstances, has now become useless,
#pernicious and obsolete? The latter theologian 
inquired in his essay "New Testament and Mythology" 
in 194-1: "Can Christian preaching expect modem
man to accept the mythical view of the world as 
true?"^# Can the modem man still be Christian 
in the genuine sense that he believes in Jesus 
Christ as Lord and Saviour? If so, does this 
mean that modern man, living and thinking in the 
light of the results of modem science, must believe 
in the resurrection as a miraculous fact, in the 
empty tomb, in the "Last Day" as the end of human 
history, in the virgin birth, in angels, and 
demons, etc?
Both of these theologians posed their questions 
as Christians whose prime intention was to be 
sincere with themselves, to be sincere before God, 
and to be at the same time a citizen of our modem 
world. Both theologians, in their definition and 
exposition of the problem and in their separate 
solutions, caused considerable consternation 
among biblical critics and theologians. But, and 
this needs emphasising, these New Testament 
scholars were not seeking to harm Christianity or
3. Bultmam, Rudolf, "Kerygma and Myth" - p«3*
684-.
impede the interpretation of the Gospel; on the 
contrary, they are seeking to free Christianity 
and make possible a wider affirmation of the 
Christian message.
Not only were their questions similar, but their 
inquiries were motivated by a similar assumption, 
viz. the scientific picture of the modem world. 
Strauss and Bultmann believe in the uniformity of 
history and the natural order. Strauss, we recall, 
believed Gospel histoiy to be unhistorical when the 
narrative is irreconcilable with the known and 
universal laws which govern the course of events. 
The ancient world, according to him, did not 
delineate the infinite and finite; consequently, 
God was viewed as the immediate cause of every 
change in nature or the human mind. But, the 
modem scientific approach to history views events 
as successive. All occurrences, not excepting 
the most violent convulsions and the most rapid 
changes, follow in certain order of sequence of 
increase and decrease. On the other hand,
Bultmann, writing a hundred years later, makes the 
same point. "Man's knowledge and mastery of the 
world have advanced to such an extent through 
science and technology, that it is no longer
possible for anyone seriously to hold the New 
Testament view of the world...What meaning, for 
instance, can we attach to such phrases in the 
creed as 'descended into hell' or 'ascended into 
heaven'?....We no longer believe in the three- 
storied universe which the creeds take for 
granted. The only honest way of reciting the 
creeds is to strip the mythological framework from 
the truth which they enshrine - that is, assuming 
that they contain any truth "at all, which is just
h.
the question that theologians have to ask." * In 
another context in his essay, Bultmann writes:
"The only relevant question for the theologian is 
the basic assumption on which the adoption of a 
biological as of every other Weltanschaujng rests, 
and that assumption is the view of the world 
which has been moulded by modem science and the 
modem conception of human nature as a self­
sub sistent unity immune from the interference of 
supernatural powers."-^
It would appear that both theologians allow the 
contemporary post-Oopemican scientific picture to 
act as their criterion for discarding the pre- 
scientific view in the Bible. Both theologians 
assume that in this scientific age we cannot 
believe in miracles, e.g., resurrection,
4. Ibid., p.4.
5« Ibid., p.7»
transfiguration, etc. Criticisms levelled 
against Strauss' scheme are echoed in those 
offered against Bultmann's scheme. Strauss' 
capitulation to modem science, according to his 
critics, is merely carried forth in Bultmann's 
theology in another guise.
The third level of obvious agreement concerns 
their common denial of the demything schemes 
devised by the naturalists (Paulus and Eichora 
in Strauss* era) and the later liberals (Harnack 
and the historicists in Bultmann's era). These 
naturalists, rationalists and later 19th century 
liberals, hoped to discover behind the miraculous 
and symbolic statements in the New Testament, the 
genuine history of Jesus. When certain thoughts 
were eliminated and fantastic impostures uncovered, 
the history of Jesus could be disengaged from the 
outward shell. Paulus and Eichorn believed that 
the Old and New Testament writings contained a 
minute and faithful historical narration, composed 
shortly after the occurrence of the events, recorded 
and derived, whenever this was possible, from the 
testimony of eye witnesses. Strauss, we recall, 
was anxious to point out, though not on a textual 
or source examination of the narratives, that the 
miraculous forms affected the content of the
historical narrations. The Evangelists, 
according to Strauss, considered the things which 
Paulus and others would retain as essential, as 
secondary aspects. That which Paulus calls the 
Evangelists1 opinion about the fact, constituted, 
in their estimation, the fact itself. The 
essential defect of the naturalist position and the 
later "Quest of the Historical Jesus" school, is 
its unhistorical mode of procedure. These 
commentators allow conjectures to supply the 
deficiencies of the record; adopt individual 
speculations as a substitute for real history; 
seek by vain endeavours to represent real history 
that as natural which the narrative describes as 
supernatural; and lastly, the method of the 
naturalists evaporates all sacredness and divinity 
from the scriptures, reducing them to collections 
of amusing tales no longer meriting the name of 
history.
In his searching criticisms of the naturalists, 
Strauss has, from a different perspective, given 
voice to the criticisms which contemporary 
theologians have made against the efforts of Harnack 
and the historicists to extract the eternal ideas - 
the kernel of Jesus' message - from the temporary 
husks. These late 19th century interpreters
considered Eschantology and Christology as a 
mythological clothing of the pure belief in the 
God of Jesus* The ideas associated with the 
historical Jesus, discoverable behind the 
furniture of the New Testament and later Patristic 
embellishments, are timeless realities. Jesus* 
views on the brotherhood of man, the Fatherhood of 
God and His ethical deeds and high moral aims are 
the timeless values behind the temporal clothing.
But, how did Strauss propose to account for the 
innumerable, and never otherwise to be harmonised 
discrepancies and chronological contradictions in 
the Gospel histories? These factors, according to 
him, would disappear, as it were, at one stroke 
if the mythical view is admitted.
For the moment we are not concerned with Strauss 
view of myth and its function in the New Testament 
Nor are we concerned to point out that Strauss' 
early clarification of the problem of mythology in 
thescriptures and his solution, i.e., his mythical 
key, subordinated the Gospel to timeless truths 
streaming out of Hegelian philosophy. We are not 
concerned to distinguish Strauss' and Bultmann*s 
definition and application of the mythical key.
We are interested in establishing their common 
historical scepticism. Strauss was not, whatever
his reasons, interested in the historical facts 
in the Gospel history. That is to say, he was 
not intent, as were the naturalists, rationalists 
and later historicists in the 19th century, upon 
recording the pure history which lay behind the 
accidental embellishments which science or 
philosophy had decided upon. Unlike his liberal 
successors, he was not interested in the distinction 
between the religion of Jesus and the religion 
about Jesus. He did not, so far as we could 
determine - though this is evident to some degree 
in his "Popular Life for the German People" in 
1864 - erect an antithesis between Jesus and Christ 
within the New Testament. When he concerned 
himself with the antithesis between historical 
facts and the Idea which these facts depicted in 
a mythical or pictorial fashion, he did not view 
the facts as supreme. It was, as we have pointed 
out, the Idea of the Divine Humanity which these 
facts suggested which was foremost in his mythical 
inquiry.
What is the state of affairs when we survey 
Bultmann's thoughts on the real Jesus - the Jesus 
which the naturalists and historicists thought 
they could find behind the records? While Bultmann's 
views have been influenced by a century cfcf source 
and form criticism, the two men, however they arrive
at their perspective, are not interested in the 
factual, past event of Jesus. A paragraph from 
Bultmannfs "Jesus" illustrates and substantiates 
our point. He writes of his attitude towards 
the historical approach to the life of Jesus: "In 
the following exposition (he says) indications 
that Jesus might be regarded as the Great Man 
or Genius will be lacking; he appears neither as 
a 'demonic* nor ’fascinating' figure. His words 
will not be described as profound, nor His faith 
as mighty, nor His character childlike. 2b subject 
is not the Vernal value of His message, nor his 
discovery of the limitless depths of the human 
soul. Our attention will be directed to that 
which he intended, and which can, therefore, as 
the challenge of his historical existence, become 
a present reality. For this reason, any concern 
with the 'personality' of Jesus is excluded, but 
not because I make a virtue of necessity; for I 
am naturally of the opinion that we know almost 
nothing about the life and personality of- Jesus, 
as the Christian sources were not interested in 
them and are, further, fragmentary and overgrown 
with legend; and there are no other sources." * 
Another statement from his essay "New Testament
6. Bultmann, Rudolf, "Jesus" - p. 11-12
and Mythology" gives us Bultmann's conception of
the role of historical criticism. He writes:
"The facts which historical criticism can verify
cannot exhaust, indeed they cannot adequately
indicate, all that Jesus means to me. How he
actually originated matters little, indeed we
can appreciate his significance only when we
cease to worry about such questions. Our interest
is in the events of his life, and above all in 
the cross, is more than an academic concern with
the history of the past. We can see meaning in
them only when we ask what God is trying to say
n
to each one of us through them."'*
While Strauss and Bultmann, on the basis of 
their separate perspectives, were not interested 
in recapturing the "Jesus of history", or present­
ing the Gospel as a series of facts about a man 
in the first century, it is clear that both did 
not doubt there was such a Jesus. Both men may 
underestimate the impression which Jesusmade upon 
His disciples and both may pass too quickly from 
the "objective-historical" to the "existential- 
historical" (Bultmann) or from the "image" to 
the "Notion" (Strauss). Some of the men 
influenced by Strauss* mythical key, e.g. Bauer
7* Bultmann, "Kerygma and Myth" - p.35* 
8. Macquarrie, op.cit. p.170.
and, indirectly, the Christ-Iyth theorists in 
the early 20th century, went on to doubt and 
deny the historical Jesus. Similarly, according 
to Macquarrie, some of the men influenced by 
Bultmann, e.g., Jaspers and Fritz Buri, dehistorize
Q
the Christian faith. * It is probable that we 
may witness, though only from those who misunderstood 
Bultmannfs interpretation of the historical Jesus, 
a negation of the historical Jesus in the future.
It is clear from the foregoing similarity between 
Strauss and Bultmann, that we cannot glibbly say 
that Bultmann merely returned to a conception of 
history which Strauss denied in his theology. The 
issues are not that simple. The question Left in 
our minds by this discussion concerns the nature of 
the "Kerygma" in Bultmannfs theology. Is the 
"Kerygma" in Bultmann and the "Idea" in Strauss 
the same? That is to sayj Does the"Kerygma?* cease 
to be historical in the same sense as the "Idea"?
This question will be answered when we discuss 
Bultmann*s interpretation of "history", i.e., 
historisch and geschichtlich. Meanwhile, we may 
move to another similarity between the two theologians, 
more of a terminological character.
9* Macquarrie, John, "The Limitations of Demyth- 
ologizing" - Unpublished lectures delivered 
at Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.,
Spring, 1957*
Bultmann and Strauss express their methodological 
key for the interpretation of New Testament 
mythology in a similar fashion. On the one hand, 
Strauss is concerned with the notion of self- 
consciousness. An elimination of the obsolete 
mythology or pictorial language will bring mankind 
to a realisation or (self-awareness) of the 
prevailing unity between the finite and infinite. 
The pictorial (Vorstellung) may suggest this unity 
to the naive mind, but this consciousness is 
native to one who does not require a concrete 
manifestation of the unity. Self-consciousness 
for Hegel and Strauss is an immanent quality - 
something which exists prior to and apart from any 
special revelation. The purpose of philosophy and 
theology is to sketch this innate quality and to 
negate anything that obstructs this awareness.
Bultmann’s methodological interpretative key 
and its terminological similarity with Strauss* 
may be seen in his crucial question: "What does
the myth say about man’s relation to God in the 
midst of this world? What is the conception and 
the understanding of our personal life expressed 
in the myth? While Bultmann’s interest in self- 
understanding has this terminological similarity 
with Strauss’ self-consciousness, this is the only
point of agreement. Self-understanding, unlike 
Strauss* self-consciousness, according to 
Bultmann, has its source in the revelation coming 
to meet man. This existential interpretation of 
myth comes from above into existence. That is to 
say, in Bultmann*s concern for the encounter between 
God and man in the New Testament and in history 
presupposes a genuine difference between the 
finite and the infinite and yet a basis foro
contact between them. *
But, have we exhausted the obvious agreements 
between the two theologians, even if some of these 
similarities are merely terminological and extremely 
tenuous when the underlying assumptions are 
surveyed? There is another agreement between the 
two men, though this emphasis was rectified by 
Bultmann in his later interpretation of myth. I 
refer here to a definition of myth which appeared 
in Bultmann’s earlier writing "Geschichte der 
Synoptischen Tradition". In this writing,
Bultmann relies on a view of myth which closely
8. The reader is referred to Bultmann’s paradoxical 
understanding of the points of contact and 
conflict in his essay by that name in the 
volume of essays entitled "Essays: Philosophical 
and Theological". In this essay, Bultmann, 
unlike Barth, clarifies his understanding of 
the possibility of man receiving revelation, 
though he is in a "fallen" state.
resembles Strauss* conception. For example, 
when Bultmann determines the content which is 
taken over from materials which deal with gods 
and their fate as myth, his view may be under­
stood to mean what Strauss meant when he 
understood myth as fantasies of man. We shall 
inquire into this distinction when we examine 
Bultmann’s handling of myth in his essay "New 
Testament end Mythology".
Our exposition to this point has merely raised 
questions which, if our essay was intended to 
expound the various nuances of difference and 
agreement between the two theologians, we would 
be obliged to expose. But, we are searching for 
an essential difference between the two ways of 
demythologizing the New Testament message which, 
on the one hand, will serve as a comparative guide, 
and, on the other hand, mirror the advance made in 
Bultmann’s plan. Possibly our surest way, though 
by no means the easiest or safest, is to discuss 
their use of myth. There seems to be a fundamental 
difference between Strauss and Bultmann at the 
level of their understanding of two adjectives 
which are used interchangeably in their theologiesi
i.e. mythical and mythological. The former 
adjective expresses Strauss* approach to the 
New Testament and the latter is Bultmann* s way 
of looking at the reality, albeit garmented in 
myth, in the New Testament. Strauss is 
concerned with the origin of and elimination of 
myth, and Bultmann with the content and 
interpretation of myth. Possibly our discussion 
will receive, despite the misunderstandings on 
every hand, some clarity if we further state how 
we are going to elaborate this essential clue.
In the first place, we are going to allow Strauss 
to explain his view of myth and the mythical way 
of looking at things. In this point, we shall 
be concerned, as was Strauss, with the origin of 
the mythical. The two criteria which served to 
eliminate the mythical, i.e., modern science and 
Hegelian philosophy. The Straussian idea of 
self-consciousness will be clarified. In our 
exposition of Bultmann, we will want to explore 
his dual conception of myth and to comprehend his 
mythological way of looking at things which is 
valid apart from the corrections and aids received 
in modem science and Heideggerian philosophy. In 
this point, we shall want to point to Bultmann*s
"self-understanding". Some of the weaknesses 
of Bultmann’s scheme will he recorded, e.g. an 
elimination of the cosmic Christology in the 
New Testament, particularly to be detected in 
the unimportance assigned to the passages about 
the second coming, etc. After we have shown 
Bultmannfs relationship to Strauss and his 
advance beyond the 19th century demythologizing 
schemes, we shall want to pick up the thread of 
our argument, i.e., Bultmann’s understanding of 
history and his indebtedness to Wilhelm Herrmann.
3* Strauss’ Demythologization of the Christian 
Message.
We have surveyed Strauss’ demythologizing scheme 
in some detail in the first section of our thesis, 
but, for the purpose of comparing and contrasting 
his approach with Rudolf Bultmann, some of his 
essential points must be briefly summarised. We 
turn now to his primary interest in myth and his 
understanding of myth and history.
Strauss is interested primarily in the origin of 
myth in the New Testament and how, on the basis of 
his Hegelian philosophy, i.e., the idea gaining
form in the Vorstellung (the image) and returning 
to itself through this temporary antithesis, these 
unconscious, spontaneous and unintentional 
imaginations are carried into the person of Jesus. 
The Jesus which Strauss sketched for us in his 
"Dogmatic reconstruction of the Life of Jesus"
**as, as we intimated, but the reflection of an 
Hegelian face. His interest in mythology was a 
springboard for his philosophic speculations and 
his concern to distinguish between the types of 
myth in the Hew Testament, e.g., Evangelical,
Pure, Historical, was a means to substantiate the 
primary type of myth in the New Testament, i.e., 
the Pure or Philosophical myth. The image, 
pictorial or myth, obstructed the realisation of 
the Idea, i.e., the Divine Humanity or the self- 
consciousness of God and man.
In our summary of Strauss in the context of a 
discussion primarily designed to understand 
Bultmann’s demythologizing, we are intent on 
bringing into some focus the points which will 
enable us to discover what Bultmann has attempted, 
and how his process of demything differs from 
Strauss.
A. Origin of Myth.
Strauss1 biblical work was designed to prove the 
presence of myth in the New Testament and to discuss 
the origin of the mythical ideas. His problem was 
to show that myth, or the application of myth was too 
circumscribed. The entrance to Gospel history and 
the exit was accepted as myth, but the immediate 
space was still traversed by the crooked and 
toilsome paths of natural interpretation. To 
disprove the interpretation of the Rationalists 
and supernaturalists, Strauss must find myth in the 
public life of Jesus - from the Baptism to the 
resurrection. How was he to demonstrate mythical 
embellishments in every section of Gospel history?
He attempted, in the first place, to show that 
the life of Jesus was not written by eye-witnesses, 
or any nearly contemporaneous with the events in 
the life of Jesus. The Rationalists, Naturalists 
and supernaturalists had assumed the historical 
basis of the Old and New Testaments. The former 
interpreters recognised legendary accretions, but, 
on the basis of their assumption concerning the 
genuineness of the accounts, these embellishments 
could be disengaged from the historical accounts. 
Secondly, even if documents could be found that 
were written during the life-time of Jesus, these
ideas were still imbued with a philosophy of 
history which failed to distinguish between 
history and supra-history. In other words, on 
the basis of the requirements of modem science, 
e.g., the non-interference of the casual, 
natural and historical process, these writings 
could not stand as historical documents.
In these two external criteria, the production 
of the New Testament writings from Oral trad&ion 
and the unhistorical nature of the content when it 
presupposed the violation of the natural order, 
Strauss had set up his case for myth in the New 
Testament. His fundamental idea of the unhistorical 
element in the Gospels being that of myth, by which 
he understood investitudes, resembling histoiy of 
original Christian ideas, fashioned in the legend 
which -unconsciously invented them. These legends, 
or legendary transformations of the real life of 
Jesus arose chiefly from the practical feelings 
and wants of the people and on this account 
formed according to the free play of the imaginat­
ion.
The life of Jesus* then, is the mythical creation 
of facts out of ideas. These ideas were narrated 
into facts - ideas which arose unconsciously 
and unintentionally from the Old Testament
■background. The life of Jesus was depicted 
feature for feature after the Old Testament 
prototypes. Strauss1 thought in this matter 
is illustrated in the guide which he believed 
directed the Evangelists in their narrations.
"Such and such things must have happened to the 
Messiah; Jesus was the Messiah; therefore, such 
and such things haijpened to him." An illustrate 
sylogism which Strauss employs makes his point 
clear: "The Messiah was to come from Bethlehem,
Jesus was the Messiah, consequently he must have 
been born in Bethlehem." The Messianic 
prophecies were fulfilled in Jesus. He had to 
correspond to the example of Moses, to come from 
the stock of David, to be born in Bethlehem, etc. 
etc. His life had to be adorned with the most 
splendid and significant events in the lives of 
the prophets. The deeds and types of the Prophets 
were to serve as examples of the Messiah.
But, how was Strauss to answer the objection 
that the interval between the death of Jesus and 
the formation of the narratives was too short for 
the rich collection of myth, and especially for 
the application of the Messianic myths to Jesus? 
These myths and legends, according to Strauss, 
did not have to be invented; they already existed
in the popular hope of the Messiah, having been 
mostly derived with various modifications from 
the Old Testament, and had merely to be transferred 
to Jesus and accommodated to his character and 
doctrines. These Old Testament prototypes were 
unconsciously transferred to Jesus.
But, having established myth in the New Testament 
on the grounds of the transmission of oral accounts 
and not eye-witness reports, and upon the nature 
of the writings in the New Testament, viz. the 
assumption that the casual nexus suffered 
inruptions from some supra-natural or supra- 
historical sphere; and having made it clear where 
myths originated; Strauss had to distinguish 
the various levels of myth in the New Testament. 
These were, according to him, Evangelical myth,
Pure myth, Historical myth and additions of the 
individual authors which might be characterised 
as Poetical myth. The Evangelical myth is a 
product of an idea of Jesus1 earliest disciples.
The Pure or Philosophical myth is a Messianic 
idea and expectation transferred to Jesus. The 
Historical myth has for its groundwork a definite 
individual fact which has been seised upon by
t
religious enthusiasm and twined around with
mythical conceptions culled from the idea of 
Christ* The additions, or Poetical myth, of the 
individuals are those myths which do not point to 
the impetus to clothe an idea, or to tradition, 
but which are designed to give clearness, 
connection and climax to the representation.
What then is the criterion used by Strauss to 
distinguish the various myths which are discovered 
in the hew Testament? Strauss has two types of 
criteria which he develops in separate places in his 
writing. The first is elucidated when he poses 
this question in the body of his work, and the 
second evolves when he discusses the dogmatic 
import of his mythicising process in the last 
section of his "Life of Jesus". The first concerns 
the canons of modem science, and the second the 
things which his speculative philosophy can allow.
In the first criterion, it is the things which 
history cannot allow which are deemed unhistorical 
in the New Testament. History does not suffer 
violations and the chain of finite causes are 
successive, preserving the unbroken lav/s of 
psychology and the natural order. This criterion, 
moreover, asserts an account in the New Testament 
to be mythical partly by its form and partly by its
substance. If the form is poetical, if the actors 
converse in hymns, in a more diffuse and elevated 
strain than might be expected from their training 
or their situations, then, these discourses cannot 
be accepted as historical. If the contents 
within the region in which the narrative originated, 
which themselves seem to be formed from preconceived 
opinions rather than from actual experience, then, 
according to the circumstances, it is more or less 
probable that such a narrative had a mythical origin.
It would seem, on the basis of Strauss’ theology, 
that modern science dictates what can be historical 
and what must be eliminated from the promiscuous 
blending of unhistorical ingredients and historical 
fact in the New Testament. This criterion was 
not a corrective or a guide in Strauss’ efforts to 
explore the historical in the New Testament, but, 
it was the primary tool to enable him to validate 
his essential idea of myth: ideas which had
gained form or been embodied in unessential facts. 
But, this moves him to another criterion for 
postulating the presence of myth in the New 
Testament and disengaging the Idea (Begriff) from 
the myth (Image or Vorstellung).
What, then, is the essential clue to the New
Testament and the means whereby the mythology 
may be eliminated and, at the same time, preserve 
the Christian faith? Strauss gives us a summary 
of his philosophical criterion in the section 
where he attempts to offer a reconstruction of 
the life of Jesus which had been invalidated by 
his mythical critique. He writes: "The real
state of the case is this: The Church refers her
Christology to an individual who existed 
historically at a certain period; the speculative 
theologian to an idea which attained existence in 
the totality of individuals; by the Church the 
evangelical narratives are received as history; 
by the critical theologian they are regarded for 
the most part as mere mythic." The rapproachment 
between religion and the deepest philosophical 
truth is made when the whole of humanity is the 
subject of the union ox divine and human nature 
and when it is realised that the incarnation of 
God from eternity is a truer thing than one at 
an exclusive point of time.
Strauss1 understanding of, and sympathy with, 
Hegel’s ideas on the unity existing between God 
and man and of history as a path which actualises 
this self-conscious unity, leaves little place for
the Jesus of histoiy or the Christ of faith. In 
other words, there is no special revelation 
called for in the Hegelian-Straussian 
understanding of the "Absolute Religion". The 
New Testament, whether historical in parts and 
questionable in others, is not considered in his 
philosophical reconstructions. He is intent on 
showing that the ‘'negation of the negation", viz. 
the negation of the phenomenal life, nature and 
all forms, i.e., Jesus, the higher life of self- 
awareness is realisable. Self-consciousness 
arises when man breaks away from nature, the 
sensual and the temporary, and returns to that 
which he essentially is - the union of the finite 
and infinite. The credentials for man’s life are 
found in right thinking and in an awareness that, 
through thought, he might transcend relative and 
naive understandings of life.
We may close our brief recapitulation of Strauss 
with some discussion of his use of myth, lyth, for 
all intents and purposes, is regarded as an image, 
a story in fantastic dress of the Idea. When the 
Idea arrives at self-consciousness, viz. when God 
returns out of His Other and man breaks away from 
his temporal bonds, the image or the mythical and
historical in the New Testament is nothing but a 
dreamy vision. It would seem that Strauss follows 
the classical Greek idea of the myth: the myth is 
a word of falsehood making an image of the truth.
In working with the form-content plan or the 
Vorstellung-Begriff pattern, the form and image 
may be a path through which the Idea passes, but, 
after the Idea is actualised, the path, i.e., 
history and every temporary interpretation of the 
embodiment of the Idea, is negated. The myth is 
an eternal idea become form. The elimination of 
the form releases the Idea.
With these thoughts in mind, we proceed to 
examine another effort to demythologize the New 
Testament message. It is important that we 
should bear in mind as we proceed, two points 
which have been described in Strauss1 scheme, i.e., 
the place of modem thought in Bultmann’s re­
interpretation of the New Testament' and his 
definition of myth. Is myth an image, & form to 
be eliminated? Is the Kerygma in Bultmann the 
same as the Idea in Strauss? Is the myth for 
Bultmann the image, and the Kerygma the Idea? Is 
there an ascent from myth to Kerygma in Bultmann ’g 
theology?
4. Bultmannfs Demythologization of the New 
Testament:
In our brief recapitulation of Strauss’ central 
ideas, we have outlined his criteria for 
distinguishing myth in the New Testament, i.e., 
modern science and Hegelian philosophy. It is 
at these two points which Bultmann has had to make 
his demythoiogizing scheme clear, and it is at 
this level where his plan, if viewed surfacely, 
is vulnerable. Whether he capitulates to modem 
science and a philosophy of existence, viz* 
Heidegger, will be one of our concerns. We saw 
that Strauss* capitulation to modern thought 
invalidated the historic revelation in Jesus Christ 
and, moreover, his Christological reconstruction 
stripped the New Testament of its distinctive 
character. The Hegelian Idea, while outwardly 
resembling the Kerygma, is merely a Christ Idea 
independent of the New Testament event and the 
New Testament message. Is the same the case in 
Rudolf Bultmann’s theology?
A • Bultmann1 s Aim:
We have said that Bultmanm’s theology is 
motivated by his desire to face modem man with 
the genuine "stumbling block" of the New 
Testament. Instead of the "offense", the paradox 
of the God-man who addresses man through the word 
of preaching and encounters contemporary man in 
and through the ordinary course of events - events 
seen in their casual relation - and demands a 
decision from man which does not entail a sacrifice 
of his place in history, modem man is asked to 
accept the imagery of the New Testament on par with 
the content. Such imagery, according to Bultmann, 
belongs to a view of the v/orld which is obsolete! 
moreover, such imagery is not in itself Christian. 
The setting of the proclamation, of the Kerygma, 
because of its immediate requirement to be 
believed, obscures the relevant message of the New 
Testament.
We have said that this impetus to clarify the 
New Testament message was not novel. Others in 
the early centuries of the faith, the adoptionists, 
the allegorists, and, in the 19th century, Strauss, 
the liberals (Harnack) and the history of Religion
School (Troeltsch) were desireous of relating 
the New Testament message in a changing world. 
Bultmann and Strauss recognise these attempts and 
they each criticise them from their separate 
perspectives. Bultmann is, of course, dependent 
on these earlier attempts for much of his 
critical data, and especially for the problems 
which these demything effects clarified and for 
the ones which were left in some ambiguous manner. 
All of these prior demything schemes failed, 
according to Bultmann, in one respect: they made
the New Testament proclamation into some timeless 
truth or truths which were independent of the 
temporal setting in the New Testament and divorced 
from the person and work of Jesus the Christ. Such 
is the delicate balance which Bultmann must 
maintain in his plan. On the one hand, how to 
relate the message of the New Testament in a way 
which will facilitate its being heard in the 20th 
century, and on the other hand, how to maintain 
the historicity of the message and its birth in 
the Christ and in the first community. It may be 
simply said in the light of our historical survey: 
How to relate the origin and the development of
the New Testament message was the problem which 
faced Bultmann in his inquiry. Modem science 
and modern man’s understanding of himself 
required the New Testament message or its 
advocates to take into consideration the develop­
ment which had occurred in the interpretation of 
history and the natural order. Yet, the 
proclamation itself, the eventful, or the "mighty 
acts" must not be forfeited in the restatement.
F. Strauss’understanding of the New Testament, as 
we have shown, compromised the "acts" for some 
intellectualistic understanding. That is to say, 
everything which was identified with the initial 
faith of the disciples and the message of the 
Christ was sacrificed to the fuller and more 
perfect knowledge and objectivity gained in the 
idea of self-consciousness. The Straussian- 
Hegelian man was divided and his world was 
fragmentised. A split was made between religion 
and science, faith and knowledge, in their static 
synthesis. But, Bultmann attempts to avoid such 
a dichotomy wherein knowledge is derived after 
passing through the dark night of irrational 
faith. Objectivity, in the strictly empirical 
sense of that term, and faith are reconciled in
his mind, if not always correlated in his 
theology. There is no step up from faith to 
knowledge. The objective relationship of man 
to his world around him and the existentialist 
conception of his history are both encumbent upon 
him. There is no irreconcileable division between 
development and origin or between knowledge 
informed by the tools of science and philosophy 
and faith informed by the same desire to see itself 
related to its world and the object of its concern 
vis a vis God. The division between science ard. 
faith takes place, at least for Bultmann, at the 
level of application of the data of science.
Bultmann quarrels with the idealists, whether 
in a Hegelian or "Quest of the Historical Jesus" 
guise. Harnack, in his concern for the religion 
of Jesus, strips the New Testament of its place in 
history by extricating timeless ethical truths from 
what he considers to be the temporary expressions. 
Thinkihg himself freed from all the hodge-podge 
of metaphysical abstractions surrounding the 
Christ in the creeds and in the New Testament, 
Harnack isolated the historical ideas associated 
with Jesus, only to make these thoughts as abstract 
and doctrinaire as those which had been rejected#
Any careful student of the 19th century and 
early 20th century, and particularly of the 
efforts to rehabilitate the New Testament 
message, is aware of the problems which face 
Bultmann in his enterprise, and, according to 
one interpreter, "the problem of the mythological 
way of talking in the New Testament can be solved 
not against Bultmann, but only with Bultmann.#
That is to say, future efforts to refurbish the 
Christian faith which are motivated by a concern 
that the message should be heard in the idiom 
which modem man can understand, are by necessity 
dependent on Bultmann1 s handling of the mythological 
and his solution to the problem. While some would 
reject Bultmann’s exposition of the problem and 
the solution which he offers, the delineation of 
the way mythology is to be interpreted in the 
biblical writings must give attention to Bultmann*s 
scheme.
We made a leading statement in our discussion a 
few paragraphs back. Bultmann is dependent, as 
future discussion will be upon him, on the early 
attempts at demythologizing for much of his critical 
data, and especially for the problems which these 
demything efforts clarified and raised. In the
9* Backhaus, Gunther, "Kerygma Und Mythos: Bei
David Friedrich Strauss Und Rudolf Bultmann" -
page 76.
light of these efforts and the one-sidedness 
of their solutions, Bultmann has certain obvious 
questions raided for him, Moreover, much of the 
ground covered by Strauss in his efforts to prove 
the existence of myth in every section of the 
New Testament and to discern the origin of such 
mythical data did not require Bultmann*s 
attention. While correcting Strauss* preference 
for the mythical forms stemming from the Old 
Testament in his broader view of the mythical 
data used by the H e w  Testament writers, Bultmann 
did not have to wage a battle for the acceptance 
of the presence of myth in the Hew Testament. 
Furthermore, the historicity of the documents and 
of the figure of Jesus of Nazareth had been 
ascertained. Neither concerns, the presence of 
myth in the New Testament or the historical 
features in the Hew Testament, require Bultmann*s 
consideration. On the one hand, it is not 
encumbent upon Bultmann to discuss the presence 
of myth in the writings or to unfold the origin 
of the mythical material. Though, as we shall 
note, his utilisation of other literature and 
popular miracle stories concurrent with the
New Testament make for a better understanding of 
the New Testament world and the consequent 
transformation and demythologization of these 
forms in the Pauline and Johannine writings.
Unlike Strauss, Bultmann does not confine the 
myth forms to the Old Testament and, moreover, 
contrary to Strauss, he does not make use of the 
myth to explain the New Testament texts. He 
advances to a literary critique of the sources 
and forms with the purpose of discussing the 
content of the myth. The myth, according to 
Bultmann, does not produce the Kerygma, it 
explains it. The myth in Strauss served as a 
point of departure to illuminate the Kerygma, 
and, because the mythi was questionable, the 
Kerygma could be invalidated by Strauss’ 
reliance on Hegelian ideas. It is not the 
historicity nor the mythical setting of the 
Kerygma which is decisive in Bultmannfs view; on 
the contrary, it is the content of the Kerygma - 
one might say, the essence of the Kerygma which 
is primary in Bultmann*s theology.
On the other hand, the liberal quest for the 
validation of the historical significance of Jesus 
and of the New Testament documents was in the
background. As the battle had been waged for 
the acceptance of the history, Bultmann did not 
have to fight over old battlefields. His form 
critical interest and his predilection for viewing 
the documents and the arising of them as historic­
al, do not require him to be jealous to prove his 
starting point in the New Testament• His problem 
is to show that, when the historical or probable 
historical is acknowledged, this does not constitute 
the basis of genuine faith. The late 19th century 
liberals (Harnack, Ritschl and others) were intent 
on showing that the dogma did not constitute the 
necessary foundation of faith, while Herrmann and 
Bultmann are intent on demonstrating that the 
historical facts (in vacuo), so painstakingly 
uncovered by the portraits of the Life of Jesus and 
in the Ritschlians, do not form the groundwork for 
faith. It is not the past event which presents the 
stumbling block, nor the immunisation of these 
sacred facts from criticism which offers a defense 
for the faith. On the contrary, it is not the 
"back behind the historical Jesus" to the pure 
teachings or to the cosmic process which initiated 
these events. The "proclamation of the word", the 
Kerygma, is an eschatological event, an ever-
present announcement and address of God to man.
The Bible is not primarily a historical document.
History, according to Bultmann, in the sense in
which that term is used in connection with the
New Testament message, does not bear the same
connotation it has in a phrase like "the history
of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . T h e  Bible is
supremely the Word of God before us. That is to
say, we are met by a Word which makes quite a
definite claim on us. It raises the claim not in
the first place to be judged, but to be heard.
The content of the Kerygma is decisive. The Now
of the Kerygma (2 Gor. 6:2) is not purely
fortuitous, but identical with the advent of Jesus
and his passion. According to Bultmann, "The
reliability of the Kerygmatic tradition must not
be questioned, for otherwise the eschatological
event to which the Kerygma testifies would be
implicated in the relativity of all historical 
11knowledge." * It is in the interests of the 
Kerygma - an interest which is motivated by the 
claims of science and modern thought—  which makes 
it imperative to elucidate the mythological in the 
New Testament. It is the content of the Kerygma 
and the character of the relation of man to it 
which must be communicated. Faith, in other words,
10. Bultmann, R. "Kerygma and Myth" - p.111.
11. Ibid., p.116.
must unfold its relationship to Christ. While 
science and modem philosophy force this under­
standing upon Christians, these disciplines, 
according to Bultmann, are a corrective and a 
guide. "Modem thought," so Bultmann contends,
"as we have inherited it, provides us with a
motive for criticising the New Testament view of 
12the world." * The disciplines of modem thought 
are not the ultimate criteria for making the faith 
intelligible. This criteria and urgency spring 
from within the faith itself. There is, according 
to Bultmann, a new understanding of self and its 
relationship to God and the world unfolded in the
IX
New Testament Kerygma, and, moreover, this 
understanding of self is implicit in the announce­
ment and address of God to man through the Word 
of preaching. Self-understanding, while 
essentially the same in every age, is expressed in 
a time-historical conceptuality which must be 
considered. Bultmann’s central statement which 
inaugurates his demythologizing inquiry is given 
by Backhaus. Bultmann v/rites: "Every explanation
of the saving events and the Christian existence 
completes itself in the conceptuality in the time
12. Ibid., p.4. 
13* Ibid., p.15*
concerned; since it is always talk about man 
and bis world, it moves in the traditional
14.anthropology and cosmological conception."
(In German: "Jede Explikation der Heilsgeschichte 
und der Christlichen Existenz vollzieht sich in 
der Begrifflichkeit der betreffenden Zeit. Da 
sie immer auch Rede uber den Menschen und seine 
Welt ist, bewegt sie sich in den traditionellen 
anthropologischen und kosmologischen Begriffen.")
Before inaugurating our discussion of Bultmann*s 
description of myth and the attention which we 
shall want to give to the criteria for understanding 
the application of myth, i.e., modern science and 
philosophy, let us take stock of our argument 
to this point. Bultmann has had certain problems 
posed for him by previous demythologizing efforts.
He erects his scheme on the results of these 
efforts and seeks to correct many of their 
solutions, particularly the compromise of the 
Christian message and the ultimacy being given 
to the prevailing thought patterns which initiated 
these inquiries. Bultmann’s methods presuppose the 
ground covered by Strauss and late 19th centray 
liberals. He is not concerned with the origin of 
myth and validating the existence of myth in the 
New Testament. Nor is he concerned to discard
14. Backhaus, Op. Cit., p.41.
and eliminate any thought in the New Testament
merely because these thoughts conflict with
modem science. Unlike Strauss, who had
discovered the presence of myth in certain
sections of the New Testament, and who was intent
on the basis of his adopted scientific canons, to
distinguish between the various mythi and arrive
ISat some historical groundword, ^’Bultmann sees 
myth in every part ox the New Testament. He 
makes no attempt to separate the mythical and 
historical. Unlike his liberal predecessors who 
were concerned to isolate the objective historical 
from the subjective opinions in the New Testament, 
Bultmannfs demythologization transcends this 
particular interest. His concern, we may 
cautiously remark at chis point, was in an extens­
ion of the historical to cover the character of 
existence as such. The past is not the sole 
area of time which is historical. The present and 
the future are historical and God’s address and
15. We will recall that Strauss was intent on 
isolating the historical features of the 
New Testament in his later period, particul­
arly in his "Popular Life of Jesus for the 
German People" C1864). In this work, he 
ethicises the life of Jesus and attempts to 
portray Jesus as a prophet and a moral hero.
man’s reception and decision is a historical 
phenomenon which occurs in space-time.
But, as we have shown, while learning from these 
previous efforts to relate the New Testament to 
man’s changing cultural climate, Bultmannfs 
primary concern was the nature of faith. What 
occurred in faith? What hai^ pens when man is 
addressed by the Word which meets him as a 
historical announcement, which, moreover, encounters 
him in and through the outward events of history, 
and which, furthermore, comes to him as a present 
demand and promise? While it is important to 
discuss Bultmann*s demythologization of the New 
Testament and how he uses modem tools to clarify 
the message of Christianity, one cannot understand 
Bultmann without some attention being given to his 
theological assumptions. We believe Bultmann*s 
theology to be vulnerable just at the place where 
we criticised the Ritschlians, viz. the preponderat­
ing influence of the imperative over the indicative 
and the slight interest in and concern for any 
cosmic or universal significance or setting of the 
Christian faith. Bultmann's Christology, however 
one may appraise his demythologizing scheme, is 
inadequate. The New Testament message does
present man with a new understanding of himself
and his place in the world, but that announcement
receives virtually no place in Bultmannfs theology*
That is to say, he eschews, like the Ritschlian
school, any interest in the "cosmic" significance
of this "announcement". Bultmann may be concerned
with the "demand" inherent in the announcement,
but he does not interest himself in the "announcer",
vis a vis the Person ox Christ. The being of the
Christ precedes His words, though that is not to
infer that either can be separated as Bultmann tries
to do in his theology. This "existialist liberalism",
according to Paul Tillich, "cannot answer the
question of wherein lies the power to obey the
teachings of Jesus or to make the decision for the
Kingdom of God....The Cross is the symbol of a gift
16.before it is the symbol of a demand.”
The above remarks are an indication of the basic 
criticism which will be offered of Bultmannfs 
theology - a criticism which is relevant to his 
demythologizing of the New Testament. It is not 
certain how one should interpret the cosmic 
symbolism in the New Testament, but we are certain 
it serves a more positive role than Bultmann assigns 
it in his theology. Admittedly, much of the thought
16. Tillich, Paul, "Systematic Theology" - Vol. II
p. 106.
patterns in this connection stem from Gnosticism 
and the mystery religions in the first century 
world, hut this type of symbolism, if interpreted 
along the lines suggested in Paul Tillich’s 
theology, is as necessary as the ethico-religious 
symbolism which Bultmann reinterprets so expertly 
in his Biblical theology.
B. The Problem of Demythologizing: The Interpret­
ation of Myth in Bultmann’s Theology.
Bultmann’s central statement, according to
Backhaus,was: "Every explanation of the saving
events and the Christian existence completes
itself in the conceptuality in the time concerned,
since it is always talk about man and his world
it moves in the traditional anthropological and
17cosmological conception." (' There is, as we can 
discern, an interest in the addressee - in the one 
receiving and interpreting the "announcement" - 
whether in the first century or in the present 
century. With this understanding of self and 
world, expressions are given to the meaning of the 
"address" and the nature of the "Addresser".
When man meets the interpretation of the self- 
understanding derived from the "announcement" on
17. Backhaus, op.cit. p.41.
the pages of the New Testament or in the Word of 
preaching there is the imagery of the world 
conveyed along with the message. Is this imagery 
the content of the message? Did not the pagans 
in the first century imbibe the same "Weltanschauung?? 
Is there something particularly revelatory in the 
tripartite world view or in the idea that the beyond 
exercised Himself or Itself on the plane of history 
in some miraculous, demonstrable fashion? Bultmann 
thinks not. If the Kerygma conveys a particular 
content, not, however, timeless truths, can this 
content or understanding be demythologized or 
deobjectified from the surrounding time-conceptual- 
ity (der Begrifflichkeit der betreffenden Zeit)?
This is BultmannTs belief and we shall describe 
his method of precluding the mythology while 
interpreting it.
C. Description of Myth:
Possibly our best course is to try to understand 
how Bultmann uses myth in his writings. Bultmann’s 
various interpretations of myth, possibly because 
he leaves gaps in his own use of the noun "myth" 
and the two adjectives "mythical" and "mythological", 
have received numerous criticisms, and, to this
writer, unfortunate misunderstandings have 
arisen. We shall want to show that Bultmann has, 
despite his much talked about dual conception of 
myth, a unitary or bi-polar view of myth. He is 
intent on distinguishing his use of myth as a 
mythological way of approaching reality frofe the 
mythical way of approach. The mythical approach 
on the one hand, is essentially the Platonic, 
Hegelian-Straussian understanding. The myth in 
this classical sense is h form of the truth or 
the Idea, a mere copying of the truth which can 
be dispensed with when abstract thought inter­
venes. And, onothe other hand, Bultmann is 
intent on revealing that the mythical approach 
to reality has become circumspect on the basis of 
a view of the world which leaves no room for the 
arbitrary interventions into history and nature of 
a transcendent, observable force. But, before we 
can discuss Bultmann1s so-called dual use of myth 
in .his 1941 essay "New Testament and Mythology", 
we should consider his early usage of myth in his 
"Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition", and in 
his volume of essays, "Glauben und Verstehen".
In these early works, myth is for Bultmann 
almost exclusively a history of the gods (story of 
gods). The content taken over from materials which
deal with gods and their fate counts as myth.
So, for instance, in 2 Cor. 2:6-9, mythological 
conceptions are at the bottom of it. The 
mythological divine being deceives the demon and 
leads his own ones to Heaven. In 1 Cor. 155 20-22, 
the myth of primeval man is applied, as also the 
Johannine way of expressing the raising. These 
motifs, according to Bultmann, belong to Gnostic 
mythology. According to him, the Gospel of John 
leans on the revealer myth of Hellenistic Gnostic 
literature when he reports in his prologue of that 
"between being" which existed with God from the 
beginning and now, for the sake of the redemption 
of man, became man. The myth is, accordingly, 
characterised by its depicted content.
Bultmann, so it would appear in his early 
conception of myth, is not interested in the 
meaning of the content in a specifically Christian 
sense. The myth is conceived purely materially 
and this means that it stands near the Straussian 
conception. Both theologians look around for 
parallels in the extra-biblical religious history 
in order to find on what basis myth is present, 
though Strauss, as we noted, confined his source 
pretty much to the Old Testament. The material
myth idea, i.e., fantasies of man or the stories 
of gods, is not new. One must merely distinguish 
that Strauss first of all on the basis of his 
understanding of natural law and its consequent 
invalidagion of history which was "unthinkable" 
and incomprehensible, introduced the myth idea 
in order to explain the origin of myth and its 
presence in the text. Bultmann compares 
immediately and thus finds out where myth is 
present. The result, meanwhile, is the same.
But, this is different in Bultmann1 s essay 
"New Testament and Mythology", which was 
published for the first time in 1941. This 
controversial document set forward his 
demythologizing thesis and described what we 
shall term his "historicising" of the mythical 
material in the New Testament, particularly in the 
Pauline and Johannine literature. Bultmann is 
here working with a myth idea which is certainly 
prepared and sometimes applied in his earlier 
writings but, according to his conception, is 
completely new, at least as far as its application 
within theology is concerned. The decisive factor 
in the emphasis of the myth has shifted considerably 
indeed it is expressly represented that the ideas 
can be easily traced back to the historical
mythology of the Judaistic apocalyptic and 
Gnostic redemption myths, but that is by no means 
decisive and final. Rather, according to Bultmann’s 
own definition, the following has become decisive. 
Mythology is the manner of imagining in which the 
unworldly divine appears as worldly. God’s 
beyondness is thought ox and expressed in spaeial 
categories. Myth, in the sense in which Bultmann 
is now describing, speaks of the supermundane 
power in terms of worldly space. Transcendence 
is described as remoteness in space, projected 
above or beneath the earth. The transcendent 
power is perceived in an anthropmorphic perspective 
as an immanent, though highly exalted reality. 
Doubtless, this is done contrary to the intention 
of mythological speaking. But, the kind of 
imagination and terms employed transmute 
transcendence into immanence, so that even gods are 
represented as some kind of supermen. God above in 
heaven, his omnipotence and omniscience, is 
distinguished from mankind here by means of this 
"omni", i.e., by means of quantity and not by 
quality.
But, this type of objeetivisation can no longer 
be achieved by modern man. He cannot, on the basis
of his scientific view of the orderliness of 
nature and history accept this obvious way of 
personalising the activity of God. With the 
differentiation in modem science between the 
sphere of the natural and supernatural, and the 
consequent denial of the habitation of the 
divine in some transcendent world above nature, 
it is imperative, according to Bultmam, that 
theology demythologise or deobjectify this 
obsolete mythology. If science is offended by 
this picture of things, faith, even more so, is 
jeopardised by its reliance on this manner of 
describing its relationship to, and the activity 
of, the transcendent. A description of God in 
this natural-supernatural way leads eventually to 
some sort of deism,or to a limitation of God’s 
activity in ther world. He can only act 
miraculously or acknowledge Himself in some 
demonstrable fashion in this dualistic ontology.
God is for Bultmann active, present and trans­
cendent, but not the same manner in which He is 
spoken of in the world-picture in the New Testament.
The reader will note that we have not described 
Bultmann*s view of myth as two-fold which he,
according to some interpreters, does not 
harmonise in his 1941 essay. The other view of 
myth - Bultmann*s initial definition before he 
described the content of myth, i.e., a manner of 
speaking of the unworldly divine - concerns the 
primitive, pre-scientific picture of the world met 
in the New Testament. This primitive science 
believed that the world was governed by super­
natural powers, by gods and demons who rule the 
history of men and nature. The world is viewed 
as a three-storied structure with the earth in 
the centre, the heaven above, and the underworld 
beneath. The upper level is the home of Gods and 
angels and the lower level is the residence of 
the demons and the place of torment, while the 
centre of these two spheres, the earth, is the 
scene of the continuous activity and conflict 
of God and Satan. These supernatural forces 
intervene in the course of nature and in all men
-1 o
think and will and do.
But, according to Bultmann’s interpreters, 
these two views of myth, i.e. as primitive 
science on the one hand and as a way of speaking 
of the other world in terms of this world and of 
the gods in terms derived from human life on the
18. Bultmann, "Kerygma and Myth” - p.l.
other, are in radical conflict. Is not, according 
to the majority of the commentators in "Kerygma 
and Myth”, (Vol. I), the second way the only way 
of talking about mythology, and, moreover, has 
Bultmann not capitulated to modern science, allowing
its view of the world to determine what is
acceptable and non-acceptable as history and as 
Kerygma? These are delicate questions which have 
occupied many serious theologians, and not only 
those interpreters who reject Bultmann1s scheme 
before subjecting it to criticism.
Some pages back, before elaborating the second 
view of myth in Bultmam’s essay - the view which 
he enunciates first - we voiced the belief that, 
however Bultmann interprets himself in his treatise, 
and despite the loopholes left for misunderstanding, 
he unified the two views of myth or held them in
unity in his mind. That is to say, myth as
primitive science and myth as objectifying the 
transcendence of God are not contradictoiy or 
conflicting descriptions. There has been so much 
emphasis placed on the two apparent views that any 
harmony between them at this stage is scarcely 
possible. But, it is encouraging tp note that 
some interpretations of Bultmann1s descriptions of 
myth attempt to mitigate this confusion. Erick
Dinkier’s article "Existentialist Interpretation 
of the New Testament" and Gunther Backhaus’ 
periodical, "Kerygma Und Mythos: Bei David 
Friedrich Strauss Und Rudolf Bultmann", lead us 
out of this realm of confusion. Dinkier, on the 
one hand, points out that in a recent clarification 
of his argument, Bultmann seeks to show that his 
two descriptions of myth in the 1941 treatise 
refer to one and the same thing. The first 
definition, i.e., myth as primitive science,'is, 
therefore, only a special aspect of the second 
definition, i.e., as a way of describing the other­
worldly in terms of this world. The two conceptions, 
the primitive world view and the manner in which one 
must describe the activity of God in this time- 
conceptuality of the period, are one and the same 
thing. Backhaus does not enter into the various 
shades of Bultmann’s expression of his formal 
definition of myth. Instead, Backhaus elaborates 
the material definition, i.e., story of the gods, 
and contrasts Bultmann’s later conception.
Another related question which is raised in 
Bultmann*s conception of myth and its manner of 
describing tjie superhuman and the activity of God 
in the world, concerns the conflict between modem
science and myth. Does Bultmann, like Strauss, 
use the 19th and 20th century scientific picture 
as an ultimate criterion for the truth of the 
Christian faith? Strauss, we recall, made modem 
science, along with the understanding of reality 
derived from Hegel, the final norm. Unless am 
event or the description and interpretation of the 
events conformed to the canons of modem science, 
it could not stand in the record. With very few 
incidents measuring up to this rigorous test,
Strauss attempted to revive the faith by showing 
that it was not really dependent on the inept 
images and probable historical detail. For him 
and Hegel, the validity of the Christian message 
was certified by the idea of the union of the 
finite and infinite which was already a possibility 
in human consciousness. Salvation, for Strauss, 
lay in self-awareness of the potential reconciliation 
between the phenomenal and ideal. His speculative 
theology had decided in advance what was ideal and 
what was phenomenal, although he used the canons 
of science to give his argument some documentary 
value.
Does Bultmann employ the canons of science in 
this eliminating fashion? Many competent
interpreters of Bultmann believe that there is a 
"hangover of liberal modernism"^ in his devaluation 
of miracles. In his decision in advance, 
according to Dr. Macquarrie, "That in this scientific 
age we cannot believe in miracles, (Bultmann is) 
bringing in some sweeping assumption to show that
Of)
it (the resurrection) could not have taken place."
While not, at this point, discussing Macquarriefs
central point, i.e., the division which Bultmann
makes between an objective-historical and an
existential-historical event, we are concerned to
show that Bultmann, while being influenced by the
modern scientific picture, does not allow, as
Strauss and others have done, this picture to
determine his Christianity. His demythologising
scheme recognises that modern science, regardless
of its use of myth and symbols, e.g., "totality"
21and "source", does not have a place for myth in 
the way in which he describes this term. The 
scientific world view of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
or any future century picture of the world, cannot 
be called mythological in the specific meaning of ' 
the term, since the decisive feature is missing, 
namely, the idea that unexplainable phenomena are
19. Macquarrie, John, "Existentialist Theology" -
p.186. .
20. Ibid., p.186.
21. Bultmann, R. "Kerygma and %th" - p. 103*
perceived as the immediate breaking-im of 
transcendent powers.
Primarily, Bultmannfs intention, so he informs 
us in many sections of his 1941 essay, is to 
demonstrate that the truth of the Christian 
Gospel is independent of any world view, either 
past, present or future. This independence of 
the Kerygma from the time-conceptuality expressed 
in an anthropormophic and cosmological framework, 
does not, on the one hand, imply the "timelessness" 
of the "proclamation", that is if timelessness 
means a denial of the specific, concrete quality 
of the address of God to man; nor on the other, 
does Bultmann consider the primitive world view 
and the expression of the character of the 
activity of God binding upon one who attempts to 
understand the content of the Kerygma. Bultmann 
rejects the binding nature of the forms, for 
instance, as they are understood by Paul Minear.
Minear writes: "The key words (terms, symbols and
conceptions in the New Testament) are the 
structural girders that support an entire edifice 
of thought. They bear not only their awn weight, 
but a mammoth construction of assumptions,
pi
implications and affiliations.There is,
21. Minear, Paul, "Some Eschatological Quandaries - 
and How they Grew"; unpublished paper, 1947 > 
quoted in Wilder, Amos, "Eschatology and Ethics" 
p.66. Refer to MinearTs "Eyes of Faith" for 
father elucidation of the distinctive character 
of the outlook of the men of the Bible.
according to Minear, a language distinctiveness 
about the New Testament outlook which cannot be 
translated without falsification. But, this 
stifling, static view of theological concepts, 
however sacred these forms have become, and 
however fundamental they may be in dogmas and 
devotional language, is theological suicide. This 
view of theological language is a type of biblicism, 
however sophisticated it may be in Minear1 s writings. 
He and others reject the task which Bultmann and 
Tillich in our period set themselves to, namely, to 
use terminology which may appear alien to the New 
Testament in order to clarify the words which have 
in the course of time become bound in a fixed false 
sense. Bultmann realises that, when he succeeds in 
bringing the old terms of the Bible back to their 
original meaning, and faith means no longer the 
agreement with certain metaphysical views, but, 
rather, the existence from God and towards God, 
then the expressions taken over have made 
themselves superfluous. Paul Tillich’s theology 
is evidence that at least another eminent 
theologian does not ascribe to Minear’s petrifying 
view of theological symbolism. This sort of
emphasis on the "girders" of the faith is a 
dogmatic idea which, if endorsed by Christendom, 
cuts the dialectical position - the yes and no 
relationship - which the Church stands to the 
world.
Bultmann is accused of allowing a contemporary 
world view to dominate and decide his interpretation 
of scripture, and doubtless there are instances in 
his Biblical Theology which substantiate this 
accusation. But, if this is the case, Bultmann 
is contradicting himself at the wry base of his 
interpretation of Christianity. A typical 
expression of this basal point in his theology may 
be lifted from his second volume of his "Theology 
of the New Testament”. He writes: "The demand for 
faith, therefore, is the demand that the world 
surrender the understanding it has had of itself 
hitherto - that it let the whole structure of its 
security which it has erected in presumptuous 
independence of the Creator fall to ruins. The 
inner unity of this demand with Paul’s conception* 
of faith is clear in spite of its orientation 
against other antitheses than his. Faith is 
turning away from the world, the act of 
desecularisation, the surrender of all seeming
security and every pretense, the willingness to 
live by the strength of the invisible and 
uncontrollable. It means accepting completely 
different standards as to what is to be called 
death and what life.. .Faith, then, is the 
overcoming of the ’offense’ - the offense that 
life meets man only in the word addressed to him 
by a mere man - Jesus of Nazareth. It is the 
offense raised by a man who claims, without 
being able to make it credible to the world, 
that God is encountering the world in him. It is 
the offense of ’the word became flesh’....As an 
overcoming of the offense and as a decision against 
the world faith is desucularisation, transition 
into eschatological existence. In the midst of the 
world the believer is lifted out of secular 
existence - though he is still ’in the world’, he is 
no longer ’of the world’ (John 17:11,14,16).^* 
Clearly, it is not the world view of modem 
science, neither of Gnostic dualism of Judaistic 
eschatology, which determines the content of the 
Kerygma. Christianity is not a world-view. This 
point, to risk a comparison, has certain affinities 
with Tillich’s belief that Christianity is not a 
religion.
22. Bultmann, Rudolf, "Theology of the New 
Testament” - Vol. I, p.75-76, 78f.
Possibly our argument to the effect that 
Bultmann’s dual conception of myth is really 
a bi-polar view and that his estimation of the 
primitive scientific picture of the world as 
obsolete does not capitulate to the canons of 
modem science should receive soiae more 
clarification. Let us glance at another source 
which motivates his "demythologisation" and his 
re-interpretation of myth in the New Testament, 
namely, his philosophical roots. Dr. John 
Macquarrie*s expert book "Existentialist Theology:
A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann", undertakes 
an analysis of the thought patterns which Bultmann 
imported into his theology. Macquarrie says that 
in utilising philosuphical concepts in a present­
ation of the Christian faith, Bultmann is simply 
following the precedent of some of the greatest 
theologians of the past. Unlike Ritschl, Herrmann 
and Barth, Bultmann admits his indebtedness to 
philosophy and is at pains to tell us how his 
philosophical ideas influence his theology. In 
Bultmann, through his adoption of existentialist 
categories, there is a legitimate effort to 
analyse the constitution of the being of man. But, 
Bultmann’s theology, according to Macquarrie, is
particularly vulnerable by the over-emphasis 
which he gives to "those elements of Christian 
teaching which are especially congenial to the 
theologianfc philosophical outlook, accompanied 
by neglect of anything that is not so congenial, 
with consequent distortion of the whole.
The point which Macquarrie makes, could be made,
and has been made, about every theological system,
whether these systems, e.g., Eitschl, Barth,
disclaim any interest in or relationship to
Philosophy. It is to the credit of Bultmann and
Tillich that they acknowledge the philosophical
roots of many biblical terms however coloured their
theologies may be by their philosophical persuqsions.
It is debateable that Bultmann makes, according to
Thielicke, "the content of the "word of God into a
kind ox enlightenment about himself, so that he can
24understand himself rightly before God."
Macquarrie*s analysis of Bultmann*s indebtedness to 
Heidegger, while recognising the limitations of an 
existentialist reading of the Christian faith, 
places his finger on the place where Bultmann parts 
company with his adopted philosophy. "Bultmann is 
influenced by Existentialism and he makes no secret 
of it, as v/e know, but that does not prevent him
23* Macquarrie, op. cit., p*24.
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from seeing perfectly plainly the place where 
Christianity and existentialism part company, and 
the distinctive indispensable element in Christian­
ity as a supernatural religion which no philosophy 
can supply
We are in two minds over Bultmann*s relationship 
to existentialism. In the first place, we desire 
to disprove the claim made by many that he, like 
Strauss, capitulates to philosophy in his theology, 
and particularly, that he allows philosophy to 
take the place of the revelation in Jesus the 
Christ, or that he allows a negation of history in 
his concern for the Kerygma. In the second place, 
we are of the opinion that Bultmann*s theology, 
whatever its roots and however he uses 
Heideggerian terms to clarify the Christian 
understanding of inauthentic man, fails to do 
justice to the cosmic, universality and ultimacy 
of the Christian faith. He may rely on Heidegger 
to assist him in his darification of inauthentic 
man, but he, and this is our primary quarrel with 
Bultmann, continues the agnosticism characteristic 
of the Ritschlian epistolomology, viz. God cannot 
be spoken of in his unrevealed character. We 
pause to make this separation, because we desire
25* Macquarrie, Op.cit. p.156
to discuss Bultmann,s relationship to existent­
ialism from two angles, i.e., his relationship 
to Heidegger and his continuation of a Ritsehlian 
motif, albeit in a different guise in his 
existentialist analysis of the Christian faith.
Returning to the point concerning Bultmann*s 
subjugation of Biblical religion to existent­
ialism, we may follow Bultmann in his initial essay 
on "demythologization". Bultmann knows the 
limitations of the existentialist evaluation of 
man, and no where is this more evident than in his 
views on the "nature" of man and whether this 
"nature" is realisable. Is all that is required to 
reach authentic being philosophical reflection?
"Is it enough," asks Bultmann, "siiaply to show 
man what he ought to be."^’ Existentialist 
philosophy seeks, according to Bultmann, "bo 
’liberate* the true naturalness of man."^ Man 
arrives at a form of self-awareness through 
philosophy which emancipates that self-commitment 
which is proper to nan and enables it to attain to 
its full stature. Whether in an Hegelian, 
Heideggerian or Jasperian form, man is capable of 
self-awareness through resolving to be.. Jasper’s 
position in this matter is ably summarised by
26. Bultmann, "Kerygma and Myth" - p.27* 
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Backhaus. We note in the following description, 
despite the different terminology, an essential 
Straussian-Hegelian belief. Backhaus writess 
"For Jaspers, religion and philosophy are 
distinguished by the fact that religion is 
concerned with everything and philosophy with 
the individual things. The young Strauss in 
conjunction with Hegel also speaks of the 
difference between religious believers and 
philosophers. (Jaspers speaks for philosophers 
of the ’Enlightenment* while Strauss speaks of 
knowledge). More important: For Jaspers the
central point of the Bible is the ^consciousness 
of the inborn nobility of man created by God.
This is the same as Strauss understands by the 
unity of divine and human consciousness, the 
human feeling of having an affinity with the 
divine. We have already shown that with this real 
revelation becomes unnecessary. This circumstance 
is also valid for Jaspers; who will not recoginse
po
the opposition of God and man.*1
In this description of existentialism, it is 
not our purpose to compare Jaspers with Hegel and 
Strauss. We are interested in highlighting 
Bultmann’s break with any form of Hegelianism or 
existentialism which min.im.ises man’s ”fallenness"
28. Backhaus, Op. cit. p.67
and the distance between man and God. What is 
the primary disagreement between Bultmann and 
the philosophy which he uses so well to describe 
man-in-the-world? According to Bultmann, "the
29 •point at issue is how we understand the fall." y
Bultmann and his philosophical colleagues do not,
according to him, disagree "that the authentic
life is possible only because in some sense it is
already a present possession. But, there is one
difference - the New Testament speaks thus only
to Christian believers, only to those who have
opened their hearts to the redemptive action of
God. It never speaks thus to natural man, for he
does not possess life, and his plight is one of 
*50despair.* Are Bultmann*s statements contradict­
ory? Man, according to him, is aware of his 
authentic nature and man is fallen, totally. 
Bultmann distinguishes between theoretical and 
actual possibility in his understanding of the 
"nature" of man. The Ball has destroyed man’s 
actual possibility. Man may know the good and 
yet depart from it and be powerless to attain it. 
"He is,” according to Bultmann, "capable of 
knowing that his authentic life consists in self­
commitment, but is incapable of realising it
29 • Bultmann, Op • cit., p. 28. 
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because, however hard he tries, he still remains 
what he is, self-assertive man. So, in practice, 
authentic life becomes possible only when man is 
delivered from himself. It is the claim of the 
New Testament that this is exactly what has 
happened. This is precisely the meaning of that 
which was wrought in Christ. At the very point
where man can do nothing, God steps in and acts -
olindeed he has acted already - on man's behalf."^ * 
Before veering away from the point, we have seen 
that, by reference to Heidegger, Bultmann has been 
able to describe and clarify in non-theological 
language and in a non-mythological fashion, the 
concepts of TsinT and 'faith*. The essential 
difference between Bultmann and Heidegger is the 
way man interprets his fallenness: Both know,
according to Bultmann, the fall - the inauthentic 
life. The Christian interprets the analysis of 
existence which he shares with the existentialists 
in terms of alienation from God, whilst the 
existentialist interprets it in terms of man's 
alienation from himself. The existentialist may 
produce, as Bultmann acknowledges, a secularised 
version of the New Testament conception of faith 
and this, according to him, proves'that there is 
nothing mysterious or supernatural about the
31. Ibid., p.31.
Christian life.^* But, the existentialist and 
theologian pert ways on the evaluation of the 
inauthentic life and how one receives the 
authentic life.
We should take stock of our discussion before 
we move into another facet of Bultmann1 s theology. 
We set out to describe what we termed the bi-polar 
use of myth in Bultmann*s "New Testament and 
Mythology". Because it appears that science 
determined what was myth in the hew Testament, it 
was necessary to evaluate Bultmann1 s handling of 
science in his appraisal of myth in the hew 
Testament, Then our enquiry was directed to 
another motivating force in his demythologfsing 
and theology, i.e., his use of existentialist 
philosophy. On hoth counts, we dicided that 
Bultmann's task cannot be invalidated simply by 
accusing him of abdicating to the canons of modern 
thought, especially when his demythologizing plan 
is compared with Srrauss’ wholesale subjugation of 
theology to philosophy and science. We were not 
concerned to explore in detail the charges made 
against Bultmann*s use of science and philosophy. 
We have merely taken notice of this criticism to 
move our exposition of Bultmann to' another level.
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As was stated in our survey, we are interested in 
the bearing of Bultmann’s demythologi?5ed Christian­
ity and existentialist interpretation of myth on 
the cosmic understanding of the Christian faith. 
Integral to this concern, is the refusal to speak 
of God directly. As a preparatory step in the 
direction of clarifying our central concern, we will 
direct our attention to the two adjectives, 
mythical and mythological, in Bultmann*s writings.
5* $he I/frthical and Mythological Approach to 
Reality.
It has been stated that Bultmann uses the two 
adjectives mythical and mythological ambiguously 
in his theology. He is intent, it would appear, on 
eliminating the mythical approach to reality, which 
includes for him all that is associated with the 
view that God acts in history in an obvious, 
demonstrable manner. This activity of God as a 
force penetrating into histoiy and nature from an 
outer world is, according to him, damaging to the 
claims of faith and science, especially the former. 
Like Herrmann, his teacher, he is interested in the 
processes of faith and in the ways in which faith 
can be understood and communicated, lor Herrmann,
it was the "inner life of Jesus" confronting, man 
in the now, and, according to Bultmann, it is the 
Word of preaching that encounters man in the 
present; which, moreover, preserves the Christian 
message from the type of subjectivism and mysticism 
which characterised Herrmann’s description. While 
cariying obvious differences in meaning, the 
underlying notion is the same. Man, according to 
Herrmann and Bultmann, is met in the now, where he 
stands in history, by a subject in history. Man is 
addressed not primarily through creedal concepts 
and doctrines which he must believe before he can 
hear and respond to the address. It is not 
encumbent on a being-in-histoiy to believe the 
mythical processes, e.g., God becoming man, physical 
resurrection and ascension.
Bultmannfs initial treatise, "New Testament and 
Mythology", and in his replies to his critics in 
"Kerygma and Myth", (Vol. I), and in his two volume 
"Theology of the New Testament", warrants a 
distinction being made between the two adjectives 
mythical and mythological. In these two expressions 
and through a careful survey of Bultmann1 s handling 
of the terms, we may estimate one of the central 
points which Bultmann appears to be making in his
understanding of myth in the New Testament. The 
distinction between the two adjectives may be 
said to constitute the positive and negative 
aspects of Bultmann fs demythologized New Testament* 
In his treatise, "New Testament and Mythology", 
it is implied, and the implications are supplemented 
in his other writing^ particularly those concerned 
with Gnostic mythology, that the mythical material 
in the New Testament is any material or concepts 
drawn from a metaphysic which depicts the activity 
of God in the arena of history and nature in a 
demonstrable, objectified manner. This material in 
the New Testament, derived partly from Gnosticism 
and in part from the apocalytic hopes of inter­
testament Judaism, characterises God and man in a 
manner which, while being offensive to science, 
distorts a valid faith. In these categories, there 
is a split between God and the world which is 
healed when God enters history and nature as a 
mediating force between the forces of evil and the 
forces of good. Moreover, integral to this view of 
the mythical, is the world of primitive science. 
This mythical approach to reality obscures the 
content of the Kerygma, which content, according to 
Bultmann, is to express man’s understanding of 
himself. Instead of this possibility,the terms
applied to the Deity, e.g., omnipotence, 
transcendence, judging God, etc., are understood 
in a literal, non-symbolic snnse. These concepts 
are to be held, according to this view of reality, 
prior to an encounter with God. While, according 
to Bultmann, such attributes are in reality ways 
of speaking which depict manfs knowledge of him­
self, e.g., "the man who speaks of God’s 
omnipotence knows about his own powerlessness.
Man knows about demands being made upon him when 
he speaks of a demanding God, of God as Judge; and 
from the knowledge of continually having demands 
made on him and of being unfulfilled comes his 
talking of God as the Holy One, and the demanding 
one...Man knows about his transient nature when 
he speaks of God’s eternity and transcendence."^** 
When one speaks of God in this manner, according 
to Bultmann, he is using the analogical approach. 
While Bultmann types this as the "analogical"
approach in his -paragraphs entitled "She Language 
34-of God", *in an essay in ,fKerygma and Myth", we 
are, on the basis of the inherent division between 
• the mythical and mythological in his analysis, 
justified in calling his approach the mythological 
instead of the analogical. At least, upon our
33• Bultmann, R., "Essays: Philosophical and 
Theological" - p. 94—96.
34. Bultmann, R., "Kerygma and Myth" - p.201.
reading, the two terms are synonomous. It is our 
purpose to make explicit this implied distinction 
between the mythical and mythological, and to 
suggest that this may be one reason for opposing 
Bultmann fs understanding of myth in the New 
Testament.
Mythical means to Bultmann every idea and 
expression associated with an absolute view of 
faith. The mythical approach would objectify God in 
the world and speak of Him in an imagery borrowed 
from nature, e.g., substance, force, and energy. 
Furthermore, these untenable symbols bred superstit- 
ion and encouraged idolatry. That is to say, 
when man infers the freedom of God in some 
transcendent sphere from the absence of God in the 
here and now, he is speaking of God’s transcendence 
in a sinful manner.
But, the mythological, analogical manner of 
speaking of God entails a speaking which is at the 
same time a talk of our own existence. Faith is, 
according to Bultmann and Herrmann, related to its 
object. As the ground and object of faith do not 
fall apart, but are identical, we cannot say what 
God is like in Himself, but only what he does to 
us. According to Bultmann, "in existential self- 
understanding there is an understanding not only of
35* Bultmann, "Essays"*- p. 107
self, but also of the object of encounter, the 
person or environment 'which is encountered."^*
"In existentialist self-understanding, we are,"
according to him, "met by a Word of God on a
specific occasion and it is the Word of God not
in virtur of the ideas it contains, e.g., the mercy
and grace of God, but because it comforts man with
mercy and grace in an address which encounters man
37again and again • (*
Briefly, this is the interpretation which Bultmann 
places on the mythical approach to reality, and the 
mythical approach. He cites in his writings the 
historisation of many of the concepts borrowed 
from paganism and Judaism which Paul transforms, e.g. 
spirit, soma, cosmos, etc. To speak of God is to 
speak of man in the world who is addressed by God 
and encountered supremely in the act of revelation 
in Jesus Christ. The mythical is, moreover, the 
fantasies of man and a way of approach which 
perpetuates a knowledge of God which is of a type 
given in advance of faith. This mythical approach 
encourages the thought that faith consists of 
abstract propositions about God which are applicable 
and binding before submitting to the power of God 
which exercises His unique presence upon man here 
and now. Faith, according to Bultmann, transcends
36. Bultmann, "Kerygma and Mjyth" - p.201. 
37* Ibid., p.207*
the classic rift of cause and effect, though not
38as in mythical thought. * The mythical approach 
to reality imagines the world to be torn asunder, 
whereas faith transcends this view as a whole when 
it speaks of the activity of God.
We may summarise the point of our argument. It 
appears that a distinction between mythical and 
mythological is made in Bultmann’s writings. The 
mythical approach to reality is the type which 
Bultmann wants to exclude and the mythological mode 
is what he seeks to retain. He eliminates the 
cosmic mythology and objective knowledge of God 
associated in his mind with the mythical, only 
while retaining the mythological or analogical 
approach. In view of Bultmann’s understanding of 
mythology, it seems unfortunate that the term myth 
is used in his treatise. In his desire to eliminate 
the conventional understanding of myth in the Hew 
Testament, viz. as an objective depiction of the 
activity of God, he incurs the criticism that his 
theology negates the legitimate place mythological 
thinking has in Christianity. Whatever the terms 
he employs to describe the place of concrete 
symbolism in the Christian Gospel, he is not, 
contrary to much modem opinion, abstracting the
38. Ibid., p.197*
Christian faith. That is to say, he is. not 
translating the faith into some esoteric existent­
ial language. He intends to vitalise the faith 
hy divorcing it from the conventional modes and 
grounding it in history as an address delivered 
to man in specific situations.
At this point, our exposition could veer away 
into many facets of Bultmann's thought, all of 
which are integral to an understanding of what he 
proposes in his reinterpretation of mythology.
But, we are concerned with the distinction which 
he makes between mythical and mythological approaches 
to reality and the related thought that we cannot 
speak of God-in-Hikmself. By concentrating on the 
reception of the address of God, Bultmann has 
failed to complete the task of theology. Theological 
statements must be made about God, however symbolic 
they may be. The mythological approach to reality 
is incomplete without the mythical, or the approach 
which has the possibility of symbolising the 
content of the divine. While Bultmann has 
contributed to an understanding of the way in which 
man receives the Christ - event, his theology, because 
he neglects to speak of the being of Christ, is one­
sided. In the remaining pages of our exploration of 
Bultmann's theology, we will refer to the theology
of Paul Tillich. Tillich’s theology has been 
selected because, on the one hand, he agrees with 
the positive emphases in Bultmann’s thought, e.g., 
reinterpreting the supranatural, the paradoxical 
presence of the divine in the sphere of history and 
the nature of Revelation as ’’encounter11, ’’address”, 
and not as propositions about past events; on the 
other hand, Tillich’s theology moves beyond 
Bultmann’s conception of the role of the symbolical 
and mythical. In view of our specific interests, we 
shall proceed in the following manners first, the 
agreements between Bultmann and Tillich will be 
summarised, and secondly, the way in which Tillich 
assigns a more positive role to symbolism, in 
particular the way in which symbols may speak about 
God or God-in-Himself•
6. Paul Tillich’s Understanding of Myth and Symbol:
A* Comparison of Tillich and Bultmann:
Tillich may be called, at least the Medievals
would have had no hesitation in calling him,
Doctoris Consiliatoris - the Doctor of Reconciliation.
In a dispute., or when considering a theological 
problem, he never chooses one side to the exclusion
of the other, nor does he try to blend or force
a union between opposites. His method is
synthetic, and always he tries to uncover some
deeper principle of which conflicting standpoints
are instances, their conflicts arising^  perhaps,
from a too-one-sided emphasis of one part of the
total picture. In his polemical or apologetic 
39approach, he correlates "questions and answers,
situation and message, human esixtence and. divine
4-0manifestation." # His polemical and dialectical 
approach in theology appears to gather all other 
areas of correlation into it. His method of 
correlation is, according to him, able to consider 
each opposing view and relate these views to some 
underlying principles.
We are not concerned to unfold Tillich’s 
theology in these pages, nor are we proposing a 
detailed treatment of the place of symbols and 
myths in his thought. We are, as we have 
intimated, merely interested in two aspects of 
Tillich’s theology. First, how does Tillich compare 
with Bultmann, especially in matters which Bultmann 
considers primary, and, secondly, how does Tillich’s 
formulations of the problems move beyond Bultmann’s. 
In the first place, Tillich shares Bultmann’s
39» Tillich, P., "Systematic Theology", Vol.I. p.6-8.
40. Ibid., p.8.
concern to relate Christianity to the modern 
mind. Like Bultmann, Tillich considers it 
idolatrous to identify the New Testament picture 
of Jesus the Christ with a world view which is 
obsolete - with a view of the world which 
relegates the Divine to a sphere above the natural 
world. In his second volume of his "Systematic 
Theology", he offers some clarifying words on how 
the natural-supernatural world view has plagued 
Christianity. While stating his opposition to this 
"Weltanschuung" in numerous places in his writings, 
his efforts to clarify his point of view in his 
second volume include much that he has written in 
other contexts. He writes: "The main argument 
against it (supranaturalism) is that it transforms 
the infinity of God into a finiteness which is 
merely an extension of the categories of finitude. 
This is done in respect to space by establishing 
a supranatural divine world alongside the natural 
human world; in respect to time by determining a 
beginning and an end of God’s creativity; in 
respect to caosuality by making God a cause 
alongside other causes; in respect to substance 
by attributing an individual substance to Him. 
Against this kind of supranaturalism, the
arguments of naturalism are valid and, as such,
represent the true concern of religion, the
infinity of the infinite, and the inviolability
41of the created structures of the finite."
In this same context, Tillich broadens upon his 
negation of the objectified terminology which 
would conceive of the Divine inhabiting a localised 
sphere. "The traditional discussion between the 
naturalistic ideas of God uses the propositions ’in’ 
and ’above’ respectively. Both are taken from the 
spatial realm and, therefore, are unable to express
the true relation between God and the world - which
42certainly is not spatial."
In Tillich’s first volume "Systematic Theology",
there are two fnther points which compare with
Bultmann’s emphases. In the first instance,
Tillich articulates what remains implicit in
Bultmann when he protests against the absolutism of
43the ways in which the Christ is conceived. While
the stories, legends, symbols, paradoxical 
descriptions and theological interpretations point 
to the Christ (New Being), "none of these expressions, 
the experience of final revelation, is final and 
absolute in itself. They are all conditioned,
41. Ibid., Vol.I. p.6.
42. Ibid., Vol.II. p.8.
43. Ibid., Vol.I. p.151.
h A
relative, open to change and additions. Til lieh
criticises Bultmann for identifying the meaning
45of Jesus with his message.
At another point, determinative for both
theologians in their thinking, on the contemporaniety
of the Christ, the theologians agree in the emphasis
to be placed on the receptive side of the Christian
event. This receptivity of the event is implicit
in Bultmann*s consideration of the self-understanding
which is part and parcel of the Christ-event. Neither
theologians consider the factual side apart from
the receptive and interpretative. Both have gone
beyond the subjective-objective view of history in
the Ritschlian school. That is to say, for Tillich
and Bultmann, unlike Ritschl and, to some extent,
Herrmann, the factual side is not the objective and
the interpretative the subjective. Bultmann*s
kerygmatic theology and Tillich’s apologetic approach
have this in common: they emphasise, to employ one
of Tillich’s expressions, ’’the biblical picture of 
46Jesus.” * Raith does not guarantee the empirical 
factuality of the biblical material, nor does it 
rigidly endorse the interpretative symbols in the 
New Testament. Both, the fact and interpretation, 
are received together, both are historical. It is
44. Ibid., Vol.I. p.151. 
45» Ibid., Vol.II. p.106.
46. Ibid., Vol.II. p.115.
not encumbent at this point to pursue the shades 
of meaning given this thought in Tillich and how 
Bultmann expresses himself in a similar vein.
The central point they share: Faith is not
theoretical judgments of historical probabilities, 
belief in propositions or an endorsement of 
questionable symbols and myths or legends used by 
the original receivers of the Christ-event. Faith 
is a reality which concerns the totality of man’s 
being. It is not a sacrifice of reason, but a 
transformation of the self or of self-understanding.
We may, perhaps, conclude our all too brief 
comparative section on this note. Bultmann and 
Tillich were nurtured in the same fires of historical 
criticism under the tutelage of Martin Kahler.
Both men, in their separate ways, are continuing 
the mediating, reconciling approach in theology, 
though Bultmann does not broaden his apologetic 
to include as many areas as Tillich surveys. Both 
theologians are speaking to the challenges 
offered Christianity by science and philosophy. 
Tillich’s theology is more receptive to philosophy 
than Bultmann’s and, consequently, he extends his 
reconciling task to cover many disciplines, though 
the primary purpose of clarifying the Christian 
message remains central in his philosophical theolcgy.
B• The Role of Symbolism in Tillich Theolbfcr:
Symbolism occupies such an important role in
Tillich System and in his other writings, that
one hesitates to embark upon an analysis of this
theme, especially when we are not purposing to
give a detailed estimation of his ontology. The
subject of symbolism and the way in which Tillich
has expressed the part which symbolism plays in
Christology, has been the root of numerous adverse
criticisms of his Systematic Theology. When he
stated in the first volume of his "Systematic
Theology” that Jesus as Jesus must sacrifice
himself to the Christ in order to remain
47transparent to the divine mystery, some critics,
notably D.M. Bailie, accused Tillich of dissolving
Jesus into a symbolic truth and thus removing the
48reality of Jesus. * In other words, in Tillich’s
view of the relationship of Jesus to the Christ,
he could be called, according to his understanding
49of Baillie’s criticism, a ndocetic heretic.”
The reason why this criticism is invalid depends 
on an understanding of the vital role given to 
symbolism in Tillich’s theology. Possibly the 
point of Jesus sacrificing his finitude to the 
content of the revelation may receive some
47. Ibid., Vol.I. p.134.
48. Baillie, D.M., "God Y/as In Christ” - p.79.
49. Tillich, P., "Systematic Theology”, Vol.II,p.96.
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clarification if we state a few of Tillich’s
words on the function of symbols in theology*
In the first place, he writes in his second
volume... •"everything religion has to say about
God, including his qualities, actions, and
manifestations, have symbolic character and that
the meaning of God is completely missed if one
takes the symbolic language literally."^0. let, 
according to Tillich, there must be a point where
a non-symbolic assertion about God must be made.
If this assertion is not made, symbolism would fall
into a circular argument. The non-symbolic
assertion about God is, according to Tillich, "the
statement that everything we say about God is 
51symbolic."-' # The statement that God is Being- 
itself is a non-symbolic statement - the only one 
which theolgoy can make. This unsymbolic 
statement is possible and necessary because it 
does not point beyond itself.
Having established in this one assertion about 
God the basis of his dialectical scheme of symbolic 
and non-symbolic statements, Tillich proceeds to 
illustrate why symbolic assertions are important 
and not, as many suspect, "non-real assertions."^* 
He tries to clear up these non-real connotations by 
pointing to the difference between sign and symbol 
and by endeavouring to show the realistic meaning of
50. Tillich, P. "Systematic Theology", Vol.II. p.9. 
51* Ibid., Vol.II, p.9.
52. Ibid., Vol.I. p.241.
symbols while not identifying this realism with 
empirical reality.
In the first instance, religious symbols are 
double-edged, while signs are single-edged.
Symbols depend on a correlation between the piece 
of reality used for symbolic purposes and the 
reality symbolised. That is to say, a segment of 
finite reality can become the basis for an 
assertion about that which is infinite because 
finite reality has the quality of participating in 
the reality for which it stands and to -which it 
points. The double-edged nature of religious 
symbols, according to Tillich, is integral; for 
the finite reality is directed toward the infinite 
which it symbolises and toward the finite through 
which it symbolises the infinite..."the religious 
symbol, the symbol which points to the divine, can 
be a true symbol only if it participates in the 
power of the divine to which it points."^*
A sign, on the other hand, according to Tillich,
"bears no relation to that which it points."^ *The
sign can be changed arbitrarily according to the
demands of expediency, but the symbol grows and
dies according to the correlation between that
which is symbolised and the persons who receive it 
55as a symbol. *'*
53. Ibid., Vol.I. p.239.
54. Ibid., Vol.I. p.239.
55. Ibid., Vol.I. p.239.
What of the truth of the empirical assertions
involved in a religious symbol? Is the truth of
a religious symbol dependent upon the physical,
psychological or historical assertions involved
in the symbol? Tillich answers these enquiries
in several contexts, but probably his most
significant word occurs in the several pages we
have been examining in his first volume. He
writes: "A religious symbol possesses some truth
if it adequately expresses the correlation of
revelation in which some person stands. A
religious symbol is true if it adequately expresses
the correlation of some person with final
revelation...The judgment that a religious symbol
is true is identical with the judgment that the
revelation of which it is the adequate expression
is true. This double meaning of the truth of a
symbol must be kept in mind. A symbol has truth:
it is adequate to the revelation it expresses. A
symbol is true: it is the expression of a true
56revelation.”  ^ Though Tillich provides for the 
displacement of certain symbolism in his emphasis 
on the correlation between symbol and that which it 
symbolises. Religious symbols may become obsolete 
when they fail to point to the revelatory correlation.
56. Ibid., Vol.I. p.240.
Symbols are determined by the transcendent
reality they express. This is the one side. On
the other, symbols are influenced by the
situation of those for whom they point to this
reality. "Theology," according to Tillich "must
look at both sides and interpret the symbols in
such a way that a creative correlation can be
57established between them."-
Another aspect of the double-edged nature of
symbols is illustrated in what Tillich considers
to be the two outstanding characteristics in the
New Testament picture of Jesus the Christ. These
are: "His (Jesus the Christ) maintenance of unity
with God and his sacrifice of everything he could
58have gained for himself from this u n i t y . * In 
other words, Jesus the Christ affirms his unity 
with the Father and yet, he renounced equality m t h  
God and refused to claim ultimacy for himself. 
Symbols are, according to Tillich, of this nature. 
They participate in the ground of being, are 
transparent to the revelation and yet, they deny 
that the segment of reality used to point to the 
ground of being is absolute. Any concrete 
assertion about God is symbolic; for it uses a 
segment of finite experience in order to say
57- Ibid., Vol.I. p.288-289.
58. Ibid., Vol.I. p.135-
something about him. The content symbolised
transcends the segment, although it includes it.
The segment of finite reality which becomes the
vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is
affirmed and negated at the same time. "It
becomes a symbol, for a symbolic expression is
one whose proper meaning is negated by that to
which it points. And yet, it is also affirmed by
it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic
expression an adequate basis for pointing beyond
itself."59*
This point of the negation and affirmation
quality of a symbol may receive additional
clarification by reference to the symbol of a
"related God." In relating to the creature, an
aspect of God’s relationship must be affirmed and
denied. "It must be affirmed," according to Tillich,
"because man is a centered self to whom every
relation involves an object. It must be denied
because God can never become an object for man’s
60knowledge or action." * God is not, Tillich 
emphasises in many ways, an object alongside other 
objects. Yet, for man to be related, he must speak 
of being in communion with an object, though in 
reality he is related to a subject.
59. Ibid., Vol.I. p.237.
60. Ibid., Vol.I. p.271.
We should continue to elaborate Tillich’s 
understanding of religious symbols and their 
primary function in his theology, especially the 
way in which they allow us to formulate 
statements about God. But, we must turn to some 
aspects of his theology which throw light on his 
use of myth.
Tillich describes his understanding of myth in his 
recent book, "Dynamics of Faith". In the course of 
a few pages in his discussion of symbols and myths, 
the basic difference between Bultmann and himself 
is elaborated. Tillich’s definition of myth and the 
scope of myth in his theology differs from Bultmann. 
According to Tillich, "Myths are symbols of faith 
combined in stories about divine-human encounters .^* 
Man symbolises his ultimate concern in divine 
figures and actions. The "stories of the gods", 
the meaning of the Greek word "mythos", are part and 
parcel of the symbols of faith. These stories of 
the gods, according to Tillich, are drawn from the 
material of ordinary experience. In them, and this 
is why, according to him, they have been criticised 
and transformed, the gods are placed in a framework 
of time and space. But, since "it belomgs to the 
nature of the ultimate to be beyond time and space f"^*
61. Tillich, Paul, "Dynamics of Faith" - p.48.
62. Ibid., p.49*
these stories must he interpreted. Bven with the 
untenable division which the stories create 
between the various gods and with the limitary 
feature of the gods being confined to time and 
space, polytheistic and monotheistic myths have, 
according to Tillich, a positive function in
religion. They "are forms of the human conscious-
65ness which are always present."
Tillich introduces a terminology in his discussion
of myth which he considers to be more relevant than
the artificial and negative term "demythologisation".
He speaks of a "broken" and "unbroken" myth. A
"broken myth" is one that is understood as myth, not
removed of replaced. A broken myth is one that has
been interpreted - one in which the affirmation of
the ultimate as ultimate and the rejection of any
kind of idolatry has been made. While an "unbroken
myth" is one in which there are more than one
ultimates and one in which the "symbols and myths
are understood in their immediate meaning. The
material taken from nature and history is used in
64its proper sense." * In an unbroken myth, the 
symbol, to employ Tillich’s distinction between 
an ultimate and preliminary concern^is made 
ultimate. In this absolutism of the symbol, 
including its historical, psychological and
63. Ibid., p.50.
64. Ibid., p.51.
65* Tillich, "Systematic Theology", Vol.I. p.12-13*
cosmological ideas, "The character of the symbol
to point beyond itself to something else is 
66disregarded." * Tillich, together with Bultmann,
regards the taking of the symbols in a literal
fashion idolatrous. When the conditional is
ultimatised, "it (faith) calls something ultimate
67which is less than ultimate." t% But, "faith,
conscious of the symbolic character of its symbols,
68gives God the honour which is due him."
We have reached a point in our brief outline of 
Tillichfs conception of myth and symbol where we 
have, at least to some extent, described the use of 
these two concepts; moreover, we have related 
Tillich^s "broken" and "unbroken" myth to Bultmann’s 
shheme of demythologisation. It is evident that 
thetwo theologians are attempting to interpret 
biblical language in a similar fashion. They are 
intent on showing the relative character of much of 
the symbolism in scripture, especially the 
conditional nature cf the material utilised in the 
symbolic expressions. It is not, for both 
theologians, rational or scientific criticism which 
constitute the primary norm for the re interpret at ion 
of the symbols and myths, or for the breaking of the 
myths. On the contrary, it is the inner religious
66. Tillich "Dynamics of Faith" - p. 51-
67* Ibid., p.52.
68. Ibid., p.52.
criticism of faith. The point that faith cannot 
rest with making conditional concerns in the 
symbols and myths unconditional is the central 
agreement between the two theologians.
But, our thesis Is this: While both theologians
demythologise, Tillich’s theology offers a more 
constructive version of the Christian faith. His 
theology moves beyond Bultmann’s in two respects: 
Tillich, in the first place, gives a more positive 
place to the mythical (using this adjective in the 
way we associated it with Bultmann*s thought), and 
Tillich, furthermore, in giving the mythical 
material a more integral place in his theology, can 
relate the symbolism of the mythical, e.g., Gnostic 
cosmology, the fall of Adam and creation, birth, 
resurrection and ascension of Christ, to the 
mythological (using again the way we understand 
this adjective in Bultmann1s thought).
The possibility of relating these two types of
myth lies at the root of Tillich’s ontology and
his dialectical and correlative approach to
theology. He is as vitally concerned as Bultmann
with man’s understanding of himself in and through
the Word which addresses him in history.
Revelation is, as he is careful to point out, not 
68recollection, nor is it a negation of the place
68. Tillich, ’’Systematic Theology”, Vol.I. p.126.
where man stands, e.g., structure of ordinary 
language, rational structure of reality in which 
revelation appears. Tillich’s ontology, without 
moving into any complex consideration of it, 
includes Bultmann’s quite legitimate concern for 
the self-understanding which comes in the 
revelatory context though Tillich is anxious to say 
that something is said about God in the revelatoiy 
situation. In his positive concern for symbols and 
their place in theology, Tillich, through the 
interpretation which he places upon some of the 
obsolete myths eliminated by Bultmann, moves beyond 
Bultmannfs anthropological theology to an 
ontological theology.
We will recall that our essential difficulty with
Bultmannfs demythologizing scheme lay in his
reluctance to make theological, albeit symbolical,
statements about Xlod. Dr. John Macquarriefs
critique of Bultmann is clarifying at this point.
"Bultmann,11 according to Macquarrie, puts forward
a view of theology which calls for radical
demythologizing^ and the translation of all
transcendent statements about the understanding of 
69the self." But, while insisting that this 
understanding "is only made possible by the Kerygma
69* Macquarrie, John, "Existential Theology" - p.243.
and ultimately by the mighty acts of God in 
70Jesus Christ,” Bultmann is oblivious to the 
fact that "as soon as we speak of mighty acts 
or of grace or of revelation or of the uniqueness 
of Jesus Christ, we aremmaking or implying 
statements which are not statements about human
existence, and we have abandoned the concepts
71of a purely existential t h e o l o g y . ’"Theology is," 
to employ another of Macquarriefs concluding 
remarks, "concerned not only with statements about 
human existence, but with statements about God and 
His activity as well as transcendent statements, 
if you like, which, because we lack categories for 
the understanding of transcendent being as such,
72can only be expressed in symbolic or mythical form." * 
This is, then, the weakness in Bultmann’s theology. 
While clarifying our understanding of man and giving 
valuable guides in understanding the functional 
significance of the Christ, viz., as an address to 
man in history which calls for an obedient 
response, Bultmann does not offer sufficient 
appraisal of the "being of the Christ," or of the 
one addressing man. Christology has two aspects: 
a functional and a sacramental. Neglecting the 
sacramental or "nature" of Christ in his 
inadequate appreiation of the role of symbolism,
70. Ibid., p.243*
71. Ibid., p.243*
72. Tillich, "The European Discussion of the problem
of the Demythologization of the New Testament", 
Speech delivered Union Theological Seminary,
1952, stenographic copy made available for the 
audience, p.8.
even the symbols contained in the mythical 
materials he eliminates, gives Bultaann a one­
sidedness which, despite his contributions, 
associates him with the Ritschlians.^* Bultmann’s 
anti-mystical and anti-philosophical bias, 
according to Tillich, "causes him to moralise 
Christianity."^*
While seeming to have moved away from our survey 
of the role of symbolics and mythology in Tillich 
theology, it was imperative that we focus again 
Bultmann’s untenable approach. How then does 
Tillich’s theology correct Ghe limitation we have 
isolated in Bultmann’s theology?
Tillich’s correction of Bultmann’s thought on 
the possible knowledge of God through symbolism and 
his reinterpretation of the mythical in his 
ontological approach is to be understood from a much 
wider perspective than we have time to explore in 
these pages. Without having to involve ourselves 
in the details of his ontology, we may make some 
further statements concerning the role of 
symbolism in Tillich ’s theology which are indicative 
of the broader framework of his thought.
The correlative value of symbols - their forcing 
of the infinite down to finitude and the finite 
up £o infinity, and the way in which symbols serve
73* Ibid., p.8.
74. Tillich, "Systematic Theology", Vol.I. p.241
both as a knowledge of the human and as a knowledge 
of God - may be described by referring to certain 
religious symbols, e.g., God as "father", God’s 
work as healer, which Tillich interprets. The 
symbol "father", according to Tillich, consecrates 
a human relationship into a pattern of the divine- 
human relationship. The segment of finite reality, 
in this instance a human relationship, "is elevated 
into a realm of the holy. It no longer is secular. 
Something is said about God through this symbol. 
Likewise, "if God’s work is called ’making whole’ 
or ’healing’, this not only says something about 
God, but also emphasises the theonomous character 
of all healing. If God’s self-manifestation is 
called ’the word’, this not only symbolises God’s 
relation to man, but also emphasises the holiness 
of all words as an expression of the spifcit. *
It is, according to Tillich, the ontological 
structure of being which supplies the material 
for the symbols which point to the divine life. When 
these categories appear in the relation of God to 
the creature, the elements give symbolic expression 
to the divine life itself. These categories, 
individuality, dynamics, freedom, participation, 
fona and destiny, are rooted in the divine life,
74. Tillich, "Systematic Theology", Vol.I. p.241
75. Ibid., p.241.
though the Divine life is not subject to these 
polarities. When amn uses certain foims taken 
from his own being, individualisation, freedom 
and dynamics, he realises, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, that the other side of the polarities, 
(participation, form and destiny), are present in 
the side he uses as symbolic material. While the 
symbols used for the divine life are taken from 
the concrete situation of man’s relationship to God, 
they have the possibility of implying or pointing to 
the ultimacy of God. The infinite is "hidden" 
within the finite and the finite symbols may be 
transparent to the ground of being-itself.
In these foregoing remarks, we note the 
similarity between Tillich and Bultmann in one 
respect: they both are anxious to say that the
ground and object of faith do not fall apart and 
that any speaking of God also entails a speaking 
which is at the same time a talk of our own 
existence. But, while both display a concern for 
the activity of God, his mercy and grace toward 
man, Tillich is interested to draw from the 
"encounter" and from the symbols used in the 
"meeting" between God and man, some statements 
about God - statements which will complete the 
theological task. It is not so much in the nature
of what statements about God are derived from 
the symbols used in speaking of the "meeting" 
between God and man which concern us. It is, as 
we have intimated, a necessity placed upon the 
theologian to speak about God.
In the speech Tillich delivered on the subject
of demythologization which we have referred to,
another essential difference between Bultmann and
himself is made. He criticises Bultmann for the
complete lack of cosmic symbolism as we find it in
the Bible and Christian theology. He always,
according to Tillich uses ethical symbolism.
While Bultmann wants to say that Christ puts before
us a concrete ethical decision, he is forced beyond
the ethical to the cosmic if he would consider how
Christ makes this ethical decision possible.
Admittedly, one would want to criticise many aspects
of Tillich’s Chris to logy, but that has not been our
purpose in these pages. It was, to conclude our
examination of Bultmann and the corrections made in
Tillich’s theology, to suggest the essential
limitation and one-sidedness of Bultmann’s theology.
He fails to complete the theological task when he
confines his interpretation of myth to the
"mythological". In the mythological, according to
Tillich, there is a relationship between God and man
which enables man to make theological statements 
about God.
76. Tillich, Paul, The European Discussion of the 
Problem of the Demythologization of the 
New Testament, p.8.
CONCLUSION
In the three sections of the thesis there has 
been a survey of the development of theological 
ideas around the relationship between myth and 
history. There were few efforts, especially in 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century Christ-myth theories, to give ’myth* any 
positive place in theology. Myth was a tool to 
be used when certain historically transient 
thoughts were declared irrelevant. "The Movement 
away from History" in the Hegelians and Christ- 
myth school was projected along lines which were 
not entirely new. Each interpretor of the 
Christian message sought to free the message from 
the forms in which it had been previoudy interpreted. 
There was, to use Bultmann’s phrase, a pre­
understanding of the Christian faith as there is a 
pre-understanding in any interpretation of the 
faith. It was important to make some of these 
predispositions clear in our survey.
In the Hegelains - Strauss, Bauer and, indirectly, 
the later Christ-myth theorists - there was an 
understanding of the world which was, according to 
their interpretation, radically historical. History 
was the scens of the development of ideas. History
isf for these speculative thinkers, no longer 
considered simply incidental, as it was for the* 
older rationalists in the eighteenth century. 
History is the place where the principle of the 
Divine Humanity is realised; the place where the 
eternal ideas pass through the stage of the 
antithesis, e.g., nature, the world and sundry 
contingent formulations, to the stage of the 
synthesis, vis a vis the complete embodiment of 
the Incarnation of God in History. While 
ostensibly giving history a place denied to it by 
the rationalists, viz. Lessing, the speculative 
theologians, in their concern for the ideas 
realisable in history, divorce the ideas from 
their particular embodiments. History may be 
the vehicle or the path in which ideas pass, 
nthe slaughter-bench at which the happiness of 
peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of 
individuals have been victimised,’1^  but History 
is a mere means which can be discarded as a homily, 
a sermon or a bygone dream (Strauss) when the idea 
is actualised. That is to say, history is the 
image which is displaced by the Idea coming to 
birth.
It would appear that the speculative theologians
1. Hegel, "Philosophy of History" - p.22.
in the early nineteenth century gave history a 
central place in their systems, but this is not 
the case. On the one hand, the goal to be 
realised in history, viz. the notion of self- 
consciousness, is severed from the ways in which 
self-consciousness arises in history. Yet, on 
the other hand, if themeans, the images and 
pre-rational understandings which arise in history 
or history itself appear to be given some place 
in Hegel and Strauss, this mode of representing 
things is stripped of its meaning. The 
Philosopher, in his ability to understand the 
movements of the Eternal Idea, does not need the 
objectified realisation of God in His Other, e.g., 
the Christ or the sensuous ways of conceiving of 
the Son, as the theologian. Philosophy knows the 
content of the Notion, its necessary movements, 
and the identity of God and the world. The 
Absolute Religion (Christianity) merely 
illustrates the moments of the Notion, fulfilling 
itself and returning to itself. According to 
Berdyaev, "there is nothing which is purely human 
(in the Hegelian system) distinguished from the
divine and standing before God in a drama which
2is being played out." * Philosophy, according to
2. Berdyaev, "The Divine and Human" - p.30-31..
our interpretation of Hegel and Strauss, knows 
in advance of the antithetical relationship which 
God stands to the world, of the unity and 
necessity for this antithesis. Hegel writes:
"The verification of Spirit cannot be simply 
asserted as if its truth was contained in such 
narratives regarding one who was represented as an 
Historical person and in a Historical fashion.... 
This truth, however, is pure and certain by 
itself, although it has an historical starting 
point."^*
The Christ-myth theorists, Bauer, Kautsky,
J.M. Robertson, W.B. Smith, Arthur Drews and 
P. Jensen, boldly assert the non-existence of 
Jesus of Nazareth, but this assertion of the non­
historicity of Jesus is indicative of their 
general interpretation of the histadtal. While 
being concerned with the truly historical which, 
according to these interpreters, does not entail 
a place in history for Jgsus of Nazareth, they 
offer an interpretation of history which is, for 
the most part, unhistorical. Bruno BauerTs 
dialectic of the self, its alienation and 
reconciliation to the world, occurs in the realms 
of thought. That is to say, the drama and 
vicisitudes of history are negated. While being 
concerned to invalidate Jesus of Nazareth and to 
show Gospel history to be an imaginary embodiment
3. Hegle,"Philosophy of Religion", Vol. Ill, p.110
of a set of exalted ideas, it is in the last 
analysis the ideas which are the only historical 
reality.
Karl Kautsky’s elaborate negation of Jesus in 
his "Foundations of Christianity" is merely a 
means by which he might secure a hearing for his 
Marxist interpretation of the historical. Kautsky's 
"inverted Hegelianism," whereby the processes of 
production determine the course of history instead 
of the Notion or triadic movement of the Divine 
Idea in history, is as divorced from the particular­
ities of history, e.g. concrete embodiments in time 
and tb© place of the individual and his decisions, 
as was Hegel's philosophy of the historical. When 
Kautsky's economic conception of history posits the 
modes of production and consumption characteristic 
of the epochs in history, he is substituting an 
idea of history for the dramas in history. He 
is, like Hegel, eliminating freedom and all the 
fortuitious, capricious thoughts associated with 
freedom. The idea of the movements in the Divine 
(Hegel) and the idea of the processes of production 
is conceived along the lines of necessity. These 
movements and processes necessarily occur, despite 
the complexities and frictions in history.
J.M. Robertson, W.B. Smith, Arthur Drews and
P. Jensen, as far as we could determine their 
philosophy of history in their violent, sometimes 
absurb, denial of the historicity of Jesus, give 
an i&ealogy of history. That is to say, like 
Hegel, Strauss, Bauer and Kautsky, it is the idea 
of History which is supreme. Robertson, Smith and 
Drews, convinced that the evolutionary hypothesis 
was the most v&lid method in the study of history, 
applied certain ideas to their study of historical 
phenomena. Whatever did not measure up to their 
preconceptions was outlawed.
The primary weakness in the systems included in 
the section n the movement away from History" is, 
as we have intimated in several contexts, lies in 
their conception of the historical. Any formulation 
or embodiment which did not measure up to their 
preconceived notions of the historical was declared 
mythical. Mythical or mythological material, 
accoiding to these thinkers, was any material which 
was fictional, imaginary or ideas which were 
unconsciously given historical form.
In the weakness which characterised these 
systems one may isolate the strength or the positive 
contribution to hist orography. I refer here to
the necessity viewing isolated facts in history in 
some intelligible framework. The framework chosen
by the Hegelians, the Marxists and the evolution­
ists,, or, to use Tillich's terminology, the "centre
IL
of history" decided upon by these philosophers may 
•underestimate the place of the concrete, the place 
of freedom and tragedy in time, but we are pointed 
to one side of the study of history: the inter­
pretation of the events in history. The theologians 
in the late nineteenth century, the ones included in 
the second section, "the return to history" were in 
their emphasis on the facts of history, endeavouring 
to contest the various "centres" of history in the 
preceding points of view. While appearing to 
confute the idealists by stressing the empirical 
factuality of history, they were forced to devise 
some framework for the isolated events in history, 
viz. Ritschl’s emphasis on the Kingdom of God and 
Hamack's three-fold essence of Christianity.
"The Movement away from History" depicted in the 
idealists in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century and in the Christ-myth theorists of the 
early twentieth century is a mythicising of history. 
History is myth; history is a mere image which is 
a stage of "real" history, vis a vis ideas 
comprehended in pure form. In a word, we have in 
these idealists an inverted understanding of history. 
History is an illusion while the idea of history
4. Tillich, Paul, The Interpretation of History,
p. 258.
history is the reality. The idea of history is 
the faetuality of history, while the conventional 
understanding of history as facts, events in time 
and space is myth or illusionary.
In the "Movement Away from History" there are 
two discernible conceptions of myth. Hegel and 
Strauss believed that myth was an unconscious 
transformation of history into fabulous legend or 
fables accepted as historical. This pre-philosophieal 
thinking "rests," to use the language of a 
contemporary advocate of this view of mythopoetic 
thought, " on a young and provisional form of 
thought, to which philosophy of nature - proudly 
called 'science,1 or 'knowledge* - must succeed if 
thinking is to go on. There must be a rationalistic
* l
period from this point; onward."
The Christ-myth theorists, following the examples 
of Herbert Spencer and Max Muller, concentrate on 
the view that myth is a product of a basic short­
coming, an inherent weakness of language. The 
source of myth, at least for some of these theorists, 
was not the natural phenomenon itself, but, rather, 
the circumstance of language, its ambiguity.
The mythical world is essentially a world of 
illusion - but an illusion that finds its 
explanation whenever the original, necessary, 
self-deception of the mind, from which the error
1. Langer, Susanne, "Philosophy in a New Key" -
p.164-165.
arises, is discovered. And this self-deception, 
according to Muller, Robertson, Smith and others, 
is rooted in language. Ernst Cassirer summarises 
this point of view when he quotes from Muller's 
"The Philosophy of Mythology". Bifuller writes: 
"Mythology is inevitable, it is natural, it is an 
inherent necessity of language, if we recognise 
in language the outward form and manifestation of 
thought; it is, in fact, the dark shadow which 
language throws upon thought and which can never 
disappear till language becomes entirely 
commensurate with thought - which it never will* 
Mythology, no doubt, breaks out more fiercely 
during the early periods of the history of human 
thought, but it never disaprjears altogether.
Depend-upon it, there is mythology now as there was 
in the time ox Homer, only we do not perceive it 
because we ourselves live in the very shadow of it, 
and because we all shrink from the full meridian 
light of truth....Mythology, in the highest sense, 
is the power exercised by language on thought in
p
every possible sphere of mental activity.” *
The Christ-myth theorists, in order to clear up 
what was termed by Robertson to be an error of
2. Cassirer, Ernst, "Language and Myth" - p.5», 
Quoted from Muller, "The Philosd phy of 
Mythology", appended to Introduction to the 
Science of Religion (London, 1873), P*353-355*
language, choose two related methods. It was 
thought that a clarification of names applied to 
the mythical gods would be a solution to the 
mythical parasites in language. And, Smith and 
Drews, in particular, attempt to resolve all 
mythology to a basic astral mythology - what the 
mythical consciousness derives from contemplation 
of the stars, what it sees in them directly.
But, whatever interpretations they produce in 
their elaborate systems, it is detrimental to 
any realistic view of history, especially the 
Jesus of History.
The theologians considered in the second section 
of the thesis, "The Return to History", while 
seeking to do justice to the historical in 
Christianity, confuse revelation with history 
or with "the plain facts ox history." In their 
efforts to oppose both the metaphysical formulas 
of ancient Christology andthe idealist and 
speculative Christology of the first half of the 
nineteenth century, these "historicists" concentrate 
on the empirical factuality of the events in the 
first centuiy. While the Ritschlians sought to 
correct the mistakes of the idealists, their 
thinking on the subject of history and myth is as
one-sided as the views they reject* On the one 
hand, by confining Christinaity to the "historical 
Jesus", revelation becomes dated at an isolated 
point in the past* Moreover, in the isolation of 
revelation to the facts, they were, though in 
another guise, perpetuating the duality between 
revelation and history. Beginning strictly with 
a concern for the pristine accounts of the Christ- 
event in the New Testament, they were soon led into 
two difficulties; on the one hand, in order not to 
identify revelation with every historical occurrence, 
they were forced to posit some scheme of the 
historical and suprahistorical similar to the 
natural-supranatural or image-idea patterns which 
they were rejecting; and, on the other hand, their 
distinctions between the mundanely historical and 
the suprahistorical led them back into a form of 
Christology typically idealistic. The essence of 
Christianity was, according to Albrecht Ritschl, 
the idea of the Kingdom of God. Hamack concentrated 
on Jesus' teaching of the Fatherhood of God, the 
brotherhood of man and the eternal value of the 
human soul; while Wilhelm Herrmann discovered the 
centre of Christianity in the "inner life of Jesus"* 
The decisive feature in Christianity, counter to the 
initial approach of these theologians, does not lie 
in the historical as such, nor in the purely
historical fact. On the contrary, the Ritschlians, 
while being concerned to interpret the Gospel in 
a more historical dress, practice a careful 
selection of Gospel facts and a reinterpretation 
of the historical along the same abstract lines 
which they had opposed in the Hegelians and in the 
ancient Ghristologies.
The Ritschlians, unlike the Hegelians and Christ- 
myth theorists, do not use the word ’myth* in their 
interpretations of Christianity. One must, on the 
basis of some of their ideas concerning the nature 
of the historical and their view of knowledge, 
describe their approach to the mythological. It 
would seem that 'myth* was a general term of 
disrepute employed, though there is no evidence of 
this, th refer to the Christologies which began 
their interpretation from some ideas of "God-in- 
HimselfAny thought of God, the Christ, which 
did not proceed from oke effects of God or his 
predicates, was illiisionary or mythical. It would 
appear, especially in the slight role given to 
symbolic thinking by the Ritschlians, that myth or 
symbols were negatively interpreted. Endeavouring 
to give the Gospel a certainty and an empirical 
grounding lacking in the interpretations they
criticised, they failed to see that such myths 
as the Kingdom of God, the inner life of Jesus, 
etc., went beyond the realm of the factual- 
historical. It was the function of the Christ, his 
ethical work and its value which formed the matrix 
of the Ritschlian position. But, in considering 
the universal significance of the function of Christ 
and his work, they were, seemingly, oblivious of the 
fact that their positions moved from the strictly 
ethical over into the cosmic. Their prophetic, 
functional type Christology was impregnated with 
the sacramental significance of the Christ, though 
in a different guise. In their historicising of 
Jesus, they were forced to make some theological 
statements about God and the 'nature* of the Christ. 
And, these statements were necessarily of an 
interpretative quality not unlike the general 
statements about God and Christ that they opposed 
in the Hegelians.
While we may examine the Ritschlian theology and 
find traces of mythology or interpretations of 
biblical mythology, the fact remains that the term 
•myth* does not enter into their theology. 
Endeavouring to place religion and theology on am 
ascertainable, even empirical basis, they eschewed
anything, especially j^ rth, which might detract 
from the type of religious certainty they advocated. 
It would appear that mythology, speculative 
theology, Hegelian metaphysics and the Christology 
of the ancients were declared nebulous, even 
fallacious, ways of speaking of God and His activity.
In the third section of the thesis, "Some 
Twentieth-century efforts to resolve theological 
problems" were examined. In this section, we were 
anxious to discover the positive role of the two 
concepts 'myth* and ’history'. In William Temple's 
theology, chosen because it formed a bridge over 
which many of the Nineteenth century ideas passed 
into the Twentieth century, we discovered a 
readiness to give the Hegelian and Ritschlian 
Christologies a hearing. True to his sacramental 
heritage in Anglicanism, Temple was obligated, 
even if he could not approve of much in the 
Patristic and Hegelian interpretations of the 
Christ, to relate the Christ to creation and to 
treat the uniqueness and finality of the Christ 
which presupposed a high doctrine of the Trinity. 
Influenced by the Ritschlian emphasis on the 
prophetic, ethical Jesus, it was necessary for 
Temple to assign a place of importance to the work
of the Christ. However effectively Temple's 
"sacramental universe" idea may he for understanding 
the presence of God in Christ in the world, and 
however questionable his evolutionary emergent 
hypothesis may be, we were convinced that he left 
the Hegelian and Ritschlian emphases in a side-by- 
side relationship in his theology. The idea of the 
Christ and the fact of Jesus were both integral, 
both necessary, but, so it appeared to us from a 
survey of his dependence upon the evolutionary 
hypothesis, including the incarnation as the pinnacle 
of this process, the paradox of the God-man was 
absent in his theology.
In our survey of the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, 
we compared and contrasted his demythologisation of 
the New Testament with D.F. Strauss' work in the 
Nineteenth century. After this introductory 
treatment of Bultmann's ideas, his description of 
myth and his handling of mythical materials was 
examined with particular attention being given to the 
criteria used for interpreting myth in the New 
Testament. In this context, we were interested in 
the distinction which Bultmann makes between the two 
adjectives mythical and mythological. And, finally, 
for the sake of correcting Bultmann's one-sided view
of myth, we glanced at the place Tillich accords 
myth and symbols, especially the way in which 
symbols have the possibility of saying something 
about God.
Strauss’ demythologization, apart from his 
dependence on Hegelianism for a solution to the 
doubts which his radical biblical criticisms had 
raised, was a precursor of Bultmann’s scheme.
Having had much of the mythical materials outlined 
for him, and even the distinctions between the mythi 
in the New Testament, it was not necessary for 
Bultmann to prove the presence of myth in the New 
Testament. Bultmann’s work in the origin of myth 
merely extended Strauss’ exclusive concern for 
Old Testament prototypes. He was intent on showing 
the broader basis for the mythical forms in the New 
Testament, particularly the presence of myths arising 
in intei>*test ament Judaism, Gnosticism and in the 
my&ery religions.
However, the broader basis for the mythical 
materials in the New Testament was not the only 
advance Bultmann made over the Straussian scheme. 
Unlike Strauss, who was intent on eliminating the 
mythical portions and retaining the historical, 
Bultmann is attempting to interpret the mythical and
to give the Kerygma, which is presented in the New 
Testament in a mythical framework, a positive 
interpretation.
But, to interpret the Kerygma, which is event and 
confession, act and response, address and obedience, 
a norm had to be introduced. This norm or interpret­
ative tool was the real purpose or intention of the 
Kerygma; which was, according to Bultmann, the 
self-understanding which man has when he is addressed 
by the message. The mythical in the New Testament 
was not, as Bultmann initially contended, "stories of 
the gods", or fanciful tales relating how God became 
man and, through becoming man, had made possible 
redemption from evil forces. On the contrary, the 
mythical is a way of speaking of the other worldly 
in terms of this world - the manner of speaking of 
God in analogies taken from man’s involvement in 
history.
While agreeing that Bultmann’s existentialist 
interpretation of myth had much to commend it, and 
that interest in and concern with the situation of 
revelation was a necessary corrective to the static, 
mechanical view of revelation, viz., as revelatum, 
we wanted to quarrel with the limited role he gives 
to myth and symbols. These concepts, according to 
Tillich, have the possibility of saying something
about God as well as about the situation which 
produced the symbols. Tillich’s theology, while 
agreeing with Bultmann*s emphasis on the receptive 
side of revelation and the self-understanding which 
comes through being addressed by the Word, is 
concerned with speaking about the Word which 
addresses man and which makes possible man’s response.
Two final observations may be made in connection 
with the use of the concepts ’myth’ and ’history’ in 
the theologians discussed in the three sections of 
the thesis. With the exception of Bultmann and 
Tillich, theologians use the concepts without 
clarifying the numerous ways in which they have 
been used and understood in the history of Christian 
thought. Strauss and J.M. Robertson have a reference 
point in their separate philosophies and each writer 
utilises the concepts ’myth’ and ’history’ in ways 
which will justify their chosen philosophy, e.g., 
idealism and naturalism. In point of fact, every 
theologian, including Bultmann and Tillich, has his 
particular understanding of the ideas signified in 
the two concepts, and the terms are indicative of 
the theologian’s total approach to theological 
issues. Moreover, an analysis of other facets in the 
separate points of view is necessary before one is 
equipped to grasp the weight which is given to the 
two concepts.
In the second instance, though related to the 
first observation, a survey of the development of 
the concepts ’myth* and ’history’ brings us face to 
face with many of the issues which are implied in the 
use of these concepts, e.g., Christology and, in 
particular, the ways in which one might speak of the 
activity of God in His world. One cannot rest, as 
so many are content to do, with a mere description of 
the concepts in the various theologians. An ihitial ' 
description of the terms opens the door for many other 
explorations. The theological and philosophical 
perspective of the scholars is the most important 
concern. Only when this perspective is clarified 
can one begin to understand, on the one hand, the 
ambiguity of the concepts, and, on the other, the 
necessity for their use in theological discussion.
"The development of the concepts ’myth’ and ’history’ 
from Hegel to Bultmann" could be aptly subtitled 
"The language of Christology from Hegel to Bultmann".
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